




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
THE
DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
FROM
1799 to 1818.

“ Monumentum ære perennius.”

DISPATCHES

1840

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.



1790 to 1815

1815 to 1840

1840 to 1860

1860 to 1880

1880 to 1900

THE
DISPATCHES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
IN
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE.

FROM
1799 TO 1818.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY
LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,
ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.


MDCCCXXIV.

52.D.

DISPATCHES

THE

THE DUKE OF WINDSOR, K.G.



LONDON :

Printed by WILLIAM CLOWES and SONS,
Stamford Street.

TO
HER ROYAL HIGHNESS
VICTORIA OF KENT,
PRINCESS OF ENGLAND,
THIS
HISTORICAL COMPILATION OF THE DISPATCHES AND DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.,
IS
MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,
BY
HER ROYAL HIGHNESS'S
VERY DUTIFUL AND OBEDIENT SERVANT,
JOHN GURWOOD.

ORDER OF GOVERNMENT

Whereas the President of the United States has deemed it expedient to order that the records of the War of 1812 should be preserved in the National Archives and Records Administration;

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Dedication.

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List of Official and other documents, from whence this compilation has been made, and which may be referred to, if required, for further details.

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Explanation of Indian terms, titles, and countries.

The early services of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, in Holland in 1794 and 1795, and in the Mysore and Marhatta campaigns in India, from 1797 to 1805, arranged from authentic documents, with the Official and other dispatches and treaties.

The Official and other dispatches and treaty relating to the services of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, in Denmark, in 1807.

The Official and other dispatches and documents relating to the services of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal, Spain, and the South of France, from Obidos to Toulouse, from 1808 to 1814.

The Official and other dispatches and documents relating to the services of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington in the Low Countries and France, in 1815.

The Official and other documents of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, when in command of the army of Occupation in France, from 1816 to 1818.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE favorable reception of the "GENERAL ORDERS OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON," in a condensed form, induced the Compiler to request permission to publish, as a companion to them, the whole of his Grace's Dispatches relating to his various military services and commands. The permission was accorded by the Duke, in terms that excited every exertion to seek for official authorities which might tend to elucidate the personal detail of his Grace's professional services, contained in his public Dispatches.

The victories and successes in the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington in India, have never been generally known: their importance having been absorbed by the events which were then occurring in Europe, and their celebrity eclipsed by the Duke's subsequent fame. The Dispatches themselves contain much military information and instruction in great detail. But an elucidation was necessary in order to connect them: and this explanation is offered as an apology for the presumption, that might attach to what is not official in the narrative of the Mysore and Marhatta campaigns. The Governor General's letters to Tippoo Sultaun have been inserted, as the best authority of the events which led to the campaign of 1799, in Mysore; to the command of which country Colonel Wellesley was appointed, on the fall of Seringapatam.

A list of the principal authorities, from which the narrative of the Indian campaigns has been compiled, is given at the end of this Introduction, in order that reference may, if required, be made to them for more minute details. Permission was given

to search the records of the East India Company for documents ; and much information has been afforded by several of the early friends and followers of the Duke of Wellington.

Much of the narrative, however, has been cancelled since this volume was sent to press last year ; its place having been fortunately supplied by papers of interest and importance relating to Seringapatam, and the armament at Trincomalee.

The causes and results of his Grace's campaigns in Europe, are to be found in the numerous histories of the eventful period in which they occurred, which renders it unnecessary to recapitulate them. A brief narrative of the events, connecting the subjects of the several Dispatches from Denmark, the Peninsula, the Low Countries, and France, is interspersed, with occasional notes, to supply the absence of official details.

In the compilation there has been an adherence, as strictly as possible, to the Calcutta and London Gazettes ; with the single omission of the names and lists of the killed and wounded, and other returns, which accompanied the Dispatches : the form observed in the Bulletins, printed annually during the war for the superior officers in the government, has been followed.

The Compiler has adhered to the Calcutta Gazettes in the orthography of Indian names, and in assimilating the English pronunciation to the sound of the Indian character, without any reference to more modern authorities, since their publication. Not so, however, with the names of battles and towns mentioned in the Gazettes of the Peninsular campaigns, for they will be carefully corrected ; thus, Roliça, Vimeiro, and others, although erroneously printed in the Gazettes, and even in the present day, will be restored to the correct spelling of the country.

It is presumed that this compilation will afford, in many essential respects, as complete a history of the great military achievements of the Duke of Wellington, as can be offered to

the present age and posterity. His Grace certainly must be the best authority for the details of what he knew, and of what he saw; and for what did not actually come under his observation, he had the information of all those whose duty it was to report to him the result of his orders. No presumption of visionary advantages, which might have been produced by different conduct, or different circumstances, will be attempted: but what is far better, a simple description of the events, written as they occurred. The Duke of Wellington is therefore now presented to the world, for the first time, the historian of his own brilliant career.

LIST of the OFFICIAL and other AUTHORITIES, from which this Compilation has chiefly been made, and which are referred to for further details :—

The Calcutta Gazettes.

The London Gazettes.

The Parliamentary and State Papers.

The Records of the East India Company.

The Asiatic Annual Registers.

Beatson's Account of the War in Mysore.

Wilkes's India.

The Diary and Papers of the late General Lord Harris.

The Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire, published at Fort William, 15th December, 1803.

Malcolm's Sketch of the Political History of India, and his other Works.

The Life of Major General Sir Thomas Munro, K.C.B.

The Journals (manuscript) of Captain Nicoll, now Major General Sir Jasper Nicoll, K.C.B.

The Autograph Correspondence with Marquis Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley (Lord Cowley), Col. Murray, Col. Barry Close, Col. Merrick Shawe, &c.

PRÉCIS
OF THE
COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS,
AND PUBLIC HONORS
OF
FIELD MARSHAL
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.,
&c. &c. &c.

Born	1 May, 1769
Ensign	7 Mar. 1787
Lieutenant	25 Dec. 1787
Captain	30 June, 1791
Major	30 April, 1793
Lieutenant Colonel	30 Sept. 1793
Colonel	3 May, 1796
Major General	29 April, 1802
Lieutenant General	25 April, 1808
General, in Spain and Portugal	31 July, 1811
Field Marshal	21 June, 1813

1794.

Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regiment to join the Duke
of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at Ostend . . . June.
Re embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp . . . July.

1795.

As senior officer commanded three battalions on the retreat of the
army through Holland . . . Jan.

Early in the Spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, including the 33rd regiment, re-embarked at Bremen for England. On return to England, embarked in the command of the 33rd regiment for the West Indies, on board the fleet commanded by Admiral Christian Oct.

1796.

But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being six weeks at sea, returned to port 19 Jan.
 Destination of the 33rd regiment changed for India 12 April.
 Joined the 33rd regiment at the Cape of Good Hope Sept.

1797.

Arrived in Bengal Feb.
 Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival at Penang Aug.
 Returned to Calcutta Nov.

1798.

Proceeded on a visit to Madras Jan.
 Returned to Calcutta Mar.
 The 33rd regiment placed on the Madras establishment Sept.

1799.

Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 33rd regiment being attached to it Feb.
 Advance of the army on Seringapatam; Colonel Wellesley moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy . . . 10 Mar.
 Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly; the attack and defeat of his right flank by the division under Colonel Wellesley, and the cavalry under Major General Floyd 27 Mar.
 Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam 3 April.
 The army take up their ground before the west face of that fortress: first attack on the Sultaunpettah Tope, by the 33d regt. and 2nd Bengal Native regt., under Colonel Wellesley 5 April.
 Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade, (94th regt.) two battalions of Sepoys, and four guns 6 April.
 Siege of Seringapatam, until 3 May.
 Assault and capture: Colonel Wellesley commanding the reserve in the trenches 4 May.
 Colonel Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam 6 May..
 A Commission, consisting of Lieut. General Harris; Lieut. Colonel Barry Close; Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley; the Hon. H.

Wellesley; and Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor General for the settlement of the Mysore territories	4 June.
Commission dissolved	8 July.
Colonel Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and Mysore	9 July.

1800.

Colonel Wellesley named to command an expedition against Batavia, in conjunction with Admiral Rainier, but declines the service, from the greater importance of his command in Mysore	May.
The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a Marhatta freebooter. Colonel Wellesley takes the field against him	July.
Defeats him; death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare	10 Sept.
Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trincomalee	Oct.
Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, or in the Red Sea, in the event of orders from Europe to that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile attempt upon India	15 Nov.

1801.

A dispatch, overland, received by the Governor General, with orders, dated 6th Oct., 1800, to send 3000 men to Egypt	6 Feb.
The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor General directed the whole force to proceed to the Red Sea; and appointed General Baird to command in chief, and Colonel Wellesley to be second in command	11 Feb.
In the mean time, Colonel Wellesley, having received from the Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the overland dispatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops	15 Feb.
Colonel Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appointment of Major General Baird to the chief command	21 Feb.
Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to Egypt; Colonel Wellesley is ordered to resume his government of Mysore	28 April.

1803.

Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march into the Marhatta territory	27 Feb.
Advance from Hurryhur	9 Mar.
Arrival at Poonah	20 April.

The Peshwah replaced on the musnud	13 May.
Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British government in the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta States and Chiefs in the Deccan ; similar authority being given to General Lake in Hindustan	26 June.
The Marhatta War commenced	6 Aug.
Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur	11 Aug.
Siege and capture of Baroach	29 Aug.
Battle of Assye	23 Sept.
Siege and capture of Asseerghur	21 Oct.
Battle of Argaum	29 Nov.
Siege and capture of Gawilghur	15 Dec.
Treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar	17 Dec.
————— with Dowlut Rao Scindiah	30 Dec.

1804.

Surprise of a body of predatory Marhattas, who were routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near Munkaiseer	6 Feb.
A sword of the value of 1000 pounds voted to Major General Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta	21 Feb.
Visits Bombay	4 Mar. to 16 May.
Fêtes and address by the garrison and inhabitants	
A golden vase voted to Major General Wellesley, by the Officers of his division ; afterwards changed to a service of plate, embossed with " Assye "	26 Feb.
Returns to the army near Poonah	17 May.
Resigns the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General	24 June.
Left the army for Seringapatam	28 June.
Address voted to Major General Wellesley, on his return from the army, by the native inhabitants of Seringapatam	6 July.
Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations	
Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath	1 Sept.
The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th of June, 1803, and resigned on the 24th of June, 1804, renewed by the Governor General	9 Nov.
Returns to Seringapatam by Madras	30 Nov.

1805.

Resigns the political and military powers in the Deccan, and proposes to embark for Europe	24 Feb.
--	---------

Addresses on quitting India :—

From the Officers of the division lately under his command	27 Feb.
Answer	8 Mar.
From the Officers of the 33rd regt.	28 Feb.
Answer	Mar.
From the native inhabitants of Seringapatam	4 Mar.
Answer	4 Mar.
Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras, by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency	5 Mar.
Appoints Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and Captain Bellingham to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan	6 Mar.
The thanks of the King and Parliament for his services in the com- mand of the army of the Deccan, communicated in General Orders by the Governor General	8 Mar.
Embarks in His Majesty's ship Trident for England	Mar.
Arrival in England	Sept.
Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover, under Lord Cathcart	Nov.

1806.

Appointed Colonel of the 33rd regt. vice Marquis Cornwallis, deceased	30 Jan.
On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to com- mand a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district	Feb.
Returned to serve in Parliament	

1807.

Appointed Secretary to Ireland (the Duke of Richmond being Lord Lieutenant)	3 April.
Sworn of His Majesty's Privy Council	8 April.
Appointed to a command in the army under Lord Cathcart, in the expedition against Copenhagen	July.
Affair at Kioge	29 Aug.
Appointed to negotiate the capitulation of Copenhagen	5 Sept.

1808.

Receives the Thanks of Parliament for his conduct at Copenhagen, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker	1 Feb.
Returns to Ireland	
Appointed to command an expedition assembled at Cork	July.
The expedition sails for Corunna and Oporto	12 July.
Finally lands at the mouth of the river Mondego, in Portugal	1 to 3 Aug.
Affair of Obidos	15 Aug.
Roliça	17 Aug.

Battle of Vimeiro	21 Aug.
Superseded in the command of the army by Lieut. General Sir H. Burrard	21 Aug.
By the desire of Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Dalrymple, the Commander of the Forces, he signs the armistice with Lieut. Gen. Kellerman which led to the convention of Cintra	22 Aug.
A piece of plate, commemorating the battle of Vimeiro, voted to Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, by the General and Field Officers who served at it	22 Aug.
Commands a division of the army under Sir H. Dalrymple	22 Aug.
Convention of Cintra	30 Aug.
Returns to England	4 Oct.
Court of Enquiry on the Convention of Cintra	17 Nov.
His evidence before it	22 Nov.
Returns to Ireland	Dec.

1809.

Receives the Thanks of Parliament for Vimeiro, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker	27 Jan.
Appointed to command the Army in Portugal	April.
Resigns the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland	April.
Arrives at Lisbon, and assumes the command	22 April.
The passage of the Douro, and battle of Oporto	12 May.
By a decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, appointed Marshal General of the Portuguese army	6 July.
Battle of Talavera de la Reyna	27 and 28 July.
Created a peer, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera	26 Aug.
Meets Marquis Wellesley at Seville and Cadiz	2 Nov.

1810.

Thanks of Parliament voted for Talavera	1 Feb.
Pension of 2,000 <i>l.</i> per annum voted to Lord Wellington and his two succeeding heirs male	16 Feb.
Appointed a member of the Regency in Portugal, in conjunction with Lord Stuart de Rothesay, then Mr. Stuart, His Majesty's Minister at Lisbon	Aug.
Battle of Busaco	27 Sept.
Takes up a position to cover Lisbon in the Lines, from Alhandra on the Tagus, to Torres Vedras and the Sea	10 Oct.
Follows the retreat of the French army, under Marshal Massena, to Santarem	16 Nov.

1811.

Again follows the retreat of the French army to Condexa, and from	5 Mar.
thence along the line of the Mondego, to Celorico, Sabugal,	to
Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo	10 Apr.
Affairs with the French army on its retreat	
at Pombal	11 Mar.
at Redinha	12 Mar.
at Cazal Nova	14 Mar.
at the Passage of the Ceira, at Foz d'Arouce	15 Mar.
at Sabugal	3 Apr.
Thanks of Parliament for the liberation of Portugal	26 Apr.
Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro	3 and 5 May.
Fall of Almeida	11 May.
Battle of Albuera	16 May.
Siege of Badajoz raised	10 June.
Concentration of the army on the Caya	19 June.
Carries the army to the north	1 Aug.
Affair at El Bodon	25 Sept.
at Aldea da Ponte	27 Sept.
License granted in the name of the King, by the Prince Regent, to	
accept the title of Conde de Vimeiro, and the insignia of	
Knight Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword, from the Prince	
Regent of Portugal	26 Oct.
General Hill's surprise of General Girard, at Arroyo de Molinos	28 Oct.

1812.

Storm of Fort Renaud, near Ciudad Rodrigo	8 Jan.
Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo	19 Jan.
Created by the Regency a Grandee of Spain, with the title of Duke	
of Ciudad Rodrigo	
Thanks of Parliament for Ciudad Rodrigo	10 Feb.
Advanced in the British peerage by the title of Earl of Wellington	18 Feb.
Vote of Parliament of 2,000 <i>l</i> per annum, in addition to the title	21 Feb.
Siege and capture of Badajoz	6 April.
Thanks of Parliament for Badajoz	27 April.
Forts at Almaraz taken by General Hill	19 May.
Siege and capture of the fortified convents at Salamanca	27 June.
Battle of Salamanca	22 July.
Charge of Cavalry at La Serna	23 July.
The Order of the Golden Fleece conferred by the Regency of Spain	
Enters Madrid	12 Aug.
Appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies	

Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Marquis of Wellington	18 Aug.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Marquis of Torres Vedras	
Marches towards Burgos	4 Sept.
Siege and failure at Burgos	22 Oct.
Retreat to the frontier of Portugal, to the	19 Nov.
Thanks of Parliament voted for Salamanca	3 Dec.
A grant of 100,000 <i>l.</i> from Parliament, to be laid out in the purchase of lands to that value, as a reward for his services, and to enable him to support the dignity of his peerage	7 Dec.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Duke of Victoria	18 Dec.
Visits Cadiz, where he is received by a deputation of the Cortes	24 Dec.

1813.

Appointed Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards	1 Jan.
Returns to Portugal by Lisbon, where he is received by the whole population	16 Jan.
Fêtes given by the Regency, and at San Carlos	
Letter on quitting the 33rd regt. as Colonel	2 Feb.
Elected a Knight of the Garter	4 Mar.
Advance into Spain in two columns; the left column, under Lieut. General Sir T. Graham, by the north bank of the Douro; the right column to Salamanca	6 May.
Quits Freneda for Salamanca	22 May.
Affair near Salamanca	25 May.
The Commander of the Forces proceeds to the left column, at Miranda de Duero	29 May.
Affair of the Hussar brigade at Morales de Toro	2 June.
Junction of the two columns at Toro, and advance of the army on Valladolid and Burgos	4 June.
The castle of Burgos blown up	12 June.
The Ebro turned at S. Martin and Rocamunde	14 June.
Affair at St. Millan	18 June.
Battle of Vitoria	21 June.
Promoted to Field Marshal (Gazette, 3rd July)	21 June.
Pursuit of the French army to France by Pamplona, and the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya in the Pyrenees; and by Tolosa, St. Sebastian and Irun	
Thanks of Parliament for Vitoria	8 July.
Siege of St. Sebastian	17 July.
The Regency of Spain, on the proposition of the Cortes, offer to bestow on the Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo the estate of the Soto de Roma in Granada, 'in the name of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its sincere gratitude'	22 July.

First assault and failure at St. Sebastian	25 July.
Advance of the French army under Marshal Soult, by Maya and Roncesvalles; the right and centre divisions of the army concentrating near Pamplona	24 to 27 July.
Battle of Sorauren	28 July.
Retreat of the French army into France	30 July.
Affair at the Puerto de Echalar	1 Aug.
Re-occupation of the positions on the Pyrenees by the Allied Armies	2 Aug.
Second assault and fall of St. Sebastian	31 Aug.
Affairs on the Bidassoa and S. Marcial	31 Aug.
Castle of St. Sebastian capitulated	8 Sept.
Passage of the Bidassoa, and entrance into France	7 Oct.
Surrender of Pamplona	31 Oct.
Thanks of Parliament for St. Sebastian, and the operations subsequent to Vitoria	8 Oct.
The whole of the army descend into France; passage and battle of the Nivelle	10 Nov.
Passage of the Nive	9 Dec.
Marshal Soult attacks the left and right of the British army, and is successively defeated	10 to 13 Dec.

1814.

Leaves two divisions to blockade Bayonne, and follows Marshal Soult with the remainder of the army	Feb.
Affair at Hellette	14 Feb.
Battle of Orthez	27 Feb.
Passage of the Adour at S. Sever	1 Mar.
Affair at Aire	2 Mar.
The permission of the Prince Regent granted to the Marquis of Wellington, to accept and wear the insignia of the following Orders	4 Mar.
Grand Cross of the Imperial Military Order of Maria Teresa.	
the Imperial Russian Military Order of St. George.	
the Royal Prussian Military Order of the Black Eagle.	
the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword.	
Detaches two divisions to Bordeaux	8 Mar.
Affair at Tarbes	20 Mar.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and the Parliament for Orthez	24 Mar.
Passage of the Garonne	4 April.
Battle of Toulouse	10 April.
Advanced in the British peerage by the titles of Marquis of Douro and Duke of Wellington	3 May.

Visits Paris	4 May.
Visits Madrid. King Ferdinand confirms all the honors and rewards conferred upon him in His Majesty's name by the Regency and the Cortes	24 May.
A grant of 400,000 <i>l.</i> voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants	June.
Arrives in England	23 June.
Proceeds to pay his respects to the Prince Regent, then at Portsmouth with the Allied Monarchs	24 June.
His reception in the House of Peers on taking his seat as Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and Duke	28 June.
Returns thanks at the bar of the House of Commons, and is addressed by the Speaker	30 June.
Appointed Ambassador to the Court of France	5 July.
Banquet given by the Corporation of London	9 July.
Heraldic honors bestowed	25 Aug.
Assists at the Congress at Vienna	1 Nov.

1815.

On the arrival of Bonaparte in France, appointed Commander of the British Forces on the Continent of Europe, and from Vienna joins the army at Bruxelles	11 April.
Puts himself in communication with Prince Blücher, in command of the Prussian army on the Meuse	2 May.
Moves the allied army towards Nivelles, on the French army, under Bonaparte, crossing the frontier at Charleroi	15 June.
Battle of Quatre Bras	16 June.
Retires to a position to cover Bruxelles, on the border of the forest of Soignies	17 June.
Battle of Waterloo	18 June.
Created Prince of Waterloo by the King of the Netherlands	
Thanks of the Prince Regent and Parliament for Waterloo	22 June.
Pursuit of the fugitive remains of the French army to Paris	
Surrender of Cambrai	25 June.
of Peronne	
Paris capitulated	3 July.
By his interference, prevents the column in the Place Vendôme and the Bridge of Jena being destroyed	6 July.
A grant of 200,000 <i>l.</i> voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants	July.
Appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies of Occupation in France	22 Oct.

1818.

Assists at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle	Oct.
Appointed Field Marshal in the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Armies	Oct.
The evacuation of France by the Allied Armies	1 Nov.
Appointed Master General of the Ordnance	26 Dec.

1819.

Appointed Governor of Plymouth	9 Dec.
--	--------

1820.

Appointed Colonel in Chief of the Rifle Brigade	19 Feb.
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1821.

Attends George IV., King of England, to the field of Waterloo . . .	1 Oct.
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1822.

Assists at the Congress of Verona	22 Oct.
---	---------

1826.

Proceeds on an especial embassy to St. Petersburg	Feb.
Removed from the Government of Plymouth to be Constable of the Tower of London	29 Dec.

1827.

Appointed Colonel of the Grenadier Guards	22 Jan.
Appointed Commander in Chief	22 Jan.
Resigns	30 April.
Re-appointed	27 Aug.

1828.

The King having called upon him to serve in the office of First Lord of the Treasury, he resigns the command of the army . . .	15 Feb.
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1829.

Appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports	20 Jan.
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1830.

Resigns the office of First Lord of the Treasury	Oct.
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1834.

Elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford	Jan.
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*Explanation of Indian Terms, Titles, and Countries which
occur in this Work.*

ACKBAR. A journal, newspaper.

AMILDAR, or AUMILDAR. Native officers, uniting civil, military, and financial powers; employed in the collection of the revenue.

ANNA. The sixteenth part of a rupee.

ATTAVESY, The. A country between the Taptee and the Damungunga rivers.

BAKE, BAYE. Princess or lady of high rank.

BALLA, Above—Balla-ghaut, above the ghaut. Balla killa, the upper fort or citadel in a fortress.

BAZAAR. Market. One was always established in camp.

BEETEL. See *Otter* and *Paun*.

BEGUM. Lady of high rank; widow of a prince.

BEHAUDER. Title of courtesy of high respect; literally, Invincible.

BERAR. A country of the Eastern Marhattas, Ellichpoor the capital. It was formerly a jaghire of the Marhatta empire to the Rajahs of the Bhoonslah family, residing at Nagpoor, but afterwards declared independent.

BEYAH. The ancient Hyphasis river beyond the Sutleje, on the south-east frontier of Punjaub.

BHEELS, The. Supposed to be the aborigines of India, inhabiting the mountainous districts bordering on Candeish and the Northern Conkan. These wild and uncivilized people, who usually live by plunder and robbery, are governed by chiefs, called Naiks, most of whom are now paid by the British Government.

BHOONSLAH. The family name of the Rajahs of Berar. The name and titles of the Rajah, in 1803, were Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah.

BHOW. A Hindu title.

BRINJARRIES. Grain dealers who supply armies with rice and grain, loaded in bags on bullocks.

BUCKSHEE. Commander in Chief of an army, or officer holding that rank.

CAMPOOS. Brigades of regular infantry in native armies.

CANARA. A fertile district below the Western Ghauts, between the provinces of Goa and Malabar.

CANDAHAR. A capital of the king of Caubul.

CANDEISH. A country between the Nerbudda and Taptee rivers.

CARCOON.—See *Karkoon*.

CARNATIC. The country to the east of Mysore, between the Ghauts and the sea.

CASTE. The Hindus are born to different ranks and classes, which are so called.

CAUBUL. One of the capitals of the kingdom of that name.

CHOULTRY. A covered building for travellers or for troops.

CHOUTE. Tribute; a fourth of the revenue exacted as tribute by the Marhattas.

CIRCAR, or SIRCAR. The government; also a province or geographical division of a Soubah.

COAST, The. Applied formerly to the territory subject to the Presidency of Madras.

CONFEDERACY, The Marhatta, as mentioned in this work. The alliance formed by Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar, against the Peshwah, who sought and obtained British aid.

CONKAN.—See *Konkan*.

- COOLIES.** Men and women of low caste, who carry baggage, &c., with armies. Porters, laborers.
- COORG, or KOORG.** A country in the Ghauts between Mysore and Malabar.
- COROMANDEL, Coast of.** The eastern coast of the peninsula of India.
- Coss.** A geographical measure, irregular, but generally equal to two miles.
- COWLE.** Mercy, quarter, protection, solemn pledge of promise.
- CRORE.** One hundred lacs, or ten millions.
— of Pagodas. About 4,000,000l.
— of Rupees. About 1,000,000l.
- CUSHOONS.** Brigades of infantry.
- CUTCH, or KUTCH.** A barren but strong country in the western part of Guzerat.
- CUTTACK.** A country on the coast to the east of Berar.
- CUTWAHL.** Chief officer of police and superintendent of Bazaars.
- DAR.** When joined to another word, means the holder of an office, or an officer in charge of a post.—See *Killadar, Soubahdar, Zemindar*.
- DAWK.** The post, as also the post manner of travelling in India, carried in palanquins by bearers.
- DECCAN, South.** Applied to the country south of the Nerbudda, and between that and the Kistna rivers.
- DELTA.** A country situated between the mouths of rivers, usually applied to that of the Ganges.
- DESSARAH.** A great Military festival among the Marhattas.
- DEWAN.** The principal native minister, or chief of the revenue department.
- DHURMSALA.** A place at or near a village for the reception of travellers.
- DIVAN.** A council of a prince and his ministers.
- DOOAB.** A country between two rivers which run into each other, particularly that between the Ganges and the Jumna, in Hindustan, and that between the Kistna and the Toombuddra, in the Deccan.
- DOOLIES.** Palanquins made light for carrying sick and wounded soldiers.
- DROOG.** A fortified hill or rock.
- DUBASH.** An agent. The native at Madras who manages the money concerns of Europeans, and serves as interpreter. In Bengal this person is called Banyan and Sircar.
- DUFTER.** Record office.
- DURBAR.** Court of an independent prince; levee.
- ENAUUM.** Grants of land, rent free.
- GHAUT.** A pass through hills; a ferry over a river; a range of mountains.
- GHAUTS.** Ranges of mountains which separate the upper or table land in the Deccan and Mysore from the lower countries bordering on the sea to the east and west, and on the Taptee river to the north. The country above the Ghauts is called Balla-ghaut; the country below is called Payen-ghaut.
- GOA.** A Portuguese settlement on the Malabar coast.
- GOLLAH.** That part of the camp where the brinjarries are stationed.
- GOLUNDAUZE.** Artillerymen of native troops.
- GRAB.** A small two-masted vessel, chiefly used for coasting in the East.
- GRAM.** A kind of pulse or grain with which the horses and gun bullocks are fed in India.
- GUALIOR, GWALIOR.** The modern capital of Scindiah.
- GUICKWAR.** The family name of one of the great Marhatta chiefs holding Guzerat. The name and titles of the chief, in 1803, were Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar.
- GUZERAT.** Part of the Marhatta empire, of which it was formerly a jaghire under the Guickwar, who afterwards declared it independent. Baroda the capital.

HAVILDAR. A non-commissioned officer of native troops, of the rank of sergeant.

HINDUSTAN Proper. The country so called between the Indus, the Ganges, and the Nerbudda, and bounded on the north by the mountains of Thibet and Tartary.

HIRCARRAHS. Messengers employed to carry letters, generally brahmins. They are sent also to gain intelligence, and used as guides.

HOLKAR. The family name of one of the great Marhatta chiefs, formerly a jaghiredar of the empire, but afterwards declared his independence; his territory in Malwa, and his capital Indore. The name of the chief, in 1803, was Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

HURGOORY, or HUZOORIAHS. Personal attendants of a chief, of his own tribe or caste.

HYDERABAD. The capital and seat of government of the Nizam's dominions.

INDORE. The capital of Holkar in Malwa.

JAGHIRE. A grant of territory from a sovereign prince to a subject.

JAGHIRE DAR. The holder of a jaghire, usually for life only.

JAH. Title of the Nizam and of Scindiah.

JEMIDAR. The junior rank of officer in the native troops.

JOWARRY. A kind of Indian corn.

JUNGLE. Wood, high grass or reeds, waste country.

KANARA.—See *Canara*.

KARKOON, or CARKOON. A native revenue officer under the collector. An agent.

KHAREETAH. A letter, dispatch.

KHELAUT. Robe or dress of honor with which princes confer dignities.

KILLA. Balla Killa, the upper fort or citadel of a fortress.

KILLADAR. The governor of a fort.

KIRKANA. Term applied to the cattle department of the army; and where the elephants are kept.

KISTNA. A large river dividing the Deccan from Mysore.

KONKAN, or CONKAN. The country between the Western Ghauts and the sea, near Bombay, under the Peshwah.

KUR. When attached to a name, as Nimbulkur, Nepaunee kur, &c., designates the chief of that family.

LAC. One hundred thousand.

— of Rupees, at 2s., about 10,000%.

— of Pagodas, about 40,000%.

MAHA. Great.

MALABAR. The country on the western coast of the peninsula of India.

MALWA. A country north of the Nerbudda, divided between the Peshwah, Holkar, and Scindiah.

MARHATTA EMPIRE. Founded by the celebrated Sevajee over a considerable race of people about the middle of the seventeenth century, afterwards divided into several independent governments; the Rajah of Sattarah, a descendant of Sevajee, still being chief, although only nominally governing through the Peshwah, the chief magistrate of the empire. The principal chiefs of the Marhatta empire, in 1803, were,

The Rajah of Sattarah.

The Peshwah.

The Rajah of Berar.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

Anund Rao Guickwar.

MAUNKARRIES. Men of high caste, nobles.

MOGUL. The title of the Mahomedan emperors of Hindustan; one of the sects of Mussulmann.

MOHUR. A gold coin varying in value, according to weight, from 12 to 14 or 15, and even 16 rupees.

MOOLUCK-GEERY, MULUK GHEEREE. Collection, exaction, or kind of revenue, in Guzerat.

MOONSHEE. Letter writer, tutor, secretary.

MOPLAHS. A race residing in Ma-

- labar Proper, descended from the Arabs who colonized on that coast.
- MUSNUD.** Throne.
- MUTASEDDEE.** Accountant, chief clerk, or secretary of brinjarries.
- MYSORE.** A country south of the Deccan, conquered from the native Hindu Rajahs by Hyder Ally, retaken from Tippoo Sultaun by the British, and restored to the ancient family on the fall of Seringapatam.
- NABOB, or NAWAUB.** Mussulman king or chief, often a title of courtesy unattended with power.
- NAGPOOR.** The capital and the seat of government of the Rajah of Berar.
- NAIG, NAIK, or NAIGUE.** The lowest rank of non-commissioned officer in native troops, answering to that of corporal. Naik is also a title of the chiefs of the Bheels.
- NAIRS.** A warlike race of Hindus, inhabiting the mountainous and jungly parts of Malabar.
- NERBUDDA.** A large river dividing Hindustan from the Deccan.
- NIMMUK WALLAH.** Literally salt-eater. Eating salt in the East is a bond of faith and friendship among the natives, to those with whom they eat it.
- NIZAM.** The Soubahdar of the Deccan, reigning over a large portion of territory between the Wurda, Godavery, and Kistna rivers. Capital at Hyderabad. The names and titles of the Nizam in 1803, were Nizam and Dowlut, Asoph Jah, Soubahdar of the Deccan; he was succeeded in the same year by his son, Secunder Jah.
- NOTCH, NOUTCH.** A dance, Indian fête.
- NULLAH.** A stream, watercourse.
- NUZZER.** An offering, a present made to a superior, a fine or fee.
- OOMRAH,** high rank of nobility.
- OTTER and PAUN.** Essence of the preparation of beetel nut, presented to visitors on quitting a durbar.
- OUGEIN.** The ancient capital and seat of government of Scindiah in Malwa.
- PAGODA.** Hindu temple of worship. A gold coin, of about eight shillings value.
- PATAN.** Name applied to the Afghan tribes.
- PAYEN.** Lower. Payen-ghaut, the country below the Ghauts.
- PEONS.** Irregular infantry, armed with swords or matchlocks, employed chiefly in the defence of forts, and in the collection of the revenue.
- PERGUNNAH.** A district. The largest division of land in Zemindarry.
- PESHCUSH.** Tribute, fine, quit rent on the stipulated revenue.
- PESH-KANAH.** Chief agent, or manager to a Resident.
- PESHWAH.** Literally, the First. The chief magistrate of the Marhatta empire, nominally under the Rajah of Sattarah, but usurping his authority. His capital and seat of government at Poonah. The names and titles of the Peshwah, in 1803, were Sreemunt Bajee Rao, Ragonaut Rao, Pundit Purdhaun.
- PETTAH.** A suburb, or outwork of a fortified place, with wall and ditch.
- PINDARRIES.** Freebooters, who ravaged the countries of other nations.
- POLYGARS.** Natives who consider themselves independent; they inhabit forts, hills, and woods, armed with pikes and matchlocks.
- POONAH.** The capital and seat of government of the Peshwah.
- PUNDIT.** A learned Brahmin.
- PUNJAUB.** Five rivers; the country intersected by, between the Indus and the Sutleje.
- PURNEAH, or POURNEYA.** The celebrated Dewan of Mysore.
- PURWUNNAS.** Orders.
- RAJAH.** The Hindu title of a prince.
- RAJPOOT.** A high caste of Hindu soldiers, inhabiting the country Rajpootana.
- RANNEE.** Hindu princess. The wife of a Rajah.
- RAO or ROW.** A title under the rank of Rajah.

RUPEE. A silver coin, value about two shillings in the explanation of lac, but is sometimes one shilling and ten pence: it varies in value all over India.

RYOT. Peasant or labourer.

SATTARAH. The capital of the country so named. Though the Rajah of Sattarah was, as descendant of Sevajee, nominally the head of the Marhatta empire, yet the real power had been usurped, and was exercised, by the chief magistrate, the Peshwah.

SCINDIAH. The family name of a great Marhatta Chief, jaghiredar of the empire, but afterwards independent. His territory was in Malwa, and his capital Ougein. The names and titles of the Chief, in 1803, were Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. He had much increased the territory of his predecessors by conquest in Hindustan, and his power at Poonah by his influence over the Peshwah.

SEBUNDY. Irregular native soldiers, country militia employed generally in the police and revenue.

SEER. A dry measure, rather more than a pint. Or two pounds weight.

SEPOYS. Native troops.

SERINJAUMY, or SURINJAM. Grants of jaghires for personal expenses, or for raising troops. Charges of collection.

SEVAJEE. The founder of the Marhatta empire in the seventeenth century, whose descendants were Rajahs of Sattarah.

SEWARY, SOUARREE, SOIREE. Retinue, suite.

SHROFFS. Native bankers, money changers.

SILLEDAR. Horsemen bearing arms, and finding their own horses and equipment.

SIRDAR. Chieftain, captain, headman, gentleman.

SOUBAH. A province.

SOUBAH, SOUBAHDAR. Governor general, prince over other rajahs or princes; used indiscriminately by General Wellesley and others, as applied to the Nizam. Viceroy or

governor of a soubah or province.

Subaltern officer in native troops.

SOUCAR. Banker, merchant, money leader.

SULTAUN. Mussulman king, the title assumed by Tippoo.

SUNNUD. Patent, authority for holding land or office. Grant or command of a prince or chief.

TALOOK. Lands and villages under the protection of a fort. District held under superior authority.

TANDAH. As applied to brinjarries, a body, a horde, an encampment.

TANK. Reservoir for water.

TANNAH. Police station.

TAPPALL. The Post.

TITLES. Attached to proper names among Hindus, beginning with the lowest rank:

1st. Rao or Row.

2nd. Rajah.

3rd. Wunt.

— Attached to proper names among Mahomedans.

1st. Khan or Cawn.

2nd. Behauder.

3rd. Jung.

4th. Dowlut.

5th. Moolk.

6th. Oomrah.

7th. Jah.

TOPE. A grove or thicket.

VAKEEL or VAQUEEL. Envoy, ambassador, agent.

VISIAPoor, or BEEJAPoor. Formerly the most splendid Mahomedan capital of the Deccan, now in decay. It is situated in the country between the Kistna and Beemah rivers.

WHEEL. Called the perambulator, to measure distances, always used by General Wellesley in India at the head of the column of march, to regulate the rate of it.

WYNAAD. A country to the south of Coorg, above the Ghauts, between Mysore and Malabar.

ZEAFET. An entertainment, an extraordinary allowance on particular occasions, either in money or provisions, as a reward to the troops.

ZEMINDAR. Landholder, government officer, charged with the finance department, superintendence of the land revenue.

ZENANA. The apartment of the women.

ZERREEN PUTKA. The golden pennon; the standard of the Marhatta empire, which always accompanied the Peshwah when he took the field in person, and was sometimes

sent with another commander, when the Peshwah chose to remain at Poonah. The charge of the zereen putka constituted such officer commander in chief. Major General Wellesley was anxious that this charge should be conferred on Appah Dessaye with whom he was satisfied: and it would have indicated that the Peshwah was earnestly engaged in the prosecution of the war.

Names, as written in this Work, and as they are sometimes written in other Books and Maps.

Bednore,
Binkenholy,
Burhampoor,

Candeish,
Chichkaira,
Canara,
Casserbary,

Darwar,
Deccan,

Erroor,

Ferdapoor,

Gualior,
Gulpurba river,
Guzerat,

Kistna river,

Naulniah,
Panowullah,
Perinda,
Phoolmurry,
Puttun,
Pahlood,

Rackisbaum,

Toombuddra river,

Umber,

Visiapoor,

Biddenoor, Bennoor.

Bunkinnola.

Berhampore, Boorhaunpoor.

Khandes.

Cheesekair, Cheechekhera.

Karnara.

Kasarbaree.

Dharwar.

Dekan, Deckan.

Enoor.

Furdapore.

Gwalior.

Gutpurba.

Goujerat.

Krishna.

Nulnair.

Panowly, Poonowla, Poonawellee.

Paraindah.

Foolmerry.

Moongee Pyetun.

Palode.

Rakshusbowan.

Tungbudra.

Amber.

Beejapour.

REMARKS.

The pages 17 to 80, and the following pages (17* to 120*) inclusive, have been inserted since this volume was printed, to replace pages 17 to 80, which have been cancelled: these pages contained narrative, now replaced by documents.

The names of Chiefs and towns, are variously written, to signify the same persons and places. These, from the liberty observed in Indian orthography, the reader of Indian history will understand. The Compiler has adopted the most general spelling of such names, and has attempted to adhere to it; but not always, for when he had a doubt, he has left it as in the manuscript.

THE EARLY SERVICES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON
IN
HOLLAND AND INDIA.
WITH THE OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES.

LIEUT. COLONEL the Hon. ARTHUR WELLESLEY embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regiment in May, 1794, and landed in the month following at Ostend, to join the British army under his Royal Highness the Duke of York, then in the Low Countries. The approach of the French army under General Pichegru rendered it necessary to evacuate Ostend without delay ; and the 33rd regiment, with two other battalions, proceeded round by the Scheldt to Antwerp, where it remained encamped during the month of July. On the retreat of the army under the Duke of York from Alost into Holland, Lieut. Colonel Wellesley took up his allotted station with his regiment, and joined in the retrograde movement on Breda and Bois-le-duc. The French army followed ; and on the 14th of September there was a serious affair near Boxtel.

The British army afterwards continued to retreat towards Nimeguen, and took up a position on the right bank of the Waahl. While posted between the Whaal and the Leck, several affairs took place with the advance of the French army, in which the 33rd were engaged both in the attack on Tuyl, on the 30th December, 1794, and at Meteren and Geldermalsen, on the 5th January, 1795. Crossing the Leck, the retreat was continued by Amersfoort, Deventer, and Coeverden, to Meppen on the Ems. In these operations, Lieut. Colonel Wellesley, as senior officer, commanded a brigade, consisting of three

battalions, in the rear guard; evincing that zeal and intelligence which, in the opinion of Sir James Craig, and several officers of merit and reputation, gave promise of future distinction. The campaign ended by the re-embarkation of the British army at Bremen, on the breaking up of the ice in the spring of 1795.

On the return of the army to England, the 33rd regiment landed at Harwich, and was for a short time encamped at Warley. In the autumn it proceeded to Southampton, and Lieut. Colonel Wellesley embarked with it for the West Indies, in the fleet commanded by Admiral Christian. After many delays from contrary winds the fleet sailed; but the expedition having been about six weeks at sea during the most tempestuous weather, in which many of the vessels composing it were lost, was obliged to return to Portsmouth.

The 33rd regiment was landed and quartered at Poole. Its destination having been changed for India, it was again embarked in the beginning of April, 1796; but Lieut. Colonel Wellesley, in consequence of severe illness, was unable to leave the country. He, however, followed shortly afterwards, and joined his corps at the Cape of Good Hope. He proceeded with it to Bengal, and arrived at Calcutta in the beginning of 1797. At the end of that year, the 33rd regiment formed part of the expedition from Bengal under General St. Leger, projected by the Governor General, Sir John Shore, to attack Manilla: but on arriving at Penang, where the other part of the expedition from Madras had joined, fresh orders were received for the recall of the troops to their several presidencies, in consequence of apprehensions entertained by Lord Hobart, Governor of Fort St. George, that Tippoo Sultaun might be induced, by the absence of the troops, to invade the Carnatic.

The 33rd regiment returned to Bengal; and Colonel Wellesley soon afterwards went to Madras on a visit to Lord Hobart, previously to the departure of his Lordship for Europe. After an absence of two months, he returned to Calcutta, having rapidly examined the establishments of Madras, and other parts of the Carnatic.

The Earl of Mornington (afterwards Marquis Wellesley) having been appointed to succeed Sir John Shore* as Governor General of India, arrived at Calcutta on the 17th of May, 1798, after having touched at the Cape of Good Hope, and at Madras, where he had remained a few days.

Lord Mornington had been for some time an active member of the Board of Control, and he had the advantage of being well acquainted with the general state of affairs in India.

At the period of his departure from England, it was generally believed, and he was himself confident, that he would find India in a state of profound peace; and that expectation was fully confirmed by the reports which reached him upon his arrival at Madras, from the several authorities at the different Presidencies of India.

Internal tranquillity prevailed throughout the Company's possessions, and no apprehension was entertained of hostile designs on the part of any of the neighbouring states.

In the absence of all appearance of danger from abroad, his Lordship's attention, upon his arrival at Calcutta, was principally directed to internal affairs. This state of tranquillity was not, however, of long duration: it was interrupted by the discovery of the hostile designs and treacherous conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and followed by the campaign of 1799.

It may be proper here to advert shortly to the circumstances which gave rise to the second Mysore war, as the commencement of Colonel Wellesley's military career in India; the more so, as some of the publications, which profess to record the events of this period, have ascribed to the Indian Government at home, and to the new Governor General, an inclination to take advantage of any pretext for reducing the power of Tippoo Sultaun: and for removing from India the French officers in the service of the native princes. This assumption is directly at variance with the general tenor of the public records. On the contrary, it appears that one of the first acts of the new Governor General was to address a conciliatory letter to Tippoo

* Afterwards Lord Teignmouth.

Sultaun, dated 14th of June, 1798, in reply to an application received by Sir John Shore at the moment of his departure, claiming restitution of Wynaad, and some other districts on the western frontier of Mysore; which Tippoo alleged had been erroneously transferred to the East India Company, under the treaty of Seringapatam in 1797.

The Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun.

‘ Fort William, 14th June, 1798.

‘ Immediately on my arrival in Bengal, Sir Alured Clarke communicated to me your friendly letter to him, stating that some people of the Koorg country, having descended from the woods and mountains, had fixed their residences in the villages of Kauntamungle, Coloorbajee, &c.

(The contents of the letter recapitulated.)

‘ Sir Alured Clarke has also communicated to me your answer to the letter from the late Governor General, Sir John Shore, respecting the claims of the Company and of your Highness to the district of Wynaad, bordering on Tambercherry.

‘ Being anxious to afford you every proof in my power, of my sincere desire to maintain the good understanding which had so long subsisted between your Highness and the Company, I made it one of the first objects of my attention to examine all the papers existing on the Company’s records, as well respecting Wynaad, as the district of Souleah, in which it appears that Kauntamungle and Coloorbajee are situated.

‘ From these papers, I find that not only the right to the districts of Wynaad and Souleah has remained in doubt; but also to the district of Amerah and Ersawaraseemy, and to some other inconsiderable territories on the side of Malabar.

‘ Your Highness is well aware that it is a maxim among states, who are sincerely disposed to maintain the relations of amity and peace, to bring all contested points of this nature to a speedy determination.

‘ A seasonable and temperate discussion of those differences of opinion, which must occasionally arise between powers of the most pacific disposition, tends to prevent quarrels between their subordinate officers, and to obviate the misrepresentations which each party is apt, in such cases, to make to their respective governments. This is the most friendly, as well as the most prudent course, and will always defeat the views of interested

and designing persons, who may wish to foment jealousy and to disturb the blessings of peace.

‘For this object Lord Cornwallis, the Nawaub Nizam Ali Khan, and the Peshwah Pundit Purdhaun, wisely provided in the treaty of peace, concluded with your Highness at Seringapatam, by establishing a regular mode of bringing to an amicable adjustment, with the knowledge and approbation of all parties, any questions which might hereafter arise between your Highness and any of the Allies respecting the boundaries of your adjacent territories.

‘I am persuaded that it is your Highness’s disposition to maintain faithfully your public engagements with the Company. On my part, you will always meet with a religious adherence to every article of the treaties subsisting between us. On this occasion, therefore, it is my intention to depute a respectable and discreet person to meet upon your frontier such of your officers as your Highness may please to name, for the purpose of conferring together, of discussing the grounds of the respective claims, and of satisfying each other on all points respecting which any doubts may be entertained on either side.

‘It would not be consistent with your Highness’s high reputation for justice and good faith, to refuse to enter into this candid investigation; I therefore entertain no doubt that, as soon as you shall have fully understood the nature of this representation, you will afford every facility to the conduct of the necessary inquiries, and will use your endeavors to bring them to a speedy determination; and, for this purpose, that you will, without delay, direct your officers at Korial Bunder (or Mangalore), to enter into conference with those deputed by the managers of the Honorable Company’s affairs on the coast of Malabar. The result of the conferences will be communicated to me by the government of Bombay, with all practicable dispatch; and you may rely upon it, that after a regular discussion shall have taken place, according to the established law of nations, and to the practice uniformly observed on every occasion of disputed boundary which has arisen between your Highness and the Allies, since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, I will not suspend, for one moment, the full acknowledgment of whatever shall appear to be your just right.

‘In the mean time, as the districts of Amerah and Souleah have been in the possession of the Koorg Rajah for several

years, your Highness will, no doubt, see the propriety and justice of recalling the troops sent into the neighbourhood of Souleah. Your Highness must be sensible that, until I have been satisfied of the justice of your claims in a regular and amicable manner, I will never suffer any of the Company's allies or dependents, whose country and interests I consider to be, in every respect, the same as those of the Company, to be forcibly deprived of territories of which they have so long held possession: with the most cordial disposition to maintain the intercourse of friendship with your Highness, I trust that I shall always meet an equal return on your part; and, therefore, I cannot but lament, that your Highness did not immediately resort to the established channels of peaceable negotiation, in place of stationing a military force upon the frontiers of the territory possessed by an ally of the Company.

‘Confident, however, that your Highness, upon a full review of all the circumstances of the case, will be equally inclined with myself to conform to the dictates of justice, I am satisfied that, after our respective officers shall have conferred together, and explained to each other all matters that remain in doubt, we shall have no difficulty in terminating these long depending questions to our mutual satisfaction.

‘*Tippoo Sultaun.*’

‘MORNINGTON.’

Tippoo Sultaun's claims were accordingly referred to certain Commissioners, then employed in Malabar under the orders of the Government of Bombay, for the investigation of claims of this nature; and upon their making a report in favour of the Sultaun's pretensions, those districts were immediately restored to him, under a Proclamation by the Governor General.

This circumstance alone would be sufficient to demonstrate the pacific intentions of the British Government at that period; in addition to which, the exhausted state of the Company's treasury, and of its credit in India at that moment, were also reasons to deter the Governor General from engaging in war, if it had been possible to avoid it: but the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, or of the influence of France in India, did not then form any part of the policy, either of the Earl of Mornington or of the British ministry, or of the East India government at home.

Early in the month of June, a paper was received by the Governor General, at Calcutta, containing a Proclamation by Mons. Malartic, the Governor General of the Isle of France, and of the French establishments east of the Cape of Good Hope, which announced the arrival of two Ambassadors with letters from Tippoo Sultaun, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance, for the purpose of expelling the English from India. This intelligence, which at first appeared incredible, was, in a few days, confirmed by a dispatch, received at Calcutta, from Lord Macartney, the Governor at the Cape of Good Hope, conveying a copy of Mons. Malartic's Proclamation; and it was further confirmed by the arrival of a ship from the Mauritius, the captain of which deposed, upon examination before the Governor General, that he was on shore when the Proclamation was issued, and that he had witnessed the reception of the Ambassadors.

General Malartic, having no regular troops to spare, invited all French citizens, so disposed, to join the standard of Tippoo: and it is a coincidence worthy of remark, that Tippoo's Ambassadors, with as many Frenchmen as they were able to engage for the Sultaun's service, landed from 'La Preneuse' French frigate, at Mangalore, on the 28th of April, 1798; being the very same day on which Lord Mornington had landed at Madras when on his way to Calcutta.

Although Tippoo's hatred of the British nation, and his eager desire for vengeance, and for the recovery of the provinces which Lord Cornwallis had compelled him to cede to the Company and its Allies, in 1791, were well known; yet it appears that no suspicion was entertained, before the receipt of this intelligence from the Mauritius, that he had actually adopted such decided measures of hostility. It was, however, soon afterwards discovered that he was engaged in similar negotiations with Zemaun Shah, and several other native princes, as well as with the French officers in their service; and it was also ascertained that he had actually succeeded in engaging the French officers in the Nizam's service to enter into his views.

His Highness the Nizam, Soubahdar of the Deccan, had in his

service a force of 14,000 well disciplined infantry, commanded by M. Raymond, with 124 French officers, eager partizans of the French republic, and who were on the point of erecting the French standard at his capital, Hyderabad. The strength and efficiency of this corps, and its position on a vulnerable part of the frontiers of the Company's territory, demanded immediate attention. By the judicious and prompt interference of the Governor General, a British detachment, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Roberts, was secretly but expeditiously dispatched to Hyderabad on the 10th of October 1798; and on the 22nd of the month, under the orders of the Nizam, the whole of the French officers were compelled to surrender without firing a shot. His Highness being thus relieved from their control, concluded a new treaty of alliance with the British Government, whereby he bound himself to exclude, not only from his army, but from his dominions, all Frenchmen or other adventurers from Europe; and likewise engaged to maintain at his capital a corps of British troops for the effectual security of the alliance. A treaty was also formed with the Peshwah, the nominal head of the Marhatta empire, which secured the neutrality of that Chief, in the absence of any other stipulated advantage.

Lord Mornington obtained information of all the Sultaun's measures, and prevented their execution with that vigor which characterized his administration in India. After a very able minute in the Secret department, on the 12th of August 1798, in which he fully and satisfactorily stated the grounds and motives of his proceedings, he ordered Lieut. General Harris, the Commander in Chief at Madras, to assemble the forces of the Company in the Carnatic. His Excellency, having written to Tippoo Sultaun the following letters, proceeded in person to Fort St. George, where he arrived on the 31st of December, 1798, for the purpose of superintending and directing the preparations for war, in the event of failure in negotiation.

The Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun.

‘ Fort William, 8th November, 1798.

‘ I have received your letter informing me (the substance of the letter, received on the 24th of October, recited.)

‘ It affords me sincere satisfaction to learn that you have nominated two persons of integrity and honor to meet and confer with the deputies appointed, under my orders, by Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, for the purpose of investigating the question regarding the talooks of Amerah and Souleah. It is only by means of regular inquiry and amicable discussion, that such questions can be adjusted among independent powers. My determination in the case of Wynaad was dictated by those principles of justice and moderation which always direct the Company’s government; nor shall my scrupulous adherence to the same principles be less manifest, in my decision on your claim to the district at present in question: the possession of which shall not be withheld from you for an instant, if, after full investigation, I shall be satisfied of the justice of your title to them.

‘ It is a well-known truth, that they, who are the most ready to respect the just rights of others, are the most vigilant and resolute to maintain their own.

‘ I have understood your sentiments concerning the “turbulent disposition of interested men, who, by nature, are ever seeking opportunities of sowing the seeds of dissension.” For the happiness of mankind it is to be lamented, that these authors of confusion are too numerous, assiduous, and successful, in all parts of the world. In no age or country were the baneful and insidious arts of intrigue ever cultivated with such success, as they are at present by the French nation. I sincerely wish that no impression had been produced on your discerning mind by that dangerous people; but my situation enables me to know, that they have reached your presence, and have endeavored to pervert the wisdom of your councils, and to instigate you to war against those who have given you no provocation.

‘ It is impossible that you should suppose me to be ignorant of the intercourse which subsists between you and the French, whom you know to be the inveterate enemies of the Company.

and to be now engaged in an unjust war with the British nation. You cannot imagine me to be indifferent to the transactions which have passed between you and the enemies of my country; nor does it appear necessary, or proper, that I should any longer conceal from you the surprise and concern with which I perceived you disposed to involve yourself in all the ruinous consequences of a connexion, which threatens not only to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company; but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion, to shake your own authority, to weaken the obedience of your subjects, and to destroy the religion which you revere.

‘Immediately after my arrival in Bengal, I read your correspondence with the late Governor General, Sir John Shore, and with the acting Governor General, Sir Alured Clarke; and I perceived, with great satisfaction, that in all your letters you constantly professed a disposition to strengthen the bonds of sincere attachment, and the foundations of harmony and concord, established between you and the Honorable Company. I received particular pleasure from reading your last letter to Sir John Shore, in which you signified your amicable desire that he should impress me with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so long subsisting between the two states. Your subsequent letters to me have abounded with professions of the same friendly nature.

‘Combining these professions of amity on your part, with the proofs which the Company’s government have constantly given of their sincere disposition to maintain the relations of friendship and peace with you; and adverting at the same time, to your reputation for wisdom and discernment, it was natural for me to be extremely slow to believe the various accounts, transmitted to me, of your negotiations with the French, and of your military preparations. But whatever my reluctance to credit such reports might be, prudence required, both of me and of the Company’s allies, that we should adopt certain measures of precaution and self defence; and these accordingly have been taken, as you will no doubt have observed. The British Government and their allies wishing, nevertheless, to live in peace and friendship with all their neighbours; entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any views in the least incompatible with their respective engagements; and looking to

no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects, will always be ready, as they now are, to afford you every demonstration of these pacific dispositions.

‘The Peshwah, and his Highness the Nizam, concur with me in the observations which I have offered to you in this letter; and which, in the name of the Company and of the allies, I recommend to your serious consideration. But as I am also desirous of communicating to you, on the behalf of the Company and of their allies, a plan calculated to promote the mutual security and welfare of all parties, I propose to depute to you, for this purpose, Major Doveton, who is well known to you, and who will explain to you more fully and particularly the sole means, which appear to myself and to the allies of the Company, to be effectual for the salutary purpose of removing all existing distrust and suspicion, and of establishing peace and good understanding on the most durable foundations.

‘You will, I doubt not, let me know at what time and place it will be convenient to you to receive Major Doveton; and as soon as your friendly letter shall reach me, I will direct him to proceed to your presence.

‘I shall expect your answer to this letter, with an earnest hope, that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the allies; and that you may be convinced that you cannot in any manner better consult your true interests, than by meeting with cordiality the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points, on which any doubts or anxiety may have arisen in the minds either of yourself or of the allies.

‘*Tippoo Sultaun.*’

‘MORNINGTON.’

The Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun.

‘Fort William, 10th December, 1798.

‘I had the honor of addressing a friendly letter to your Highness on the 8th of November last, in which I stated a variety of important points, to which your Highness would no doubt perceive the propriety and necessity of giving your earliest and most serious consideration. I particularly hope that your Highness will have been sensible of the advantages

likely to result, to all parties, from the conciliatory measure of my deputing Major Doveton to you, which I proposed in that letter.

‘ I expect to have the pleasure of finding your answer to that letter on my arrival at Madras, for which place I am on the point of setting out from Calcutta. I hope to arrive at Madras about the same time that this letter will reach you; and should any circumstances hitherto have prevented your answering my letter of the 8th of November, I assure myself that you will immediately, on your receipt of this, dispatch a satisfactory reply to it, addressed to me at Madras.

‘ *Tippoo Sultaun.*’

‘ MORNINGTON.

The 33rd regiment had been in the mean time sent from Bengal to be placed on the Madras establishment, where it arrived in September, 1798. In November the greater part of the troops were assembled and encamped at Wallajahbad, under the orders of Colonel Wellesley, with whom the general superintendence remained until February following, when General Harris arrived to assume the personal command of the army, which had proceeded to Vellore. The attention which Colonel Wellesley had bestowed on the discipline and well-being of the troops, and in practising them in combined field movements, with the admirable system he adopted for supplying the bazaars, which were kept constantly well provided, attracted general notice and approbation; and when General Harris joined the army to take command, after receiving the reports of the heads of corps and departments, he was so pleased with all Colonel Wellesley's arrangements, that he conceived it to be an imperative duty to publish a general order, conveying commendation of the merits of Colonel Wellesley during his temporary command.

Soon after the arrival of the Governor General at Fort St. George, his Excellency again wrote to Tippoo on the 9th of January, recapitulating, at considerable length, the complaint contained in the letter of the 8th of November, with other details of the whole of the Sultaun's hostile proceedings, unnecessary here to be introduced, being subsequently embodied in the

Declaration of War. The Governor General requested that a reply might not be deferred for more than one day after this communication of the 9th of January should reach the Sultaun's presence, or dangerous consequences would ensue. No reply, however, having been received, and the difficulties inseparable from the equipment of so large a force having at length been overcome, the Governor General, on the 3rd of February, dispatched his commands to General Harris, to enter the Mysore territory with the forces assembled at Vellore; and to Lieut. General Stuart to co-operate with the Bombay army from Malabar; while, at the same time, he gave intimation to the Allied Courts, and the British Admiral on the coast, that he now considered the Company at war with Tippoo Sultaun.

The army assembled at Vellore exceeded 20,000 men, whereof 2,600 were cavalry, and 4,300 Europeans. It marched on the 11th of February, and on the 18th was joined by the British detachment serving with the Nizam, 6,500 strong, under Lieut. Colonel Dalrymple; with an equal number of the Nizam's infantry, including a portion of the Sepoys lately under French, but now, according to treaty, under British officers, commanded by Captain John Malcolm*; and a large body of the Nizam's cavalry under Captain Walker.

The whole of the Nizam's force was under the superintendence of Meer Allum, his Highness's minister; and in order to give it the utmost degree of efficiency and respectability, it was deemed proper to add one of his Majesty's regiments of infantry to the Company's battalions serving with it; and to form the whole into a separate division. Meer Allum expressed a wish that the Governor General's brother should be appointed to command the Nizam's forces; and General Harris felt the importance of selecting an officer who possessed his own confidence, and who was likely to enjoy that of Meer Allum. The 33rd regiment was accordingly attached to the Nizam's contingent, as this force was denominated, and the general command of it was thus given to Colonel Wellesley. This arrangement was very agreeable to the Nizam and to

* Lieut. General Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.

Meer Allum; and it contributed very much to maintain the good understanding between the Court of Hyderabad and the British Government.

The forces assembled under the orders of General Harris consisted of upwards of 30,000 men; and in the words of the Governor General, an army more completely appointed, more amply and liberally supplied in every department, or more perfect in its discipline, and in the acknowledged experience, ability, and zeal of its officers, never took the field in India. The army of the western coast, equal in excellence, under Lieut. General Stuart, consisted of 6,400 fighting men, of whom 1,600 were Europeans; whilst a detachment of about 4,000 under Lieut Colonel Brown, and another of 5,000 under Lieut. Colonel Read, marched to co-operate with the Commander in Chief, from the southern districts of the Carnatic and the Baramahl.

On the 13th of February, the Governor General received a letter from the Sultaun, to which, on the 22nd, his Excellency replied; accompanied by a Declaration of the same date from himself and his allies, the Nizam and the Peshwah.

The Governor General to Tippoo Sultaun.

‘ Fort St. George, 22nd February, 1799.

I had the honor, on the 13th instant, to receive your letter acknowledging the receipt of my two letters of the 9th and 16th of January, informing me of your intention to proceed on a hunting excursion, and desiring me to dispatch Major Doveton, unattended, to you.

‘ I lament most sincerely that the friendly intimation, contained in my letter of the 9th of January, regarding the dangers of delay, produced no effect on your discerning mind; and that you deferred your reply to that letter to so late a period of the season. Your long silence, on this important and pressing occasion, compelled me to adopt the resolution of ordering the British forces to advance, in concert with the armies of the allied powers. You are not ignorant that the period of the season rendered the advance of the army absolutely necessary to the common security of the allies. This movement of the army is to be imputed entirely to your repeated rejection of

my amicable proposal of sending an ambassador to your presence.

‘ Under the present circumstances, to send Major Doveton to you could not be attended with those advantages which would have resulted from his mission at a proper season.

‘ The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with you, Lieut. General Harris, Commander of the British troops, has been empowered to receive any embassy which you shall dispatch to him. Lieut. General Harris will also authorise such persons as he may think proper, to concert, in communication with your ambassadors, a new treaty of friendship with your Highness, founded on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

‘ *Tippoo Sultaun.*

‘ MORNINGTON.’

Declaration of the Right Honorable the Governor General in Council for all the Forces and affairs of the British Nation in the East Indies, on behalf of the Honorable the East India Company, and the Allies of the said Company, their Highnesses the Nizam and the Peshwah.

‘ Fort St. George, 22nd February, 1799.

‘ A solemn treaty of peace and friendship was concluded at Seringapatam, between the Honorable Company and the Nabob Asoph Jah and the Peshwah on the one part, and the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun on the other part; and from that day all commotion and hostility ceased. Since that day the three allied states have invariably manifested a sacred regard for the obligations contracted under that treaty with the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun. Of this uniform disposition abundant proofs have been afforded by each of the allies: whatever differences have arisen with regard to the limits of the territory of Mysore, have been amicably adjusted without difficulty, and with the most exact attention to the principles of equity and to the stipulations of the treaty.

‘ Such has been the solicitude of the allies for the preservation of tranquillity, that they have viewed with forbearance, for some years past, various embassies and military preparations on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, of a tendency so evidently hostile to the interests of the allies, as would have justified them not only in the most serious remonstrances, but even in

an appeal to arms. On the part of the British Government, every endeavor has been employed to conciliate the confidence of the Sultaun, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit, by the most unequivocal acknowledgment and confirmation of his just rights, and by the removal of every cause of jealousy which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace.

‘These pacific sentiments have been most particularly manifested in the Governor General’s recent decision on Tippoo Sultaun’s claim to the district of Wynaad, and in the negotiation opened by his Lordship, with regard to the districts of Amerah and Souleah. In every instance, the conduct of the British Government in India, towards Tippoo Sultaun, has been the natural result of those principles of moderation, justice, and good faith, which the legislature of Great Britain and the Honorable the East India Company have firmly established as the unalterable rule of their intercourse with the Native princes and states of India.

‘The exemplary good faith, and the pacific disposition of the allies, since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, have never been disputed even by Tippoo Sultaun. Far from having attempted to allege even the pretext of a complaint against their conduct, he has constantly acknowledged their justice, sincerity, and good faith; and has professed, in the most cordial terms, his desire to maintain and strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord with them.

‘In the midst of these amicable professions on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, and at the moment when the British Government had issued orders for the confirmation of his claim to Wynaad, it was with astonishment and indignation that the allies discovered the engagements which he had contracted with the French nation; in direct violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, as well as of his own most solemn and recent protestations of friendship towards the allies.

‘Under the mask of these specious professions, and of a pretended veneration for the obligations of treaty, Tippoo Sultaun dispatched ambassadors to the Isle of France, who, in a period of profound peace in India, proposed and concluded, in his name, an offensive alliance with the French, for the avowed purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company; and consequently against the Peshwah and the Nizam, the allies of the Company.

‘The ambassadors, in the name of Tippoo Sultaun, de-

manded military succours from the French; and actually levied a military force in the Isle of France, with the declared view of prosecuting the intended war.

‘ When the ambassadors returned, in a French ship of war, from the Isle of France, Tippoo Sultaun suffered the military force, which they had levied for the avowed purpose of making war upon the allies, to land in his country, and finally he admitted it into his army; by these personal acts ratifying and confirming the proceedings of his ambassadors.

‘ This military force, however, was not sufficiently powerful to enable him immediately to attempt his declared purpose of attacking the Company’s possessions: but, in the mean while, he advanced his hostile preparations, conformably to his engagements with the French; and he was ready to move his army into the Company’s territories, whenever he might obtain from France the effectual succours which he had assiduously solicited from that nation.

‘ But the providence of God, and the victorious arms of the British nation, frustrated his vain hopes; and checked the presumptuous career of the French in Egypt, at the moment when he anxiously expected their arrival on the coast of Malabar.

‘ The British government, the Nizam, and the Peshwah, had not omitted the necessary precaution of assembling their forces, for the joint protection of their respective dominions. The strict principles of self-defence would have justified the allies, at that period of time, in making an immediate attack upon the territories of Tippoo Sultaun; but even the happy intelligence of the glorious success of the British fleet, at the mouth of the Nile, did not abate the anxious desire of the allies to maintain the relations of amity and peace with Tippoo Sultaun;—they attempted, by a moderate representation, to recall him to a sense of his obligations, and of the genuine principles of prudence and policy; and they employed every effort to open the channels of negotiation, and to facilitate the means of amicable accommodation. With these salutary views, the Governor General, on the 8th November, 1798, in the name of the allies, proposed to dispatch an ambassador to Tippoo Sultaun, for the purpose of renewing the bonds of friendship, and of concluding such an arrangement as might afford effectual security against any future interruption of the public tranquil-

lity, and his Lordship repeated the same proposal on the 10th of December, 1798.

‘Tippoo Sultaun declined, by various evasions and subterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the allies; and he manifested an evident disposition to reject the means of pacific accommodation, by suddenly breaking up, in the month of December, the conferences which had commenced with respect to the districts of Amerah and Souleah; and by interrupting the intercourse between his subjects and those of the Company on their respective frontiers. On the 9th of January, 1799, the Governor General, being arrived at Fort St. George, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances in the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, renewed with increased earnestness the expression of his Lordship’s anxious desire to dispatch an ambassador to the Sultaun.

‘The Governor General expressly solicited the Sultaun to return an answer within one day to this letter; and as it involved no proposition either injurious to the rights, dignity, or honor of the Sultaun, in any degree novel or complicated, either in form or substance, it could not require a longer consideration. The Governor General waited with the utmost solicitude for an answer to the reasonable and distinct proposition contained in his letter of the 9th of January, 1799. Tippoo Sultaun, however, who must have received this letter before the 15th of January, remained silent; although the Governor General had plainly apprized that prince that dangerous consequences would result from that delay. In the meanwhile the season for military operations had already advanced to so late a period as to render a speedy decision indispensable to the security of the allies.

‘Under these circumstances, on the 3rd of February, eight days having elapsed from the period when an answer might have been received from Seringapatam to the Governor General’s letter of the 9th of January, his Lordship declared to the allies that the necessary measures must now be adopted, without delay, for securing such advantages as should place the common safety of the allies beyond the reach of the insincerity of Tippoo Sultaun, and of the violence of the French. With this view, the Governor General, on the 3rd of February, issued orders to the British armies to march; and signified to the commander of his Majesty’s squadron, that the obstinate

silence of the Sultaun must be considered as a rejection of the proposed amicable negotiation.

‘At length, on the 13th of February, a letter from Tippoo Sultaun reached the Governor General: in which the Sultaun signifies to his Lordship, “that being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, he was accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion;” adding, “that the Governor General would be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton to him, unattended.”

‘The allies will not dwell on the peculiar phrases of this letter; but it must be evident to all the states of India, that the answer of the Sultaun has been deferred to this late period of the season with no other view than to preclude the allies, by insidious delays, from the benefit of those advantages which their combined military operations would enable them to secure. On those advantages alone, (under the recent experience of Tippoo Sultaun’s violation of the treaty of Seringapatam, and under the peculiar circumstances of that prince’s offensive alliance with the French,) can the allies now venture to rely for the faithful execution of any treaty of peace concluded with Tippoo Sultaun.

‘The allies cannot suffer Tippoo Sultaun to profit by his own studied and systematic delay; nor to impede such a disposition of their military and naval force as shall appear best calculated to give effect to their just views.

‘Bound by the sacred obligations of public faith, professing the most amicable disposition, and undisturbed in the possession of those dominions secured to him by treaty, Tippoo Sultaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace; and compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honor.

‘For a period of three months, he obstinately rejected every pacific overture; in the hourly expectation of receiving that succour which he has eagerly solicited for the prosecution of his favorite purposes of ambition and revenge. Disappointed in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conquest, he now resorts to subterfuge and procrastination; and by a tardy, reluctant, and insidious acquiescence, in a proposition which he had so long and repeatedly declined, he endeavors to frustrate the precautions of the allies, and to protract every effectual operation until some change of circumstances and of season shall

lity, and his Lordship repeated the same proposal on the 10th of December, 1798.

‘Tippoo Sultaun declined, by various evasions and subterfuges, this friendly and moderate advance on the part of the allies; and he manifested an evident disposition to reject the means of pacific accommodation, by suddenly breaking up, in the month of December, the conferences which had commenced with respect to the districts of Amerah and Souleah; and by interrupting the intercourse between his subjects and those of the Company on their respective frontiers. On the 9th of January, 1799, the Governor General, being arrived at Fort St. George, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances in the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, renewed with increased earnestness the expression of his Lordship’s anxious desire to dispatch an ambassador to the Sultaun.

‘The Governor General expressly solicited the Sultaun to return an answer within one day to this letter; and as it involved no proposition either injurious to the rights, dignity, or honor of the Sultaun, in any degree novel or complicated, either in form or substance, it could not require a longer consideration. The Governor General waited with the utmost solicitude for an answer to the reasonable and distinct proposition contained in his letter of the 9th of January, 1799. Tippoo Sultaun, however, who must have received this letter before the 15th of January, remained silent; although the Governor General had plainly apprized that prince that dangerous consequences would result from that delay. In the meanwhile the season for military operations had already advanced to so late a period as to render a speedy decision indispensable to the security of the allies.

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silence of the Sultaun must be considered as a rejection of the proposed amicable negotiation.

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‘The allies cannot suffer Tippoo Sultaun to profit by his own studied and systematic delay; nor to impede such a disposition of their military and naval force as shall appear best calculated to give effect to their just views.

‘Bound by the sacred obligations of public faith, professing the most amicable disposition, and undisturbed in the possession of those dominions secured to him by treaty, Tippoo Sultaun wantonly violated the relations of amity and peace; and compelled the allies to arm in defence of their rights, their happiness, and their honor.

‘For a period of three months, he obstinately rejected every pacific overture; in the hourly expectation of receiving that succour which he has eagerly solicited for the prosecution of his favorite purposes of ambition and revenge. Disappointed in his hopes of immediate vengeance and conquest, he now resorts to subterfuge and procrastination; and by a tardy, reluctant, and insidious acquiescence, in a proposition which he had so long and repeatedly declined, he endeavors to frustrate the precautions of the allies, and to protract every effectual operation until some change of circumstances and of season shall

revive his expectations of disturbing the tranquillity of India, by favoring the irruption of a French army.

‘ The allies are equally prepared to repel his violence, and to counteract his artifices and delays.

‘ The allies are therefore resolved to place their army in such a position, as shall afford adequate protection against any artifice or insincerity, and shall preclude the return of that danger which has so lately menaced their possessions.

‘ The allies, however, retaining an anxious desire to effect an adjustment with Tippoo Sultaun, Lieut. General Harris, Commander in Chief of his Majesty’s and the Honorable Company’s forces on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar, is authorised to receive any embassy which Tippoo Sultaun may dispatch to the head quarters of the British army; and to concert a treaty on such conditions as appear to the allies to be indispensably necessary for the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

‘ By order of the Right Hon. the Governor General,

‘ N. B. EDMONDSTONE.’

The Bombay army, under Lieut. General Stuart, marched from Cannanore on the 21st of February: General Harris entered the Mysore territory on the 5th of March, and commenced his operations by the reduction of several forts on the frontier.

General Harris was not only invested with unrestricted military command, but was empowered to exert all the civil authority which would have belonged to the Governor General in his situation. He was further provided with a political and diplomatic commission, composed of Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Lieut. Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm, with Captain Macaulay as Secretary. This commission was not, however, entitled to act, except in obedience to the orders of the General.

‘ On the 6th of March, Tippoo Sultaun passed his own frontier, and attacked a detachment of the Bombay army near Sedaseer. This attack though sustained by a body not exceeding 2,000 men, was repulsed, and the enemy thrown into disorder, even before General Stuart could collect the whole of his divided force. After this signal failure, Tippoo retreated precipitately

to his camp at Periapatam, and remained there until the 11th of March, without making any further attempt to molest the Bombay army. He then moved to Seringapatam, and afterwards marched from thence to meet the Madras army under General Harris.

The army under General Harris was not ready to make its united movement upon Seringapatam until the 9th of March. Many delays occurred from the British army being overloaded with equipment and materials for siege, in addition to the cumbrous baggage of the Nizam's army, a host of brinjarries, and the innumerable followers of the camp. The draught and carriage bullocks died in great numbers, and the arrangements necessary to remedy this evil compelled the army to halt on the 11th, on the 14th, on the 15th, and again on the 18th. On the 21st, it encamped at Cankanelli; and on the 22nd, two tanks of importance, which the enemy had begun to destroy, were secured at Achel.

This slow movement brought the army, on the 27th, only as far as Mallavelly; when, on approaching the ground of encampment, the army of Tippoo Sultaun was discovered at a few miles distance, drawn up on a height. The advanced picquets of the British army were attacked by the enemy, and more troops being sent out to their aid, a general action ensued. The British army, under General Harris, formed the right wing; and the Nizam's army, with the 33rd regiment, under Colonel Wellesley, formed the left. The right wing, having deployed into line, began to advance: an opening between two brigades tempted the Sultaun, and he marched against it in person with a body of cavalry with much spirit; but was unsuccessful, as it produced no disorder in the British ranks, which soon outflanked the enemy's left. In the meanwhile the division commanded by Colonel Wellesley was formed nearly opposite the enemy's extreme right, which was strongly posted on the elevated crest of a rocky ridge. General Harris having dispatched an aide de camp to Colonel Wellesley, approving of the attack he had proposed, and also to General Floyd to support it, Colonel Wellesley advanced *en échelon* of battalions,

supported by three regiments of cavalry; when a column of the enemy, consisting of about 2000 infantry, moved forward in excellent order towards the 33rd regiment, which corps, reserving its fire, with the utmost steadiness received that of the enemy at a distance of about sixty yards; then quickening its advance, the column gave way, and was thrown into disorder. General Floyd, seizing this critical moment, charged them with his cavalry, and destroyed great numbers.

The army moved on the 28th of March to Sosilay, where there is an easy ford to cross the river Cauvery. Tippoo Sultaun being thus disappointed in the route which General Harris took after the affair of Mallavelly, fell back on Seringapatam; and the British army arrived on the ground for the siege of that fortress on the 5th of April. A new line of entrenchments had been constructed between the Dowlut Baug to the Periapatam Bridge, and covered that part of the fort. Between these works and the Cauvery, the infantry of Tippoo Sultaun were encamped. Fronting the east, the right of the British camp was posted on high commanding ground, whence it gradually descended to the left flank, which was doubly secured by an aqueduct or watercourse, and by the Cauvery. From the left of the position, the aqueduct took an easterly direction till within 1700 yards of the fort, when it turned off towards the Sultaunpettah Tope. There were several ruined villages and rocky eminences in front that afforded cover, from whence the enemy threw rockets which fell among the tents of the British camp. It became, therefore, indispensable to the quiet and security of the besieging army to dispossess the enemy of these posts without loss of time. For this purpose the 12th regiment and two battalions of sepoy, with their guns, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Shawe, of his Majesty's 12th regiment; and another division, consisting of the 33rd regiment and a Native battalion, under Colonel Wellesley, were ordered to be in readiness at sunset on the 5th; and whilst Colonel Shawe was to attack the posts at the aqueduct, Colonel Wellesley was to make a diversion by scouring the Tope.

The following letter, found amongst the papers of the late General Lord Harris, relates to this attack.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris,
Commander in Chief.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 5th April, 1799.

‘I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and I shall therefore be obliged to you if you will do me the favor to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines and show it to me. In the meantime I will order my battalions to be in readiness.

‘Upon looking at the Tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah, you have the Tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.

‘I am, my dear Sir,

‘Your most faithful servant,

‘*Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Both divisions marched a little after sunset. The darkness of the night was very unfavorable to their advance. Colonel Shawe seized a ruined village within forty yards of the aqueduct; Colonel Wellesley advancing about the same time with one wing of the 33rd regiment to attack the Tope, was, upon entering it, assailed on every side by a hot fire of musketry and rockets. This circumstance, joined to the extreme darkness of the night, the badness of the ground, and the uncertainty of the enemy's position, were inducements to confine the operations to the object of causing a diversion to Colonel Shawe's attack, and to postpone any further attempt until a more favorable opportunity should occur; and Colonel Wellesley, after the firing had ceased, returned to camp to make his report of the failure of the Commander in Chief*.

* *A literal extract from the private Diary of Lieut. General Harris, Commander in Chief of the British Army marching in the Mysore country in the year 1799, between the 4th and 8th of April.*

‘4th April. Commissioned General Baird to form a party of not less than the flank companies of his brigade, supported by the picquets, to beat up a tope in front of the ground the picquet was on, and said to have had parties of men with arms assembling on it. It appears to me, from the report, they are only intended for rocketing; but our beating them up, instead of their attempting us, will have the best effect; for if our intelligence is true, his whole army are in a complete state of terror; of course we should keep it so.

‘5th April.

General Harris, finding that the village occupied by Colonel Shawe was very much annoyed by the enemy's musketry from the aqueduct, to which the enemy had sent a reinforcement;

' 5th April. Marched to Seringapatam; rocketed a little on the march. Took up our ground nearly for the siege. Concluded the arrangements for detaching General Floyd and General Stuart. Formed parties for the attack of the post occupied formerly by the Bombay troops, and the tope of Sultaunpettah. Lieut. Colonel Shawe to command the detachment for the Bombay post; Colonel Wellesley that of the tope, as being composed of his own people. Remained under great anxiety till near twelve at night, from the fear our troops had fired on each other. Lieut. Colonel Shawe very soon reported himself in possession of the post; but a second firing commenced, and as he had previously sent to know what had become of the two native battalions, I could not be satisfied but that, in the dark, they had mistaken each other. It proved that all the firing was from the enemy, his Majesty's 12th regiment scarcely firing a shot the whole night. Near twelve, Colonel Wellesley came to my tent in a good deal of agitation, to say he had not carried the tope. It proved that the 33rd, with which he attacked, got into confusion and could not be formed, which was great pity, as it must be particularly unpleasant to him. Altogether, circumstances considered, we got off very well. General Baird's expedition of last night so far answered our expectations, as he fell in with a small party of the enemy's horse and cut up eight or ten of them, which will tend to prevent their plaguing us with rockets, I trust. He missed his road coming back, although one would have thought it impossible; no wonder night attacks so often fail.

' 6th April. Determined to make another attack on the tope; Lieut. Colonel Bowser's and Halyburton's corps, with the Scotch Brigade (supported by the 25th dragoons and 2nd regiment native cavalry, on seeing the Sultaun's cavalry appearing from the fort), were destined to assist in this service, and, with scarcely any opposition, carried it.

' Sunday, the 7th. Yesterday evening walked down to the advanced post with Baird and Macleod. Found it very strong against so contemptible an enemy as we have to deal with; and such as may, with a little trouble, be made very strong against any. How fortunate thus to find a good parallel prepared to our hands! The fort fired a great deal yesterday, with no other effect than furnishing shot to us. A long line of cavalry seen coming out of the fort about twelve; reported at three, by Colonel Wellesley, to have come more round our right; and that he has therefore ordered the battalions we spoke of when looking what they were about, on the road which leads to Periapatam. Our foraging party coming in fast; but this cannot be their object, and they would move more rapidly than they have done. Great many of us much fatigued. Beatson, among the rest, very much relaxed and weak. Our duties pretty severe; but if the whole is not pressed on with vigor we shall fail; for no doubt there will be more difficulties to overcome than we yet foresee.

' Monday, 8th. Visited the post taken possession of by Colonel Wellesley on the 6th instant. Found it a continuation of the nullah which makes Shawe's post, but not so favorable in that part for keeping hold of. Directed a burnt village, on a rise above the nullah, to be made the right hand post, by barricading the streets and cutting down the walls to six feet, thickening them next the fort, and putting a bauquette within. Brisk cannonade from the fort. Colonel Close brought Dallas and Hart to speak about the bullock drivers, &c.'

[The Compiler has thought proper to insert, as a note, a copy of this authen-

and that the possession of the Sultaunpettah Tope was absolutely necessary to secure the camp, as well as to support Colonel Shawe's post, ordered a new disposition on the morning of the 6th, to drive the enemy from their whole line of outposts, extending from the Cauvery to the Tope. For this purpose he directed that three simultaneous attacks, under the orders of Colonel Wellesley, should be made, covered by guns previously posted. The troops were paraded: and, at nine in the morning, Colonel Wellesley, with the Scotch brigade, two battalions of sepoy, and four guns, in addition to his former force, again advanced on the Tope, which was soon carried; as parties being detached to take the enemy in flank threw them into confusion, and obliged them to retire with precipitation. Precisely at the same moment, Colonel Shawe quitted the ruined village and rushed upon the enemy; whilst Colonel Wallace drove them out of a village on the right flank. Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, who had accompanied Colonel Wellesley on this service, soon came back; and, on entering General Harris's tent, he announced—'It has been done in high style and without loss.' The posts evacuated by the enemy were immediately occupied by the British troops, who thus secured a strong and connected advanced line, extending from the Cauvery to the village of Sultaunpettah, a distance of two miles; forming, in fact, a line of contravallation, principally by the aqueduct, at a convenient distance from the fort, and from the encampment of the army.

tic document, relating to an affair of little importance, from some circumstances attending it having been detailed in the Memoirs of the late General Sir David Baird, by Mr. Hook. A conversation is there related as having taken place between General Harris and General Baird, on the parade on the morning of the 6th of April: although there is little doubt that both General Harris and General Baird were capable of feeling and acting in the manner represented by Mr. Hook, yet as General Harris makes not the slightest mention of it in his minute private diary, and as Colonel Wellesley does not allude to it in his several letters to General Harris on that and the following days, and until many years afterwards never even heard of it, it is very possible that Mr. Hook has been misinformed.

The authentic documents relating to the appointment of Colonel Wellesley to the command of Seringapatam must exculpate the Commander in Chief for unduly favoring Colonel Wellesley to the prejudice of General Baird, a charge which Mr. Hook has permitted himself to cast upon that honorable and distinguished General Officer.]

The following notes and letters, written by Colonel Wellesley after this attack, show the terms on which he was with his General; and at the same time substantiate a fact, not sufficiently known, that General Harris himself conducted the details of the victorious army which he commanded.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, to Lieut. General Harris.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 6th April, 1799.

‘I find that by moving Malcolm’s corps to the rear a little, and by an arrangement of my posts on my right and rear, I shall be able to protect Meer Allum, the brinjarries, the park, and the cavalry, from any attempts that may be made by horse and rocket boys, which alone seem to me to be destined to annoy us in that quarter.

‘I shall now go out and see what support I can give to my post at Sultaunpettah, and will report to you on my return.

‘I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘Lieut. General Harris.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know whether you think the guards for the outposts can now be reduced a little, as between foraging parties and outline picquets, we have not men enough left to give a relief. The outline picquets were not relieved this morning for want of men. You were talking yesterday of looking at these posts this afternoon, and if you have an inclination I will go with you at any hour you may appoint. I think I can show you a situation where two embrasures might be opened in the bank of the nullah with advantage, and that would add to the strength of the post.

‘I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘Lieut. General Harris.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

3 P. M. 7th April, 1799.

‘A body of horse, of about seven or eight hundred, has passed, and is getting round by my right and your rear. They

keep clear of our picquets, and are most probably a reconnoitring party.

‘ They have some few straggling footmen with them, but I have seen no infantry.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you, that the foragers are coming in fast, well loaded with forage, and I have therefore ordered the battalion to stay where it is, ready to turn out, but (as battalions are now scarce articles) not to move till further orders.

‘ The body of cavalry has passed our right flank, and seems inclining rather to its left. It appears more like a line of march than a body intended for a *coup de main*, as there are with it bullocks and baggage of different kinds. At all events, it can do our right no harm, as, excepting by the high road which Malcolm’s corps will cover as soon as it shall have moved, no cavalry can approach us.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I see the cavalry has come more round our right, and I have therefore ordered the battalion on to the high road, whence it will afford protection to the foragers coming in, as well as to the rear of our camp, should they be inclined to molest it.’

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘ I have drawn back the battalion, as the foragers are come in, and the cavalry have disappeared. As soon as Schoey’s brigade shall have taken up its ground, we shall have four field pieces, at least, bearing upon that road, when I shall have an opportunity of looking at it again. I will let you know whether they will be sufficient, or what will.

‘ I have fourteen 6 pounders, of which eight are out of the lines at the outposts and picquets.

‘ I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

' Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘ Since I returned home, I have received a report from the outposts in Sultaunpettah, that some infantry had passed this evening in the same direction in which the cavalry passed this morning; and there are some persons in this camp who say they saw guns pass likewise.

‘I have not yet received a report from my picquets in my front; when I do, I will let you know what it is.’

‘ At all events, I am prepared for him, if his attack is directed against this flank of your line, whether it be made by day or by night. I do not intend to relieve the outposts until after it is ascertained whether or not he intends to make his push here : if he does attack us here, he will probably attack the outposts at the same time ; and, in that case, we must depend upon your line for the support of our posts.

'I am, my dear Sir, &c.

'Lieut. General Harris.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

' Camp, 7th April, 1799.

‘ The Field Officer of the day was at the picquet in my front till sunset; saw cavalry pass, but no infantry or guns.

' I am, my dear Sir, &c.

'Lieut. General Harris.'

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The siege proceeded, when fresh overtures were made by Tippoo Sultaun. The advanced period of the season and the failure of provisions made it hazardous to delay the siege for an instant; particularly as the Governor General, in his letters to the Court of Directors, afterwards described in his own words:—‘Towards the end of April fresh circumstances arose, which disposed me to think that, if the course of the war should favor the attempt, it would be prudent and justifiable entirely to overthrow the power of Tippoo; accordingly, on the 23rd of April, I signified to Lieut. General Harris my wish that the power and resources of Tippoo Sultaun should be reduced to

the lowest state; and even utterly destroyed, if the events of the war should furnish the opportunity.'

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'7 A.M., 3rd May.

'We did all our work last night, except filling the sand-bags, which could not be done for want of tools: I shall have them filled in the course of this morning, and there will be no inconvenience from the delay, as it was not deemed advisable last night to do more than look for the ford; and it is not intended to do any thing to it until the night before it is to be used.

'Lieut. Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis, I believe, on the left of the breach. He found the wall, which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, seven feet high, and the water (included in those seven feet) fourteen inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Lieut. Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept up upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our working party was in front of the five-gun battery, from which alone we could fire, as we repaired the other.

'Lieut. Lalor is now on duty here with his regiment, but if you wish it, he will remain here to-night, and try the river again.

'I am, my dear Sir, &c.

'Lieut. General Harris.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'I have not heard any thing of the 12 pounders ordered to a new situation by the general orders of yesterday.'

On the 3rd of May the breach appeared to be practicable, and preparations were eagerly made for the assault. On the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the attack were placed in the trenches before daylight, that the enemy might not observe any particular movement. The heat of the day, when the people of the East, having taken their mid-day repast, give themselves up to repose, and when it was confidently expected that the troops in the fortress would be least prepared

to resist, was chosen for the hour of assault ; the experience of former wars, and especially of that under Lord Cornwallis, having proved that the enemy was always found more watchful and alert at night than in the heat of day.

Two regiments and ten flank companies of Europeans, three corps of grenadier sepoy, and 200 of the Nizam's troops, formed the storming party, consisting of 2,500 Europeans and 1,900 Native infantry. Major General Baird, who had solicited the command, divided this force into two separate columns, which, on mounting the breach, were to file off to the right and left. Colonel Sherbrooke commanded the right column, destined for the attack of the southern rampart ; and Lieut. Colonel Dunlop commanded the left, to clear the northern rampart. The forlorn hope of each attack consisted of a sergeant and 12 Europeans, who were followed by two subalterns' parties ; that of the right column was commanded by Lieut. Hill of the 74th, and the other of the left column by Lieut. Lawrence of the 77th regiments. Colonel Wellesley remained in the advanced trenches in command of the reserve, to support the troops in the assault, in case it should be necessary.

At one o'clock the troops began to move from the trenches. The width and rocky channel of the Cauvery, though it contained but little water, its exposure to the fire of the fortress, the imperfection of the breach, the strength of the place, the numbers, courage, and skill of its defenders, constituted such an accumulation of difficulties, that nothing less than unbounded confidence in the force and courage of his men could have inspired a prudent general with hopes of success. The troops descended into the bed of the river, and advanced, regardless of a tremendous fire, towards the opposite bank. ' In less than ten minutes from the period of issuing from the trenches, the British colors were planted on the summit of the breach.' Tippoo Sultaun, although advised by the most judicious of his officers, had neglected to cut a trench, so as to insulate the angle of the fort in which the breach had been effected ; and the assailing parties, under Major General Baird, Colonel Sherbrooke, and Lieut. Colonel Dunlop, taking the

are due to Major Beatson, for the essential assistance given to this branch of the service by the constant exertion of his ability and zeal.

‘ The merit of the artillery corps is so strongly expressed by the effects of their fire, that the Commander in Chief can only desire Colonel Smith to assure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command that he feels most fully their claim to approbation.

‘ In thus publicly expressing his sense of their good conduct, the Commander in Chief finds himself called upon to notice in a most particular manner the exertions of Captain Dowse, and his corps of pioneers; which, during the present service, have been equally marked by unremitting labor, and the ability with which that labor was applied.

‘ On referring to the progress of the siege, so many opportunities have occurred for applause to the troops, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit; but the gallant manner in which Lieut. Colonel Shawe, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, Lieut. Colonel Moneypenny, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. F. St. John, Major Mac Donald, Major Skelly, and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, conducted the attacks on the several outworks and posts of the enemy, demands to be recorded. And the very spirited attack led by Lieut. Colonel Campbell of his Majesty’s 74th regiment, which tended so greatly to secure the position our troops had attained in the enemy’s works on the 26th ultimo, claims the strongest approbation of the Commander in Chief.

‘ The important part taken by the Bombay army, since the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which led to its honorable conclusion, has been such as well sustains its long established reputation. The gallant manner in which the post at the village of Agrar was seized by the force under Colonel Hart, the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there, the vigor with which every attack of the enemy on the outposts of that army was repulsed, and the spirit shown in the assault of the breach by the corps led by Lieut. Colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice; for which the Commander in Chief requests Lieut. General Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and troops employed.

‘ Lieut. General Harris trusts that Lieut. General Stuart

will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and assistance received from him during the present service; in the course of which he has ever found it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty from the warmest feelings of his private friendship.'

'G. O.

'Seringapatam, May 8th, 1799.

'Lieut. General Harris has particular pleasure in publishing to the army the following extract of a report, transmitted to him yesterday by Major General Baird, as it places in a distinguished point of view the merit of an officer, on the very important occasion referred to, whose general gallantry and good conduct, since he has served with this army, have not failed to recommend him strongly to the Commander in Chief.

"If, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack."

Return of the Corps and Regiments which assisted in the Siege and the Assault of Seringapatam.

EUROPEANS.			NATIVE INFANTRY.			
			BENGAL.		MADRAS.	
Corps of Madras Engineers			1st Batt.	10th Regt.	1st Batt.	1st Regt.
Detachment of Bengal			2d do.		2d do.	2d do.
1st Batt. } Madras	Artillery.		1st do.		2d do.	3d do.
2nd do. }			2d do.	Volunteers.	2d do.	5th do.
Detachment of Bombay			3d do.		1st do.	6th do.
H. M.'s 12th Regiment	Infantry.				2d do.	7th do.
— 33rd do.					1st do.	8th do.
— 73rd do.					2d do.	9th do.
— 74th do.			1st Batt.	2d Regt.	1st do.	11th do.
— 75th do.			2d do.		2d do.	
— 77th do.			1st do.	3d do.	1st do.	12th do.
— Scotch Brigade			2d do.		2d do.	
— Regt. de Meuron			1st do.	4th do.		
Bombay Regiment of			1st do.	5th do.		
European Infantry.			The Pioneer Corps.		The Pioneer Corps.	

General Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of Corps composing the army before Seringapatam, from the 4th of April to the 4th of May, 1799:—

	Officers.	Europeans.	Natives.
Killed	22	181	119
Wounded	45	622	420
Missing	—	22	100

In the abstracts it appears that the strength of Tippoo Sultaun's forces on the 4th of May, 1799, consisted of 48,000 men, about 22,000 of whom were either in the fort or in the dependent entrenchments of Seringapatam; and that the army, commanded by Lieut. General Harris, consisted of 8,700 Europeans, and 27,000 natives, of which force 20,000 assisted at the siege.

The Governor General, on the arrival at Madras of the dispatch announcing the fall of Seringapatam, issued the following general order to the army in India:—

General Order by the
Earl of Mornington,
Governor General.

‘ Fort St. George, 15th May, 1799.

‘The Right Honorable the Governor General in Council, having this day received from the Commander in Chief of the allied army in the field, the official details of the glorious and decisive victory obtained at Seringapatam on the 4th of May, offers his cordial thanks and sincere congratulations to the Commander in Chief, and to all the officers and men composing the gallant army, which achieved the conquest of the capital of Mysore on that memorable day.

‘His Lordship views with admiration the consummate judgment with which the assault was planned, the unequalled rapidity, animation, and skill with which it was executed, and the humanity which distinguished its final success.

‘Under the favor of Providence, and the justice of our cause, the established character of the army had inspired an early confidence, that the war in which we were engaged would be brought to a speedy, prosperous, and honorable issue.

‘But the events of the 4th of May, while they have surpassed even the sanguine expectations of the Governor General in Council, have raised the reputation of the British arms in India to a degree of splendor and glory unrivalled in the military history of this quarter of the globe, and seldom approached in any part of the world.

‘The lustre of this victory can be equalled only by the substantial advantages which it promises to establish, in restoring the peace and safety of the British possessions in India, on a durable foundation of genuine security.

‘The Governor General in Council reflects with pride,

satisfaction and gratitude, that, in this arduous crisis, the spirit and exertion of our Indian army have kept pace with those of our countrymen at home; and that in India, as in Europe, Great Britain has found, in the malevolent designs of her enemies, an increasing source of her own prosperity, fame, and power.

‘ By order of the Right Honorable the Governor
 ‘ General in Council,
 ‘ JOSIAH WEBBE, Secretary to Government.’

It may be necessary here to mention that Colonel Wellesley entered the fort immediately after the assault; and was one of the few present when Tippoo Sultaun's body, which was still warm, was discovered in the sally-port gateway.

Major General Baird having desired to be relieved, and Colonel Wellesley, being next on the roster, was ordered, on the same night, to command within the fort.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, to Lieut. General Harris.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Ten A. M. 5th May.

‘ We are in such confusion still, that I recommend it to you not to come in till to-morrow, or, at soonest, late this evening. Before I came here, General Baird had given the treasure in charge to the prize agents. There is a guard over it, and it appears to be large.

‘ As soon as I can find out where the families of the great men are, I shall send guards to take care of them. At present I can find nobody who can give me any information upon the subject. I have here now the 12th, 33rd, and part of the 73rd, and the 2nd of the 5th, 2nd of the 9th, and 2nd of the 7th. These troops ought to be relieved this day as early as possible by two regiments of Europeans and three of sepoy.

‘ I am, dear Sir, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Harris.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ There are some tigers here, which I wish Meer Allum would send for, or else I must give orders to have them shot, as there is no food for them, and nobody to attend them, and they are getting violent.’

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, to Lieut. General Harris.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Half past twelve

‘I wish you would send the provost here, and put him under my orders. Until some of the plunderers are hanged, it is vain to expect to stop the plunder.

‘I shall be obliged to you, if you will send *positive* orders respecting the treasure.

‘I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

‘Things are better than they were, but they are still very bad; and until the provost executes three or four people, it is impossible to expect order, or indeed safety.

‘There are, at this moment, sepoy and soldiers belonging to every regiment in your camp and General Stuart’s in the town.

‘It would surely be advisable to order the rolls to be called constantly, and to forbid any people to leave camp.

‘For a few days likewise it would be very advisable that the officers of the army should suspend the gratification of their curiosity, and that none but those on duty should come into the town. It only increases the confusion and the terror of the inhabitants. Till both subside in some degree, we cannot expect that they will return to their habitations.

‘I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘I hope the relief is coming, and that I shall soon receive your orders respecting the treasure.’

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Harris.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Seringapatam, 6th May, 1799.

‘Plunder is stopped, the fires are all extinguished, and the inhabitants are returning to their houses fast. I am now employed in burying the dead, which I hope will be completed this day, particularly if you send me all the pioneers.

‘It is absolutely necessary that you should immediately appoint a permanent garrison, and a commanding officer to the place; till that is done, the people will have no confidence in us, and every thing must be in confusion. That which I arrange this day, my successor may alter to-morrow, and his the next day; and nothing will ever be settled. A garrison which would be likely to remain here, would soon make themselves comfortable, although it might be found convenient hereafter to change some of the corps sent in: but these daily reliefs create much confusion and distrust in the inhabitants; and the camp is at such a distance, that it is impossible for the officers or soldiers, or sepoy to get down their dinners.

‘I shall be obliged to you, if you will order an extra dram and biscuit for the 12th, 33rd, and 73rd regiments, who got nothing to eat yesterday, and were wet last night.

‘In hopes that you will attend to my recommendation to send a garrison in to-morrow, I shall look out for a place to accommodate one or two battalions of Europeans, and three or four of sepoy.

‘I am, my dear Sir, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Harris.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Wellesley exerted himself to the utmost to prevent excess of every kind; Cowle flags were hoisted in different parts of the town, and public notice given that severe examples would be made of any persons detected in the act of plundering the houses, or molesting the inhabitants; for, although General Baird had given protection to some of the principal families, and used every means in his power to restore order in the town, yet it could not be expected that the tumult and disorder, which were unavoidable in a city so extensive taken by assault, could immediately subside; nor was it until four men had been executed for plunder that perfect tranquillity was restored. These examples and the personal activity of Colonel Wellesley, who went himself to the houses of the principal families with safeguards, soon inspired a general confidence. The inhabitants, who had quitted the town during

the night of the storm, and had slept in the open fields, returned quickly to their houses and occupations. In a few days the bazaars were stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandise, for which there was a ready and advantageous sale; and the main street of Seringapatam, three days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair, than that of a town just taken by assault.

General Harris, on the receipt of Colonel Wellesley's report, contained in his letter of the 6th, lost no time in carrying into effect the recommendation. He immediately directed a regular garrison for Seringapatam, and appointed Colonel Wellesley to the command of it, as he felt satisfied that he could not confide the complicated and delicate duties of a civil and political, as well as of a military nature, required from the officer in charge of the capital, to any other better qualified to conduct them with advantage. These duties of necessity devolved upon the officer in command of Seringapatam, in consequence of the sudden and complete dissolution of Tippoo's government, the dispersion of all the public functionaries, and the helpless situation of the late Sultaun's family, then in the palace.*

* Mr. Hook, in the 'Memoirs of the late General Sir David Baird,' professes to give the copies of the letters of remonstrance of that officer to the Commander in Chief, on the appointment of Colonel Wellesley to the command of Seringapatam, as well as to his former appointment to the command of the army of his Highness the Nizam. Mr. Hook was probably not aware that the original letters remain in the possession of the family of the late Lord Harris; or on comparing these original letters with those published by Mr. Hook, it appears that some passages have been omitted in his publication of them, which in a great measure contain in themselves a refutation of the partiality and injustice of which General Baird complained.

The great end of history is the exact illustration of events, as they occurred; and there should be neither exaggeration nor concealment to suit angry feelings or personal disappointment. It should contain the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Mr. Hook has, however, in this respect, wandered from his proper province as an historian, at the expense of the reputation of his gallant hero, by attacking the judgment, justice, impartiality, and duty of the Commander in Chief and of the Governor General, for the purpose of establishing a grievance and an insinuation, which the facts and results do not warrant; and to which Sir David Baird, had he been alive, would have

The complete subjugation of Mysore was the immediate consequence of the fall of Seringapatam and the death of Tippoo Sultaun. A commission, composed of Lieut. General Harris, Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, was appointed by the Governor General in Council, to carry into effect his arrangements for the settlement of the conquered territories. Captains Malcolm and Munro were appointed Secretaries to the Commission. The arrangements for removing the family of the late Sultaun were particularly committed to Colonel Wellesley, who had been confirmed as Governor subsequent to the capture. 'The detailing this painful but indispensable measure,' said the Governor General, in his instructions, dated 4th June, 1799, 'cannot be entrusted to any person, more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by the occasion, than Colonel Wellesley; and I therefore commit to his discretion, activity, and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by the other members of the Commission.'

On the settlement of the Mysore territory by the Commission, the provinces which fell under British protection and authority became a distinct command; and Colonel Wellesley was confirmed in it by the Governor General, receiving his orders from, and reporting direct to, the Supreme Government at Calcutta. He availed himself of the intelligence and experience of all those who had served under Tippoo Sultaun, and replaced them in their former posts; their chief security

never given countenance. But Mr. Hook, being a civilian, could not be aware of the impropriety of publishing these letters of remonstrance, which are so inconsistent with subordination and discipline; particularly when it is known that General Baird requested permission to withdraw his intemperate appeal, which General Harris, from personal regard, allowed to pass without further notice. And certainly, what General Baird thought unworthy of him as a soldier, his biographer had no right to bring up against him, with no other apparent purpose than that of attacking the honor of those who are living, and the memory of those who are dead.

for retaining which rested on the correct discharge of their several duties. His active superintendence, discernment, impartiality and decision, in the arduous and important duties of the civil, as well as of the military administration of the command, were such as to have fully warranted his brother's judicious selection; and he soon deserved and obtained the gratitude of the conquered people.

The tranquillity of Mysore was, however, interrupted by the celebrated Dhoondiah Waugh, one of those adventurers who have so often subverted empires and founded dynasties in the East. This freebooter had formerly committed various depredations on the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, who, having secured his person, compelled him to conform to the Mahomedan faith, and afterwards employed him in military service; but either detecting him in some treacherous project, or suspecting his fidelity, the Sultaun confined him in irons in Seringapatam. After the assault he was released, with several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the British troops, and immediately fled, accompanied by several of Tippoo's disbanded army. He proceeded to Bednore, and laid that rich country under severe contributions, which he exacted with unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating throughout the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder. His band being considerably increased, a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under Lieut. Colonel Dalrymple, moved against him from Chittledroog; and another light corps, under Colonel Stevenson, advanced into Bednore in another direction. Dhoondiah crossed the Toombuddra, followed by these corps, and suffered considerable loss; but he effected his escape into the Mahrattah territory; and the pursuit ceased, as the Governor General had strictly prohibited any violation of the Mahratta frontier.

Colonel Wellesley was now in chief command, the following being published in the General Orders of the Commander in Chief of the Madras army.

‘ G. O.

‘ Head Quarters, 11th Sept. 1799.

‘ The Commander in Chief, being about to proceed to the Presidency, in obedience to the orders of the Governor General in Council, appoints Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to command the troops serving above the Ghauts.’

Colonel Wellesley was long occupied in visiting the different provinces of the late conquest, making roads and communications, and organizing the civil as well as the military establishments.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro, Collector at Canara.

‘ Camp in the province of Loo,
8th October, 1799.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ I have received your letter, and as I had some hand in sending you to Canara, I am much concerned that your situation there is so uncomfortable to yourself. It is one of the extraordinary and unaccountable circumstances attending the commission at Seringapatam, that my brother and I should have imagined that you were desirous of being appointed Collector at Canara; that we should have been seriously angry with Kirkpatrick, who, it appeared, had proposed an arrangement for you, of which you did not approve, and which had occasioned your refusal of the appointment for which you wished; and yet that, after all, we should have done you an injury, instead of a benefit, (as well as one to the service,) which we intended. I acknowledge that, knowing my own wishes in your favor, and being very sensible of my brother’s, I cannot but attribute what has happened, to yourself. One word from you would have stopped the arrangement, and there is every reason to believe that provision would have been made for you elsewhere. It is, perhaps, not now too late. I have written to my brother upon the subject; and I hope that he will make an arrangement suitable to your wishes. Whether he does or not, I hope that you will believe that your cause has not failed for want of zeal on my part.

‘ This country, into which I have come to visit my posts on the Marhatta frontiers, is worse than that which you curse daily. It is literally not worth fighting for. Hereafter, it will be necessary to communicate with it from Canara; and I have desired the amildar to make a good road from Soopah towards your borders. I am told that Seedasheeghur is not more than

sixty miles by the road from Soopah, my most western post; that in the war of 1780, a detachment of Matthews's army advanced upon Soopah by that road. I wish that you would desire one of your people to communicate with the amildar of Soonda respecting this road, and that you would have a good one made from Seedasheeghur to meet it.

'The drubbing that we gave to the Marhattas lately has had the best effects; and although all the robbers are in motion to cut each other's throats, they treated us with the utmost hospitality, and have sent back our people whom they had driven away.

'Believe me, &c.,

'Major Munro.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

'MY DEAR MUNRO,

'Seringapatam, 2nd March, 1800.

'Since Colonel Close's return to Seringapatam, I have had some conversation with him respecting the thieves in Soonda. It has appeared to him and to me, that the only mode by which you can expect to get rid of them, is to hunt them out. In the province of Bednore we employed some of the Rajah's cavalry; with the support of our infantry, some thieves were caught, some of them were hanged, and some severely punished in different ways: the consequence has been, that lately that country has not been visited by them; and most probably a similar operation in Soonda would have a similar effect. I have spoken to Purneah* on the subject, and I find that he can assist with about two hundred and fifty or three hundred horsemen, without inconvenience; these, divided into two or three small parties, supported by our infantry, would give a proper *shekar* †; and I strongly advise you not to let the Marhatta boundary stop you in the pursuit of your game when you shall once have started it. Two or three fair hunts, and cutting up about half a dozen, will most probably induce the thieves to prefer some other country to Soonda, as the scene of their operations. Let me hear from you upon this subject, and if you approve of the plan, I will make all the arrangements for putting it into execution.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Munro.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* The celebrated dewan of Mysore.

† A hunt.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Seringapatam, 7th May, 1800.

‘ I am glad to find that your people in Canara are so free from the foul crime of rebellion. We shall not be able, in this year, to make an impression on Kistnapah Naig, which will keep him entirely quiet; but on the 30th of last month he received a beating from Colonel Montresor, who took from him his post of Arakeery, which will, at least, give him reason to believe that it is not easy to keep our troops out of any place into which they are ordered to enter. The entire subjection of him depends upon the destruction of his strong holds; and for that, as we cannot expect much more fair weather, we have not at present a sufficiency of time.

‘ Colonel Montresor is now gone through to the Bipolla ghaut; but I do not expect from that, that we shall be able to re-establish the tappall upon the road; that, I am afraid, must still go round by Canara. Measures have been taken for collecting in Canara as many troops as Lieut. Colonel Mignan will require: one battalion must come from Goa, if he wants it, and another from Malabar. It would not do to withdraw every thing from Goa; for in that case how is Soonda to be assisted, if it should be attacked? Not from Mysore certainly, for we cannot get there during the rains. Not from Canara, where there are no troops; but from Goa.

‘ Soonda appears a favorite place of yours, and it is extraordinary that you should not have provided for it some way or other; and that you should not allow your amildars to assist the paymasters in procuring provisions for the forts which are to be kept.

‘ I think that upon the whole we are not in the most thriving condition in this country. Polygars, nairs, and moplas in arms on all sides of us; an army full of disaffection and discontent, amounting to Lord knows what, on the northern frontier, which increases as it advances like a snowball in snow. To oppose this, we have nothing that ought to be taken from the necessary garrisons, and the corps we have in them are incomplete in men and without officers. If we go to war in earnest, however, (and if we take the field at all, it ought to be in earnest,) I will collect every thing that can be brought together from

all sides, and we ought not to quit the field as long as there is a discontented or unsubdued poligar in the country.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Seringapatam, 10th May, 1800.

‘ I have again, this morning, received a letter from the Commanding Officer at Hullihall, stating that the paymaster’s servant cannot get grain, and that he begins to feel a want in the bazaar.

‘ I acknowledge, in general, the propriety of the refusal of those charged with the civil government to interfere with the purchases which it may be necessary to make on account of the military ; but there may be cases in which such an interference may be not only proper, but absolutely necessary. If the paymaster’s servant is dishonest, it may be possible that nothing more may be required than to turn him out ; and an honest servant may be able to procure all he wants, notwithstanding the neutrality of the sircar. But it may happen that the sircar, or his servants, are not neuter ; and that (as it is stated in this instance) the amildar throws difficulties in the way of procuring the necessary supplies for the troops ; in that case, surely the interference of the collector is necessary to check the improper conduct of his servant.

‘ As the frontier is disturbed, it may happen that the people are unwilling to part with their grain at any price ; or there may be a real scarcity, which may induce the people to wish to keep it. But in either of these cases, it surely is necessary that the Company’s garrisons should be provided ; and in order to procure a provision, the authority of the civil government must be exercised.

‘ There are other circumstances under which the interference of the civil government might be desirable in order to procure supplies ; but I only allude to those which it appears have hitherto prevented us from making any store of grain in Soonda ; and into them I wish you would make inquiry, and to take such measures as you may think necessary to remedy the evil.

‘ Government have approved of the measure of throwing grain into the garrisons in that country ; they will require

about one thousand loads; and all I can say upon the subject is, that if the grain is not procured, I do not conceive that I am answerable for the consequences.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Seringapatam, 17th May, 1800.

‘ You will be glad to hear that I have called away both the battalions of native infantry from Goa; and I hope they will join the army, which is forming to the northward, by the end of the month.

‘ I have attended to your suggestion regarding the interference of commanding officers of posts in the prices of grain, and I have this day issued an order of which the enclosed is a copy.

‘ An officer of Chandergooty has contrived to drive away all the bazaar people; and if I find upon inquiry that this is to be attributed to his improper interference, I shall put in execution the threat contained in the order.

‘ I hear from Mr. Gordon this morning, that your amildar in Soonda has given his servant some assistance, and the consequence is, that he has got some grain. I hope the assistance given has not been to enable him to get it at a low price, but to get it at any price the ryots may ask.

‘ You will perceive, by my letters to Colonel Mignan, that I am entirely of your opinion regarding the utility of providing against disaffection at all points; we shall do well if we can provide against those places where it manifests itself by acts of violence and rebellion. I have urged Colonel Mignan to provide for a call which you may make upon him for troops, to be stationed at Vittell; and as he will not require so large a force for the blockade of Jemadabad as I expected, he will be able to furnish what you may require.

‘ Colonel Montresor has been very active and successful in Bullum. But I am of opinion that nothing has been done which can tend effectually to put an end to the rebellion in that country; and that the near approach of the rains renders it impossible to do that which alone, in my opinion, will ever get the better of Kistnapah Naig.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

In May, 1800, whilst occupied in the important command of Mysore, Colonel Wellesley received a proposition from his brother, Lord Mornington, to be united with Admiral Rainier in the charge of an expedition which the Governor General, in obedience to the King's orders, had planned against Batavia. The letter of the Governor General, and the consequent correspondence, will best elucidate the motives which induced Colonel Wellesley to decline this service.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley. (Extract.)

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Calcutta, 13th May, 1800.

‘ The object of this letter is to propose to you a situation which I think it would be unjust not to submit to your option, although I entertain considerable doubts whether you will think it eligible with a view to your individual interests; and I am still more apprehensive of the difficulty of reconciling it with the exigencies of the public service in Mysore at this crisis. You will, however, exercise your own free judgment on the subject, and I have no doubt that you will decide in the manner most honorable to yourself and most advantageous to the public.

‘ I have received instructions directly from the King, addressed to me in my individual capacity, empowering me to take measures for the purpose of endeavouring to induce the settlement of Batavia to accept his Majesty's protection on the same terms lately granted to the colony of Surinam, and some time past to those of Demerara and Berbice.

‘ It is not the intention of ministers to attempt to reduce, or to retain Batavia by force. Indeed, a sufficient force for that purpose could not be spared from India at the present moment. The plan is, therefore, to send to Batavia several ships of war, with a force sufficiently numerous to furnish an ostensible justification to the Governor General to surrender the colony into our hands.

‘ The King has given me the power of selecting the persons who are to conduct this expedition; and I have thought it, on every ground, most expedient to place the principal conduct of the equipment and negotiation in the hand of Admiral Rainier. It will be necessary to join a military officer in the commission with him, and a conscientious sense of duty induces me to think

that you are the most fit person to be selected for that service, provided you can safely be spared from Mysore for the period of the expedition, which I imagine may be four or five months, but probably cannot be longer.

‘ In proposing this service to you, justice requires that I should state to you its contingent advantages. I have every reason to believe that the warehouses at Batavia contain public property to a very large amount. This will necessarily fall to the crown ; and in the instructions for the expedition to Surinam, the whole property of the same description was reserved expressly for his Majesty’s pleasure, no part of it being granted to the captors by the tenor of those instructions.

‘ The instructions, however, are so expressed, as to admit little doubt that the King’s intention was ultimately to grant a proportion, at least, to the captors, of the public property at Surinam. My instructions, with relation to this point, will be precisely the same as those given in England with respect to Surinam ; and I therefore conclude, that the expedition will be very advantageous to the naval and military commanders.

‘ The importance of Batavia, especially when considered with relation to the illicit and contraband trade, which has excited so much alarm in England, will certainly render the success of the negotiation creditable to the officers concerned in conducting it. No previous negotiation has taken place with Batavia ; and it is therefore possible, although I believe it to be, from all accounts which have reached me, highly improbable, that our flag of truce may not be favorably received, and that the whole plan may fail of success.

‘ Having thus stated the whole of this case to you without reserve, I desire you to make your option, upon your own view of the question ; with this single reservation, that I am persuaded you will be aware of the necessity of postponing any decision upon it until you have ascertained that Lord Clive can substitute in your present command, during your absence, a person completely satisfactory to him in every respect. For this purpose, I request you to write privately to Lord Clive, and to act according to his wishes.

‘ On this part of the question, much will certainly depend on the season which the Admiral may choose for the enterprise. I cannot, at present, give you any information on that subject ; but I shall request Lord Clive to communicate to

you the Admiral's intentions by the earliest possible opportunity.

‘ Believe me, my dear Arthur,

‘ Yours most affectionately,

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ MORNINGTON.

Mr. Webbe, Secretary to Government, to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Fort St. George, 24th May, 1800.

‘ I shewed you a note from Wilks at Seringapatam, mentioning the receipt of dispatches from hence for restraining the Dutch at Batavia; and I think we agreed that an armament against that place would be impracticable, under the present circumstances of this government.

‘ Since my arrival, I find that orders are arrived from Bengal, for equipping a naval and military force for that purpose; the latter, however, not to exceed 600 European, and 600 natives. Lord Mornington proposes that you should command the military; but no force is to be used, and the government of Batavia is to be persuaded to put itself under our protection, in the same manner as Surinam: this negotiation will be conducted by the Admiral, so that I fear you are likely to obtain neither fame nor prize money.

‘ I have no doubt, therefore, that you will prefer your present independent and extensive command, to being stationed at Batavia; and Lord Clive has made a most earnest request to the Governor General, that some other officer may be appointed, as his Lordship would not know how to supply your temporary absence from Mysore. I hope this will be satisfactory to you.

‘ The immediate consequence of this order is the countermand of the 74th; and the 12th is so sickly, that it is again gone into quarters at Ponawally. So that if the expedition goes on, we shall be under the unavoidable necessity of crippling your detachment. Lord Clive has however recommended, on the ground of our defective military force on the coast, that no detachment should be made from this army for the armament; and I hope that Lord Mornington will consent to convert it into a naval blockade. In the event of the expedition going on, his Lordship has requested that the European regiment may be partly drawn from Goa for the service in Mysore.

‘ You are to pursue Dhoondiah Waugh wherever you may

find him, and to hang him on the first tree. For this purpose you will receive immediate authority to enter the Marhatta frontier.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ JOSIAH WEBBE.

Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George, to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 26th May, 1800.

‘ You have been already apprized by Mr. Webbe, that the Governor General has received his Majesty’s commands to take measures, in conjunction with Vice Admiral Rainier, to induce the settlement of Batavia to accept the protection of Great Britain; upon terms similar to those which have been granted to the colony of Surinam. To effect this important object, it is intended to open a negotiation with the leading people in Batavia; and in order to give weight to the negotiation, it is proposed that a considerable portion of the Vice Admiral’s squadron, accompanied by a land force under the command of a respectable officer, should be in readiness to blockade the principal Dutch ports in the island of Java.

‘ The force allotted for this expedition is to consist of a detachment of artillery and 600 Europeans, to be furnished by this Presidency and Ceylon, and of the Bengal Marine battalion, now encamped in this neighbourhood.

‘ By a private communication which I received last night from Lord Mornington, I find it is his Lordship’s desire, that I should inform him how far I may think it advisable for you to quit your present command, for a few months, that you may be joined with Admiral Rainier in the conduct of the negotiation with Batavia, and take the command of the troops intended for embarkation. But in all events it is his Lordship’s wish, that the option between the two situations should be left to the decision of your own choice.

‘ Previous to my receipt of Lord Mornington’s private letter, I had, in a dispatch of the 24th instant, fully stated to his Lordship my sentiments upon the inexpediency and danger of further weakening our present incomplete and divided army; and I have not scrupled to give it as my opinion, that in the actual state of affairs in the Carnatic and in Mysore, it will be most for the public good to attempt the attainment of the object of his Majesty’s commands by a naval blockade only, of

the principal port of Batavia. But whatever may be the result of Lord Mornington's deliberation upon my dispatch, I have deemed it my duty to represent, that it is not possible for you to quit your present command even for a few months, without the greatest detriment to the affairs of Mysore; and I have made it my earnest request that his Lordship will select some other officer for this service.

‘ In sending you, therefore, the offer of the command of the land forces about to sail to the eastward, I have no hesitation in recommending in the strongest terms, and in requesting you, if I may be permitted so to do, to remain in a situation which I have long felt, and still feel, that you fill with singular advantage to our own country, as well as to Mysore; a situation in which for the prosperous settlement of our new acquisitions, integrity and vigilance of conduct are indispensable; and in which your acquired knowledge and experience, especially in the event of active operations, must give you the advantage over other men; and in which I should find it not only difficult, but impossible to replace you to my satisfaction. I remain, with respect and sincere regard, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ CLIVE.

‘ P.S. I learn from Admiral Rainier that the detachment of his Majesty's ships, which he proposes to appoint for the service in question, will be ready in three weeks.’

Lieut. Colonel Close to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Laal Baug, 29th May, 1800.

‘ I have now to intimate that I have just received a confidential communication from the Presidency, containing matter which quite alarms me.

‘ In consequence of orders from home, a force is to be sent off from the Coast to take charge of Batavia, and it is said you are destined to command it. How is this to be reconciled? Is not Mysore a great charge, and is not the command of the troops in it at the present conjuncture particularly important? Lord Clive, I understand, cannot bear the idea of your quitting this country; and concluding that the conduct of the service at Batavia cannot be viewed as equally important as your present charge, means to solicit Lord Mornington to forbear taking you from Mysore. I hope your inclinations go with his Lordship's intention on this point.

‘ I cannot prevail on myself to look forward to the various uncomfortable consequences that would follow your vacating the command here.

‘ Yours most faithfully,

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ BARRY CLOSE.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Josiah Webbe, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George.

‘ MY DEAR WEBBE,

‘ Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

‘ I have received a letter from Lord Mornington, in which he offers me the command of the troops intended against Batavia, provided Lord Clive can spare me from this country. I have written to Lord Clive upon the subject, a letter which he will probably communicate to you; and I have left to him to accept for me Lord Mornington’s offer or not, accordingly as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period at which he would propose to depart from the coast upon this service.

‘ The probable advantages and credit to be gained are great; but I am determined that nothing shall induce me to desire to quit this country, until its tranquillity is ensured. The general want of troops, however, at the present moment, and the season, may induce the Admiral to be desirous to postpone the expedition till late in the year. In that case it may be convenient that I should accompany him; but I beg, if you have any conversation with Lord Clive, you will assure him, that if it should be in the smallest degree otherwise, I shall be very sorry to go.

‘ It appears by Lord Mornington’s letter to me, that the order for the attempt upon Batavia comes direct from the King, and that it is reckoned a matter of some importance in England. I think it probable that it will be made; although not immediately, on account of the great want of troops, and the employment already cut out for those we have at command.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Josiah Webbe, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have just received your letter of the 24th, and you will perceive that I have decided upon the offer in the manner that Lord Clive would wish. Lord Mornington, in his letter to me, seems to think that it will be advantageous to me, and

from the importance of the object, in England, one from which I may derive some credit; but I feel all that entirely out of the question, and I leave it to Lord Clive to decide according to his sense of the public convenience.'

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive.

' MY LORD,

' Camp at Currah, 29th May, 1800.

' I have just received a letter from Lord Mornington, by which he offers me the military command of certain troops intended to be sent on an expedition against Batavia, provided your Lordship can spare me from this country.

' I am fully aware of the advantages which may attend, and of the credit which may be gained by the attainment of the object proposed in sending troops to that place; but, under the present circumstances of this country, I cannot express a wish to quit it.

' From the information which your Lordship will have of the time at which Admiral Rainier would prepare to go to Batavia, you will be enabled to judge whether it may possibly be convenient to the public service that I should accompany him. I beg, therefore, that your Lordship will give Lord Mornington an answer, whether I am to be employed on this service or not, according to your Lordship's view of the public interest and convenience, after having ascertained from the Admiral the period of his departure from the coast.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lord Clive.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Earl of Mornington.

' MY DEAR M.,

' Camp at Curruh, 29th May, 1800.

' I have received your letter of the 13th instant, and I am very much obliged to you for the offer which you make me of sending me with the Admiral to Batavia.

' I do not deny that I should like much to go; but you will have learned, before you receive this, that my troops are in the field, and it is therefore probable that Lord Clive will be desirous that I should remain in this country until its tranquillity is ensured, and the troops can be sent back to their different garrisons. I have written to him upon the subject, and I have desired him to accept your offer for me or not, as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascer-

tained from the Admiral at what time he proposes to depart from the coast on this service. If he should not depart until late in the year, I think it more than probable that I shall be able to go with him. I do not know which of the services will answer best; but I am certain that it will be more easy to spare troops from the Carnatic and Mysore, towards the end of the year, than it is at this moment.

‘ Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy; but, from circumstances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this country of Canara and Malabar, that that man should be given up to us; and I doubt not that before now you will have made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have information that letters have been received by most of them, either from him, or from others written in his name, calling upon them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company’s government, or that of their allies; and his invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance favorable to their views.

‘ The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity; and nothing will be more easy, if the Marhattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are not, it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to this object. I was aware that this was the case before the troops were collected; and although I was certain that it was the only mode of saving this country from being plundered, I did not like to put it in execution without Lord Clive’s orders.

‘ It was clear that when an army should be collected to oppose a man who had an asylum in the Marhatta country, and who may therefore be reckoned a part of the Marhatta state, the government would be committed with that of the Marhattas, and our honor would require that we should go through with the business until that man should be given up to us, or that we should have some adequate security for his good behaviour.

‘ If, then, the government of Poonah is inclined to give this man up to us, or to co-operate with us in his destruction, it may

be possible for me to go to Batavia. If they should not, matters here will take a very serious turn, and no prospect of advantage or of credit to be gained shall induce me to quit this country.

‘ Besides the destruction of this Dhoondiah, there are other objects, which comparatively, however, are of a trifling nature. The attainment of these might be given in charge to other people, if it should be thought desirable to postpone the expedition to Batavia until matters are settled on the Marhatta frontier.

‘ Ever yours, most affectionately,

The Earl of Mornington.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Cheyloor, 31st May, 1800.

‘ I had the honor of writing to you on the 29th instant, after I had received a letter from Lord Mornington upon the same subject with that from your Lordship of the 26th. Since I wrote to you on the 29th, I have received your Lordship’s instructions of the 25th, which I am proceeding to put in execution ; and I beg leave to decline to accept the command of the troops destined to sail with the squadron under Admiral Rainier.

‘ When I wrote to your Lordship on the 29th, I imagined that, under the present circumstances, it might have been desirable to postpone to send troops on this service until a late period of the year, when it might possibly have been convenient that I could accompany them ; but as it appears that the Admiral will be prepared to sail in three weeks, I cannot think of relinquishing the command with which your Lordship has intrusted me at this interesting period, for any object of advantage or credit to be gained in another place.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Earl of Mornington, created Marquis Wellesley, to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley. (Extract.)

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Fort William, 6th June, 1800.

‘ Lord Clive has pressed for your continuance in Mysore with an earnestness so honorable to you, that I think you cannot accept the command of the forces destined for Batavia ; indeed, I suspect that you could not quit Mysore at present.

Your conduct there has secured your character and advancement for the remainder of your life, and you may trust me for making the best use of your merits in your future promotion.

‘ Ever, my dear Arthur,

‘ Yours, most affectionately,

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

In the mean time that bold adventurer, Dhoondiah Waugh, had re-appeared at the head of a very numerous body, with which he ravaged the Mysore frontier. It was found necessary again to send a force to subdue him ; and Colonel Wellesley, with detachments of the army of Mysore, proceeded in person against him.

The details of the short but decisive campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh are described in the following letters of Colonel Wellesley to his friends, Lieut. Colonel Barry Close and Major Munro ; and also in the official dispatches published in the General Orders of the Governor in Council at Fort St. George.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ Camp, left bank of the Toombuddra,
26th June, 1800.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd instant, and its enclosure ; and I am obliged to you for the intelligence which you give me, that a lac of Behaudry pagodas, for the use of the troops in this country, were likely to leave Cundapoor on the 23rd instant. From a conversation which I had with Mr. Webbe at Seringapatam, early in the last month, I had reason to expect that this sum would have been at Nuggur some time ago. I sent orders to the officer commanding in Soonda to drive the party which had got possession of Budnaghur out of that post. He would have done this before now, according to the former orders which his predecessors received from me, only that he has found it impossible to move even a small detachment of the troops under his orders, for want of the common assistance which the country can afford.

‘ This, he informs me, the amildars have refused to give ; and I am waiting here at this moment for a battalion of Bombay sepoy, which are detained at Hullihall, in Soonda, for want of a few bullocks, which cannot be provided without the civil government.

‘ If the officer commanding in Soonda should be enabled to detach a force to get possession of Budnaghur, I do not propose to have a post there, and I conceive that it will be expedient to raise as many more peons as you can get in Soonda. The number of troops allotted to that province, by government, was one battalion; and although it is certainly much exposed, I have not means of increasing that force at present.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ Camp, three miles South of Havery,
3rd July, 1800.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ I do not deny that I did believe that you were not quite so ready to assist my wants as you might have been, as I understood from Mr. Webbe that you had been desired to send to Nuggur all the money which you had in your treasury, and which was not immediately wanted for other purposes; and I therefore did not think it necessary to take any further steps to procure the money, than to desire the officer in command at Nuggur to have in readiness an escort to bring it to camp. I also thought, and from the complaints which have been received, it appears to be true, that your servant in Soonda gave no assistance whatever to enable the battalions, marching through that district, to move. For want of money and every thing, one of them has not joined me yet; and, from what I am going to tell you, you will perceive that it is probable that I shall not see it for some time.

‘ Dhoondiah has beat Goklah; and I am informed that a body of the troops of the latter fled to Hullihall with Chintomeny Rao, where they are at this moment.

‘ Dhoondiah followed them, and if the battalions had not marched before the 30th of June, on which day was the action, it is probable that Dhoondiah will have kept such a watch upon Hullihall, as to have rendered it impossible for them to march since. I have no orders to take possession of any part of the country, and I have hitherto put the Bhow's people in possession of every part that has fallen into my hands. I have done this as much because I have no troops to spare for garrisons, as because it is a most desirable and necessary thing to me, that the country on this side of the Werdah, towards the

Rajah's frontier, should be settled, that I may draw from it its poor resources, and have my communication with Mysore unimpeded. I enjoy all these advantages at present; and I am therefore desirous not to risk the loss of them, even for a moment, by asking you to come up to settle this country. The change of government would, I fear, have this effect; and, besides, as I already told you, I have no order to take possession of the country in any manner.

‘ I approve of your proposal to advance your peons to Hangal, or where else you please, when your amildars hear that I have crossed the Werdah. I will also apprize you when I shall have done so. It will be proper that I should tell the Bhow that I have desired them to enter the Savanore country, and to possess themselves of the districts on the borders, for the general good.

‘ It appears to me, that when at Hangal they will be able to assist me with some rice, of which I stand wofully in need: all that I have comes from the rice countries in Mysore, which are at a distance of about a month's march; and you will perceive that, to bring it to me, will require a tolerably large number of brinjarries. If I could get a little at Hangal it would be a great relief.

‘ Desire your amildars to let me know if they can give me any assistance whatever in rice; from what country it is to come; to what place I am to send for it; the distance such place may be from Savanore; and such other information regarding it as they can afford.

‘ There is not a single paddy field in this whole country, but plenty of cotton-ground swamps, which in this wet weather are delightful.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

‘ I have received your letters of the 7th and 12th, and I have written to your amildar at Bonawasi, to desire him to increase his peons as much as possible, to endeavor to drive the banditti out of Soonda, and to retake Budnapoor, in concert with the officer at Mudnapoor, to whom orders will be sent to make another attempt on that place. I have also desired the amildars, if the attempt on Budnapoor should fail, at all events

to turn the siege into a blockade, and to advance and take possession of Hangal, and give protection to the inhabitants on the borders. If we cannot restore tranquillity to Soonda in any other manner, I must stretch out that way myself, which will certainly do the business effectually.

‘ I am prevented from doing so at this moment by the necessity of looking out for the safety of Bowser on one side, and of the remains of Goklah’s army on the other.

‘ I have given Dhoondiah one run, and I have established an opinion of our superiority in our own people, in his army, and in the country in general. His people begin already to leave him. I have not time to write you the particulars.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

‘ I was joined last night by Goklah’s cavalry, and expect to be joined this day by that under Chintomeny Rao. This materially alters my situation as it stood in regard to Soonda. In order to get the corps from Hillcah, it must now come to me; and, on its route, it may as well clear out Budnaghur, and all that country. I have sent orders accordingly; and if guns are wanted for Budnaghur, they will be furnished from a redoubt which I have upon the Werdah, which is about seven miles from Bancapoor.

‘ Send orders by express to your people, to use every exertion to supply the wants of the corps, and afterwards the same exertions to forward supplies to my troops. I wrote to Mungush Rao this day upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S.—I have just received your letter of the 15th, and I shall be obliged to you if you will delay the sale of your rice for a short time.’

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Col. Close, Resident at Mysore.

‘ Camp, right of the Malpoorba, opposite Manowly,

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

31st July, 1800.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I have struck a blow against Dhoondiah, which he will feel severely. After the fall

of Dummul and Gudduck, I heard that Dhoondiah was encamped near Soondootty, west of the Pursghur hill, and that his object was to cover the passage of his baggage over the Malpoorba, at Manowly. I then determined upon a plan to attack both him and his baggage at the same time, in co-operation with Bowser, whose detachment, however, did not arrive at Dummul till the 28th, and was two marches in my rear; but I thought it most important that I should approach Dhoondiah's army at all events, and take advantage of any movement which he might make. I accordingly moved on, and arrived on the 29th at Allagawaddy, which is fifteen miles from Soondootty, and twenty-six from this place.

‘ I intended to halt at Allagawaddy till the 31st, on which day I expected Colonel Bowser at Nurgoond; but Dhoondiah broke up from Soondootty, as soon as he heard of my arrival at Allagawaddy, sent part of his army to Doodwar, part towards Jellahaul, and part, with the baggage, to this place. I then marched on the morning of the 30th, to Hoogurgoor, which is east of the Pursghur hill, where I learnt that Dhoondiah was here with his baggage. I determined to move on and attack him. I surprised his camp at three o'clock in the evening, with the cavalry; and we drove into the river or destroyed every body that was in it, took an elephant, several camels, bullocks, horses innumerable, families, women, and children. The guns were gone over, and we made an attempt to dismount them, by a fire from this side; but it was getting dark, my infantry was fatigued by the length of the march; we lost a man or two; and I saw plainly that we should not succeed; I therefore withdrew my guns to my camp.

‘ I do not know whether Dhoondiah was with this part of the army, but I rather believe he was not. Bubber Jung was in the camp, put on his armour to fight, mounted his horse, and rode him into the river, where he was drowned. Numbers met with the same fate.

‘ One tandah of brinjarries, in this neighbourhood, has sent to me for cowle, and I have got the family of a head brinjarry among those of several others. I have detained them; but have sent cowle to the brinjarry.

‘ I hear that every body is deserting Dhoondiah; and I believe it, as my Marhattas are going out this night to attack one of his parties gone towards Darwar. They were before very partial to my camp.

‘ I have a plan for crossing some Europeans over the river to destroy the guns, which I am afraid I cannot bring off; and then I think I shall have done this business completely. I am not quite certain of success, however, as the river is broad and rapid.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S.—I have just returned from the river, and have got the guns, six in number. I made the Europeans swim over to seize a boat. The fort was evacuated. We got the boat and guns, which I have given to the Marhattas.’

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Soondooty, 1st August, 1800.

‘ I have received your letters of the 22nd and 23rd. I have sent orders to the commanding officers of Hullihall and Nuggur to furnish ammunition, in moderate quantities, on the requisition of your amildars; in any quantities you please on your own. Do not press Hullihall too much, as I know they are not well supplied there. Take what you please from Nuggur.

‘ I have taken and destroyed Dhoondiah’s baggage and six guns, and driven into the Malpoorba (where they were drowned) about five thousand people; I stormed Dummul on the 26th of July. Dhoondiah’s followers are quitting him apace, as they do not think the amusement very gratifying at the present moment. The war, therefore, is nearly at an end, and another blow, which I am meditating upon him and his brinjarries in the Kittoor country, will most probably bring it to a close.

‘ I must halt here to-morrow, to refresh a little, having marched every day since the 22nd July; and on the 30th, the day on which I took his baggage, I marched twenty-six miles, which, let me tell you, is no small affair in this country.

‘ My troops are in high health and spirits, and their pockets full of money, the produce of plunder. I still think, however, that a store of rice at Hullihall will do us no harm; and if I should not want it, the expense incurred will not signify.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO, ‘ Camp at Kittoor, 7th August, 1800.

‘ I arrived here on the 5th. Dhoondiah had gone even to the sources of the Malpoorba, where he passed, and his baggage is following him. Colonel Stevenson is after them, and will cut off part of the tail, I hope.

‘ I have halted here in the neighbourhood of a bamboo jungle, to make boats, which I must have upon the river, in order to keep up my communication with my rear.

‘ I went yesterday to Hullihall, and was glad to see the country so much improved since last year. It is now one sheet of cultivation. The dubash there ought to be hanged, for having made any difficulties in collecting the rice to be stored.

‘ My principal objects in going to Hullihall were to converse with your amildar respecting his operations upon the frontier; and with him and the paymaster’s man, respecting a depôt for my troops, to be made at that place.

‘ In regard to the forts, the allies, respecting whom it would be inconvenient to convert them into enemies at the present moment, are exceedingly offended at their forts being taken from them by a parcel of peons. Besides, to tell you the truth, now that Dhoondiah is off, I do not see what end it will answer to put your guards in the forts on the frontier, excepting to perpetuate confusion.

‘ The Company do not intend, I believe, in consequence of this warfare, to take possession of any territory. To garrison a fort, then, against the inclination of the person who deems himself, and is supposed by the Government to be the rightful owner, will only tend to bring on a kind of minor contest on the borders, between your amildars and the Marhatta killadars, in which nobody will be gainers, excepting the thieves; and which we, above all other people, ought to endeavour to avoid.

‘ I have, therefore, desired your man to withdraw his people from Jeygoor, &c., which are Goklah’s jaghires; and to use the peons he has raised in preserving tranquillity in that part of Soonda, and not to pass the Company’s borders till he hears further from me.

‘ Many circumstances have tended heretofore to occasion this system of thieving upon the borders; and that of one party

giving protection to the robbers of the other, which I hope will no longer exist.

‘ First, the government of this country has been for some time in a very disturbed state, and every man has been accustomed latterly to do very nearly whatever he chooses.

‘ Secondly, the Marhattas undoubtedly took possession of Soonda; and if they were not encouraged to do so, they were not opposed by us, until a very late period, when they broke off a treaty which was pending. They have always, therefore, looked at our possession of that country, with a jealous and an envious eye; and of course saw with pleasure, and rather encouraged, any attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the people living there under our protection.

‘ I hope now, that, before we shall have done in this country, (if we do not take it for ourselves,) we shall establish in it a strong government—one which can keep the relations of amity and peace. At all events, we have already established a respect for ourselves; we have gained a knowledge of, and have had a friendly intercourse with, the principal people; and it is not probable that they will hereafter be very forward to encourage any disturbance in our country. They see plainly that it is in our power to retaliate; and from what I have seen of their country, and their mode of management, I am of opinion, that at present our robbers would get more than theirs; or, in other words, that they have more to lose than we have. I have had some conversation with them all upon the subject; they promise fairly that nothing of the kind shall happen in future; and I acknowledge that, if we are not to take possession entirely of the country, I rather prefer to trust to what they say, than to the desultory operations of amildars and peons.

‘ In regard to the storing of rice, the dubash swore that he could not get a grain; although the head man of this place, which is only twenty-five miles from Hullihall, promised a large quantity in eight days, on the evening that I arrived here. I was, therefore, under the necessity of desiring your amildar (whom I believe to be the brother of Mungush Rao) to exert himself to collect some. He says that he will begin to do so immediately; and he thinks he shall be able to procure a quantity in a short time, which will be of use to me. He is to put it with the store at Hullihall; to take the receipt of the dubash, and it is to be drawn from thence as I may

want it. There was some doubt whether the amildar would not want money for his purchases of grain upon this occasion, as he had given over to the dubash all he had collected. In order to obviate this difficulty, I have ordered the commanding officer at Hullihall to give him whatever money he may want, from the dubash's treasury, upon his receipt; and I have also desired the commanding officer to inform you whenever he will authorize an issue of money to him.

A store of rice at Hullihall will be a great comfort and convenience to me; and I shall be glad to have it increased to any extent that may be practicable. If you should wish any other arrangement, either for the mode of collecting it, or for that of advancing the money, let me know it, and I will alter that above stated accordingly.

Believe me, &c.

Major Munro.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

MY DEAR MUNRO, Camp on the Malpoorba, 16th August, 1800.

I wrote to you on the 7th, and informed you of the manner in which Dhoondiah had escaped. A detachment from Stevenson's corps followed his track, and the road was covered with dead camels, bullocks, and people; but we got hold of nothing.

Bowser has since crossed the river Malpoorba, and has advanced to Shawpoor; and he tells me, that he found many dead cattle and people of all ages and sexes on the road. The people of the country beyond Shawpoor plundered 4000 brinjaries. I am now employed in crossing the Malpoorba, and I hope to be prepared to advance in two or three days. I shall leave something on this side, in case Dhoondiah should double back.

I wrote you fully respecting your amildars on the 7th: since that day I have received a letter from Soubah Rao, (whose name, by the by, I never heard till he put himself in possession of part of the country,) in which he tells me that he will neither come to me, nor withdraw his tannah, without orders from you; and he makes many bad excuses for this determination. I had no idea that he had so many peons as he says he has, (1200,) or I should not have called him to me; and I have since begged of him to go wherever he pleases, and never

let me see or hear of him again. I agree with you, that, provided he does not disturb my rear, his expedition will do me more good than harm with my allies.

‘ I have put them to the test respecting the thieves you mention at Mundragoor. They promise that the cattle shall be forthwith restored, and that the head men of those villages, which, by their own acknowledgment, are inhabited by thieves only, shall be given up to me.

‘ Your people at Hullihall are behaving capitally: they have sent me leather for my boats.

‘ Captain Greenlay informs me that they will send me some arrack, which I expect from Goa; and this will be a considerable relief to my cattle.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO, ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 20th August, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 14th. My state of supplies is as follows:—I have 1200 loads in the grain department, and 1500 full brinjarries in camp; I am told that I have 5000 between the Werdah and Malpoorba; and as the head man has not deceived me lately, I believe it. Besides that, 3000 brinjarries left me at Kittoor on the 5th, in order to fill along the borders of Soonda, Savanore, and Darwar. There are 5000 brinjarries full, who are following the Nizam’s camp; but some of them, I believe, have only jowarry.

‘ Now for my consumption. It is impossible to say exactly what it is, when every body can get as much rice as he can eat; as Marhattas, Moguls, and all, go to the same bazaar on one day, and to different bazaars the next; and it is not practicable to form any rational estimate.

‘ The fighting men of the Company’s troops, to whom alone I allow rice in times of scarcity, consume eighty loads a day, including those of Bowser’s detachment. Thus, then, as long as rice is produced at all in the bazaars, that is to say, while we are in a country which produces rice, I allow about 100 loads of brinjarry to be sold: or, if the country is plentiful, I allow still more. When rice was not to be got in the country, as was the case between the Werdah and Toombuddra, and, indeed, till we came to Kittoor, I allowed none to be sold by

the brinjarries, excepting to the grain department ; and I issued it to the troops at the rate of half a seer gratis. They then consumed eighty bags per diem.

‘ At this rate of consumption, I have now in camp some thirty-three days’ rice ; and between the rivers, Lord knows what. It is, however, very clear that I am now in no want, and that I am not likely to suffer any.

‘ The brinjarries I look upon in the light of servants of the public, of whose grain I have a right to regulate the sale as I may find most advantageous to its interests ; always taking care that they have a proportionate advantage. But, besides these, there are another set of people who have attended my camp ; these are dealers from Mysore, of whom I have kept no account. They come and sell their grain, and go off again ; and, till we arrived at Kittoor, the rice they brought was all that was sold. Of these, I am told, there are many upon the road at this moment.

‘ I look forward in future to the following sources of supply : first, a few hundred loads at Hullihall, suppose five hundred ; secondly, when the season opens, two thousand one hundred loads, for which I will make the brinjarries go to the Seedasheeghur river ; thirdly, as much more from Canara as you can let me have.

‘ You see, by the state of my supplies, that I can wait till the ghauts are practicable for bullocks ; and I must beg of you to let me know the road, and the name of the place to which I shall send upon the Seedasheeghur river ; and the districts to which you would wish my brinjarries to go in future.

‘ My ideas of the nature of the Indian governments, of their decline and fall, agree fully with yours ; and I acknowledge that I think it probable that we shall not be able to establish a strong government on this frontier. Scindiah’s influence at Poonah is too great for us ; and I see plainly, that, if Colonel Palmer* remains there, we shall not be able to curb him without going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as the present moment ; and probably by bringing forward, and by establishing in their ancient possessions, the Bhow’s family under our protection, we should counterbalance Scindiah, and secure our own tranquillity for a great length of time. But I despair of it ; and I am afraid that we shall be reduced

* Colonel Palmer was the British Resident at Poonah.

to the alternative of allowing Scindiah to be our neighbour upon our old frontier; or of taking this country ourselves.

‘ If we allow Scindiah to be our neighbour; or if the country goes to any other through his influence, we must expect worse than what has passed—thieves of all kinds, new Dhoondiahs, and probably Dhoondiah himself again. If we take the country ourselves, I do not expect much tranquillity.

‘ In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo, and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandize ourselves at the expense of the Marhattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment, and of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies; at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government, and of defending ourselves, are proportionably decreased.

‘ Upon all questions of increase of territory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am in general inclined to decide that we have enough; as much, at least, if not more than we can defend.

‘ I agree with you that we ought to settle this Marhatta business, and the Malabar Rajahs, before the French return to India; but I am afraid that to extend ourselves will rather tend to delay, than accelerate the settlements; and that we shall thereby increase, rather than diminish, the number of our enemies.

‘ As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country, I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with,—if indifference constitutes that character.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Honorable the Court of Directors. (Extracts.)

‘ HONORABLE SIRS,

‘ Fort William, 31st August, 1800.

‘ 13. The letter from the Resident at Hyderabad of the 25th of March, recorded on our proceedings of the annexed date,

will inform your Honorable Committee of the depredations committed by the rebel Dhoondiah Waugh in the territories of his Highness the Nizam, and of the preparations which that robber had been making for renewing his excesses, not only in the Nizam's dominions, but in those of the Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore.

‘ 14. The considerable force which Dhoondiah Waugh was stated to have collected, joined to his well-known character, rendered it indispensably necessary that the most vigorous and decisive measures should be adopted, for the timely and effectual removal of the danger with which the territories of the Company and of its allies were menaced.

‘ 15. We, therefore, directed the government of Fort St. George to issue immediate orders to the commanding officer, and to the resident in Mysore, for attacking and dispersing the force collected by Dhoondiah Waugh, whenever they might deem such an attack necessary or expedient, for the protection of the possessions of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore. We authorized the government of Fort St. George to furnish the commanding officer in Mysore with power to attack Dhoondiah even within the boundaries of the Marhatta empire ; but we directed the Governor in Council to explain to the officer commanding in Mysore, that should it be necessary for the Company's troops to pass the Marhatta frontier, they were not to remain within the territories of that State longer than should be absolutely requisite, and that, during the continuance of our troops within those territories, the strictest discipline and most perfect regularity must be observed, in order to preclude any ground of complaint on the part of the Peshwah.

‘ 16. We also directed the government of Fort St. George to offer a considerable reward for the apprehension of Dhoondiah Waugh ; and as he could be viewed in no other light than that of a robber and murderer, we directed that in the event of his falling into the hands of our troops he should be publicly executed, as soon as his person was identified.

‘ 17. The position which this robber had taken within the frontier of the Marhatta empire, combined with various circumstances in the conduct of the Peshwah, seemed to countenance a suspicion that he was secretly encouraged by the court of **Poonah** ; but reference to the personal character of Bajee

Rao, as well as to the actual state of the government of Poonah, induced us to attribute the undisturbed establishment of Dhoondiah in the district of Savanore, to the imbecility rather than to the collusion of the Peshwah. Subsequent events have abundantly justified this conclusion.

‘ 18. For the instructions which were transmitted to the Resident at Poonah on this subject, we beg leave to refer your Honorable Committee to the accompanying copy of a letter written to Colonel Palmer, by order of the Governor General on the 11th of May, directing him to endeavour to obtain the Peshwah’s consent to the entrance of the Company’s troops eventually into the Marhatta territories, in pursuit of Dhoondiah Waugh.

‘ 19. The Peshwah repeatedly refused his consent to this measure, under the pretence of its being rendered unnecessary, by the peremptory orders which he professed to have dispatched to his officers on the southern frontier of his dominions to unite and attack Dhoondiah, and to expel him from the Marhatta territories. So great, indeed, was the reluctance manifested by the court of Poonah to admit our troops within its territories, that the Peshwah, after many frivolous objections, first endeavoured to limit the number to be admitted to three battalions of infantry, and 1000 cavalry, stating that he would direct Dhoondiah Punt Goklah to form a junction with them, and to attack the insurgent. His Highness, however, was subsequently induced to consent to the entrance of our troops in any number which we might judge necessary.

‘ 20. We also transmitted instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad, for the employment of any part of the subsidiary force which might be requisite on this occasion, being confident that his Highness the Nizam would be sufficiently disposed to contribute his endeavours towards the effectual restraint of the excesses of Dhoondiah ; and we have the satisfaction to inform your Honorable Committee, that we were not disappointed in this expectation, his Highness having cheerfully and readily complied with every application made to him on the subject by the Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ 21. In the month of May Dhoondiah entered the Savanore district (belonging to the Peshwah), seizing on all the forts near which he passed in his march, and stationing a garrison in each of them. The Hon. Colonel Wellesley, commanding

the forces in Mysore, pursued the rebel immediately upon hearing of his motions, and, on the 21st of June, attacked and took by assault the fort of Rany Bednore. Colonel Wellesley advancing towards the Werdah, soon cleared the country situated between that river and the Toombuddra, of Dhoondiah's adherents, driving them from the different forts which they occupied. In the mean while, Dhoondiah himself having fallen in with a small body of Marhatta troops (which was moving through the Kittoor district for the purpose of joining Colonel Wellesley), surprised and completely routed it. This body of Marhatta troops was commanded by Dhoondiah Punt Goklah, one of the Peshwah's officers, who was slain in the action.

' 22. On the 11th of July, Colonel Wellesley, who was at this time encamped at Savanore, received intelligence that Dhoondiah had advanced to Hangal, declaring an intention of giving battle to the British army. Colonel Wellesley, immediately throwing all his baggage into Savanore, proceeded, on the morning of the 14th, towards Hangal. Dhoondiah, however, did not wait for our army, but moved rapidly in the night of the 13th of July to Darwar, leaving a garrison of six hundred men in Hangal. This place was stormed by Colonel Wellesley, and carried on the evening of the 14th. On the 15th, Dhoondiah left Darwar and proceeded to Argherry, with the intention of crossing the Malpoorba; but that river being at this time full, and Dhoondiah having no boats, a prospect opened of our army being able to overtake him on its bank. Notwithstanding the rapidity of his motions, Colonel Wellesley arrived on the 26th of July at Dummul, a strong fort on the Marhatta frontier, which it was of importance to secure: there was in the fort a garrison of 1000 men, which Colonel Wellesley summoned. The commander, however, refusing to surrender the place, it was attacked and carried by escalade. The killadar fell into the hands of our troops and was hanged.

' 23. On the 30th of July, Colonel Wellesley came up with a division of Dhoondiah's army, encamped on the right, or south bank of the Malpoorba, opposite to the fort of Manowly. This camp was instantly attacked by the cavalry, which were the only troops of Colonel Wellesley's army yet arrived. All the baggage in this camp, two elephants, with many camels, horses,

and bullocks, fell into the hands of our troops, and every soldier belonging to the enemy in the camp was either killed on the spot, or driven into the river. Dhoondiah's guns had been removed to the opposite bank of the river before Colonel Wellesley reached this camp; but they were seized on the next day by a party of Europeans, who, in the most spirited manner, swam across the river for the purpose. Our latest accounts from Colonel Wellesley's army are dated the 8th instant. By these it appears that Dhoondiah had escaped by marching through the jungles of Kittoor, round the sources of the Malpoorba. Dhoondiah's army was considerably diminished by desertion; and Colonel Wellesley was preparing to prosecute the pursuit until the forces of the rebel should be entirely dispersed. Part of the subsidiary force in the service of the Nizam, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Bowser, had effected a junction with Colonel Wellesley's army.

‘ 24. The judicious arrangements made by the Honorable Colonel Wellesley in providing and securing the resources necessary to the movement of his army, as well as the great ability displayed by that officer in the application of his means to the purposes of the campaign, deserve the highest approbation, and have accordingly received the most distinguished notice from the Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George. We have observed, with the greatest pleasure, the spirit of alacrity which has distinguished the movements of Colonel Wellesley, and the perseverance with which the troops under his command have sustained a succession of fatiguing service.

‘ 25. The skill of Colonel Wellesley's dispositions for attacking the enemy, and the gallantry with which his orders for the execution of them have been obeyed, cannot have failed to impress the adherents of Dhoondiah with a just sense of our superiority, and must contribute essentially to maintain, in the estimation of the neighbouring states, the character of the British arms.

‘ 26. Although the emissaries of Dhoondiah had been extremely active throughout Mysore, in their endeavors to alienate the inhabitants from the established government, we have the satisfaction to assure your Honorable Committee, that the success of those attempts was merely partial, and in no degree considerable; and that since the important advantages obtained

over the rebel by Colonel Wellesley, the tranquillity of Mysore has been completely restored.

‘ We have the honour to be, &c.

‘ WELLESLEY

‘ *The Secret Committee.*’ (and other Members of the Council).

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Jellahaul, 1st Sept., 1800.

‘ Unfortunately the Malpoorba fell on the 24th; and Dhoondiah crossed it on that night, and the next day, at a ford a little above the junction with the Kistna. Lieut. Colonel Capper was then at this place; and although I had desired the Marhattas to push on for the very place at which Dhoondiah passed, and Colonel Capper entreated them to attend to the orders I had given them, and promised to follow with all expedition, they would not move from the camp. If they had occupied that place, Dhoondiah could not have passed there; he must have returned to look for another ford higher up the river, and would then have fallen into my hands. He is gone towards the Nizam’s country; and left behind him on the north side of the Malpoorba, a tandah of ten thousand brinjarries, which I have got. I likewise took and destroyed five excellent guns and carriages, some ammunition, tumbrils (Company’s), arms, ammunition, &c. &c., which he had left in charge of the Jalloor polygar.

‘ I have crossed the river, and I am going to the Nizam’s country immediately.

‘ I sent off this day eight hundred empty brinjarry bullocks to load in Canara, on the Seedasheeghur river. I shall desire them to go by Hullihall, and shall give them a letter to your amildar there. I shall be obliged to you if you will write to him, and point out the place to which you would wish them to go to get the rice.

‘ I shall also be obliged to you, if you will let me know what sum of money you can let me have between this time and the month of November, after providing for the payment of the troops in Canara, till January; when I understand that you begin to make your collections.

‘ I have money in camp to pay the troops for the months of August, September, and nearly for October.

‘ I expect at Chittledroog one lac of rupees; so that you see

I am not in want ; although it is necessary to look forward to the means of procuring a supply in future.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO, ‘ Camp at Yepulpurry, 11th September, 1800.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I gained a complete victory yesterday, in an action with Dhoondiah’s army, in which he was killed. His body was recognised, and was brought into camp on a gun attached to the 19th dragoons.

‘ After I had crossed the Malpoorba, it appeared to me very clear, that if I pressed upon the King of the Two Worlds, with my whole force, on the northern side of the Dooab, his Majesty would either cross the Toombuddra with the aid of the Patan chiefs, and would then enter Mysore ; or he would return into Savanore, and play the devil with my peaceable communications. I therefore determined, at all events, to prevent his Majesty from putting those designs in execution ; and I marched with my army to Kanagherry. I sent Stevenson towards Deodroog, and along the Kistna, to prevent him from sending his guns and baggage to his ally the Rajah of Soorapoor ; and I pushed forward the whole of the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry in one body, between Stevenson’s corps and mine.

‘ I marched from Kanagherry on the 8th, left my infantry at Nowly, and proceeded on with the cavalry only ; and I arrived here on the 9th, the infantry at Chinnoor, about fifteen miles in my rear.

‘ The King of the World broke up on the 9th, from Malgherry, about twenty-five miles on this side of Raichore, and proceeded towards the Kistna ; but he saw Colonel Stevenson’s camp, returned immediately, and encamped on that evening about nine miles from hence, between this place and Bunnoo. I had early intelligence of his situation ; but the night was so bad, and my horses so much fatigued, that I could not move. After a most anxious night, I marched in the morning and met the King of the World with his army, about five thousand horse, at a village called Conahgull, about six miles from hence. He had not known of my being so near him in the night,—had thought that I was at Chinnoor, and was marching to the

westward with the intention of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and me. He drew up, however, in a very strong position, as soon as he perceived me; and the victorious army stood for some time with apparent firmness. I charged them with the 19th and 25th* dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regiments of cavalry; and drove them before me till they dispersed, and were scattered over the face of the country. I then returned and attacked the royal camp, and got possession of elephants, camels, baggage, &c. &c., which were still upon the ground. The Mogul and Marhatta cavalry came up about eleven o'clock; and they have been employed ever since in the pursuit and destruction of the scattered fragments of the victorious army.

'Thus has ended this warfare; and I shall commence my march in a day or two towards my own country. An honest killadar of Chinnoor had written to the King of the World by a regular tappall, established for the purpose of giving him intelligence, that I was to be at Nowly on the 8th, and at Chinnoor on the 9th. His Majesty was misled by this information, and was nearer me than he expected. The honest killadar did all he could to detain me at Chinnoor, but I was not to be prevailed upon to stop; and even went so far as to threaten to hang a great man sent to show me the road, who manifested an inclination to show me a good road to a different place. My own and the Marhatta cavalry afterwards prevented any communication between his Majesty and the killadar.

'The brinjarry bags must be filled, notwithstanding the conclusion of the war, as I imagine that I shall have to carry on one in Malabar.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Munro.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'G. O.

By Major General
Braithwaite.

'Head Quarters, Choultry Plain,
24th Sept., 1800.

'The operations of the force employed under the Hon. Colonel Wellesley on the frontier of Mysore have been frequently marked by circumstances which demanded and obtained the applause of the Commander of the army in Chief; but in no instance has judgment in the plan, and gallantry in the

* Afterwards the 22nd light dragoons.

execution of a military movement, been so eminently conspicuous as in the conclusion of the campaign on the 10th instant; when the rebel chief, Dhoondiah Waugh, baffled by the judicious disposition of Colonel Stevenson's detachment, in his attempt to escape in a northern direction, was intercepted in his retreat at Conahgull by Colonel Wellesley, with the cavalry of his division only; and forced to a decisive action, which terminated in his total defeat and death. Colonel Stevenson's detachment on the same day dispersing the remnant of his force, then employed in crossing the Kistna near Deodroog, and seizing the remaining cannon and baggage of the rebel army.

‘ Major General Braithwaite requests that Colonel Wellesley will accept his public thanks for the judgment with which his measures have been planned, and the vigor which has marked every movement of his force. He has particular satisfaction in publishing to the army at large, the very honorable report Colonel Wellesley has made of Colonel Stevenson's conduct, and the activity of the detachment under his command, to which that officer attributes the occurrence of the opportunity he seized of forcing Dhoondiah to a decisive action. And the Commander of the army in Chief is happy to record, in honor of his Majesty's 19th and 25th regiments of light dragoons, and the 1st and 2nd regiments of native cavalry, that those corps, under Colonel Pater, Majors Paterson and Blaquiere, and Captains Doveton and Price, composed the line, whose rapid charge upon a body of 5000 horse, formed to receive them, achieved this glorious conclusion to a campaign, distinguished throughout every stage of its operations by peculiar and progressive energy.

‘ The Hon. Colonel Wellesley has expressed his obligation to Lieut. Colonel Bowser, for his services with his detachment from the subsidiary force; and reported, in the warmest terms of praise, the uniform good conduct of the troops in general, under circumstances of uncommon fatigue and difficulty, incident to the nature of the recent service. The advantages derived from the able arrangements of the gentlemen charged with the department of supply, have been pointed out to the particular notice of the Commander of the army in Chief; and he is happy in adding this record of their merits to the general expression of his thanks to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, and

the army employed under his orders, on the recent service on the frontiers of Mysore.'

' G. O.
By Government. }

' Fort St. George, 25th Sept., 1800.

' 1. The Right Hon. the Governor in Council is pleased to publish, in General Orders, the following dispatches received from Colonel the Hon. Arthur Wellesley :—

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Adjutant General of the Army of Fort St. George.

' SIR,

' Camp at Yepulpurry, 10th Sept., 1800.

' After I had crossed the Malpoorba at Jellahaul, I marched on the 3rd instant, and entered the Nizam's territories at Hum-munsagur on the 5th. As Colonel Stevenson was obliged to cross the Malpoorba in boats, he was not able to advance from that river till the 4th. It appeared to me probable, that when Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede our communication ; or, if favored by the Patans of Kurnool, and the Poligars on the right bank of the Toombuddra, he would pass that river, and would enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. I therefore determined to bring my detachment to the southward, and to prevent the execution of either of those designs, if he had them ; and afterwards to push him to the eastward, and to take such advantage of his movements as I might be able ; while Colonel Stevenson should move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance of between twelve and twenty miles from the Kistna, and the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry collected in one body between his corps and mine.

' I arrived at Kanagherry on the 7th ; and on the 8th moved with the cavalry to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to this place ; the infantry being on those days at Huttty and Chinnoor, about fifteen miles in my rear. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah moved from Mudgherry, a place about twenty-five miles from Raichore, at which he had been encamped for some days, towards the Kistna ; but on his road, having seen Colonel Stevenson's camp he returned and encamped about nine miles in my front, between me and Bunnoo. It was clear that he did not know that I was so near him ; and

I have reason to know that he believed that I was at Chinnoor.

‘ I moved forward this morning, and met his army at a place called Conahgull, about six miles from hence. He was on his march, and to the westward; apparently with the design of passing between the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor. He had only a large body of cavalry, apparently 5000, which I immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regiments of cavalry.

‘ The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood for some time with apparent firmness; but such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those four regiments, which I was obliged to form in one line, in order at all to equalize in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles. Many, among others Dhoondiah, were killed; and the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country.

‘ Part of the enemy’s baggage was still remaining in his camp about three miles from Conahgull; I returned thither, and got possession of elephants, camels, and everything he had*.

‘ The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy’s force, and, above all, the death of Dhoondiah, puts an end to this warfare; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my sense of the conduct of the troops. Upon this last occasion, their determined valor and discipline were conspicuous; and their conduct, and that of their commanding officers, Colonel Pater, Major Paterson, Major Blaquiere, Captain Doveton, and Captain Price, have deserved my most particular approbation. At the same time I must inform you,

* Among the baggage was found Salabuth Khan, a son of Dhoondiah, an infant of about four years old. He was taken to Colonel Wellesley’s tent, and was afterwards most kindly and liberally taken care of by him. Sir Arthur, on his departure from India, left some hundred pounds for the use of the boy in the hands of Colonel Symmonds, the judge and collector at Seringapatam. When Colonel Symmonds retired from service, the Hon. Arthur Cole, the Resident at the Court of Mysore, took charge of him, and had him placed in the Rajah’s service. He was a fine, handsome, intelligent youth. Salabuth Khan died of cholera in 1822.

that all the troops have undergone, with the greatest patience and perseverance, a series of fatiguing services.

‘ It is also proper that I should inform you how much reason I have to be pleased with the gentlemen charged with the business of procuring supplies for the troops. Notwithstanding the distance of the scene of my operations from the usual sources of supplies, and rapidity of my marches; and the necessity, from the species of warfare carried on, of perpetually altering their direction, I have always been well supplied with everything which the troops could want.

‘ The Marhatta and Mogul cavalry are now employed in the pursuit of the fugitives; and I propose to draw off towards the frontier of the Rajah of Mysore in a few days.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Col. Agnew, Adj. Gen.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Adjutant General of the Army of Fort St. George.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Yepulpur, 13th Sept., 1800.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you, that I have this day received a report from Colonel Stevenson, of his proceedings on the 10th instant; by which it appears that near Deodroog, he came up with and took the only two remaining guns the enemy had, a quantity of baggage, camels, bullocks, brinjarries, &c., and that he dispersed and threw the whole into confusion. Their object had been to pass the Kistna, and to go to Soorapoor: the guns belonged to the Soorapoor polygar, and were destroyed in his country; and Colonel Stevenson found his people employed on the Kistna, giving assistance to the baggage to pass the river. Thus the service upon which the troops have been employed has been completely performed.

‘ I attribute the opportunity which was given of destroying the enemy’s army to the movements of the detachment under Colonel Stevenson; in no part of the army has there been greater exertion, or more fatigue, nor has it been more cheerfully borne; and I conceive Colonel Stevenson, Lieut. Colonel Bowser, and the officers and troops under their orders, to be entitled to my approbation, and to the favorable report of their conduct which I now make to you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Col. Agnew, Adj. Gen.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ 2. The Right Hon. the Governor in Council takes this occasion of expressing to Colonel Wellesley, the high sense which his Lordship entertains of the judicious arrangements made by Colonel Wellesley for the supply of his army, of the indefatigable activity displayed in its operations, and of the distinguished ability manifested in those masterly dispositions which have terminated in the discomfiture and utter defeat of the enemy.

‘ 3. The force of the rebel Dhoondiah having increased to that alarming extent, which menaced the tranquillity of the Honorable Company’s possessions, and those of its allies, in the western provinces of the peninsula, the Right Hon. the Governor in Council attached the greatest degree of political importance to the success of the troops under the command of Colonel Wellesley: and although the implicit confidence reposed in the talents of that officer cannot be strengthened by the successful events of the campaign, his Lordship will feel the greatest pleasure in reporting to the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, and to the Hon. Court of Directors, the solid and extensive advantages derived to the affairs of the Hon. Company under this Presidency, by the able and spirited conduct of the war entrusted to Colonel Wellesley.

‘ 4. The Governor in Council has observed, with the utmost degree of satisfaction, the patience with which the officers and troops under the command of Colonel Wellesley have endured this series of fatiguing service; the spirit of zeal which has distinguished the operations of the army; and above all, the matchless bravery and discipline with which the detachment of cavalry attacked, defeated, and destroyed the collected force of the enemy on the 10th of September.

‘ 5. The Right Hon. the Governor in Council, therefore, directs the officer commanding in the army in chief, to convey to Colonel Wellesley, and to the officers and troops under his command, the public thanks of the Governor in Council, for the important services which they have rendered to the British empire in India.

‘ By order of the Right Hon. the Governor in Council,

‘ JOSIAH WEBBE,

‘ Secretary to Government.’

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO, ‘ Camp at Dummul, 26th September, 1800.

‘ After receiving my letter of the 14th, I hope that you will have sent the rice to Ankolah, notwithstanding that you will before have stopped it, as you state in your letter of the 22nd, and that you will have allowed the brinjarries to go into Canara by the Arbigh ghaut, as you first proposed. If, however, you should have ordered them down to Cundapoor, it does not much signify, as I have plenty ; and I am going over towards Soonda, from which country I expect to draw enough for my consumption during the time that I may find it necessary to remain in its neighbourhood.

‘ Between ourselves, I imagine that I shall have to carry on operations on a much more extended scale than you suspected ; but I am well prepared for everything.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Munro.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Hon. Court of Directors.

‘ HONORABLE SIRS, ‘ Fort William, the 3rd October, 1800.

‘ 1. Our last letter to your Honorable Committee in this department, was dated and closed on the 31st of August ; since that time further details have reached us of the operations of the army under the command of Colonel the Honorable A. Wellesley ; and finally, we have received the satisfactory intelligence of the happy and honorable issue of the expedition against Dhoondiah Waugh, which terminated on the 10th September, by a decisive and brilliant victory obtained under the personal command of Colonel Wellesley, over the remnant of the rebel army, by the death of Dhoondiah Waugh, who fell in the action, and by the entire destruction or dispersion of the troops which that insurgent had assembled on the frontier of Mysore ; deeming these details to be equally interesting and important, we propose to submit them to your Honorable Committee in the present dispatch.

‘ 2. After the destruction (on the 30th of July) of that part of the revolted army encamped near Manowly, Dhoondiah retired precipitately in the direction of Kittoor, whence he effected his escape by penetrating through the jungles in the vi-

cinity of that place, and by taking a circuitous route round the sources of the river Malpoorba. He thus surmounted the difficulty to which he had been reduced by the want of boats, and on the 7th of August he reached Shawpoor, in the vicinity of the river Gulpurba.

‘ 3. Colonel Wellesley, marching from Soondooty, on the 3rd of August, arrived at Kittoor on the 5th; here he was detained until the 10th of August, in preparing boats for the passage of the Malpoorba. Colonel Wellesley justly concluded that boats might be constructed for the passage of the river with more expedition and facility than the movement of the army with its guns and stores could have been effected through the jungles of Kittoor in the track of Dhoondiah’s route.

‘ 4. In the meanwhile, Colonel Stevenson, with Lieut. Colonel Bowser’s detachment, and the 4th regiment of native cavalry, lightly equipped, was detached to some distance in Dhoondiah’s track, for the purpose of cutting off a part of the insurgents’ baggage. This detachment afterwards crossed the Malpoorba before Colonel Wellesley was able to effect the passage, and for some time menaced Dhoondiah’s rear. Colonel Stevenson’s detachment was ordered not to push the rebel force closely until the troops under Colonel Wellesley’s personal command should attain a position sufficiently advanced to support the operations of the detachment.

‘ 5. Dhoondiah continuing his march along the river Gulpurba, to the eastward, attempted to pass that river west of Gokauk, but was prevented in consequence of Colonel Wellesley’s express desire, by a polygar, named Narity Seerjary. Colonel Stevenson’s detachment continued its march along the Gulpurba, while Colonel Wellesley, having completely effected the passage of the Malpoorba, moved along the left bank of the latter river, being accompanied by a force of Marhatta and Mogul cavalry from the Peshwah’s and the Nizam’s armies, acting as our allies against the rebel’s force.

‘ 6. With a view to prevent Dhoondiah from crossing the river with any large body of troops and followers by the passes of the Malpoorba, east of Manowly, and near Badamy, Lieut. Colonel Capper’s brigade, with the Marhatta cavalry, under Chintomeny Roa and Baba Saheb, was detached by the road to the right of the river Malpoorba, and was ordered to occupy the passes most likely to be fordable.

‘ 7. Lieut. Colonel Capper marching for this purpose through the valley of Pursghur, assaulted and carried by escalade, on the 22nd August, the fort of Hoobly, situated in that valley: the garrison of this fort had received cowle from Colonel Wellesley after the action of Manowly, on the 30th July; but had, notwithstanding, plundered the baggage of the dragoons as it passed the fort on the march to Soondooty, on the 1st of August. Colonel Wellesley was prevented by other more urgent objects from punishing the perfidy of this garrison at the time; but the direction of Lieut. Colonel Capper’s march affording a favorable occasion for the purpose, it was not neglected. From Hoobly Lieut. Colonel Capper proceeded on the same day to Sirhitty, another fort, situated about eight miles to the eastward of the former, and occupied by a polygar in the interest of Dhoondiah. The escalade of this fort being found impracticable, the gateway was attacked, and the outer gate carried; but the passage being too narrow to admit a gun upon its carriage, the gun was immediately taken off the carriage and transported to the inner gate, under a very heavy fire from the fort. This gallant enterprise was happily accomplished by Sir John Sinclair and a detachment of the coast and Bombay artillerymen, and the gate was speedily burst open. The fort of Sirhitty is represented as being very strong.

‘ 8. The gallantry of the action performed by Sir John Sinclair and his party is highly commended by Colonel Wellesley, and we are persuaded will attract the notice and approbation of your Honorable Committee.

‘ 9. Colonel Wellesley, having been informed that the polygar of Jalloor had in his possession, and under his care, some guns, stores, and ammunition belonging to Dhoondiah Waugh, dispatched Lieut. Colonel Montresor on the 24th of August, with a detachment to seize and destroy them. This service was performed very satisfactorily by Colonel Montresor. In the place were found one iron and four brass guns, with excellent carriages, several tumbrils, a quantity of ammunition, several (Company’s) musquets, ammunition for them, &c., all of which were destroyed. The hill fort of Cutarraghur was abandoned on Colonel Montresor’s approach.

‘ 10. Before any part of our army could reach Dhoondiah’s

force, the river Malpoorba suddenly fell so considerably, that Dhoondiah was enabled, on the 24th August, to cross that river near Boodyhall, and to enter the Nizam's country. Colonel Wellesley immediately prepared to pursue the rebel; but the British force was not able to cross the Malpoorba until the 29th August, at a very deep and rapid ford near Jellahaul. Here Colonel Wellesley was detained until the 3rd of September; being obliged to wait the junction of Lieut. Colonel Montresor, and to allow time for Colonel Stevenson's passage of the river, which it was necessary to perform in boats; these operations delayed the advance of the British army until the 4th of September. On the 5th of September, Colonel Wellesley, following the track of Dhoondiah, entered the Nizam's territories at Hunmunsagur.

‘ 11. It appeared probable to Colonel Wellesley, that when Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force, on the northern side of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede the supplies, and interrupt the communications of our army; or if favored by the patans of Kurnool, and the polygars on the right hand of the river Toombuddra, Dhoondiah might pass that river, and might enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. Colonel Wellesley, therefore, judiciously determined by moving his own detachment to the southward, to preclude the execution of either of those designs, and afterwards to push Dhoondiah to the eastward, taking such advantage of the movements of the rebel force as might be practicable. Colonel Stevenson, in the meanwhile, was ordered to move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance of between twelve and twenty miles from the Kistna; and the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry (collected in one body) was put in motion between the divisions of the forces under the respective commands of Colonels Wellesley and Stevenson.

‘ 12. Having thus, with a degree of judgment and skill, which cannot fail to attract the notice of your Honorable Committee, combined his future operations, Colonel Wellesley proceeded on the 7th September to Kanagherry. On the 8th he moved with the cavalry alone to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to Yepulpur, the infantry being on the last day about fifteen miles in his rear.

‘ 13. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah appears to have moved from Mudgherry, a place about twenty five miles from Raichore, (where he had been encamped for some days) towards the river Kistna, but on his road, having seen Colonel Stevenson’s camp, he returned, and encamped about nine miles in Colonel Wellesley’s front, between Colonel Wellesley’s position and Bunnoo. It was evident that Dhoondiah was not apprized of the vicinity of Colonel Wellesley’s force; the latter was well informed that Dhoondiah believed him to be still at Chinnoor.

‘ 14. On the morning of the 10th of September, Colonel Wellesley moved forward, and met Dhoondiah’s army at a place called Conahgull, about six miles from Yepulpurry. Dhoondiah was then on his march to the westward, apparently with a design of passing between the body of the Marhatta and Mogul cavalry and Colonel Wellesley’s detachment, which Dhoondiah supposed to be at Chinnoor. The insurgent at that time was accompanied by a large body of cavalry, consisting of about five thousand men, which Colonel Wellesley immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regiments of native cavalry.

‘ 15. The enemy was strongly posted with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood for some time with apparent firmness. Colonel Wellesley was obliged to form the four regiments of cavalry in one line, in order to render his line in any degree proportioned in length to that of the enemy; and such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by the four regiments, that the whole line of the enemy gave way, and was pursued for many miles. Many persons (among others, Dhoondiah Waugh himself) were slain, and the whole body of the rebel force was scattered in small parties over the face of the country. Part of the enemy’s baggage was still remaining in his camp, and was taken possession of by our troops.

‘ 16. Colonel Stevenson on the same day (10th of September) took, near Deodroog, the only two remaining pieces of cannon belonging to the enemy, together with a large quantity of baggage, camels, bullocks, and brinjarries.

‘ 17. Colonel Wellesley has borne the most ample testimony to the bravery and perseverance of all the troops employed

under his command, during the whole of this active and rapid expedition. When it is considered that the expedition was commenced, and prosecuted in a season of the year most unfavorable to military operations, through a country presenting various impediments, and in pursuit of a bold, active, and skilful enemy, at the head of a numerous body of light cavalry, the zeal and gallantry manifested by our troops on this occasion, and the ability and energy with which they were commanded, are entitled to particular commendation.

‘ 18. In our dispatch of the 31st August, it was our public duty to express our sense of the able and spirited conduct of the Honorable Colonel Wellesley in the former part of the campaign against Dhoondiah. The same obligations of public duty, and of justice to merit require, that we should declare to your Honorable Committee, that Colonel Wellesley’s subsequent operations have realized every expectation which we were induced to form from our confidence in his professional knowledge, in his skilful management of his resources and supplies, and in his enterprising and active spirit.

‘ 19. The manner in which the expedition against Dhoondiah Waugh has been conducted and terminated, has effectually removed the immediate danger which menaced the possessions of the Company, and of their allies and dependants in the peninsula of India ; and the impression made by our success against this insurgent, cannot fail to contribute in an eminent degree to the permanent establishment of tranquillity in our recent conquests, and on the whole line of our new frontier.

‘ We have the honor, &c.

‘ WELLESLEY

‘ *To the Secret Committee.*’ (and other Members in Council).

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO, ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 6th October, 1800.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th September. I have been ordered by Government to remain for some time in this country ; and I have come here in order to eat rice, which I propose to draw from the borders of Soonda, without using any brought from Mysore by my brinjarries. You will, therefore, perceive the necessity that my brinjarries should return to me to the northward ; but I am not in a hurry about them, and it

does not much signify if they do go to Cundapoor and Mangalore to receive their loads.

‘I fancy that you will have the pleasure of seeing some of your grand plans carried into execution ; all that I can say is, that I am ready primed, and that if all matters suit, I shall go off with a dreadful explosion, and shall probably destroy some campoos and pultans, which have been indiscreetly pushed across the Kistna ; that is to say, if the river remains full.’

‘I have written to Colonel Close about your money, which I shall want. The only reason why I cannot get it is, that you are obliged to keep enough in your hands to pay the troops in Canara, &c., till January. I have written to desire that a sum of money for that purpose may be sent round from Madras, in one of the ships of the squadron ; and whatever sum I hear that they will send, I will draw an equal one from you ; that is the only mode that occurs of procuring the supply of money which I shall want in December.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Munro.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘G. O.

By Government.’

‘Fort St. George, 24th Dec. 1800.

‘In the General Orders of the 25th of September, the Right Hon. the Governor in Council published the high sense his lordship entertained of the services rendered to the British interests in India by the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, and the officers and troops under his command.

‘The Governor in Council has now the satisfaction of announcing the entire concurrence of the most noble the Governor General in Council in the sentiments expressed in those orders, on the dispatches from Colonel Wellesley ; and the Governor General in Council has directed the Governor in Council to communicate, in General Orders, “the thanks of the Governor General in Council to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, for the judgment, energy and valor which have distinguished his operations against Dhoondiah Waugh, during the late rapid and prosperous campaign ; and for the important services which he has rendered to the Hon. Company, in terminating the war against that insurgent with such signal and speedy success.”

‘The Governor in Council has further been directed to convey the thanks of the Governor General in Council to the officers and troops acting under the command of Colonel Wellesley, for the gallantry and perseverance manifested by them throughout the late arduous service; and particularly to express to the officers and men of the detachments of cavalry, employed in the action of the 10th September, the high sense entertained by the Governor General in Council of the eminent courage and discipline manifested by them in the attack on the army of Dhoondiah Waugh, which terminated in the fall of that insurgent, and in the complete destruction or dispersion of his forces.

‘The Governor in Council is further pleased to add, that it will afford to the Governor General in Council the highest satisfaction to represent to the Hon. the Court of Directors, the important benefits which have resulted to the interests of the East India Company and to the British nation in India, from the services of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, and the officers and troops acting under his command during the late campaign.

‘Circumstances having rendered it necessary for the Governor General in Council to employ the services of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley at a distance from Mysore, his Lordship in Council has been pleased to appoint Colonel James Stevenson to the important command of the forces in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara; and the Governor in Council has great satisfaction in this opportunity of manifesting his high sense of the zealous and spirited support afforded to Colonel Wellesley by Colonel Stevenson, as second in command of the army employed against Dhoondiah.’

Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘Fort William, 5th November, 1800.

‘The enclosed copies of my dispatches to Vice Admiral Rainier and to Sir Roger Curtis, will afford you a general view of the nature of the command to which I have appointed you, as well as of the various objects to which the force to be assembled at Trincomalee may be applicable, according to the state of circumstances and events towards the close of the month of December.

‘In order to assist you in the consideration of these dispatches, I will in this place shortly recapitulate the general purport of my orders and intentions.

‘First: In consequence of the state of the war in Europe, and of the strength of the French power in Egypt, I have determined to suspend the intended expedition against Batavia.

‘Secondly: I have ordered the force, noted in the margin*, to assemble at Trincomalee, where I trust it will be collected by the middle of December; and I have desired the Admiral to repair to the same station with the strength of his squadron.

‘Thirdly: This force is to be applied to either of the following objects, if required:

‘To proceed up the Red Sea in order to co-operate with any British force which may be employed in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean.

‘To proceed to any point which the French may menace in India, especially on the western side of the peninsula. The governments of Fort St. George and Bombay are ordered to hold in readiness whatever troops they can spare, to act in concert with the force assembled at Trincomalee, either in Egypt, or in any part of India; and the forces holden in readiness at each of those Presidencies respectively, will be subject to your command, and will repair to such position as you may eventually point out with a view to either of the stated objects.

‘Fourthly: Intelligence which I have received has satisfied me that a blow might now be struck, with every prospect of success, against the Isle of France. If the state of my accounts from Europe and Egypt should leave me at liberty to make such an attempt, at the close of the month of December, my anxious wish is, that you should proceed, on or about the 25th of December, from Trincomalee directly to the Isle of France, and carry into execution the plan contained in the papers enclosed in my letter B of this date; provided you and the Admiral, after full consideration, should judge that plan to be practicable, with the means which I can enable you to command, and within the period of the season stated in the plan.

‘The enclosures of this letter, and of my letter B of this

* His Majesty's 10th, 19th, and 80th regiments. 1000 Bengal volunteers. 38 European and 46 Golundauze, Bengal artillery. The remaining proportion of artillery to be furnished from Ceylon.

date, contain such ample details as to require no explanation from me. You will meet the Admiral and Mr. Stokes at Trincomalee. In the meanwhile, I shall furnish you with such information as I possess respecting the expedition formerly projected against the Isle of France, directing your attention to the various changes of circumstances which favor the plan of Mr. Stokes, and also stating such observations as occur to me on the general principles of the plan. The particular details of the project involve many questions purely naval or military, on which the Admiral and you must be more competent to decide.

‘It is necessary to apprise you that I have observed the strictest secrecy with regard to my views against the Isle of France. I have not yet communicated them even to Lord Clive. If I judge it advisable to disclose them to him, I will give you timely notice.

‘Ever yours, dear Arthur, &c.

‘Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘WELLESLEY.

Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘Fort William, 5th November, 1800.

‘I enclose in this letter copies of several papers which I have received from Mr. C. Stokes, containing suggestions for an attack on the Isle of France. The sketch which accompanies these papers is imperfect, and was hastily copied from a very accurate original survey, during Mr. Stokes’s passage down the river to the packet destined to convey him to the Admiral. I do not expect that these papers, without much personal explanation from Mr. Stokes, can enable you to form a competent judgment of his plan. My only object in forwarding these papers to you at present, is to save you the time which you must have otherwise employed in reading these papers after Mr. Stokes’s arrival at Trincomalee.

‘This letter will probably reach you before you can arrive at that place, where I trust you will find Mr. Stokes and the Admiral.

‘It is only necessary to add some account of Mr. Stokes’s character, and of his means of information on the subject of these papers. I have every reason to believe his character per-

fectly unexceptionable. You are aware that he accompanied me on board 'la Virginie.' As an evidence, I know no man more deserving of credit.

'With regard to his means of information, he has resided three several times in the Isle of France: First: Previously to the war, when he proceeded to the Isle of France from America, on a commercial speculation. Secondly: He was taken prisoner in the year 1795, and detained for some time in the island. Thirdly: He was again taken prisoner and carried into the Isle of France early in the month of July last, and he remained in the island until the commencement of the month of August.

'Ever yours, dear Arthur, &c.

'Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'WELLESLEY.

*The Governor General in Council to the Right Hon. Lord Clive,
Governor in Council at Fort St. George.*

'MY LORD,

'Fort William, 15th November, 1800.

'1. Although your Lordship has been already apprized, by a separate dispatch from the Governor General, of the general measures of precaution and defence which have been deemed necessary, in consequence of the late unfavorable advices from Egypt and from Europe, the Governor General in Council will now proceed to recapitulate the general tenor of those measures, and to transmit his instructions on the occasion to your Lordship in Council in the present form.

'2. Since the date of the separate dispatch from the Governor General, referred to in the preceding paragraph, more recent advices have been received from Europe, than those which suggested the measures and instructions detailed in that dispatch. We are now in some measure apprized of the impression produced, both in England and at the court of Vienna, by the disastrous reverse of fortune in Italy and in Germany; and although no reason now appears to justify an apprehension, that a separate peace between Austria and France will be the immediate consequence of those misfortunes, the Governor General in Council deems it proper to be prepared for such an event. Under these circumstances, the Governor General thinks it necessary to guard against any probable effort of the enemy to relieve their army in Egypt; whether such effort be

accompanied or speedily followed by an attack on our possessions in India.

‘ 3. The renewed spirit and enterprising genius of Buonaparte will naturally lead him to commence his operations with a view to either or both these objects, at the earliest practicable period of time. Experience warrants an expectation that he will not lose a moment in availing himself of the actual advantages of his situation; and it is certain that any naval armament which he might be able to dispatch from France, in the past months of July, August, and September, 1800, might reach the Red Sea, or the western coast of India, during the approaching season.

‘ 4. On the other hand, it appears necessary to be prepared for any eventual demand from his Majesty’s ministers upon the British government, and upon his Majesty’s squadron in India, to co-operate with a force to be employed in the Mediterranean for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A considerable British force has been collected in the Mediterranean; originally, perhaps, with a view to co-operation with the Austrian army in Italy, or to an attempt on the southern coasts of France. Those designs, however, may have been relinquished, in consequence of the late events on the continent of Europe. And it is not impossible that the British troops, assembled in the Mediterranean, may be employed in concert with the Turkish army against the French in Egypt. In such an event, an expedition from India might prove essentially useful, by creating a diversion on the side of Upper Egypt; and the tenor of the Governor General’s private dispatches from the Earl of Elgin, tends to confirm the probability, that the unfavorable alteration which has taken place in the state of the war in Europe, may induce his Majesty’s ministers to require an expedition from India to Egypt; in the only manner in which such an operation could be undertaken with any prospect of advantage, by combining it with a powerful attack from the side of the Mediterranean. If such a plan of operation should be in the contemplation of his Majesty’s ministers, it may be supposed that their orders on the occasion will soon reach us; and that they will expect the fleets and armies of India to be ready to act against Egypt during the approaching season.

‘ 5. The preceding statement will have explained to your

Lordship in Council our reasons for apprehending that the naval and military strength of India is likely to be required, either for the purpose of defensive or offensive operations, on the western side of the Peninsula, between the ensuing months of December and March; and your Lordship's judgment and experience in the interests of the British empire in India will form a correct estimate of the magnitude of the danger which we may be called upon to repel; and of the urgent necessity of placing our force in such a condition, and in such a station, as shall enable us to act with promptitude and effect, whenever the expected exigency shall arise.

'6. After the fullest consideration of these circumstances, we are decidedly of opinion that the British Government in India would not be justified in undertaking or prosecuting any expedition, the necessary effect of which must be to remove the strength of his Majesty's squadron to any considerable distance to the eastward, for any long period of time. The same objection applies, in a certain degree, to the detachment of any part of our military force, in the present conjuncture, for the purposes of any foreign conquest, unconnected with an increase of our means of defence against the probable point of danger. This objection applies most powerfully to any detachment of our European force; the whole disposable amount of which, throughout India, is by no means adequate to the extensive demands of the public service.

'7. If the expedition lately in contemplation should be prosecuted, even under the most favorable circumstances, Vice Admiral Rainier, with the strength of his squadron, could scarcely reach the western side of India sooner than the commencement of the month of February, or the close of the month of January, 1801; and the troops employed in concert with his Majesty's ships would necessarily be detained to the eastward for a much longer period of time.

'8. It has been, therefore, with considerable reluctance, and under an irresistible conviction of the necessity of preparing to meet the exigencies which we have described, that the Governor General has found himself compelled to suspend, a second time, the final execution of his Majesty's secret commands, addressed to his Lordship in his individual capacity; and to request his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier's assistance in carrying into effect a system of operations, adapted to the new

and alarming crisis of affairs. The pursuit of any foreign conquest, however easy or advantageous, must always yield to the necessity of self defence. The further suspension of the measures commenced in pursuance of his Majesty's orders will not render the prosecution of that expedition less practicable at a future period; while the absence of our fleet, and of part of our disposable European force, in any of the cases which we have supposed, might be fatal to our interests in India. The Governor General has therefore requested his Excellency the Admiral to consider the proposed expedition to be postponed to a more favorable opportunity.

‘9. Having decided this important point, the Governor General has submitted to his Excellency's consideration a general view of the plan which appeared to his Lordship most eligible for enabling us to act offensively or defensively, as the case may require; to frustrate any attempt of the French, either for the relief of their army in Egypt, or for the disturbance of our possessions in India; and to answer the eventual demand of his Majesty's ministers for our co-operation in Egypt during the approaching season.

‘10. With a view to meet all these cases as they may arise, it has appeared to his Lordship in Council desirable to concentrate the strength of his Majesty's squadron, together with the largest disposable force of Europeans, which our limited means will enable us to spare, at some point, from which they may be ready to issue with promptitude and facility, either to the western coast of the Peninsula of India, or to the Red Sea, or to any other quarter which the enemy may menace during the north-eastern monsoon. The general security of our possessions in India will be further promoted, if the station chosen for his Majesty's fleet, and for the proposed military force, should be central in its relation to the whole British empire in India; and should be a point at all times valuable and important to our interests, and necessary to be maintained against any assault of the enemy. After much attention to the subject, Trincomalee appeared to us, under every aspect of the question, to be the most eligible station for the immediate rendezvous of the strength of his Majesty's squadron, and of the force which the Governor General in Council proposes to assemble. It appeared further necessary, that the military force to be assembled should be provided with transport and

camp equipage; and should be ready to move, under the convoy of his Majesty's squadron, wherever the service might require its presence. The force which the Governor General proposes to assemble at Trincomalee will consist of about 2000 from his Majesty's infantry. To these will be added a corps of Native volunteer infantry from Bengal, and a suitable proportion of field ordnance.

'11. We have reason to expect that we shall be enabled to assemble this force at Trincomalee, on or before the middle of the month of December; and it is the intention of the Governor General in Council, that it should be commanded by Colonel Wellesley, and that Colonel Champagné should be the second in command. We therefore request that your Lordship in Council will order Colonel Wellesley to proceed without delay to Trincomalee, and to assume the command of the troops directed to be assembled there.

'12. The Governor General, in consequence of this plan of measures, has earnestly requested his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier to proceed to Trincomalee without delay; where Colonel Wellesley will, we trust, be prepared to meet his Excellency, and to concert such plans of operation as may appear best suited to the purposes of the armament.

'13. Although our opinion is, that a part of the European force, to be employed in concert with his Majesty's squadron, will be most conveniently conveyed to the point of active service on board his Majesty's ships, we have judged it expedient to engage transports sufficient for the conveyance of the whole European and Native force to be assembled at Trincomalee, together with their necessary provisions and supplies. His Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier and Colonel Wellesley will determine on the spot, what proportion of the European troops can be conveniently accommodated on board his Majesty's ships.

'14. To aid the execution of the plan of general defence which has been detailed in this dispatch, the Governor General in his separate dispatch, has requested your Lordship to issue orders for the five companies of the 19th regiment, now or lately stationed on the coast at Warriore or elsewhere, to proceed to Negapatam, there to be embarked for Trincomalee with the least practicable delay; unless your Lordship should be of opinion that the object of dispatch may be best answered,

by ordering the troops in question to proceed to Trincomalee, by the route of Ramnad, crossing the Gulf of Manaar at the usual passage; in which case your Lordship has probably directed them to take that route. A proper vessel will, notwithstanding, be sent from hence to Negapatam, for the purpose of conveying the detachment to Trincomalee, in case your Lordship should have decided in favor of their embarkation at Negapatam.

‘ 15. It will be further necessary that your Lordship in Council should adopt measures for the collecting together, and holding in readiness, a detachment of not less than one thousand European infantry, to be embarked at the shortest notice for Trincomalee; in order to replace the garrison of that place at any future period, when the 80th regiment, now stationed at Trincomalee, may be required to proceed from thence, in pursuance of the plan of operations described in the present dispatch.

‘ 16. It is also indispensably necessary, in the present crisis, that your Lordship in Council should draw together, at a convenient point, as large a force, European and Native, as the internal security of the possessions subject to your Lordship’s government will admit; with a view to such force being ready for service at the shortest notice, in whatever direction or quarter the course of events may demand.

‘ 17. For this purpose it will be requisite that your Lordship in Council should hold at command, during the pressure of the existing danger, a sufficient quantity of tonnage, to enable you to transport the troops which you shall have assembled for eventual service to the necessary point. If the resources of the port of Madras, after the close of the monsoon, should not appear to your Lordship likely to prove adequate to your probable demands; on application from your Lordship in Council, the Governor General will direct such tonnage as you may require to be provided from Calcutta.

‘ 18. It will be proper that the usual proportion of camp equipage, with field ordnance and military stores, should be held in readiness with the troops; and that the transports which shall be taken up for this service, shall be stored with six months’ water and provisions, for the use of the troops to be embarked.

‘ 19. The most eligible mode of engaging freight for the

service in question, conformably to the plan already adopted by the government, is for a term of months (as short as may be obtainable), renewable at the option of government.

‘ 20. The movements of this force will be governed by future events. We deem it necessary, however, that it should be held at the disposal of the Honorable Colonel Wellesley, in such cases as will be specified in the secret and separate instructions of the Governor General to your Lordship and to Colonel Wellesley: for this reason, it is requisite that no officer should be appointed to the command of it, or to serve with it, who shall be senior in rank, either to Colonel Wellesley or to Colonel Champagné.

‘ 21. We request that your Lordship in Council will direct as large a quantity as possible of water casks to be collected at Fort St. George, to be held at the eventual disposal of Vice Admiral Rainier; or to be applied to the use of any troops which may be hereafter embarked from Fort St. George, according as circumstances shall require. We also request that you will send to Trincomalee, as soon after the receipt of this letter as may be practicable, whatever number of water casks may be in store, or immediately procurable at Fort St. George. We understand that the water casks prepared for the expedition against Manilla, in 1797, are probably in store at Fort St. George, and consequently applicable to the purpose in question.

‘ 22. We are peculiarly anxious that copies of all intelligence which your Lordship in Council may receive (through the channel of the government of Bombay or otherwise) from Europe or Egypt, from this time, until further advice from us, should be forwarded, with all possible dispatch, to the officer commanding the force to be assembled at Trincomalee. A strict attention to this suggestion is absolutely necessary, for the eventual guidance of the discretion of Vice Admiral Rainier and of Colonel Wellesley.

‘ WELLESLEY

(and other Members of the Council).

‘*The Right Hon. Lord Clive.*’

The Governor General in Council to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 15th November, 1800.

‘ The Governor General in Council has judged it necessary,

in consequence of the late successes of the French in Europe and in Egypt, to adopt certain measures of precaution, with a view to the security and defence of the British possessions in India, from any attack which may be meditated against them by the enemy ; and also with the further view of answering any demand which may be made by his Majesty's ministers in England, for the co-operation of the British government of India, in the expulsion of the French from Egypt.

‘ 2. For this purpose it has been determined to assemble the following force at Trincomalee, as the position best adapted, during the present season, for the operations which actually are, or may eventually be, in the contemplation of government.

‘ 3. To his Majesty's 80th regiment of infantry, forming at present the garrison of Trincomalee, will be added his Majesty's 19th regiment of infantry ; and these corps will be joined from hence by his Majesty's 10th regiment of infantry, and by a body of about a thousand Native volunteer sepoy, and a detachment of 38 European artillery, 46 golundauze, and 100 lascars, for the service of the following train of field ordnance, which will be embarked with the troops—

Four 12-pounders.

Six 6-pounders.

Two Howitzers.

‘ 4. The Governor General in Council is pleased to appoint you to the chief command of the above mentioned forces ; and Colonel J. Champagné, of his Majesty's 80th regiment, to be second in command of the said forces. You will appoint such military staff as you shall judge necessary, reporting your arrangement in this respect to the Governor General in Council.

‘ 5. It is expected that the transports, with the troops proceeding from hence, will be ready to sail from Saugor by the 20th instant ; and that they will be enabled to reach Trincomalee by the 30th instant.

‘ 6. The transports and the troops proceeding from hence will be watered and victualled for six months.

‘ 7. It is also intended to take up tonnage at this port as soon as possible, for the eventual transportation of his Majesty's 19th and 80th regiments, to whatever quarter the public service may require. These transports will also be supplied with six months' water and provisions for the crews, and for the troops to be embarked in them.

‘ 8. The military force, hereby placed under your command, is to be employed according to such instructions and directions as you shall hereafter receive, either from the Governor General in Council, or by separate orders from the Governor General.

‘ 9. We have reason to expect that Vice Admiral Rainier, with the strength of his Majesty’s squadron, will soon proceed to Trincomalee, for the purpose of acting in conjunction with the forces under your command, during the present crisis. You are, therefore, to communicate unreservedly with his Excellency on all subjects relating to the public service; and to execute, in concert with Vice Admiral Rainier, whatever orders you shall receive from the Governor General in Council, or through the Governor General’s separate dispatches.

‘ 10. The Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George has been directed to adopt immediate measures for eventually replacing the garrison of Trincomalee; and the Governor General in Council has also directed the government of Fort St. George to assemble, at a convenient point, as large a force, European and Native, as may be practicable, with a view to such force being prepared for active service, at the shortest notice, in whatever direction or quarter the course of events may demand. This force (for which transports are to be held in readiness) will be provisionally placed at your disposal; and you will be empowered to call for it in such cases as will be specified in the Governor General’s separate instructions to you, and to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George.

‘ 11. In like manner, the Governor in Council of Bombay has been directed to hold in a state of the most forward preparation as large a force, (to be provided with transports,) European and Native, as possible, to be ready for service at the shortest notice, in whatever direction or quarter may be necessary. This force will likewise be provisionally subject to your orders.

‘ 12. With the troops proceeding from hence, a military chest, containing six lacs of rupees, will be sent. The Governor General in Council expects that his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon will be enabled to provide the requisite funds for his Majesty’s 19th and 80th regiments, during the period of their continuance on the island; and that his Excellency

may possibly contribute towards a further augmentation of the funds destined for the military chest.

‘13. The necessary measures have been taken for the purpose of your being furnished, in the speediest manner, with whatever intelligence may be received from Egypt or from Europe, by the Governments of Bombay or Fort St. George.

‘WELLESLEY,
‘ALURED CLARKE,
‘Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley. ‘P. SPEKE.

‘P.S. Mr. John Rider, of the Bengal Civil Establishment, proceeds from hence as paymaster of the troops, to the command of which you have been appointed; Mr. Rider has also been appointed to the temporary charge of the provisions laid in for the troops.’

*The Secretary of the Supreme Government to Colonel the
Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘SIR, ‘Fort William, 20th Nov., 1800.

‘I am directed by the Most Noble the Governor General in Council to inform you, that in addition to the force stated in the dispatch of his Lordship in Council, dated the 15th instant, his Majesty’s 88th regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Beresford, has been ordered to proceed from Bombay to Pointe de Galle, and to join you at the latter port, in the event of your prosecuting the enterprise described in the Governor General’s separate and private communications to you. The reason of the 88th regiment being ordered to Pointe de Galle is, that it could not, on account of the north-east monsoon, arrive in time at Trincomalee.

‘You will be pleased, in concert with his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, to send such orders as you may think proper for the regulation of Lieut. Colonel Beresford’s conduct, to Pointe de Galle; with the necessary directions to the officer commanding there, to deliver the same to Lieut. Colonel Beresford, on the arrival of the 88th regiment at or off that port.

‘The Governor General in Council, adverting to the possible utility of gun-boats on the present service, proposes to send one with the transports proceeding from hence. Another will be sent from hence in the second week in December, if it can be completed in time; and his Lordship has also in-

structed the government of Bombay to send to Pointe de Galle, with the 88th regiment, any gun-boats which that government may be enabled to furnish in time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ W. KIRKPATRICK, Sec. to Gov^t.

‘ Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

Mr. Secretary Dundas to Marquis Wellesley, Governor General of India.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Downing Street, 6th October, 1800.

‘ By the private letter I received from your Lordship, No. 25, dated the 5th of March last, and the communications I have since had with Major General Stuart, I am apprized that the subject of annoying the French army in Egypt, from the Red Sea, has been under your consideration. For that reason, and because I concur in your Lordship’s sentiments as stated in the letter above mentioned, I feel it the less necessary to enter into any details in this dispatch, which cannot, indeed, be extended to any great length, as it is to be forwarded overland.

‘ I shall, therefore, confine myself to shortly stating to your Lordship, that Sir Ralph Abercrombie has received his Majesty’s orders to proceed up the Mediterranean; and by an attack on Alexandria and the coast, to co-operate with the Turkish army assembling in Syria, in whatever plan may be concerted with them for expelling the French army from Egypt: and it is thought expedient that a force should also be sent from India, to act in such manner as may appear conducive to that essential object, from the side of the Red Sea. With this view Captain Sir Home Popham, with a proper squadron, will be immediately sent into that sea, taking with him a regiment from the Cape of Good Hope. His first rendezvous will be the port of Mocha.

‘ I enclose, for your information, the letter I have written to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject of the expedition under his command; and I am to signify to your Lordship his Majesty’s pleasure, that a force of about 1000 Europeans, and two thousand Native infantry is to be sent from India to the proposed place of rendezvous in the Red Sea, with as little delay as possible, to co-operate with Sir Home Popham in the object of his instructions. The command of these troops should be given to some active and in-

telligent officer; and care should be taken that they be furnished with every necessary requisite for such a service.

‘I have thought it right to send a copy of this dispatch to the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay. To the latter it is necessary, because Bombay is the most proper place from whence to send the proposed force; but I have thought it likewise necessary to send it to Fort St. George, in case, upon a full consideration of the places where the force upon the two coasts is at present stationed, it should appear to that presidency expedient to make any new arrangement of any part of the army under their presidency, in order to enable the Bombay government to detach the requisite force from their coast, without any real inconvenience to the territories under their own immediate charge.

‘I have directed those two presidencies to proceed in making those preparations without delay; and even to carry these orders into execution without waiting for your Lordship’s directions, if they are ready in other respects.

‘If nothing unforeseen occurs to prevent or retard it, I hope that the armament under Sir Ralph Abercrombie will reach the coast of Egypt in the month of December, and that Sir Home Popham may arrive in the Gulf of Arabia in the month of February. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the forces from India may join him as soon after as possible: for this reason, it will be desirable that you should not wait till the troops are all collected, if it will save time to forward them in two or three distinct detachments.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*His Excellency Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘HENRY DUNDAS.

Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘Fort William, 1st December, 1800.

‘I enclose a list of the officers proceeding from hence with the 10th regiment and native volunteers. Those marked +, I wish to recommend to your notice as persons who have been recommended to me from England, or behaved well here; to some I have made the mark Φ , as officers of merit.

‘Most of the officers of the volunteers are fine young men. Fagan (nephew to Fagan) is a very spirited young man, and quitted an adjutancy to volunteer on this service; Popham

quitted his uncle, General Popham, to whom he was aide de camp; Captain Greville (son to Lord Warwick) has been my aide de camp for some time, and is a very good young man: he also is a volunteer.

‘ The 10th musters very strong, but many of the men are raw and new recruits; and the officers are Irish. They will require a good deal of discipline; but, on the whole, the regiment is a very fine one.

‘ It is difficult to conceive the anxiety I feel for the success of this enterprise against the Isle of France; I look upon it, however, to be certain. Great jealousy will arise among the General Officers in consequence of my employing you; but I employ you, because I rely on your good sense, discretion, activity, and spirit; and I cannot find all those qualities united in any other officer in India, who could take such a command.

‘ By the Adèle, I shall send you full instructions; in the meanwhile, I wish to apprise you, that if you should succeed in taking the isles of France and Bourbon, I mean to appoint you to the government of them, with the chief military command annexed. You might hold these situations some time with a view to the establishment of the garrison, defences, &c., as well as for the purposes of giving me an honest report on the civil government and resources, and commerce of the islands. But I consider Mysore to be a greater field for you; and I also think that, in that field, you might be more useful ultimately to the public, and of course to me. I wish, however, to know from you, whether you would choose to remain permanently in the government and command of the French islands, or to return to Mysore.

‘ I beg you will be particularly attentive and kind to Stokes, and that you will repose confidence in him, which you may venture with the utmost degree of security. He is a very honorable and honest man, of considerable knowledge in his own line, and of very uncommon talents. His ardor will not displease you. I have named him Commissary of Stores and Provisions. If you should take the island, I desire he may be appointed Intendant under you. I have received your letter of the 4th of November.

‘ Ever, my dear Arthur,

‘ Yours most affectionately,

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ WELLESLEY.

‘ The Phoenix Indiaman has taken the Malartic privateer, and the Albatross has taken the Adèle, which I have named the Waller, and sent to Trincomalee with dispatches.’

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 1st December, 1800.

‘ 1. The troops proceeding from hence to Trincomalee embarked at Fort William on the 28th of November, and I trust that all the transports will be ready to put to sea from Kedgerree on or before the 2nd of December.

‘ 2. Although that day is later than the period intimated in my former dispatches and private letters to you, I have no doubt that the whole armament from hence will reach Trincomalee in time for all the purposes described in those communications.

‘ 3. I have the honor to enclose for your information an abstract of the embarkation return; a more detailed statement will be hereafter forwarded to you.

‘ 4. You will perceive by this abstract, that the Native volunteer sepoy actually embarked amount only to 792 rank and file, including havildars and naiks. Two companies of Native volunteers, amounting to about 180 rank and file, remain to be embarked. The deficiency of tonnage renders it impracticable at present to dispatch these men to Trincomalee; but I entertain a strong hope of being able to convey them to that port in time to join you, before your departure from thence.

‘ 5. Although these two companies of Native troops should not reach you in time, I trust you will be able to avail yourself of the addition which I have ordered to be made to your European force, since the date of my first communication to you on this subject, by directing his Majesty’s 88th regiment to meet you at Pointe de Galle. I enclose for your information a copy of my letter to the Governor of Bombay, relative to his Majesty’s 88th regiment: in concert with his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, you will send such directions to the commanding officer of that corps as you may judge proper.

‘ 6. I enclose for your information a copy of my letter of the 28th of November to Lord Clive, by which you will learn the measures which I have adopted, with a view to guard as much as possible against any disappointment in the supply of tonnage.

‘7. But notwithstanding every exertion which can be made here, or by Lord Clive at Fort St. George, it may possibly prove impracticable to procure, in proper time, a quantity of tonnage equal to my wishes and to my original expectation. It may, therefore, become necessary to accommodate part of the troops to be assembled at Trincomalee in his Majesty’s ships, in the event of any part of the squadron moving with the troops from Trincomalee.

‘8. If, according to my anxious hope, his Excellency the Admiral, and you, should proceed to the Isle of France, Mr. Stokes has stated it to be advisable, that as large a portion of the troops as possible should be embarked in his Majesty’s ships.

‘Although, therefore, I should be disappointed in my expectation of assistance from Lord Clive, and no more vessels should be procurable in time at this port, I have the satisfaction to reflect, that, even at the highest calculation, not more than 1100 European troops will remain to be accommodated, beyond the number now embarked from Calcutta, and that to be embarked from Negapatam; and as the passage from Trincomalee to the Mauritius cannot be long, the difficulty of conveying that number of men in his Majesty’s squadron would not be considerable, nor the inconvenience, which might attend the measure, of long duration*.

‘9. As connected with this subject, it is necessary to apprise you, that the marine officers of this port represented, that the space allotted to the troops proceeding from hence is so ample, and so much exceeds the usual allowance, as to render it practicable to distribute among those ships, without any inconvenience, at least five hundred additional troops. On this point you and his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier will ultimately determine, according to your view of the probable length of voyage, and of other circumstances.

‘10. Enclosed is an abstract statement of the water and provisions actually embarked in the ten transports, which sailed from this port on the 28th of November. To this statement is added a memorandum of the provisions proposed to be

* 80th Regiment	.	.	.	760
19th do.	five companies	.	.	311
				1071

sent in the three vessels remaining to be dispatched, and which are expected to be ready to sail from Kedgerree on or before the 10th of December. Sufficient time could not be afforded to provide and embark the supply of water and provisions originally proposed for the whole of the European troops directed to assemble at Trincomalee. You will perceive, however, on reference to the enclosed statement, that including the supply to proceed in the three remaining transports, provisions have been embarked, sufficient for the consumption of about 1600 Europeans during six months; and as this supply is calculated upon a very large scale of daily allowance, I have reason to believe, that a sufficient stock of every essential article (excepting water) is provided for the consumption of all the Europeans to be assembled at Trincomalee for about four months. You will observe, that besides the rated supply for 1600 Europeans, it is intended to send 400 additional casks of salt meat in the three vessels remaining to be dispatched; and that 200 double casks of salt meat (equal to 400 single casks) have been embarked in the transports, for the use of the garrison of Trincomalee, conformably to an indent received from his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon. This supply may also be applied to the use of the troops under your command, if it should be judged requisite, and will in that case be replaced from hence as soon as possible. You will communicate this paragraph to his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon; but, if the distance of his situation from Trincomalee should be likely to occasion any delay, you will act under these orders immediately, notifying them to his Excellency, together with a statement of your proceedings, by the earliest opportunity.

‘11. The supply of provisions which has been specified will probably be deemed abundant, with a view to the expedition against the Isle of France; but if the armament should proceed to the Red Sea, I should certainly be of opinion that it ought not to move with less than six months’ provisions and water.

‘12. With respect to the supply of water, you will observe, that the total quantity (exclusive of the supply for their respective crews, actually embarked in the ships which have sailed, amounts to 308,678 gallons; this quantity I understand is as much (exclusive of the water for the crews) as those

vessels can conveniently carry. Whatever portion of this supply of water may be consumed on the passage to Trincomalee, can be easily and expeditiously replaced at that port. In addition to the quantity above stated, it is intended to send about 405,000 gallons in the three vessels remaining to be dispatched. Without calculating, therefore, on any supply of tonnage or water from Fort St. George, the total quantity of water with which the expedition will eventually depart from Trincomalee may be assumed at 353,878 gallons.

‘13. This supply, at an allowance of one gallon per diem for each man, would be sufficient for five thousand men (the estimated total of your force, including the 19th and 80th regiments, and exclusive of the 88th regiment) during seventy-seven days. But a gallon per diem for each man is certainly a more ample allowance than can in any case be necessary. It seems probable that, with proper economy and care, the quantity of water stated will last five thousand men (at three quarts per diem) for at least one hundred days.*

‘14. Every effort will be made at this port to complete the tonnage and the provisions to the extent originally proposed; and the supply provided will be dispatched as soon as may be practicable to Trincomalee, to be there subject to his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier's and your orders, if the supply proposed should arrive at that port previous to your departure from thence, or otherwise to be subject to such directions as his Excellency and you may think proper to leave at Trincomalee, if you should have moved from that port.

‘15. The Nonsuch frigate will eventually proceed to Trincomalee, and be subject to the orders of his Excellency the Admiral. I have also ordered the Fury gun-boat to proceed to Trincomalee, in the opinion that such a vessel may be useful to your future operations; and I shall endeavour to furnish the Admiral with another gun-boat before the end of December.

* This total is thus estimated:—

Proceeding from Calcutta, Europeans and Natives, including followers	2700
Five companies of His Majesty's 19th regiment from Negapatam .	500
Remainder of the 19th regiment	300
His Majesty's 80th regiment	800
Lascars and followers from Ceylon	700
	5000

‘16. I have the honor to enclose, for your information, an extract of a letter which I received on the 27th of November, from Sir George Yonge: the general tenor of this communication has considerably augmented my anxiety for the prosecution of the proposed expedition against the Isle of France. New indications now appear of the danger which menaces us from that quarter, and which can only be averted by a sudden and an unexpected blow.

‘17. Since the day of my last dispatch to you, I have received advices from England overland, under date of the 15th of July, at which late period his Majesty’s ministers do not appear to have entertained any idea of calling upon me to co-operate with any force in Egypt; the prospect of peace with France seemed, however, to be as remote as at any time since the commencement of the war. This state of affairs, in my judgment, forms another powerful argument in favor of the instantaneous attack of the Isle of France.

‘18. I enclose for your information a statement of the boats (ordinary and extra) belonging to the ships now proceeding from hence to Trincomalee.

‘19. It may be proper to apprise you, that I propose that the Isles of France and Bourbon should be taken possession of in the name of his Majesty; and that with this view I intend, in a few days, to forward some suggestions to his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, and instructions to you; the general tenor of which will be conformable to the spirit of the commands which I have had the honor to receive from his Majesty relative to the colony of Batavia.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘WELLESLEY.

*The Secretary of the Supreme Government to Colonel
the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Calcutta, 7th December, 1800.

‘It has occurred to the Governor General since closing his dispatches by the Waller, that it may be of material importance to prevent Mr. Stokes’s arrival at Trincomalee with Admiral Rainier being publicly known. If intelligence of Mr Stokes’s arrival at Trincomalee should reach Tranquebar, the French agents at that settlement (who must be apprized of

Mr. Stokes's recent return from the Isle of France) will probably at once conclude that the armament is destined against the Isle of France, and take some active measures for conveying intelligence of the armament to the Isle of France, and of the ground of their conjecture respecting its destination for that island.

‘ His Lordship therefore requests that you will suggest to the Admiral the expediency of taking any precautions which may be practicable for preventing Mr. Stokes's arrival at Trincomalee being generally known; and also for preventing the conveyance of any intelligence respecting the armament from Tranquebar to the Isle of France, by sea. His Lordship desires me to add, that the Admiral and you will be the best judges what measures can be taken for the above mentioned purposes.

‘ The Governor General, having ground to believe that a number of British subjects have voluntarily entered and served on board of the French privateers in the Indian seas, his Lordship requests, in the event of the enterprise against the Isle of France proving successful, you will endeavor to discover and apprehend all such persons, and that you will take the usual measures for bringing them to trial and punishment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ G. H. BARLOW.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Fort St. George, 18th December, 1800.

‘ I have had some conversation with our friends here regarding the settlement of Wynaad, the arrangement to be made with Yeman Nair, and, in general, the employment of the Nairs during the campaign in Wynaad. Our idea of eventually placing Wynaad under the same administration with Malabar has been approved, as also has the measure of calling up Yeman Nair and one of the Commissioners to Seringapatam.

‘ I have informed Webbe that you intend to take the field with Stevenson, and have communicated to him your notion regarding the council, to consist of the Commissioner, Colonel Stevenson, and yourself.

‘ It is proposed to leave to the decision of this Council all the future arrangements in Wynaad, whether regarding the

settlement with Yeman Nair and other chiefs of the same description, or the employment of the Nairs in general in the service.

‘Webbe writes this day to Colonel Stevenson upon the subject, and to the Commissioners in Malabar, and you also will probably hear from him.

‘The pensioners have been a subject of conversation since I have been here. Several modes of relieving the Rajah have been proposed which I will state to you. One was, to throw these pensioners upon the Rajah, according to the old arrangement, and to relieve Purneah from the engagement into which he voluntarily entered lately to pay the full subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas: the second was, to throw the pensioners upon the Rajah, and to enter into a discussion with the Rajah’s government regarding the burthens upon him; to compare these with his means, and if the result should be that the country is over-burthened, that the subsidy should be permanently lessened: the third was, to leave matters as they were originally arranged, and for the Company to pay these new pensioners, the ambassadors, in consideration of the heavy burthens upon the Rajah, and of the situation of the ambassadors having been sent to European powers.

‘I objected to the first mode, because I thought it would be disagreeable to Purneah, and because, at all events, the relief would be only temporary. I objected to the second, because any new discussion upon the Rajah’s situation would be disagreeable, would be a bad precedent, and would tend to shake the first settlement, and, at all events, would create a notion among the natives, that that settlement was not permanent. I think that the third will be adopted, and that the pensions of the ambassadors will be paid by the Company. Upon the whole this appears to me to be the best arrangement.

‘I do not like the proposal for a discussion upon the Rajah’s situation. It would open a door for another discussion, some years hence; and the consequence would be, that the settlement made last year, which was certainly intended to be permanent, would be overturned by the first government which should look to Mysore as a place from which it might be possible to get a few more pagodas.

‘The officer commanding at Mysore is to have full batta.

Webbe proposes to establish the court at Seringapatam. He talks of Leith as the Register, and rather prefers him to Simmonds. If you, however, prefer the latter, I think it probable that he will be appointed. I know neither of them very well. Pater is appointed to command in Arcot.

‘I enclose a letter from Colonel Cuppage, regarding the pensioners in the Nundydroog district: I shall be obliged to you, if you will make known to him your wishes regarding them.

‘I embark to-morrow for Trincomalee, from whence you shall hear further from me.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Chief Secretary of Government,
Fort St. George.*

‘SIR,

‘19th December, 1800.

‘I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report which I have received of the extent, state, and condition of the forts in Canara. They all appear to be in ruins, and it is desirable that they should be entirely destroyed, excepting Seedasheeghur, Rajahman-droog, Morjee, Cundapoor, and Coomblah. I recommend that these should not be destroyed, only because they stand at the mouths of the principal rivers in the province of Canara, and it may be desirable to retain them; but some of these may be useless, and it may be advisable hereafter to destroy entirely those of that description.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Chief Sec. of Government.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Brathwaite,
Commanding the Army of Fort St. George.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort St. George, 19th December, 1800.

‘Having been appointed by the Most Noble the Governor General in Council to command a body of troops collected for foreign service at Trincomalee, and having been directed by his Lordship to appoint a certain staff for conducting the duties of those troops, I have to request your permission to take from this Presidency, for that purpose, the officers whose names are written hereafter.

‘Lieut. Colonel Coleman, 84th regiment,

‘Lieut. Colonel Capper,

‘ Captain Scott of the artillery,
 ‘ Captain Fitzpatrick,
 ‘ Captain Ogg,
 ‘ Captain West, 33rd regiment, my aide de camp.

‘ I likewise request your permission to take Mr. Sechino, conductor, in charge of certain provisions embarked in the Rockingham for the troops, and that you will be so kind as to allow a conductor, with a detachment of tent and store lascars, to accompany the ordnance and military stores to be sent from Fort St. George.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major General Brathwaite.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Fort William, 21st December, 1800.

‘ On the 15th instant the Albatross sailed for Negapatam with the ships named in the margin*, for the purpose of conveying to Trincomalee the division of the 19th regiment, under orders to join you. This dispatch will be conveyed to you by the ship Anna Maria, carrying the two companies of sepoy volunteers who remained after the last embarkation.

‘ Yesterday I received a dispatch from Mr. North, full of his usual zeal, and of his public-spirited disposition to sacrifice the temporary strength of his own military force to general objects. I am satisfied that he will render you every possible assistance. He is extremely eager for the prosecution of an expedition to Egypt; which, as you are apprized, must be deemed impracticable until a plan of co-operation with a British force acting from the Mediterranean can be concerted.

‘ He is not apprized of my immediate views as communicated to you in my late dispatches; but if you should expect to derive any advantage from communicating them to him, in the strictest confidence, you have my permission to do so, stating that the communication is made by my order. You will be careful to enjoin the strictest secrecy, informing him to how few persons your immediate destination is known.

‘ Mr. North has informed me, that the division of the 19th regiment, which was at Manaar, has been moved to Pointe de Galle, and he recommends that it should remain at the latter station, and thence be taken up by the transports or ships of

* Hope, Elvin, London.

war. I am not aware of any objection to this arrangement. If his overflowing zeal should dispose him to add the 51st regiment to your force, and if you can contrive to accommodate it with conveyance, you have my permission to take it with you to the object of your immediate destination.

‘ I am much concerned to inform you, that I have great reason to apprehend that the Admiral and Mr. Stokes will not reach Trincomalee so soon as I expected. I, however, entertain the most anxious hopes that they may arrive in time to enable you to proceed according to the wishes which I have expressed in my last dispatches.

‘ It is necessary that I should apprize you, that if circumstances should ultimately determine me to attempt the expedition to Egypt, that attempt will require so large a force as to occasion the necessity of my employing some one or two of his Majesty’s General Officers in India. Under such circumstances, you will judge whether your best post would not be Mysore, after you shall have afforded me your assistance in collecting the army, and in giving me your opinion with respect to the general plan of its operations. Either Sir James Craig or General Baird, or both, would probably be employed on the service against Egypt; and I apprehend that in neither of these cases your situation would be very eligible. I am, however, sanguine enough to form a confident expectation, that you will find it practicable to proceed to the accomplishment of my favorite plan, and that I shall hear good news from you in the month of March.

‘ If Mr. North should choose to give you the 51st regiment, it may be a question whether it might not be expedient to leave the Bengal volunteers to form part of the garrison of Trincomalee. I leave that question to your joint decision, apprizing you, however, of my anxious desire that the laudable zeal manifested by the officers and troops of that corps should not be disappointed. I am also of opinion that it would be desirable, in every point of view, to carry the whole force with you. It occurs to me to suggest, that it may be a prudent precaution to take the largest procurable quantity of live stock with you. On this subject you will consult Mr. Stokes.

‘ I remain, my dear Arthur,

‘ Ever yours affectionately,

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Fort William, 24th December, 1800.

‘ This dispatch will be conveyed to you by the Wasp gun boat, which I trust will arrive in time to accompany you on the proposed expedition.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Duncan, and which affords every reason to hope that a detachment (composed of the whole of the 88th and part of the 86th regiments) amounting to five hundred Europeans, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Beresford, will have arrived at Pointe de Galle before the 25th of December. I therefore trust you will have at your command, within the time proposed, the whole force intended, with, perhaps, the exception of two companies of native volunteers, embarked in the Anna Maria. I enclose a letter which I beg you to transmit to Lieut. Colonel Beresford by the first opportunity.

‘ I also enclose two letters to the address of Mr. Dundas, one of which I request you to forward to England, in the event of your success in the proposed object.

‘ You will observe that one of these letters is written under the supposition of your acceptance of the government of the place to be taken, with the intention of remaining permanently in that station. The other letter is written to meet the possibility of your rather preferring the temporary charge of the government, and choosing to return to Mysore. You will forward either letter with your first dispatches to Mr. Dundas, according to your ultimate determination. You will fill up the blank in whichever letter you shall forward. You will obtain from Admiral Rainier copies of my suggestions to him on the subject of this expedition, and you will forward them with your first dispatches to Mr. Dundas.

‘ I am still under considerable anxiety with regard to the timely arrival of the Admiral off Trincomalee. If he should arrive in proper time, and should concur cordially and zealously in my sentiments on this most important occasion, I shall entertain no doubt of your brilliant success; and the reflection of every hour enhances, in my mind, the urgency and magnitude of the service in question.

‘ I am, my dear Arthur,

‘ Ever yours affectionately,

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Ceylon (the Hon. F. North).

SIR, Trincomalee, 27th December, 1800.

As it is very desirable that the quantity of provisions which will proceed from hence with the armament now lying in the harbor should be as large as possible, I shall be obliged to you if you will allow the Commissary of provisions at Trincomalee to issue, upon my requisition, 150 casks of salted beef of 360lbs each, of those lately received from Bengal, and now in his charge, and 4000 bags of rice. I shall also be obliged to you if you will order him to supply the European troops embarked in the transports, as well as those still on shore, with fresh provisions as long as the means in his power will permit him to do so, upon their regular indents.

The consumption of wood on board the transports has already been great; and, as I understand that the Master Attendant at this place has a considerable quantity in store, I shall be obliged to you if you will give him orders to issue it to the ships which may be in want of it, upon the requisition of either Vice Admiral Rainier or myself.

A certain number of hammocks will be wanted for the troops; and as it has been found practicable to make them of gunny bags, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders to the Commissary of Stores to issue 5000 gunny bags upon my requisition.

Tents for the 19th and 80th regiments have been embarked at Fort St. George; but it was impossible to procure tonnage for the proportion of lascars which ought to be attached to them. I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that ninety lascars, with the proportion of native officers, may be added to the armament from Ceylon. Such proportion of them as you may think proper to order from Trincomalee will embark at this place; and such proportion as you may think proper to order from Colombo will embark at Pointe de Galle, with the detachment of the 19th regiment now in garrison there.

I learn from the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, that your Excellency will add a sum of money to our military chest; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that the part of it, which it is proposed should be furnished from the Pay Office at Trincomalee, should be embarked

here ; and that the other part of it, which it is proposed should be furnished from Colombo, should be embarked at Pointe de Galle, in the ships which will receive the detachment of the 19th regiment. I request that your Excellency will be so kind as to give orders to the proper officer, to make me acquainted with the sum which he will embark at Pointe de Galle in consequence of this arrangement.

‘ I have already given your Excellency much trouble in the detail of the wants of the armament, and I have stated all that appears necessary at present : but as more wants may be discovered hereafter, and as your Excellency is about to depart for Pointe de Galle, I shall be obliged to you if you would leave orders with the persons in charge of the public stores, and the heads of departments at this place, to furnish what may be required for the armament, which their stores can afford, upon the requisition of Vice Admiral Rainier or myself.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Ceylon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Ceylon.

‘ SIR,

‘ Trincomalee, 27th December, 1800.

‘ It will be attended with great convenience to the troops and their followers about to embark from Ceylon, if their families could be permitted to receive from the paymasters in the island those portions of their pay which they may think proper to leave for them. If you will be so kind as to allow those paymasters to pay such sums, I will give orders that the family certificates shall be prepared in the usual manner ; copies of which will be given to the paymasters of the troops embarked, who will stop from the amount of each man’s abstract the amount of the family certificate of each corps and individual.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Ceylon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. As I understand that the European women attached to the 19th and 80th regiments receive a certain allowance from government, I shall be obliged to your Excellency if you will permit that allowance to be continued to them during the time that the corps to which they are attached may be employed upon service.’

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Trincomalee, 30th December, 1800.

‘ 1. In obedience to your Lordship’s orders, I have come here to take the command of the troops assembled at this place for service.

‘ 2. I shall proceed to state to your Lordship the arrangements which I have made for conducting the duties of the troops under my command, which appear to me to require explanation, in consequence of the authority for that purpose which I received from your Lordship.

‘ 3. I have appointed Lieut. Colonel Coleman Deputy Adjutant General, and have directed that he shall receive 500 rupees per mensem for assistants in addition to his personal staff allowance. I could not find that any regulation had been made in Bengal, fixing the amount of the allowance for assistants to a Deputy Adjutant General, and I therefore fixed this allowance upon a statement of the number of persons to be employed in that manner by Lieut. Colonel Coleman.

‘ 4. I have appointed Captain Scott, of the Coast artillery, Commissary of Stores, with an establishment as stated in the orders of January. The lascars for the camp equipage for the 19th and 80th regiments are included in this establishment, but they are not yet arrived from Fort St. George.

‘ 5. I have appointed Mr. Sechino Deputy Commissary of Provisions, with an establishment as stated in the orders of the January. This gentleman has long been employed in the provision departments of the Coast army, and his services will be absolutely necessary in the event of landing the troops. The establishment brought from Fort St. George with him, although calculated for but a small number of men, will serve as a groundwork for that department, which it will be necessary to form for the Commissary of Provisions, should the troops land and be employed in the field.

‘ 6. The Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George was pleased to send with me, at my request, one company of artillery, with three companies of gun lascars, and a detachment of pioneers, under Captain Fitzpatrick. His Lordship likewise proposes to send camp equipage for the 19th and 80th regiments, with tent and store lascars, and artificers for the service of this camp equipage, and of the store department ; and certain military stores, of which the Commissary of

Stores will send a return to the military board in Bengal, as soon as they shall be received.

‘ 7. He was likewise pleased to send with me Lieut. de Haviland, of the corps of engineers, and an establishment which appeared necessary, of which a statement is made in the orders of the January.

‘ 8. As these detachments of artillery, gun lascars, and pioneers, and the whole of these departments and establishments, belong to the Coast army, to which they will hereafter return, and as it would be inconvenient to alter the rate of the pay and allowances which they have hitherto received, and which they would receive hereafter, I have thought it proper that they should continue to receive the pay and allowances which they have received heretofore, and that they should be paid in abstracts, made out according to the forms in use under the government of Fort St. George.

‘ 9. I have therefore furnished the Paymaster with a statement of the rates of pay and allowances on the Coast to all descriptions of persons detached from the Coast, and with the forms of the abstracts according to which they are to be drawn, copies of which papers I have the honor to enclose. I have appointed Captain Fitzpatrick, who was muster master in Mysore, to muster the Coast troops and establishment employed in this service.

‘ 10. I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders by which these and other arrangements, which do not require further explanation, have been made, and I request your Lordship’s confirmation of them.

‘ 11. Besides the appointments made by these orders, I have appointed Captain Lowe Agent of Transports, at the recommendation of Captain Malcolm *, of his Majesty’s ship Suffolk, to whom, as well as to myself, this appointment appeared absolutely necessary. I beg leave to recommend that he may be allowed to draw the salary which was given to Captain Kemp, when Agent of Transports to the expedition prepared against Manilla. I am unacquainted with its amount.

‘ 12. I likewise enclose copies and extracts of letters to Mr. Rider, in which authority is given for incurring certain expenses, of which I request your Lordship’s confirmation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* Vice Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm, G.C.B., brother to the late Lieut. General Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Trincomalee, 22nd January, 1801.

‘ A month has nearly elapsed since I arrived here, but I have hitherto received no tidings of the Admiral or Mr. Stokes. It is evident from the papers received from Mr. Stokes, of which I am at present in possession, that he is of opinion that the attempt upon Mauritius should not be made, if it is not possible to reach the island before the month of February. It is probable, therefore, that it will be postponed, and that you will have to determine whether you will make the attack on the return of the season in April.

‘ As I think it desirable that you should be acquainted as soon as possible with certain circumstances, which in my opinion have altered the situation of affairs, I lose no time in writing to you.

‘ The circumstances of the island have altered in some degree since Mr. Stokes was there, and procured the information upon which you determined to undertake the expedition. In the first place, it is impossible to suppose that the enemy will not have suspected the real object of the armament, and will not have prepared for defence. Indeed, before I arrived at Madras, and *before it was known that I was going there*, I received letters from the western coast, stating that the armament was destined either for Mauritius, Egypt, or Batavia, and would be commanded by Sir J. Craig. The removal of the 88th regiment from Bombay to Pointe de Galle has made it very clear that it was not destined for Egypt; and the alteration of the rendezvous, and the removal of the squadron from the Straits of Malacca to Trincomalee, in consequence of the alteration of the plan, have made it equally clear that it was not destined for Batavia.

‘ Therefore, those who judge of the intentions of government by their acts, must have found out the real object of the expedition. But not only have the French had that mode of ascertaining our intentions, but Mr. Webbe informed me of a circumstance at Madras, which proves that they must receive intelligence of them from what they must have deemed at the time the best authority.

‘ A French lady residing at Madras, knew that an expedition was about to sail against Mauritius, and she had been

desired to make known the names of her friends upon the island, in order that they and their property might be protected. It cannot be doubted but that this intelligence flew to Tranquebar immediately, and as no object for the armament was defined, it must have obtained great credit. It is probable, therefore, that the French will be made acquainted with the design, and will prepare themselves accordingly.

‘ I acknowledge that I have never been very sanguine in my expectations of the success of Mr. Stokes’s plan to surprise the place, for many reasons ; but I expected that the enemy would not have heard of the armament, would be unprepared, and their works in bad condition : this cannot be expected in April.

‘ In the second place, the number of men at present upon the island is greater than was stated by Mr. Stokes.

‘ I conclude that the government of Fort St. George will have communicated to you the accounts received at Tranquebar by the Esther. Two ships of war and several merchant ships intended for privateers had arrived at the island, and these must have added to its strength. But if we had been able to sail as first proposed, it is probable that we should have found that some of them were gone out on a cruise, and the others unprepared for their defence. We cannot expect in April, that a ship will be out, or a man will be absent, and we must therefore reckon upon an addition to the numbers stated by Mr. Stokes, of at least 1500 men. In this calculation I do not reckon upon the troops expected ; but only upon the vessels and their men positively stated to have arrived. Upon this statement the question is, whether our numbers will be sufficient to ensure the object in April ; and whether it would be proper to make a trial of Mr. Stokes’s plan.

‘ I want much information, which Mr. Stokes alone can give, to enable me to decide upon his plan, and I therefore defer to write upon it till I see him. What I have above written may be, however, considered as independent of all particular plans, and applies only to the general question.

‘ The state of our provisions on the first of next month will be as follows :—

4 months’ provisions remaining, for	1080 men
4 months’ in the Rockingham	100
6 months’ nearly, in the other transports	500
5 months’ in the ship at Pointe de Galle which brought the 88th from Bombay	600

‘ This will give provisions for the whole number of Europeans for three months and a half, exclusive of some beef which I have taken from hence, and will last them more than four months, with the savings which I hope will be made upon the issue.

‘ The difference between this and my former statements upon this subject, arises from the want of the ship from Madras, which was to have carried 200 men, and to have been provided with provisions for them for six months; from the consumption of this month, in the ships occupied by the 10th regiment, the Bengal and Madras artillery at this place, and by the 88th regiment at Point de Galle; and from the deficiencies in the Rockingham, owing to the difficulty of embarking provisions at Madras in the bad season.

‘ I told you heretofore, that no refreshments could be procured upon this island for the troops; that if they had been landed, they must have lived upon their sea provisions; and therefore I thought it better to keep them in their ships, than to expose them in tents to the worst weather I have seen in India. Besides, so long as there was a prospect that the Admiral would arrive in such time as to enable us to undertake the expedition, I did not wish to increase the difficulty and trouble at the moment of our departure, by having so many more men to embark.

‘ The natives have been on shore ever since they arrived, but have been obliged to live upon their sea provisions till within this fortnight; and I propose to land the Europeans, as soon as I shall have seen the Admiral, if it shall be determined that we are not to sail immediately.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 24th January, 1801.

‘ Since the date of my last official dispatch to you (December 6th, 1800) I have received advice from his excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, the unfavorable tenor of which has unfortunately compelled me to delay the proposed expedition against the Isle of France.

‘ 2. This circumstance, combined with the general aspect of affairs in Europe and in India, requires an alteration in the measures which I had proposed to carry into effect, under a different view of our present situation and future prospects.

‘ 3. I have therefore determined to resume the expedition against Batavia, with the least possible delay; and it is my intention, that the whole force now assembled on the island of Ceylon shall be employed on this service.

‘ 4. Under these circumstances I have judged it expedient to appoint Major General Baird to the chief command of the expedition against Batavia, and to appoint you to be second in command on that expedition.

‘ 5. Immediately after the reduction of Batavia, a proper garrison having been appropriated to the defence of that place, it is my intention that the remainder of the troops, together with such additional force as it may be advisable to apply to this service, from India, should proceed directly from Java to the attack of the Isle of France.

‘ 6. The chief command of the expedition against the Isle of France will be intrusted to you, with the same powers, and under the same instructions, with which you were furnished by my dispatch of the 6th of December, 1800.

‘ 7. Major General Baird will proceed from hence in the course of a few days for Trincomalee; on his arrival at that port, he will assume the general command of the troops to be employed in the first instance against Batavia.

‘ 8. When you shall proceed from Batavia to the attack of the Isle of France, you will act under my instructions of the 6th of December, in the same manner as if the expedition against that place had taken effect in the month of December, 1800, as far as those instructions may be applicable to the actual circumstances of the case.

‘ 9. The details connected with the resumed expedition against the Isle of France will be communicated to you hereafter. Vice Admiral Rainier will communicate to you my dispatches addressed to him under this date.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort
St. George.*

' MY LORD, ' Trincomalee, 28th January, 1801.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of certain provisions, which are required at this place for the use of the armament, which should be sent as soon as possible.

‘ A large proportion of the troops have been embarked nearly two months, and have consumed the provisions laid in for that period ; and the quantity of provisions now remaining in the transports for the whole number of European troops, will not be sufficient for more than four months, even at a reduced allowance. The 80th regiment, and seven companies of the 19th, have been subsisted upon the garrison stock of Trincomalee, since my arrival at this place, many articles of which are already deficient, and the whole will shortly be consumed ; and as no fresh provisions can be procured, it is obvious that if the troops should remain here much longer, a supply of provisions must be sent, or so large a quantity of those intended for the armament will have been used, as to render it impossible to proceed on any service which may be proposed.

‘ I have not received any intelligence of Admiral Rainier or of the squadron, and there is every reason to believe that the armament will be detained at this place for some time.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Lord Clive. ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

' SIR, Fort William, 5th February, 1801.

‘ It is my desire that you should communicate to his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, and to Major General Baird, all my instructions and dispatches, addressed to you, relative to the expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France ; and I have requested his Excellency, and directed Major General Baird, to communicate to you all my suggestions, instructions, and dispatches, addressed to them respectively, relative to those expeditions.

I further desire that you will communicate to Mr. Birch such parts of my dispatches to you as relate exclusively to the negotiations to be opened with the government of Batavia;

and to the measures to be adopted with regard to that colony in the event of its becoming subject to the British power. Mr. Birch has been directed to communicate to you such parts of my dispatches to him as relate to that negotiation, and to the measures to be pursued with respect to the colony subsequently to its capitulation, or subjection to the British power.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

*The Governor General to Vice Admiral Rainier, Major General Baird,
and Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Fort William, 5th February, 1801.

‘ It is possible that his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier may not judge it advisable to undertake the proposed expedition against Batavia during the present season; and that his Excellency may be disposed to prefer an early attack on the Isle of France. In order to provide for a case not considered in any of my dispatches, by the present opportunity I think fit to transmit this separate dispatch for eventual use.

‘ 2. If his Excellency should make the option herein supposed, it is my wish that the whole of the armament, assembled at Trincomalee and Pointe de Galle, should proceed to the Isle of France at such period as his Excellency shall judge proper.

‘ 3. In this case, the land forces are to be commanded in chief by Major General Baird, and the Hon. Colonel Wellesley is to proceed with the expedition as second in command.

‘ 4. On the arrival of the armament at the Isle of France, his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier and Major General Baird will proceed to the attack and reduction of that island, according to the plan detailed in my dispatches of the 22nd of October, 1800, to his Excellency, and in my instructions of the 6th of December, 1800, to the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, who, in the case here supposed, is to deliver those instructions to Major General Baird, previously to the departure of the expedition from the island of Ceylon.

‘ 5. In the event of the conquest of the Isle of France, Major General Baird and the Hon. Colonel Wellesley are, in concert, to establish such a garrison for that island as they shall think adequate to its protection, the Hon. Colonel Wellesley being left in the temporary civil and military government

of the island, according to my former instructions. His Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier and Major General Baird, if they shall judge proper, will proceed with the remaining military force to the attack of Batavia.

‘ 6. In the case supposed in the present dispatch, it will be proper that Mr. Birch should proceed with the expedition against the Isle of France, in order that he may eventually accompany the expedition from thence to Batavia.

‘ 7. It does not appear necessary that the 51st regiment should compose part of the military force proceeding, in the first instance, against the Isle of France. If it should be subsequently required in the expedition proposed to be undertaken against Batavia, after the Isle of France shall have been reduced, his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier and Major General Baird will either provide for the junction of the 51st regiment on the passage from the Isle of France to Batavia, or will send orders for the junction of that corps at Batavia.

‘ 8. If the Vice Admiral should determine to undertake, in the first instance, the attack of the Isle of France, the necessary communications, in consequence of that arrangement, must be made to the Honourable the Governor of Ceylon. Such orders, also, as may appear requisite in this case, must be left for the guidance of the commanders of the transports and store ships which remain to be dispatched from Fort William.

‘ 9. In the event of your forming the determination supposed in the present dispatch, you will be pleased to convey to me the earliest possible information of the same. You will also transmit the necessary information on the subject, with the utmost practicable expedition, to the British squadron cruising off the Isle of France, to his Excellency Vice Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, and to his Excellency Sir George Young, at the Cape of Good Hope.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Vice Adm. Rainier.

‘ WELLESLEY.

‘ Maj. Gen. Baird.

‘ Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 5th February, 1801.

‘ In consequence of the necessity to which I have been reduced of delaying the execution of the proposed expedition

against the Isle of France, I have revised my instructions to you with relation to that object. I do not, however, deem it necessary to make any essential variation in the tenor of those instructions. I refer you to my dispatches to his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, and to my instructions to Major General Baird, of this date, for your guidance with respect to the assumption of the chief command of the forces destined to proceed to the Isle of France, in the cases therein stated, and according to the manner therein prescribed.

‘ 2. The enclosures of my dispatches most secret, of this date, addressed to his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, will apprise you of the measures which I have taken to obtain the co-operation of Sir Roger Curtis’s squadron. In the full confidence that his Excellency will not fail to furnish every assistance within his power, I have directed that the detachment under your command should proceed at the prescribed period of time, without convoy from his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, if he should decline to co-operate in the proposed expedition. In any case supposed in my several dispatches, the senior officer who may command any of his Majesty’s ships, co-operating with you in the attack of the Isle of France, will of course succeed to the powers and authorities specified in my instructions to you, with reference to the co-operation of his Excellency Vice Admiral Rainier, or of any officer of his squadron.

‘ 3. Mr. Charles Stokes will deliver this dispatch to you, and will accompany the expedition to Batavia, in the capacity of Commissary of Stores and Provisions and Inspector of Transports. From Batavia he will proceed with you in the same capacities to the Isle of France. He carries with him an accurate plan of Port Louis, on an enlarged scale, formed from his own actual survey, with references to his former memorial, as well as to the recent operations of Sir Roger Curtis’s squadron in the harbour of Port Louis.

‘ 4. Having reviewed the draft of the proclamation and articles of capitulation transmitted to you in my dispatch of the 6th of December, 1800, I have thought it expedient to make the alterations noted in the enclosure of this dispatch.

‘ 5. I enclose a copy of the signals to be eventually employed between your detachment and the squadron of Sir Roger Curtis.

‘ 6. I direct that all the gun boats which shall accompany the expedition to Batavia be attached to the transports which shall convey your detachment from Batavia to the Isle of France.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Enclosed I transmit a copy of the letter to Mr. Stokes, constituting him Commissary of Stores and Provisions, as mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of this letter.’

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 5th February, 1801.

‘ I authorize you to draw from the public treasury at Batavia, or from the funds which may be provided for the prosecution of the expedition against the Isle of France, or eventually from the public treasury at the Isle of France, such sums as may be requisite for defraying all the necessary expenses which you may incur in consequence of your appointment to command the expedition against the Isle of France.

‘ 2. You will consider this order in force until I shall furnish you with instructions respecting the permanent allowances which you are to receive while employed on that service.

‘ 3. The sums which you may draw under this order are to be afterwards accounted for, and will be deducted from the amount of your permanent allowances.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Chief Secretary of Government,
Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Trincomalee, 7th February, 1801.

‘ I have received your dispatch of the 1st instant by the Dragon, and I have the honor to enclose the triplicate of a letter to the Governor of Bombay, which will point out the arrangements which I propose in order to carry into execution the plan of the Secretary of State, as detailed in his letter to the Most Noble the Governor General of the 6th of October.

‘ I request that you will do me the favour to forward the letter to the Government of Bombay by express.

‘ There will remain in Ceylon, of the body of troops col-

lected here for service, the 19th regiment, seven companies of which are at Trincomalee, and three companies at Pointe de Galle. The other corps, exclusive of the artillery, will amount to about 2000 firelocks.

‘ I have been induced to take from hence a body of European troops so much larger than that proposed by the Secretary of State for the service,—

‘ First, Because I have not got with me the number of sepoy which he proposes should be employed ; and I have reason to believe that it will be difficult to collect such a body on the western coast of the Peninsula.

‘ Secondly, Because I think it probable that the body of Europeans, which it is intended should be sent from the Cape, will not arrive till the season for sailing up the Red Sea will have gone by ; and that it may be thought proper to be provided from India with a body of troops which can carry into execution the wishes of the Government.

‘ Thirdly, Because if the Governor General should think proper to stop any part of his European force, and to employ upon the proposed service only the proportion stated by Mr. Secretary Dundas, I shall, till a late period in the next month, have it in my power to receive his Lordship’s orders ; and at that period the troops will be able either to return to this place, or to proceed to any part of India that his Lordship may think proper to appoint.

‘ It is probable, however, that his Lordship may think it desirable that the armament should proceed from India in full force ; and that even the battalion of sepoy should form part of it, for which I have suggested to Mr. Duncan to make preparations.

‘ I hope that this arrangement, and the reasons on which it is founded, will meet with the approbation of the Honorable the Governor in Council ; and if his Lordship will be so kind as to send me his orders to Anjengo, Calicut, Cannanore, Mangalore, Goa, or Bombay, I will take measures to ensure the receipt of them.

‘ The provisions called for in my letter to the Governor of Bombay, are in lieu of those which I requested the Right Honorable the Governor in Council to send here in my address of the 28th of January. These will not now be wanted, excepting for the supply of the garrison of Trincomalee.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ *The Chief Sec. of Gov., Fort St. George.*

‘ You will have been made acquainted by the Most Noble the Governor General with the objects proposed for the body of troops collected at this place, and at Pointe de Galle, under my command; and you will have perceived that one of his Lordship’s reasons for collecting this force was, to be prepared to answer the call of his Majesty’s Ministers, in the quarter for which troops have now been called for by the letter of the Secretary of State of the 6th of October.

‘ Under these circumstances, and in consequence of a letter which I have received from the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, I propose to proceed towards the rendez-vous pointed out by the Secretary of State, with the troops as per margin*, as soon as I shall have been joined by the ship Wellesley, which was to leave Madras, loaded with stores, on the 3rd instant.

‘ You will perceive that I shall have with me a larger proportion of Europeans, and a smaller proportion of natives, than the Secretary of State proposes should be employed on the service; and as the Most Noble the Governor General may think proper to withdraw from this force some of the Europeans, I take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of making preparations to add to it a battalion of native infantry.

‘ I shall sail from hence under the convoy of his Majesty’s ship Suffolk; and Captain Malcolm is of opinion, that to go to Bombay will not materially retard the fleet. I am induced, therefore, to go there, not only to have the honor of paying my respects to you, and to receive the orders which I may expect from the Most Noble the Governor General, but to receive certain refreshments and provisions, of which the troops are in want, and of which I am about to give you a statement.

‘ As the troops have been for nearly two months at Trincomalee, at which place there are no refreshments, it is desirable that they should have the full advantage of those which I understand that Bombay can afford; and that preparations should be made to supply them as soon as they shall arrive in that harbour. I hope that I shall be able to depart from hence on the 12th instant, and you will be able to form a judgment

* Bengal, Madras, and Bombay artillery, 10th regiment, 80th regiment, 88th regiment, detachment of the 86th regiment, Bengal Volunteer Sepoys, 1st battalion.

of the period at which it is likely that we shall arrive at Bombay.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of certain articles of provision, which it is desirable should be in readiness at Bombay, to be embarked on the fleet as soon as it shall arrive.

‘ It will be very desirable that an addition should be made at Bombay to our military chest, if this measure should suit the convenience of your government.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will favor me with such intelligence as you may think it proper that I should have, while on my passage along the Malabar coast.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Trincomalee, 9th February, 1801.

‘ 1. The Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George has transmitted to me copies of the dispatches of the Secretary of State to your Lordship and himself of the 6th of October, and of the letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the 10th of the same month to his Lordship, in a letter from the Chief Secretary of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ 2. These letters have induced me to come to a determination to proceed to Bombay, with the troops under my command, under convoy of his Majesty’s ship Suffolk; and I have the honor to enclose copies of my letters to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, written in consequence of my forming this determination, that will best explain the motives which urged me to it, and the arrangements which I have proposed to the latter government for the speedy supply of the deficiency of provisions required for the troops.

‘ 3. Since I have formed this determination and have written these letters, further information has reached me, although through private channels, which has tended to confirm me in the opinion which I had formed of its propriety.

‘ 4. I have learned that Vice Admiral Rainier dispatched the Cornwallis to your Lordship from Prince of Wales’s Island on the 24th of December, and Mr. Charles Stokes in that ship, in charge of his Excellency’s dispatches. It is therefore clear,

that his Excellency did not think it practicable to undertake in this season the expedition, with a view to which your Lordship might still wish that the troops should remain at Trincomalee; at the same time that, if it should be practicable, and your Lordship should wish to undertake it in the approaching season, it will not be difficult to bring back the troops, so that they will be at Trincomalee long before the period for sailing will arrive.

‘ 5. I have besides learned, that on the 31st of December, his Excellency the Vice Admiral had received intelligence that part of his squadron which had been to the eastward was very unhealthy, and that he had determined to remain at Prince of Wales’s Island till the end of January.

‘ 6. From the whole of this intelligence, and from the tenor of your Lordship’s dispatches and instructions, I conceive and hope that I shall conform to your wishes in proceeding to Bombay immediately, and eventually to the rendez-vous pointed out by Mr. Secretary Dundas, in his letter to your Lordship.

‘ 7. I beg leave to recommend, that, if possible, the full number of troops, supposed to be required for the proposed service, should proceed from India; as, by my letter to Fort St. George, your Lordship will perceive that I fear that the squadron under Sir Home Popham will not be able to effect its passage in time. There is every reason to believe that it will not have sailed from England before the 1st of November, in which case it cannot arrive in the Red Sea before the end of March, and probably later.

‘ 8. If your Lordship should determine that the whole of the armament required should proceed from India, it will be necessary that you should order the Governor of Bombay to furnish one battalion of native infantry.

‘ 9. My different letters to your Lordship will have pointed out to you the want of tonnage for the troops; and notwithstanding that I expect the Wellesley from Madras, I have thought it proper to take up the ship Maria Louisa at this port. I will hereafter transmit a statement of the terms on which this ship is taken up.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Vice Admiral Rainier.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ H. M. S. Suffolk, Trincomalee, 14th Feb., 1801.

‘ I arrived here on the 24th of December last, in consequence of orders which I received from the Governor General, and in hopes that I should have an opportunity of aiding you on a service which was proposed for the troops assembled at this place and at Pointe de Galle.

‘ It is probably fortunate that it has not been possible to carry that service into execution, and that the troops are still here in preparation to obey the orders of the Secretary of State.

‘ Captain Malcolm informs me that he will leave here, for your perusal, certain dispatches from the Secretary of State to the Governor General, and Governor of Fort St. George, dated the 6th of October; and a letter from the Secret Committee to the latter government, dated the 10th of October, which I received from Lord Clive on the 7th instant.

‘ From the tenor of the dispatches of the Governor General to yourself and to me, I had not a doubt, upon the receipt of those dispatches, but that it was my duty to proceed with the troops towards the rendez-vous pointed out by Mr. Secretary Dundas; and accordingly I wrote a letter to Captain Malcolm on the 7th instant, of which, and of his answer, I understand from him that he sends you copies.

‘ Captain Malcolm is of opinion, that to go to Bombay will not materially retard the fleet; and we proceed there, not only that we may be able to receive the provisions, of which there is a deficiency, in consequence of the troops having been so long at this place and having lived upon salt provisions, but that we may have an opportunity of receiving the further orders of the Governor General and of yourself.

‘ If the Governor General, or you, should still be desirous to undertake the expedition which was first proposed, and if it should be determined that the troops which I now take from hence are to form part of the armament for that purpose, I understand that it will not be difficult to bring them back to Trincomalee from Bombay, before the season will come round at which it would be proper to undertake that service.

‘ On the other hand, if the Governor General should depend upon this body of troops, to carry into execution the wishes of

his Majesty's Ministers, as stated in the letter of Mr. Secretary Dundas of the 6th of October, it is absolutely necessary that we should proceed towards the rendez-vous pointed out by him without loss of time.

‘ These are the considerations which induced me to propose to Captain Malcolm to proceed towards Bombay immediately; and since I proposed that measure to him, other circumstances have come to my knowledge which have convinced me of its propriety.

‘ I have heard from Mr. North, that the Governor of Bombay did not propose to make any preparations to send a force to the Red Sea, in consequence of the letter of Mr. Secretary Dundas of the 6th of October, a copy of which was sent to him from England, until he heard that the armament which was assembled at this place had been otherwise disposed of; and, besides, I learn that he had only two battalions of sepoy's of 600 men each, of which he could dispose. It appears then, not only that he has no troops to answer the call of his Majesty's Ministers, but if he had them, or if they could be sent to him, it is probable that the preparations to be made previous to sending them to the proposed rendez-vous would take up so much time, that the season for sailing up the Red Sea would be gone by, before they could reach its mouth. Therefore some of the troops assembled at Ceylon must proceed on that service; and if it should be determined that a part of them should be employed on any other service, and should return here, there will be no difficulty in obeying any orders which may be given to that purport, as I have before observed.

‘ Captain Malcolm has put up for you a large packet of dispatches from the Governor General, some of which I opened according to his directions. They are in triplicate, and relate principally to the expedition which it was proposed to carry into execution in December.

‘ The Governor General sent here five Assistant Surgeons, who, I believe, were intended for the ships, and I have disposed of them as follows. One of them, Mr. Small, is in the Suffolk; Mr. Rice in the gun boat Fury, and in charge of the sick in her and the Wasp; Mr. Carnegy in the Waller, which vessel remains at this place; and Mr. Pollock in the Anna Maria transport.

‘ Mr. Cheese is a gentleman much esteemed in Bengal, on

account of his professional abilities, and he is desirous of returning thither. I have allowed him to return to Calcutta, as I understand from Captain Malcolm, that it is not likely that you will be desirous of detaining him contrary to his inclination, particularly as it is not probable that any of the ships of your squadron will be sent on any service which will detain them long at sea.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Vice Admiral Rainier.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Chief Secretary of Government,
Fort St. George.*

‘ SIR, ‘ H.M.S. Suffolk, off Trincomalee, 15th Feb., 1801.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that the fleet of transports went out of the harbour yesterday, and the whole are now at sea with a fair wind. The Honorable Company’s ship Waller remains at this port to receive the orders of the Admiral or of Government; the gun boats Fury and Wasp accompany the fleet.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Chief Sec. of Gov., Fort St. George.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Ceylon.

‘ SIR, ‘ Pointe de Galle, 18th February, 1801.

‘ I have received your letters of the 17th instant; and as I am so unfortunate as to differ in opinion with you, regarding the propriety of going to Bombay, and as you have recorded your opinion, and the communication of it to me, it is necessary that I should trouble you at some length, as well to justify myself in your eyes, as that those who will have to judge hereafter of the propriety of my decision upon this occasion, may know the real grounds upon which I formed it.

‘ First; I learn from Captain Malcolm that the passage from hence to the Red Sea will not be materially retarded by going to Bombay; that the fleet must proceed along the coast as far as the Vingorla rocks, to the northward of Goa, before it crosses; and in some cases, that it may be necessary to go still farther north.

‘ Secondly; Supposing the delay by going to Bombay were likely to be greater than it appears at present, it is impossible to think of going to the Red Sea until the ships and troops are provided with many articles which are at present deficient.

‘ This deficiency has been occasioned by the necessity of using at Trincomalee what was intended to be used upon the voyage. On the 1st of this month, there were on board the fleet about four months’ provisions for the whole armament ; at this moment this quantity will last three months and a half ; and supposing my passage to Mocha should be much better than even you suppose it would, I should reach that station with a sufficiency of provision to last the troops two months and a half ; and my first thoughts must be directed to taking measures for procuring a further supply.

‘ You propose that I should send my indent to you for the articles which are deficient ; and from the kindness and attention which I have already experienced, I should certainly have every inclination to do so. But I must observe, that you have neither the means of supplying all my wants, nor those of transporting to me the articles which you could supply. You then propose that they should be supplied from the Malabar province, which I beg to inform you is equally destitute of what I want as the territories under your government.

‘ But you propose that I should proceed without the articles which I have requested the Governor of Bombay to prepare, and you have no doubt but that he or the Governor of Fort St. George will send them after me.

‘ Articles of provision are not to be trifled with, or left to chance ; and there is nothing more clear than that the subsistence of the troops must be certain upon the proposed service, or the service must be relinquished.

‘ If there is a chance that by going to Bombay with the fleet we shall be late, is it not more probable that the provisions for which shipping must be prepared at Bombay will be late, and is there not a chance that the provisions will miss the fleet entirely, and that the troops will be in want ? If the provisions are to be supplied from Madras or Calcutta, the probability of want is greater in proportion to the greater length of the voyage.

‘ Upon the whole, then, as far as regards supplies wanted for the fleet, I conceive that I act with propriety, and that I do that which will tend most to insure the object of the armament, by proceeding to Bombay to receive provisions on board the ships in which the troops are embarked.

‘ I have taken every measure which I can think of to make

it certain that these articles and certain refreshments, of which the troops who have been at Trincomalee are greatly in want, may be prepared by the time I reach Bombay; and if they are so, I shall certainly be in time for every thing. If they are not, and if I am detained at Bombay, I have seen letters from Admiral Blanquet, which lead me to be of opinion, that I shall not be too late for one of the objects proposed even in the end of April; and as for the other, it is possible to reach it at all seasons.

‘ Thirdly; I am very anxious to receive the orders of the Governor General regarding the armament, and I can receive them only by going to Bombay. The orders of Mr. Secretary Dundas confine the demand upon India to one regiment of Europeans and two battalions of sepoy; and it may probably be the intention of his Lordship to employ upon another service the Europeans which I have under my command, which are above the number demanded. It is surely my duty to afford his Lordship an opportunity of giving me his orders, particularly as I am strongly urged to take the steps which will put me in the way of receiving them, by the motives which I have above stated, and which affect so nearly the final success of the service proposed; when I learn from the best authority that the fleet will not be materially delayed by taking those steps; and when I have reason to believe, from another excellent authority, that even after the greatest delay which can possibly be expected, I shall still be in good time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Ceylon.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Hon. Frederick North,
Governor of Ceylon.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Pointe de Galle, 18th February, 1801.

‘ I have received your letter upon the subject of my proceeding to Bombay, to which an answer will accompany this letter.

‘ I am concerned that you, or General Macdowall* should have thought it necessary to write a public letter upon this subject, as I hope that I have always shown myself ready to attend to your wishes in whatever manner they may have been made known to me. The existence of your public letter upon the

* Commanding the forces at Ceylon: he was lost at sea, in returning to Europe.

records of your government increases considerably my responsibility upon this occasion.

‘ However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay are so strong, and the urgency of the measure is so great, and will appear so much so to all those who will have to judge of my conduct, that I persist, and I still hope that it will meet with your approbation and that of General Macdowall.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *The Hon. Frederick North.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 10th February, 1801.

‘ 1. Since the date of my last dispatches to you on the subject of the intended expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France, I have received dispatches overland from England, which have determined me to relinquish for the present the prosecution of those expeditions.

‘ 2. For the contents of those dispatches, and for the measures which I now propose to pursue, I must refer you to my instructions, of this date, to Major General Baird, which he is directed to communicate to you.

‘ 3. I have appointed Major General Baird to command the armament, which is now destined to the Red Sea, and I have appointed you second in command on that important service.

‘ 4. For my instructions for your guidance, I must refer you to my above mentioned dispatches of this date, to Major General Baird.

‘ 5. I have forwarded a copy of this letter to Major General Baird for his information and guidance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Baird.

‘ MY DEAR GENERAL, ‘ On board H.M.S. Suffolk, 21st Feb., 1801.

‘ I have just received a letter from Lord Wellesley, dated the 24th of January, by which I am informed that you are appointed to take the command of the body of troops which have hitherto been under my orders; that you were likely to leave Calcutta for Trincomalee towards the end of the month; and that the object was an expedition against the Dutch settle-

ment in Java. You will probably be much surprised to find that I have left the island of Ceylon with the troops, and have gone towards Bombay; and I write you this letter to explain the motives which urged me to take this step without waiting for orders from the Governor General.

‘ On the 7th of February, I received from the Governor of Fort St. George a copy of a letter from Mr. Dundas to Lord Wellesley, dated the 6th of October, calling for the co-operation of a body of troops from India in an attack upon Egypt. As the troops were collected in Ceylon, partly with a view to be prepared to answer this call, I conceived it to be my duty to proceed immediately towards the rendez-vous pointed out by Mr. Dundas; and I go to Bombay because I understand that it will not materially retard the arrival of the fleet in the Red Sea; because I know that the troops are in want of provisions, which can be furnished at Bombay only; and because I am desirous of receiving the orders of the Governor General before I proceed finally to the Red Sea.

‘ In my opinion, the letter from Mr. Dundas, which I have above mentioned, will make a considerable alteration in the plan which the Governor General had on the 24th of January; and that he will in consequence be obliged either to relinquish the attack upon Batavia entirely, or to provide another body of troops for that purpose. I therefore proceed on my voyage, notwithstanding that I have received his orders of the 24th of January.

‘ It is true, that the number of European troops, called for in Egypt, is not equal to that which I have with me at present, although the number of natives is greater; and I might immediately send back to Trincomalee some of the European troops, in order to give Lord Wellesley an opportunity of sending both expeditions, if he should think it proper.

‘ Upon this last notion I must observe, that I do not think it probable that he will wish to send both expeditions; if he should wish it, I shall know it upon my arrival at Bombay, from the tenor of his orders to Mr. Duncan; and I can immediately send back to Ceylon the troops which it may be intended to employ upon the expedition to Batavia. These will arrive at Ceylon long before the period for sailing will come round.

‘ As I before observed to you, I do not think it probable that Lord Wellesley would wish to send both expeditions; he will

send that to Egypt only : and as I know that it was his intention to give you the command of this body of troops, in case they should go to Egypt, I recommend you to come to Bombay and take the command of them without loss of time.

‘ If Lord Wellesley should determine to send both the expeditions, and if he should wish that you should command that to Batavia, you will be with the troops which must go on that service. On the other hand, if he should determine to send troops to Egypt only, you will be late, unless you proceed to Bombay immediately.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Fort William, 3rd March, 1801.

‘ I received this day your private letter of the 7th of February, and the dispatches noticed in Mr. Barlow’s letter of this date.

‘ Being in hourly expectation of receiving a direct communication from you, of the grounds and motives which induced you to act upon Mr. Dundas’s letter of the 6th of October, before you had received any intimation of my intentions with respect to the mode of prosecuting the expedition to the Red Sea, I have not expressed any official opinion on the subject. I entertain a confident hope that you will furnish me, at the earliest possible period of time, with such official documents as shall enable me to deliver my sentiments in a regular form, and in a manner agreeable to my wishes and satisfactory to you.

‘ After the fullest deliberation, my determination is to make the most powerful diversion which may be practicable on the coasts of the Red Sea, and for that purpose to employ, in the first instance, the whole force assembled at Ceylon and Bombay. If the campaign in Egypt should be protracted, it will become a question to what extent the army acting upon the coast of the Red Sea may be augmented within the next season.

My first opinion inclined to the literal execution of the King’s commands, and to the prosecution of an expedition either against the Mauritius or against Batavia, with such forces as I might have been able to collect for either purpose after having satisfied Mr. Dundas’s requisition : under this impression I directed Colonel Kirkpatrick to write the private

letter addressed to Mr. Duncan on the 7th of February; but a fuller consideration of the subject induced me to change my opinion.

‘ The result of attempting operations in Egypt and in India at the same time, would probably have proved an unfavorable one to both services; and it is evident that the diversion on the coasts of the Red Sea cannot prove advantageous unless it be powerful, and unless it be prosecuted at the earliest possible moment.

‘ General Baird will bring you several letters from me, which will serve to explain my motives for wishing you to retain the second command of this expedition. I am persuaded that a full consideration of the question will induce you to agree with me in opinion, that the extent of the force to be employed rendered it necessary to appoint a general officer to the chief command; while the sudden call to active service precluded the possibility of removing you from the second command without injuring your character, or of leaving you officially the power of option, without reproach upon the impartiality and justice of my administration.

‘ You will, however, exercise your judgment upon the propriety of desiring leave to return to Mysore; and if you should retain your anxiety on that subject, I shall not attempt to obstruct your wishes, nor shall I feel any sentiment of unkindness upon the transaction; but my decided opinion is, that you will best satisfy the call of your public duty, and maintain the reputation of your public spirit, by serving cheerfully and zealously in your present situation.

‘ Henry arrived safe and well on the 22nd of February. I enclose an abstract from the Duke of York’s letter respecting your future situation in India.

‘ Ever, dear ARTHUR, yours most affectionately,
‘ Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ WELLESLEY.

Extract from the Duke of York’s Letter.

‘ Having the pleasure of knowing personally Colonel Wellesley, I am thoroughly acquainted with his merits, and your Lordship may be assured of the satisfaction I shall feel in laying his name before his Majesty, to be placed upon the Staff in the East Indies, as soon as his standing in the army shall admit of his being promoted to the rank of Major General.’

*The Secretary to the Supreme Government to Colonel
the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 3rd March, 1801.

‘ 1. I am commanded, by the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, to inform you, that I have received through the Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, and have laid before his Excellency in Council, copies of your letters to the Chief Secretary at Fort St. George, and to the Governor of Bombay, dated the 7th ultimo.

‘ 2. I am further directed by his Excellency to enclose a copy of his instructions to Major General Baird, and of his letter to you under date of the 10th of February; which documents will furnish you with the plan which his Excellency has adopted for the execution of his Majesty’s commands of the 6th of October, 1800.

‘ 3. As soon as this dispatch shall reach you, his Excellency in Council directs you to proceed immediately to Mocha.

‘ 4. If Major General Baird should not have arrived at that place, you will act as chief in command of the whole force directed to assemble at Mocha; and you will carry into execution, with every practicable degree of dispatch, the plan stated in his Excellency’s instructions to General Baird, dated 10th of February.

‘ 5. When Major General Baird shall join the forces destined to be employed on the coasts of the Red Sea, you will act as second in command, according to the tenor of the same instructions.

‘ 6. Adverting to your letters to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, and to the Governor of Bombay, of the 7th ultimo, the Governor General in Council directs me to remark, that under his Excellency’s orders of the month of October, (adverted to in the 11th paragraph of the instructions to you, from the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, dated the 15th November, 1800,) the government of Bombay were directed to hold in readiness a considerable force of native troops for the purpose of co-operating in Egypt, or elsewhere, with the armament assembled at Ceylon; and that a force of 1600 sepoy has accordingly been ready for embarkation, for some time past, at Bombay.

‘ 7. His Excellency also directs me to remark, that the stores embarked in the ships Shah Byramgore, Cecilia, and Anstruther, contain provisions, which, in most articles, appear more than sufficient to meet the demand transmitted by you to the Governor of Bombay.

‘ 8. Major General Baird embarked for the port of Trincomalee in the Hon. Company’s ship Phoenix ; which ship parted with the pilot off the Sand Heads, at the entrance of the river Hoogley, on the 14th ultimo.

‘ I have the honor, &c.

‘ G. H. BARLOW,

‘ Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ Chief Sec. to Government,

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Fort William, 18th March, 1801.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th of February. You will have received from the Chief Secretary to Government a copy of my instructions to Major General Baird, of the 10th of February, and of other documents, by which you will be informed of the measures adopted by me for the purpose of carrying into effect the orders of his Majesty, communicated in Mr. Secretary Dundas’s letter of the 6th October, 1800.

‘ You will observe by my instructions to Major General Baird, that it was my intention that the troops destined for this service should proceed from Ceylon directly to the place of rendez-vous. I am, however, satisfied, under all the circumstances of the case, that in proceeding with these troops to Bombay in the first instance, you have not hazarded any delay in their arrival at the ultimate point of their destination. I even trust that this measure may accelerate their arrival at Mocha. I therefore entirely approve the alacrity and promptitude which you have manifested in moving the troops towards the place of their rendez-vous.

‘ I have addressed a letter to General Baird, apprizing him of the motives which induced you to proceed to Bombay with the troops from Ceylon.

‘ By a letter from the Right Hon. Lord Clive, under date the 2nd instant, I understand that his Lordship has determined to send six companies of his Majesty’s 74th regiment

to Bombay by the ships under dispatch at Fort St. George, for the purpose of supplying the place of the 19th regiment, which you left at Ceylon. The 19th regiment will, therefore, remain at Ceylon for the defence of that island. This arrangement appears to me to be judicious; as in the approaching season it would require a considerably longer time to transport the 19th regiment from Ceylon to Bombay, than will be occupied in conveying the six companies of the 74th directly to that place from Fort St. George.

‘Advices have recently reached me, which induce me to apprehend that the French may have reinforced the Mauritius with a view to hostile operations against India; I have, therefore, judged it expedient to leave the Governor in Council at Bombay, the option of detaining the companies of the 74th for the garrison of Bombay, if he should judge it necessary.

‘I have the honor, &c.

‘Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

‘1. The letters which I have received since my arrival at this place, give me reason to apprehend, that neither my departure from Ceylon, nor my coming here have been approved by your Excellency.

‘2. Although my address of the 9th February, with its enclosures, stated the outlines of the reasons which induced me to take those steps, without waiting for your Excellency’s orders, I am induced to enter again into further detail of them, in order, if possible, to remove an impression which has given me great uneasiness; or at least, to prove that I acted upon the most mature deliberation, and did what I thought best for the service, and most likely to be agreeable to you.

‘3. I always considered that your Excellency’s intentions were, that I should attend to the intelligence which I should receive from Bombay, of a call from Europe for the co-operation of a force from this country in an attack upon the French in the Red Sea, which you foresaw would be made; and even that the expedition upon which you ordered that I should proceed at the end of December, was to be relinquished in

case intelligence came of a call for co-operation in the Red Sea.

‘ 4. Upon this point I must observe, that the government of Fort St. George conceived that I ought to proceed towards the rendez-vous pointed out by Mr. Secretary Dundas, when they sent me the copies of the dispatches, as appears by their Secretary’s letter of the 1st February, a copy of which has been already laid before your Excellency ; that the government of Bombay expected that I should proceed towards it, and therefore did not send the troops which they had in preparation ; and that the Governor of Ceylon conceived that I ought to proceed towards it, and urged me repeatedly, in the strongest manner, to lose no time previous to my departure.

‘ 5. I received the dispatches of the Secretary of State on the 7th of February, and I knew that your Excellency could not receive them till about the same day. If I had waited at Trincomalee, and you had written me your orders immediately, I should not have received them by post till the 3rd or 4th of March, and at that time the stock of provisions for the troops would have been reduced to one, for three months.

‘ 6. I consulted with Captain Malcolm regarding the passage to the Red Sea, the season, and the line which it would be most proper to follow. He was of opinion that no time ought to be lost ; that it would be necessary to proceed up the coast as far as the Vingorla rocks, before the fleet could go to the westward ; and that to go to Bombay would not create a material delay. Upon this opinion I formed my plan, and determined to sail as soon as a vessel loaded with military stores, then expected, should arrive from Madras.

‘ 7. The only doubt I had upon my mind, was whether I should take from Ceylon more than one regiment of Europeans and the battalion of sepoys, and trust to the preparations at Bombay for the remainder of the equipment. But although the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay had been ordered to have troops in readiness in case I should want them, I was ignorant of the resources of the latter, and I did not believe that they would be able to furnish the troops which have been sent to the Red Sea ; and, therefore, I took with me the whole of the force for which I had tonnage, knowing, that if your Excellency should wish that some of the troops should

be employed upon another service, and should return to Ceylon, they would be there in good time.

‘ 8. I determined to go to Bombay, because, when I sailed from Trincomalee, I had provisions for only three and a half months; and I knew by your letter of the 1st of December, 1800, that it was your opinion that the troops ought not to go to the Red Sea with a smaller quantity than for six months. I was very anxious to receive your Excellency’s orders, which would reach me at Bombay; and as I have above stated, I was informed by Captain Malcolm, that as the fleet would be obliged to go as far north as the Vingorla rocks, the passage to Mocha was not likely to be materially delayed, by putting into Bombay to receive the supply of provisions, which I had requested Mr. Duncan to prepare.

‘ 9. I have thus laid before your Excellency the grounds upon which I conceived myself obliged to come to a decision, when I received the dispatches of the Secretary of State; and those upon which I determined to sail immediately with all the troops for which I had tonnage, and to go to Bombay; and I now proceed to state the reasons for which I have persisted in that determination, notwithstanding the receipt of subsequent advices from you and Mr. Duncan.

‘ 10. When I was off Cape Comorin, I received your Excellency’s orders of the 24th January, in which you inform me that you have appointed Major General Baird to the command of the troops, and that you intended to send them on an expedition to Batavia. I was certain that you had not received the dispatches of the Secretary of State when you wrote that letter; I knew that you must depend for the expedition to the Red Sea upon some of the troops which had been, till then, under my orders; and as I did not know what might be your wishes after you should have received the dispatches, I determined to proceed according to my original plan; and I dispatched a letter to Major General Baird to Trincomalee, to apprise him of my motions. If your Excellency had determined to carry on both expeditions, the troops for that for Batavia would have been at Ceylon, before the season for sailing would have come round; and if you determined to carry on only that to the Red Sea, they would be at Bombay collected for that purpose.

‘ 11. I received a letter from Mr. Duncan on the 16th

instant, in which he enclosed a copy of a letter from Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick, dated the 7th February, and informed me that General Baird was to command the expedition to the Red Sea. Notwithstanding the contents of the enclosure, I did not know till then of the intention to dispatch from Bengal any of the vessels loaded with provisions mentioned by Mr. Secretary Barlow. At that time I was so near Bombay, that I was induced to adhere to my original plan. The intelligence received from Mr. Duncan did not state what your Excellency's intentions were regarding the proposed expedition to Batavia; although Mr. Duncan informed me that Major General Baird was appointed to command the expedition to the Red Sea. It was therefore necessary that I should come here to receive your orders. The fleet was in want of water, which could not be procured at any port to the southward of the Vingorla rocks, on account of the want of conveniences for that purpose, without losing more time than was likely to elapse while it was coming to Bombay; and the troops, in general, wanted refreshments. The 10th regiment in particular had become sickly from having been so long on board ship, living on salt provisions, and has lost men. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to come on to Bombay.

‘ 12. Since my arrival here, I have perused your Lordship's instructions to Major General Baird, and your dispatches to the Governor of Bombay; and I perceive that I have anticipated your wishes in bringing from Ceylon all the troops for which I had tonnage. I imagine that I should have incurred your disapprobation in a great degree, if I had not taken steps to insure the receipt of your Excellency's orders before the final departure of the troops for Mocha; and I certainly could not have received them, the ships would have gone ill supplied with water, and the troops in want of refreshments, which no other place can afford, if I had not come on to Bombay.

‘ 13. Having thus explained all the motives which urged me to depart from Ceylon, and to come here, I beg to observe, that notwithstanding the unexpected length of the passage hitherto, it is probable that the fleet will be at Mocha sooner than it would have been had I waited at Trincomalee for your Excellency's orders, and certainly better refreshed and supplied with water and provisions. But whatever may be your Excellency's determination upon my conduct, I hope that you will give me credit

for having maturely considered the points upon which I had to decide; and for having had an earnest and zealous desire to forward the service in view, and to give it the full benefit of your Excellency's foresight in collecting the troops in Ceylon.

' 14. The whole of the fleet is not yet come in, but as the ships arrive, I will take care that they shall be dispatched as soon as they receive their water. All the arrangements are made for putting the provisions into the ships, and your Lordship may depend upon it that not a moment shall be lost.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.**

' MY DEAR HENRY,

' Bombay, 23rd March, 1801.

' I have received your note of the 3rd of March, but none of your other letters, which you say that you have written to me. I hope that you received those which I wrote to you while you were in England, giving an account of how we were going on in this country. I enclosed them to the Doctor,† and desired him to destroy those which should arrive subsequent to your departure, on your return to this country; so that some of them written lately you will probably never see. I was very anxious about you, as you must have come from the Cape in the track of the French privateers homeward bound; and you were longer on your passage than we had reason to expect you would be.

' I have written a long letter to Government this day, about my departure from Ceylon, which I hope will explain everything. Whether it does or not, I shall always consider these expeditions as the most unfortunate circumstances for me, in every point of view, that could have occurred; and, as such, I shall always lament them.

' I was at the top of the tree in this country; the governments of Forts St. George and Bombay, which I had served, placed unlimited confidence in me, and I had received from both strong and repeated marks of their approbation. Before I quitted the Mysore country, I arranged the plan for taking possession of the Ceded Districts, which was done without striking a blow; and another plan for conquering Wynaad and re-conquering Malabar, which I am informed has succeeded without

* Now Lord Cowley, G.C.B.

† The Hon. Dr. Gerald Wellesley, now a Prebend of Durham Cathedral.

loss on our side. But this supercession has ruined all my prospects, founded upon any service that I may have rendered. Upon this point I must refer you to the letters written to me and to the Governor of Fort St. George in May last, when an expedition to Batavia was in contemplation ; and to those written to the governments of Fort St. George, Bombay, and Ceylon ; and to the Admiral, Colonel Champagné, and myself, when the troops were assembled in Ceylon. I then ask you, has there been any change whatever of circumstances that was not expected when I was appointed to the command ? If there has not, (and no one can say there has, without doing injustice to the Governor General's foresight,) my supercession must have been occasioned, either by my own misconduct, or by an alteration of the sentiments of the Governor General.

‘ I have not been guilty of robbery or murder, and he has certainly changed his mind ; but the world, which is always good-natured towards those whose affairs do not exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect that both, or worse, have been the occasion of my being banished, like General Kray, to my estate in Hungary. I did not look, and did not wish, for the appointment which was given to me ; and I say that it would probably have been more proper to give it to somebody else ; but when it was given to me, and a circular written to the governments upon the subject, it would have been fair to allow me to hold it till I did something to deserve to lose it.

‘ I put private considerations out of the question, as they ought and have had no weight in causing either my original appointment or my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in which I have been treated by government upon the occasion. However, I have lost neither my health, spirits, nor temper in consequence thereof.

‘ But it is useless to write any more upon a subject of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever.

‘ I enclose a memorandum upon the subject of Trincomalee, which will point out to you the inconveniences of that port as one of rendez-vous or equipment. You will find it of use in the next expeditions. Remember, also, that it is difficult for ships to get round Ceylon in the south-west monsoon after the middle of March.

‘ Your's, most affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Bombay, 25th March, 1801.

‘ Letters arrived last night from Muscat, by which I learn that it is probable that Sir Ralph Abercrombie has commenced his operations. If the expedition from India against Egypt means anything, it is to encourage the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt to rise against the French, and to create a diversion in favor of Sir Ralph Abercrombie. This must be done immediately, or as soon as possible, or it will be useless.

‘ General Baird is not come. They tell me that he will find it difficult to get round Ceylon, and the Lord knows when he will arrive. I therefore intend to go off immediately, and to commence the operations in the Red Sea with the troops now there, if General Baird should not be on board any of the ships now in the offing.

‘ My former letters will have shown you how much this will annoy me ; but I have never had much value for the public spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and convenience, when it is necessary. As all my baggage, &c. are on board one of the transports not yet come in, I go as bare as is possible.

Your’s, most affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Hon. Henry Wellesley and Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Calcutta, 28th March, 1801.

‘ You will perceive, by the accompanying dispatch, that Mornington has authorized you to return to Mysore, if you think proper. I think this is contrary to his own opinion ; but Lord Clive and Webbe have strongly urged it. You will judge for yourself, after weighing all the advantages and disadvantages of your quitting the army under the command of Baird ; and it is for the express purpose of enabling you to act as you shall think best, that Mornington has furnished you with the annexed dispatch.

‘ Perhaps you will think it better to remain with him, and Mornington’s objects will then be completely fulfilled, of employing the two men of the highest reputation in the army, and

of combining the talents which are most likely to conduce to the success of this most important expedition.

‘ Ever your’s, most affectionately,

‘ HENRY WELLESLEY.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Calcutta, 28th March, 1801.

‘ This letter entirely expresses my sentiments. It may not be unpleasant to you to know, privately, that I entirely approve your movement from Ceylon, under all the circumstances of the case, and that I think it will prove a very useful step, I shall hereafter say a word too, *privately*, on the nature of the precedent which might be created by this step, unless guarded by the special exigency of the case, or rather (what is much safer) by your knowledge of my intentions and objects.

‘ Ever your’s, most affectionately,

‘ WELLESLEY.

‘ I fear, my dear Arthur, that you will have quitted Bombay before this letter can reach you. Act as you shall think best, without any apprehension of displeasing Mornington; for I am certain he will approve whatever step you take, upon full consideration. No news. Kirkpatrick is gone to Poonah.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ H. W.

The Governor General to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 28th March, 1801.

‘ The several arrangements being now completed, which induced me to avail myself of your knowledge and experience in the equipment of the expedition to be employed on the shores of the Red Sea, it appears to me that your services may, at present, be more usefully employed in resuming the chief command of the troops stationed in Mysore. You have, therefore, my permission to return to that station; but you are to consider this dispatch as containing merely my permission for your return to Mysore, and not any peremptory order to that effect.

‘ You will communicate this dispatch to Major General Baird.

‘ If the troops now employed in the Red Sea should proceed to the Isle of France, after you shall have quitted the second

command, my intention is, that Colonel Champagné should hold it ; and, in this case, should the French islands be reduced, I propose to authorize Major General Baird to hold the government of that conquest until his Majesty's pleasure can be received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

The Marquis Wellesley to Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 28th March, 1801.

‘ Having judged it expedient to appoint a Major General to the chief command of the expedition proceeding to the Red Sea, and not thinking it probable that the course of events will enable me to call upon you for your service in the separate command of any part of the forces now destined to act in Egypt, it appears to me that your talents, skill, and activity might now be employed, with more public benefit, in the chief command of the troops stationed in Mysore, than in the station which you hold under my recent orders.

‘ You have, therefore, my permission to return to Mysore ; but you are to consider this dispatch as containing merely my permission for your return to Mysore, and not my peremptory order to that effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 31st March, 1801.

‘ 1. I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders which I have had occasion to issue since the 31st of January last, which will require your confirmation.

‘ 2. I likewise enclose copies of letters to the Paymaster, giving my authority to incur expenses, of which I request your approbation.

‘ 3. When quitting Ceylon, I received from the Government of that island a sum of money in Porto Novo pagodas and Bombay rupees, amounting to 55,905 Porto Novo pagodas and 8000 Bombay rupees, which money was brought to this place in his Majesty's ship Suffolk.

‘ 4. Mr. Duncan, however, having informed me that those coins were current in the countries on the shores of the Red Sea, but at a considerable loss, I have requested the Governor in Council of Bombay to receive them into the treasury ; and he proposes to supply the armament, instead of them, with a sum nearly equal in Spanish crowns and German dollars.

‘ 5. I have the honor to enclose the copy of the proceedings of a committee on some provisions, which have been condemned and destroyed in the ship Gabriel. Other committees have been assembled at different times, and have examined and condemned provisions, and their proceedings will come before you in the regular channel ; but the quantity examined and condemned by this committee is so large, that I have thought it proper to lay its proceedings before you without further loss of time.

‘ 6. Major General Baird arrived yesterday, and I delivered to him the command of the troops.

‘ 7. The ships stated in the margin* have received their provisions and sailed this morning ; the others will be ready to sail when the General may think proper to order them to sea.

‘ 8. It has been necessary to put into some of the ships above 100 tons of ballast, besides their water and provisions, which has been the occasion of their being detained so many days longer than I expected.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Bombay, 31st March, 1801.

‘ When I wrote to you on the 25th, I was in hopes that I should be able to sail the next day ; but on that night I was seized with a fever, which has lasted ever since, and of which I have not yet recovered. It is of the intermittent kind.

General Baird has arrived. I am quite distressed about my officers who followed me through the Mysore country. However, I have seen enough already to be certain, that if I do not go, matters will be uncomfortable ; and if I well can, I will go. I have the satisfaction of finding that there is not a man here who would have come, had he known what was likely to happen to me, if he had the power of refusal. Indeed, in this

* Gabriel, Calcutta, Minerva, Pearl, Eliza, Ruby.

respect, the feelings of the greater part of the army agree with mine. Mr. Stokes is not yet come.

‘ Believe me your’s, affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Mr. Webbe, Sec. of Government.

‘ MY DEAR WEBBE,

‘ Bombay, 7th April, 1801.

‘ Since I wrote to you last I have had a fever, which prevented me from putting in execution the intention I then had of going to the Red Sea immediately.

‘ The General arrived on the 30th, and is gone, and the troops are gone likewise. I am not yet quite well; and this circumstance, together with the probability resulting from the contents of the last dispatches from Europe, that Sir Ralph Abercrombie’s attacks on Lower Egypt will be relinquished, and, therefore, that our troops will be recalled from the Red Sea, and many other good reasons, have made me desirous not to go. To this Lord Wellesley has consented in his last letter. I shall write to Lord Clive upon the subject as soon as I can. If I am well enough, I shall go to Malabar by the first opportunity.

‘ You will have heard that Coleman has been dismissed from his situation, to which I had appointed him. The General offered to make him Deputy Quarter Master General, which Coleman declined, and he is now here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Josiah Webbe, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Bombay, 8th April, 1801.

‘ My fever has left me, but I am still weak, and I have got another disorder, of which it appears the medical men here do not know the nature, and which, I think it probable, will oblige me to go to a cold climate. This circumstance, and the great probability held out by the late dispatches from Europe, that Sir Ralph Abercrombie’s attack upon Lower Egypt will be postponed, or rather will never take place, and, therefore, that the operations proposed in the Red Sea will likewise be relinquished, have induced me to determine not to go. I shall write to the Governor General upon this subject as soon as I am able.

‘ In the meantime, it is but justice to General Baird to say,

that his conduct towards me has by no means occasioned this determination, but that it has been perfectly satisfactory. He offered Colonel Coleman to appoint him Deputy Quarter Master General, which the latter declined.

‘ I hope that if the service goes on, matters will be conducted satisfactorily. I have been a slave to it till this moment, notwithstanding I was sick ; and now they have only to take care of what they have got, till the operations on shore commence. I have given the General my opinion fully in writing upon this part of the subject.

‘ The ships are all gone, excepting one which came in only yesterday, having sprung a leak at sea. Arrangements were immediately made to move the troops to other ships, and they will go to-morrow. From what I have seen of the state of the ships, the troops, the water casks, &c., I am convinced that if we had not come here, the expedition would have been obliged to quit the Red Sea before they would have been there one month. The 10th regiment have to a man got the scurvy, and lost above twenty men on their passage from Ceylon.

‘ Affectionately your’s,

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Baird.

‘ DEAR GENERAL,

‘ Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

‘ The first circumstance I have to detail to you is the state of my health, which is indeed the cause of this letter. I have had no fever since I saw you ; but I am sorry to say that the breaking out of which I complained is worse than it was ; and has become so bad as to induce Mr. Scott to order me to begin a course of nitrous baths. This remedy, exclusive of the disease itself, is sufficient to induce me to be desirous to wait, at least rather longer than the *Susannah* will ; if not to give over all thoughts of joining you.

‘ I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled ; however, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

‘ As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and hand-

some manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment.

‘ I need not enter further upon this subject, than to entreat you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned it; and to inform you, that as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct.

‘ I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras; and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

‘ The Maria Louisa is unable to go on at present, and the 80th regiment will sail by Saturday in the Morad Bey, 150; the Nelson, 70; the Dundas, 70; and about seventy followers distributed in the three ships. They will have six months’ provisions of everything, even of meat. The Asia would have been taken up for this detachment, according to your desire, only that she is dismasted, and wants copper on her bottom; and the owners were desirous she should go into dock, if only for three days, before she should take her departure for the Red Sea. This operation, however, and the equipment of her with masts, &c., were likely to take more time than will be lost by the slow sailing of the vessels above mentioned; and I, therefore, preferred them, and they will be ready immediately.

‘ I enclose the memorandum upon your operations, and I refer you to my public letter for other matters. Wishing you every success,

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OPERATIONS IN THE RED SEA.

[Enclosed by Col. Wellesley to Major Gen. Baird.]

‘ The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor General, in the expedition to the Red Sea, are—

‘ 1st, To get possession of the forts and ports which the French may have on its shores.

‘ 2ndly, To urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence operations against them.

‘ 3rdly, To assist the operations of the natives by giving them arms and ammunition; or by a junction with them, either of a part or of the whole of the force.

‘ The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez, that the object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Admiral Blanquet, may have succeeded in effecting the objects in view, when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez. Cossier will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.

‘ The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here; and I shall now proceed to the second object of the expedition, viz., to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favor of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

‘ From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe that after the Turkish army was beaten by General Kleber, in March last, and after Colonel Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt. He is now stationed there, and from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt, which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt, excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cossier. It is probable that when Sir Ralph Abercrombie commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt; and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his own sense of his own interests may point out.

‘ I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes; and certainly, until the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English: and showed his power of doing injury to the French, by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army under General Dessaix, in pursuit of him.

‘ It is very probable that he does not deem his tenure in Upper Egypt very secure. He must be aware that, as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him; and from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed the fact that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey’s army is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect that, as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence.

‘ Without being too sanguine, we may expect then that, as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt, he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him; and he ought to be urged in the strongest manner to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength, as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him: and, finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red Sea, in order to ensure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

‘ The possession of the port of Cossier, and of the navigation of the Red Sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favorable to the English.

‘ The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in

Arabia ; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and Arabia, and to Mecca in particular, that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to the consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz., to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

‘ The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cossier at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

‘ It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert: they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army, or detachment which may cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile, when they reach them ; if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great, that the operation ought not to be attempted.

‘ It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can be neutral in the contest in contemplation; they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and probably no forage : and it is needless to point out that, if the Desert is to be crossed under these circumstances, care must be taken not only to send with the body of troops which may cross a very large proportion of provisions ; but means must be adopted to add to them, until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country, as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle ; a number much greater than the government of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply : but there is another consideration connected with this subject be-

sides the supply of cattle, and that is the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

‘ Upon this point, I need only call to the General’s recollection the difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions, even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, well supplied with well-water, and every other advantage of arrangement in the supply, distribution, care, and food of the cattle; and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But this is not the worst that is to be apprehended: the cattle will of course land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

‘ This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately; and upon the inutility of the measure, if they do.

‘ It may be imagined, that supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering, if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength, not of our weakness, will induce them to come forward; and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

‘ But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will show to be impossible.

‘ I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke and to co-operate with us.

‘ The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he shall have ascertained this,

it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted; and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile, that he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish a post at Ghennah; and, if possible, another in the Desert, between that place and Cossier, in order to ensure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah he should make the depôt of his stores, &c., which might be brought across the Desert by degrees; and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

‘ On the consideration of the question regarding the crossing the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy; because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who may cross the Desert.

‘ I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they shall have shown their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Baird.

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Captain Moor, the garrison storekeeper at Bombay, which will explain the arrangements which have been made at this port, to complete the supply of provisions to me for six months for the Europeans and natives embarked. Besides the supply noticed in the enclosed letter to have been sent, there is a further supply on board the other ships dispatched from hence; and one will sail in a few days for the troops on board the Wellesley, London, Experiment, Anna Maria, Hydra grab, and Fancy brig, of the amount of which Captain Moor will apprise you in due course.

‘ I likewise enclose a packet, containing the invoices and

bills of lading of treasure, sent for the service of the armament when I had the honor of commanding it. Enclosed is the receipt of Mr. Rider, the paymaster, for the treasure on board the Experiment, which he has carried to account.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a packet of papers and returns relating to the amount, the nature of which their titles will explain. In obedience to your orders, I dispatched Lieut. Colonel Capper to Sir Ralph Abercrombie on the 7th instant with a letter, of which a copy is enclosed.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of the orders which I have signed for money received from the pay office at Bombay since your departure.

‘ When all the troops shall have gone from hence, I propose to take up all the vouchers, and to forward them to Mr. Rider, and to give the Paymaster General at Bombay a receipt according to the form enclosed. I beg leave to refer you to my private letter of this date, for a statement of the reasons which have prevented me from joining you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Baird.

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter from Captain Moor, giving an account of the provisions which have been embarked in some of the ships in this harbour.

‘ I likewise enclose a letter from Colonel Champagné; and a copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor of Bombay, upon the subject of the mode of settling the account of the money received from the Paymaster General, since the departure of Mr. Rider and yourself.

‘ This mode appears well calculated to ensure the satisfactory settlement of the account, without the risk of the loss of the vouchers. ‘ If it should meet with your approbation, I request you will order Mr. Rider to transmit his receipt to the Paymaster General in Bombay, as soon as certified copies of the vouchers, as prepared in the enclosed copy of my letter to the Governor, may reach him.

‘ I have the honor to enclose accounts of the sums of money

which have been received from the Paymaster General, under authority from me since I wrote to you last.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Baird.

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 13th April, 1801.

‘ The detention of the ships till this morning has given me an opportunity of sending you a further report on the provisions sent from hence. You will observe from that report that Major Bell has a tolerably large quantity of provisions, besides what he brought here. Allowance ought also to be made for about 150 natives, taken out and drafted from the Rockingham, which of course leaves a larger share of provisions for those who remain.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that the Dundas and the Nelson are so small, and have so little capacity to hold provisions and water, that there is not a supply of the latter for more than four months on board each of those ships. The Morad Bey, however, has provisions and water for six months, as indeed have the two others a supply of provisions for the same time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Baird.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I must inform you that none of the ships have their full quantity of rice : the reason is, that rice is scarce at Bombay, and as I knew there were in the fleet about 10,000 bags of rice, I did not wish to press to have a large quantity taken from hence.’

Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘ I have to inform you that I have had a fever since I arrived here, which has prevented me from accompanying the armament to the Red Sea, although I have recovered all but my strength. I therefore purpose, with your Lordship’s permission, to proceed to join my command.

‘ I judge by the Governor General’s private letters to me, that he would have had no objection to this, even if my health had not obliged me to give over all thoughts of going

to the Red Sea; but, under the present circumstances, he must approve of it.

‘ I acknowledge that although I expected to return to put myself under your Lordship’s orders, more worthy of your favors than I have been hitherto, I shall even now return with the greatest satisfaction. I have not forgot the confidence which was placed in me, nor the favor with which all my endeavors to serve the public were viewed, by your Lordship’s government; and if your Lordship should think proper to employ me again in the same situation, an adherence to the same line of conduct which has heretofore gained your approbation will, I hope, gain it again.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Mysore.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 11th of April, 1801.

‘ You will be glad to hear that I propose to leave this place for Malabar in a day or two. The Governor General consented to my return to Mysore if I wished it; at the same time that he said he should regret my quitting the army employed on the expedition. Upon the whole, therefore, I determined to go on, notwithstanding that I was superseded in the command.

‘ When upon the point of carrying into execution this *laudable* but highly disagreeable intention, I was seized by a fever, which kept me in bed for some days; and although I have now recovered, I am still weak, and am taking a remedy which prevents me from going to sea. It has, therefore, been impossible for me to go on the expedition, and I return to my old situation, with a pleasure more than equal to the regret which I had on quitting it.

‘ I enclose a letter to my friend Quin, to desire that he will send my elephants, bullocks and some coolies to meet me at Cannanore; and if he should be out of the way, I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that these means of conveying my baggage, &c., may be sent to meet me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Champagné, with the
Army under Major General Baird.*

‘ MY DEAR CHAMPAGNÉ,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1801.

‘ I take the opportunity of the departure of Colonel Ramsay to write you a few lines.

‘ I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have caused my removal from the command of the troops; but I conclude that the Governor General found that he could not resist the claims that General Baird had to be employed. I believe you know that I always thought that General Baird had not been well used, when I was called to the command. But I do not think it was proper that I should be disappointed more than he was, in order that he might have no reason to complain. However, this is a matter of little consequence to any body but myself, therefore I say no more on the subject.

‘ Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, but said that he should regret my doing so; and for this reason, and because I saw in the General the most laudable intention to allow me to render him the services I could, I determined to proceed upon the expedition. I was, however, seized with a fever, and a breaking out all over my body; and here I am under a course of nitrous baths for a cure. When I shall be well, God knows! but, in the mean time, I cannot join the armament.

‘ I see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my reputation and future views; but it cannot be helped, and to things of that nature I generally contrive to make up my mind.

‘ I heard you were ill, but I hope not seriously. I thought it probable that you would not like to go one step beyond this, and that you would take advantage of your illness to go home. However, as you are well, you are in the right to go on.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Champagné.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ G. O. }
By Government. }

‘ Fort St. George, 28th April, 1801.

‘ Circumstances having occurred which enable the Right Hon. the Governor in Council to avail himself again of the

services of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, his Lordship in Council is pleased to direct that Colonel Wellesley shall return to Seringapatam, and resume the command of the forces in Mysore.*

‘The Governor in Council takes this opportunity of expressing his Lordship’s high sense and approbation of the conduct of Colonel Stevenson in the command of the forces in Mysore during the absence of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley: and the eminent success which has attended the operations entrusted to that officer in Malabar, having entitled him to a distinguished mark of his Lordship’s approbation, the Governor in Council has resolved to appoint Colonel Stevenson to the special command of the provinces of Malabar and Canara, under the orders of the officer commanding in Mysore.’

MEMORANDUM UPON SERINGAPATAM.

‘1. In consequence of the possibility that it may be necessary to alter the arrangements for the government in Mysore after the peace expected in Europe, it has been proposed to destroy the fortifications of Seringapatam; not only as a measure of precaution to prevent a fortress so difficult of access from falling into the hands of our enemies, but as one advisable, even if it were certain that the arrangements for the government of Mysore would remain as they are.

‘2. If there is a prospect that Great Britain will be obliged to make a peace so bad, as that Mysore will come again into the hands of our enemies, there is no doubt whatever but that the destruction of Seringapatam would be for many years a considerable drawback upon them. It would be so, however, only till the place could be rebuilt; the position, which is the great strength of Seringapatam, would still remain, on which a new and a stronger fort might in time be raised.

‘3. Admitting, however, the propriety of the measure, connecting it with a bad peace in Europe, there are several con-

* During the following year, Colonel Wellesley was fully occupied in organizing the civil and military administration of the important territory of Mysore, of which he gave a detailed account to the Governor General in July, 1804, that will be inserted according to date.

siderations which lead me to be of opinion, that it would be an improper one, if the present arrangements for the government of Mysore are likely to continue.

‘ 4. Seringapatam has long been the capital of an extensive and powerful empire, the whole of which is now in the possession, or under the government, or under the immediate influence of the Company’s government of Fort St. George. The conquest of Seringapatam, which, it is true, was accompanied by the fall of Tippoo, and the possession of his principal arsenal, gave the Company the possession and the power of disposing of this vast empire.

‘ 5. Whatever may be the real state of the case regarding the power of Seringapatam, resulting from its strength and its position in Mysore, there is no doubt whatever but that the natives look to it as the seat of power, and that they consider themselves under the government of that power in India which has possession of that fortress.

‘ 6. There is a double government in Mysore, the operations of which are now conducted in such a manner, as that there can be no occasion for exerting the influence and power in the hands of the Company from the possession of the fort of Seringapatam. But however well the person, in whose hands the conduct of that government is at present, may establish his system, can it be certain that it will last? Is it known who will succeed to him? Who will be the native successor of the present Dewan? If the French are to return to India, and particularly if they are to be allowed to have any but commercial establishments, is it known the effect that such a change may have upon the system of government in Mysore?

‘ 7. The treaty with the Rajah provides, that under certain circumstances, the country may be resumed by the Governor General in Council. It is to be supposed that whenever the Governor General shall be desirous of resuming the country, it will be in consequence of the difficulties in which the general government will be involved by the pressure of an extensive warfare. It is hardly possible to suppose any other case in which the resumption would be justifiable, or could be attempted. In this case, however, it will not be possible to spare troops to force the execution of the treaty, if the Rajah

should be inclined to resist it. Will Bangalore or Chittledroog give the power and influence over the country which will be necessary under such circumstances, and which doubtless Seringapatam has?

‘ 8. Seringapatam has been found by experience to possess means for equipping an army, which no other place in the Company’s territories or under their influence has, Madras excepted. It is supposed, however, that these means are to be attributed to its being the ancient seat of empire, to its large garrison, and to the residence of many of the Rajah’s servants in the fort, and on the island. It is also supposed that this effect of its being the ancient seat of the empire will soon be done away by the emigration of the people who depended upon the former government; that the means which are the consequence of the size of the garrison, will exist whenever there may be an equal number of troops; and that those which are the consequence of the residence of the Rajah’s principal servants will remove with them to Mysore.

‘ 9. Admitting that any other garrison of equal strength would draw to it the same number of people that have been brought to Seringapatam by the troops, and that the removal of the Rajah’s servants to Mysore will occasion a diminution of the population of Seringapatam, I cannot admit that the fall of the empire of Tippoo has diminished, or will diminish, its population in the least. In fact, the place is more populous now than it ever was, if the armies that Tippoo had are struck out of the calculation; and supposing that those who were attached to his government and person should be inclined to leave it, which they are not, they would find it difficult to pitch upon a place in the peninsula in which they would not live under a British government.

‘ 10. But I attribute the facility which has been found in equipping an army at Seringapatam, the great means which that place affords, to its being a British possession, as well as to the other causes to which have been attributed those excellent effects. Bangalore, Chittledroog, Sera, Nuggur, Colar, are nearly, if not equally populous with Seringapatam: some of them are places of great trade and riches, and all of them might afford, and doubtless afforded to Tippoo the means of bringing his troops into the field.

‘ 11. When I took the field last year, the Rajah’s government had the strongest interest in my success, and I do them no more than justice in saying that they did every thing in their power to forward it; yet, notwithstanding their exertions, and those of the officers in command of the different forts, I did not get a bullock, or a man, or any thing which could enable the troops to remain in the field from any place excepting Seringapatam.

‘ 12. At Chittledroog, there was a numerous, if not a more numerous garrison at that time, than at Seringapatam; but still, the followers of the corps at the former were brought from the latter; which fact may be adduced as a proof that the means of Seringapatam are not to be attributed exclusively to the size of its garrison; and that even those means which depend upon its garrison might possibly not be removed with it. When the troops were ordered into the field, one regiment of cavalry was brought from Bangalore, the followers and equipments of which were sent from Seringapatam.

‘ 13. It may be said that, although the fort of Seringapatam may be destroyed, and its garrison and depôt of stores removed to another place, the island will still belong to the Company; and that the population and means of equipment which it affords will still be in our power, and in the Mysore country. But admitting that to be true, I contend for it, that we shall not enjoy the same advantages from them which we have hitherto; we shall not be able to apply them with the same readiness to the service, if it should be possible to procure them for it at all.

‘ 14. We have experience of the benefit of equipping an army at Seringapatam; we know that those means still exist; and we have reason to believe that they will continue as long as the garrison and depôt of stores are at that place. We do not know that they would exist at Seringapatam if the fort were destroyed and the garrison removed; and we have reason to know from experience, that they would not exist at Chittledroog, even if the garrison and stores were removed thither; and I believe that they would not exist at Bangalore, if they were removed to that place.

‘ 15. But not only have we experience of the singular advantage of Seringapatam as a place of equipment, but we

know it is acknowledged by all parties as the most convenient depôt in point of locality for service in the province of Malabar : I might also add in the province of Canara. In truth, next to the opinion which universally prevails of the power attached to the possession of this fort, this is the point of view in which to have possession of it appears to me to be the most important.

‘ 16. From Goa to Cochin, there is not a single post which could be held by any body of troops for a moment. The works of Cannanore have been erected at vast expense, but the garrison could not remain in that fort opposed to the fire of a man of war anchored in the roads. The works are commanded in such manner as to render the situation of the besieged very disadvantageous, if the fort should be attacked on the land side ; and the fort is so small as to be incapable of holding even the quantity of stores which are necessary for the desultory service in the Malabar province. Besides, it is falling down, as appears by the reports made to the military board. The stores in Canara are now in the open town of Mangalore.

‘ 17. The state of the seasons on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar operates as a strong reason for preserving the fort of Seringapatam, and making it the depôt of the troops in those provinces. The vessels which could be employed to convey stores could keep up the communication only in the months of January, February, March, April, and part of May ; and even during those months with considerable difficulty and delay. In the latter part of May, in June, July, August, and September, it is impossible for vessels to approach the Malabar coast ; and in October, November, and December, it is equally so to approach Madras. It is more easy to communicate between Bombay and the coast. But the consequence of supplying the troops in those provinces with stores either from Madras or Bombay is, that a fort must be constructed, and arsenals must be built for their preservation. The question is, therefore, whether it is better to keep Seringapatam with all its supposed inconveniences, or to build a fort in one of the provinces below the ghauts to the westward.

‘ 18. Many objections might be urged against building a fort in those provinces, the expenses of which are sufficiently

obvious; but there is one objection, to which particular attention is requested, as it may bear upon the general question in other respects.

‘ 19. A fort situated upon the sea coast is liable to particular objections. An enemy, although of inferior strength, has the power of attacking it, and unless it is of great strength, would possess himself of it before assistance could be sent to it. This would certainly be the case, if the supposed enemy were stronger at sea; which, it is true, we have no reason to expect at the present moment. But it might be the case if we were stronger at sea.

‘ 20. The extent of the seas under the Admiral in this part of the world renders it impossible for him to provide for the protection of every part; and the difficulty, in all seasons, of going to all parts of both coasts, must for ever render the situation of a fort on the sea coast in some degree dangerous.

‘ 21. If such a fort should fall, the enemy has immediately an establishment on the coast, to deprive him of which would require an army, and the equipment for a siege; whereas, his landing under any other circumstances would be an event, the bad consequences of which might be defeated as soon as the body of troops in the western provinces, supported by those above the ghauts, could be collected.

‘ 22. In regard to the insurgents in Malabar, the war against them cannot be carried on at all without assistance, either from Seringapatam, or from Bombay, or Surat. Stores, ordnance, and grain, might be sent round from Madras, or from Bombay; but a fort must be built to receive them, and then there are no means of moving them in those provinces independent of the assistance above mentioned. In point of economy, there is no doubt whatever but that it is more expedient to supply these means from Seringapatam, than from Bombay or Surat.

‘ 23. Having thus stated the grounds which I have for believing that Seringapatam is the most convenient depôt for the coast of Malabar, I proceed to consider that place in the same point of view in reference to the line of frontier to the northward. I must first beg, that the principles of European warfare may not be applied to this country in arguing this question, to a greater degree than they are applied to the service when that is to be carried on.

‘ 24. It would be convenient that a depôt of stores for a service intended in any particular country should be as near the scene of operations as possible. In European warfare, it is absolutely necessary that the expense magazines, &c., should be on the spot, and they are usually moved forward in proportion as the army is enabled to advance. But in this country, in which armies take the field with such formidable equipments, with arsenals and magazines, in fact, which they always carry with them, it is not necessary, however convenient it would be, that the depôt which is to supply those equipments, and the wants of the service, should be immediately in the neighbourhood of the scene of action.

‘ 25. My experience of service in this country proves the truth of that observation. In General Harris’s war, notwithstanding the number of posts in advance, in which depôts had been formed, every article of provisions and stores and ordnance was brought from Madras; and in fact, if the cattle could have been fed in that neighbourhood, and if there had not been a necessity of forming a corps of observation at Arcot, for the speedy support of which it was necessary to provide, General Harris would have gained time by collecting his army at Madras, and marching at once from thence, instead of collecting at Vellore. In the last campaign in the same manner, although Chittledroog was not unprovided with stores, every article was brought from Seringapatam. In neither case was there either delay or inconvenience; and in both cases, the armies would have been as well provided, and equally secure, if there had not been a gun or an article of military stores or grain in any of the advanced posts.

‘ 26. I do not contend that in the one case it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Madras at Vellore or Kistnagherry; or in the other, that it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Seringapatam at Chittledroog; but I contend for it, that it was not inconvenient to have them otherwise; and that the service, in either case, did not suffer from the distance of the depôts, as it would have done if the same warfare had been carried on in Europe, without moving forward the magazines.

‘ 27. This circumstance arises as well from the nature of the service in India, in which immense equipments always

accompany the troops, as from the manner in which those troops are usually posted in times of peace. Considerable time must elapse before a body of troops can be collected on the frontier for service, and the stores required for such service would be on the frontier from Seringapatam, as they were in the last campaign, before all the troops for the service could be collected.

‘ 28. I am aware that the consequence of this reasoning goes the length of giving up Chittledroog : upon which I have to observe, that if I am to choose between Seringapatam and Chittledroog, for a general depôt for all possible services, I should certainly prefer Seringapatam, and that I have no desire to keep the stores in Chittledroog, even for service in the Marhatta territory. I prefer by far the fort of Hullihall in Soonda, on the one hand, and that of Hurryhur on the other, and in these I should desire to have no stores or grain, excepting such as I might find it convenient to lodge in them, at the time the service should be going on.

‘ 29. With a view to service on the frontier, there is but little difference in the distance of Seringapatam and of Bangalore from the scene of action. Bangalore is 85 miles distant from Sera, Seringapatam is 104. It is true, that those articles of ordnance and stores, which must come from the presidency by going to Seringapatam, must thus go 80 miles more than they would if the depôt were fixed at Bangalore. But in the first place it is to be considered, that if the resources of the Mysore country are fairly called into action, but few articles will be required from the presidency. In the next place it is to be recollected, that a large proportion of those articles which might be wanted from the presidency will be required in the western provinces, if it should be determined, according to my system, that the corps serving in those provinces should be provided from this country ; and, therefore, that they will not suffer by being transported at once to Seringapatam. But supposing the circuitous route to the frontier by Seringapatam should be an objection to that place, of such weight as to occasion a preference to Bangalore, let the other advantages of Seringapatam be taken into consideration, the general opinion of its power, the means which experience has proved it possesses of equipping an army, its superior

convenience as a depôt for the Malabar coast, which will more than compensate for the trifling disadvantage of being obliged to go eighty miles of distance to reach it.

30. But there are other objections to Seringapatam which, if well founded, would be decisive of the question. In the first place it is supposed that Seringapatam requires a garrison, even in times of peace, of one regiment of Europeans, three battalions of sepoys, and a large proportion of artillery. Seringapatam is full of Moorish inhabitants, and as it contains a large arsenal, it is not deemed safe to trust this arsenal without a large garrison, till these inhabitants are removed from the fort. But measures are now taking to remove these inhabitants to the pettah, and when they and the Rajah's servants shall have left the fort, there will be no reason to have any apprehension for the arsenal. The works of Seringapatam are in ruins, because they have never been repaired since the siege, and the weather and river have done them damage to a much greater degree than they would if they had been in good repair; and they are accessible in many places. The communication between one part and another of these works is not complete, and it is therefore necessary that the guns which may be required for the works should be always in their places. These two inconveniences, which the repair of the fortifications would remedy, create a necessity for larger guards, and a greater number of them on the works than would otherwise be necessary. The garrison of Seringapatam furnishes the Rajah's guard, and that of the Resident. It is the seat of the head quarters of the division, which necessarily causes the employment of a number of men on duty; it furnishes the guards for the public elephants and cattle, and other small detachments; and as the paymaster, the treasure, and the stores are at Seringapatam, the detachments with the treasure and stores for the out stations are furnished from its garrison. These circumstances naturally create a want of troops; but the removal of the Moorish inhabitants, and the repair and completion of the fortifications, would enable us to provide for those duties, and to keep the arsenal in safety, with as small a body of men at Seringapatam, as at any other place in the country. In time of war and in case of a siege, Seringapatam would require as small, if not a smaller garrison for its defence,

than any other place that has been proposed as a great depôt. An army which should besiege Seringapatam must determine at once to attack it from the north, or from the south side of the river, or from the island. No army could be brought there sufficiently numerous to form three divisions, or even two divisions large enough to make two or three attacks upon the place, because these divisions would be effectually separated from each other, and each must be strong enough to defend itself against the army which would be employed to raise the siege. In providing a garrison for the defence of Seringapatam, if such a measure should ever be necessary, no more men will be required than would be necessary to defend it on one point of attack. But looking to Seringapatam as a place liable to be attacked, it has a singular advantage over every other fort in India, viz., that from the month of June to the month of December in every year, it is impossible to approach it.

‘ 31. It is also said that Seringapatam is unwholesome, and that art cannot remedy that defect; but that Bangalore is otherwise. Seringapatam certainly has been found to be unwholesome to the European troops; and indeed in the last year the same objection applied to all parts of the upper country. I apprehend, however, that Seringapatam is not really more unwholesome than Bangalore, and upon that point I should be glad to have the opinion of Mr. Anderson. I apprehend that a great part of the sickness at Seringapatam is to be attributed to the nature of the buildings which the officers and the troops have occupied. Open choultries and buildings which do not keep out the weather cannot be supposed to answer in this country, and have been equally fatal in all parts above the ghauts. Since the buildings have been improved, the health of the troops has improved; and in this season we have not had any sick officers, or more sick men than there have been in other garrisons.

‘ 32. It is also said that the position of Seringapatam is bad, not only in reference to a depôt for service on the frontier, but as a fortress to cover the country and stop the enemy. In this respect, Seringapatam is not worse than we know Chittledroog to have been. Pursheram Bhow passed in sight of that fortress more than once, and it appears to have been no impe-

diment to his operations in the northern parts of Mysore. But, in fact, no fortress is an impediment to the operations of an hostile army in this country, excepting it lies immediately in the line on which the army must necessarily march; or excepting it is provided with a garrison of such strength and activity, as to afford detachments to operate upon the line of communication of the hostile army with its own country. In case the Company should be involved in hostilities of such extent, as that they should be obliged to stand on the defensive in this country, when at war with a foreign power, it is not probable that the Government will be able to give garrisons to the fortresses in this country, of the strength sufficient to afford detachments to operate upon the enemy's line of communication with his own country; and all the fortresses which have been proposed as dépôts would be equally incapable, from situation, of stopping an enemy.

‘ 33. The advantage of the possession of them, therefore, would be the power which each would have over the country, and their relative advantage would be in proportion to the power of each. I have already pointed out the power which, in my opinion, is attached to the possession of Seringapatam; and the history of this country has pointed out more than one instance, in which the Mysore country has been overrun by a victorious army, which, however, has been obliged to quit it, because it had not possession of Seringapatam.

‘ 34. An objection has been made to Seringapatam, on account of the expense of the repairs which will be necessary to that place. These repairs will not cost one-third of the sum at which they have been estimated; but it is said, that at all events they will be more expensive than the repairs of Bangalore. When the buildings required for Bangalore are completed, I should much doubt it. But it is forgotten that Seringapatam affords cover for one regiment of Europeans at least; and that it will afford cover for two regiments, when the family of the Sultaun shall have been removed from the place. The buildings at Seringapatam will also give an hospital, some quarters for officers, &c. In comparing the expense of the repair of Seringapatam with that of Bangalore, and the establishment of the dépôt at that place or at Chittledroog, the expenses of the cantonment, arsenal, hospital, &c., to be built,

ought to be added to the latter. Besides, I have above shown the necessity of building a fort on the Malabar coast in case Seringapatam is destroyed, the expense of which ought likewise to be added to that of establishing the depôt at Bangalore or Chittledroog.

‘ 35. There is no doubt but that Seringapatam is better provided with timber, than almost any other place in the peninsula: that article is cheaper in the bazaar at Seringapatam, than it is at Madras. Provisions and every other article are cheap; firewood alone is dear, but not dearer than at Chittledroog, or than it would be at Bangalore, if Bangalore were equally populous. The dearness of firewood is a necessary, although a greatly inconvenient consequence of large populations in almost every part of India.

‘ 36. In regard to the inconvenience of the river, it is trifling. The communication has seldom been interrupted, and never for more than two, or at most three days at a time, and even then not entirely. Six iron 18-pounders, four 12-pounders and howitzers, with all their equipments, were sent to the northward in the year 1799, when the river was full, with but little inconvenience; and in the last year (1800,) the army in the Marhatta country received regular supplies of every thing from Seringapatam, not only across the Cauvery, but across the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba, by means of basket boats, without any inconvenience.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

MEMORANDUM

UPON OPERATIONS IN THE MARHATTA TERRITORY.

‘ As before long we may look to war with the Marhattas, it is proper to consider of the means of carrying it on. The experience which has been acquired in the late contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these points, for the benefit of those in whose hands may be placed the conduct of the operations of the army in case of such a war, as I have above supposed we may expect.

The season at which it is most convenient to commence a campaign with the Marhattas, is that at which the rivers, which take their rise in the western ghauts, fill. This happens generally in the month of June. In this year, the Toombuddra was not fordable after the 14th of June, the day before the army reached Hurryhur; and in other seasons, I understand that that river fills nearly at the same time.

‘ The reasons why I think that the most favorable season for operations against the Marhatta nation, are as follow :

‘ First. The Marhatta army is principally composed of cavalry, and their plan of operations against a British army would be to endeavor to cut off its communication with its rear, and to impede the junction of its supplies from the Mysore country. As the rivers are not fordable, as there are no bridges, and no means of passing them excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult, and might be rendered impossible to procure, the fullness of the rivers operates as a barrier. It is certain, that the enemy cannot pass them in large numbers, and it is probable that they would not venture to throw across a small body, or rather, that they would not be able to prevail upon a small body to remain on a different side from the main body of their army.

‘ The inconvenience and delay which the British army experience in crossing the rivers by means of boats, when they are full, is trifling; and in fact they would experience no inconvenience or delay, if good pontoons were provided, and a bridge were thrown across each river for the passage of the army. The communication might afterwards be kept up by means of the common basket boats. If the army should be thus equipped with a bridge, the Marhattas would never dare to detach a body across any river, for the purpose of annoying our communications. Thus, then, we should enjoy all the advantage of a river not fordable, to shorten the line of our communication, which river our enemy could not pass with a large body of troops, and over which he would not dare to detach a small body; and we should have it in our power to pass it with as much ease, and with as little inconvenience and delay, as we should experience if the river were fordable.

‘ Secondly, the Marhatta country in general is but ill supplied with water. The rains which fill these rivers,

although not heavy at the beginning of the rainy season, are sufficient to fill many nullahs; and an army has at this time some chance of being supplied with water, of which, in the dry season, it is certain it would never find much, and frequently none. The inconvenience to be apprehended from the rains is trifling. It is true, that heavy rain would ruin the cattle of the army, and would put the roads in such a state as to render them impracticable for wheel carriages. But heavy rain for any long continuance is not to be expected in the Marhatta territory; and particularly not early in the season. During the last season, which was extraordinarily severe upon the coast, we had only two days of distressing rain; but we had some rain nearly on every day.

‘The Marhatta country is in general a fine black soil, very fertile and highly cultivated. The roads are all excellent, excepting when the rain is heavy. At that time the black cotton mould becomes a swamp, through which it is scarcely practicable for a man to move; the wheels of the carriages sink to their axletrees, are clogged with mud, and it is impossible for the cattle to draw them.

‘The produce of this fertile country is jowarry principally, and other dry grains, but no rice. This is the great difficulty with which our army would have to contend. The rice which must be procured for them must be brought from the distant rice countries in Mysore or from Canara, with which country, in the rainy season, it is impossible to keep up a communication.

‘The army also might depend upon procuring some sheep and bullocks in the Marhatta territory; but if its European force should be large, it will certainly require supplies of the former from Mysore, and in any case supplies from thence of the latter.

‘It is well known that jowarry straw is the best kind of forage for horses and cattle, and of this there is an abundance everywhere; and besides this forage, it seldom happens that green forage cannot be found.

‘The means of defending this country are trifling; and it must depend upon the strength of the army which is in it, compared with that of the British army. All the strong places are liable to be carried by assault, excepting, perhaps, Darwar

or Kooshgul; and it is doubtful whether these last might not be thus taken if attacked by resolute troops.

‘Having thus detailed my observations on the Marhatta territory, with a view to operations within it, I come to state those which I would recommend, and the preparatory steps to be taken in order to have the means of carrying them on with vigor, celerity, and effect. The first object in any Marhatta war, commenced in the season which I think most favorable to a British army, would be to push the enemy across the Kistna, and to establish ourselves firmly on that river as a barrier, from which we could advance to their capital, or to suit other ulterior objects as might be held out.

‘I would propose, then, to assemble the troops at Chittledroog; but they must be provided with every necessary before they arrive there, as nothing at all useful to military operations can be procured at that place.

‘The army ought to be provided with pontoons and other materials for building a bridge. On account of the difficulty of procuring rice and arrack in the Marhatta territory, a large store ought to be collected and kept at Chittledroog, and another at Hurryhur. This last place ought to be repaired, and put in a defensible state for a small garrison, as well for a point of communication with the Mysore country for the army when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, as for a post to guard the basket boats, &c., which must be made use of to convey over the Toombuddra the supplies which must follow the army. The fort at Hullihall, in Soonda, ought also to be put in repair. Granaries and storehouses for arrack and for military stores ought to be built at this station. Large stores of rice and arrack for the supply of the army, when it should be advanced into the Marhatta territory, and certain military stores, ought to be collected at Hullihall. This post, if strengthened, would be an excellent depôt, and would be supplied at all times without difficulty, from Bombay by Goa.

‘The army being assembled at Chittledroog, should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur. Its first object should be to drive the enemy across the river Werdah, and to establish itself between those two rivers. After this shall be effected, it might cross the Werdah. The best place for this will be between Deogerry and Savanore. It must be recollected, that

although the army will cross this river by its bridge, it will still be necessary that it should be provided with basket boats, in order that its supplies may cross the river likewise. These, or materials to make them, cannot be procured at or near Deogerry, and the boats must therefore be brought from the Mysore country. The boatmen must likewise come from the Mysore country.

‘It will be necessary to establish a post upon the Werdah as a guard for the boats, which otherwise it would be in the power of the enemy to seize or destroy, as a link in the communication with Mysore, and in order effectually to establish the British power in the country between that river and the Toombuddra.

‘The next object would be to get possession of Darwar. The straight road to that place, by Savanore and Hoobly, is the best. If the rains should have been heavy, the road to Darwar should be from Savanore to Bindigerry, and along the Soonda hills. The soil near these hills is red, and the roads are practicable, even in rainy weather.

‘In my opinion, Darwar can be taken by a *coup de main*. The attack ought to be made on the south-west side. Means might be adopted for keeping down the fire of the besieged, by one of cannon from two hills, on which the Bhow’s and the British batteries were erected in the former war, and by an enfilading fire from a height above a tank on the north-west angle.

‘The assailants might move under cover of the back of that tank to the foot of the glacis, where they would be covered from the fire of the besieged. They might move along the foot of the glacis till they should come opposite the hills above mentioned. They ought then to possess themselves of a square and a roundwork in the glacis, by turning them by the covert way. They ought to be provided with fascines to fill a part of the ditch, and they might escalate the outer wall, taking care to carry over some ladders for the purpose of escalating the inner wall.

‘After having got within the outer wall, they should turn to their left, and proceed to a tank between the two walls. Along the back of this tank, it is said there is a passage over the inner ditch to a gateway. At this gateway the wall is not

more than twenty feet high, and might easily be escaladed. This passage is represented as being an aqueduct from the tank outside, on the north-west angle of the fort, into the body of the place. There is a passage for water from this tank through the glacis, and it is probable that it leads over both the ditches.

‘At the same time that this attack should be made, another ought to be directed against the gateway, which is on the south-east face.

‘There are other gates. The party which should proceed on this attack, might also get under the glacis, by the back of the tank above mentioned; only it should proceed along the northern face and round to the gateway by that route. After blowing open the gates in the outer wall, it is said that the inner wall, near its gate, is not more than twenty feet high. This party ought also to be provided with scaling ladders.

‘If the attack should fail, or if, from any reason, it should be thought advisable to attack the place regularly, and to effect a breach in the walls, the only mode of doing this is, by erecting the breaching battery on the crest of the glacis. The face to be attacked will be the same.

‘The troops would establish themselves under the glacis, and in the round and square works within it, as I have above recommended. These works would be excellent flanks to the trenches under the glacis. The troops would have to work back to the hills above mentioned, on which the Bhow’s batteries were erected in the last war; and at which would, of course, be collected the reserve for the trenches.

‘Having by one of these modes got possession of Darwar, but particularly if by assault, all the other places in the country would fall of course. The first object would be to establish a garrison and the depôts in that place.

‘The garrison, &c., might be moved forward from Hulli-hall, which ought still to be held by a small force, as a post of communication with the sea coast. The enemy should then be driven across the Malpoorba, and the country between the rivers should be cleared entirely.

‘Boats should be made and prepared, and the army should cross the Malpoorba between Doodwar and Moorgoor. A post should be established on the river for the care of the boats.

‘The river Malpoorba is more rapid than the Werdah or the Toombuddra, is more liable to rise and fall suddenly, and therefore the enemy would be more likely to return from the country between that river and the Gutpurba, than from that between the Malpoorba and the Werdah. The only place which on this route is worthy of attention is Belgaon; this place has a wet ditch, but I am informed that it is dry in parts, and that the place is otherwise liable to be taken by assault. Belgaon lies to the westward of the high road to the Kistna, and is situated in a rice country. It might be possible to draw supplies from this country; and, with this view, it might be desirable to have a garrison of British troops in Belgaon, otherwise it will be useless.

‘The fort of Badamy, which is esteemed of some strength, lies north of the Malpoorba, but about seventy or eighty miles from the road to the Kistna. Unless it was found that the enemy hung about this fort, it would be better not to lose any time in going to attack it, until they are all driven across the Kistna. If they hang about Badamy, it must be attacked. Badamy ought, more properly, to be called two forts than one. There are two forts on two separate hills, and a fortified pettah between them. It appears to me that the hill forts might be taken by storm, by approaching them from the westward.

‘After the enemy should have been driven across the Gutpurba, this river ought to be crossed in the same manner as the Malpoorba, somewhere near Gokauk, and a post ought to be established upon it.

‘*Jan.*, 1801.—Since the commencement of this memorandum was written, the Company have got possession of the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra, which river has become their northern boundary; and it may, perhaps, be thought that the plan of operations, in case of a war with the Marhattas, ought to be altered. There are several reasons, however, for which they should continue to be the same.

‘1st. The treaty by which the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra have been ceded to the Company, has allied it more closely with the Nizam, whose interests now appear to be inseparable from those of the Company. The quarrel of the Company, therefore, with the Marhattas, which may create a necessity for any military operations, will equally

involve the Nizam ; and it will be necessary that measures should be taken, either by himself or by the Company, to defend the Dooab from the incursions of the Marhattas.

‘2ndly. The defence of the Dooab will provide for that of the ceded districts, which that country covers entirely. If the Nizam’s army is collected at Copaul, and Moodgul is occupied with strength, it would be impossible for the Marhatta army to make any impression of consequence on the Dooab, or to penetrate the ceded countries in any strength. It may be a question whether, when the British army should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, the army of the Nizam should not immediately cross the Kistna, and guard his Highness’s frontier to the northward of that river, if they should not operate offensively upon the enemy. At all events, they ought to cross the Kistna as soon as the Marhattas begin to retire from the countries to the southward of the rivers which fall into the Kistna. But it may be said, as the Company have now got possession of extensive countries immediately to the southward of the Toombuddra, and in the neighbourhood of the Marhatta territory, they ought to carry on their operations from thence, and leave Mysore to its own defence.

‘There are several objections to this measure, which I will detail.

‘1st. Mysore is very defenceless towards the Marhatta territory ; a body of Marhatta horse would overrun the whole of the rich province of Bednore, would plunder Bednore itself, and might push their devastations to within sixty miles of Seringapatam, without the chance of danger or molestation.

‘2ndly. They would immediately connect themselves, and act in co-operation with the polygars along the range of the western ghauts, as far as Koorg ; and probably the provinces of Malabar and Canara would be the scene of their intrigues, and the Company’s dependants in those provinces would take arms.

‘3rdly. The countries into which they would thus push themselves, are those from which supplies of rice for the army must be drawn, when it enters the Marhatta territory ; and this rice must come by the road of which the enemy would have possession.

‘4thly. The first step to be taken, after crossing the Toom-

buddra (suppose at Anagoondy), would be to clear out the countries beyond the Werdah, of the detachments of the enemy, which would have entered them, and thus much valuable time would be lost. Therefore, there is no doubt but that it would be best to assemble the troops at once at Chittledroog, and to cross them quickly over the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, by which measure a stop will be immediately put to the operations of the enemy in that quarter.

‘In case it should be determined to enter the enemy’s country by Anagoondy and Copaul, either with the whole British army, leaving Mysore defenceless, or with the Nizam’s army in co-operation with the British troops collected in Mysore, the first place of consequence which will be met with is Dummul. This is a stone fort, the walls of which are above thirty-five feet high, with a dry ditch of unequal depth. On the south and west sides there is a flank of a tank, and some rough ground and buildings which give cover to the near approach of a body of troops. In the centre nearly of the south side there is an old gateway, now blocked up, where the place may be escaladed with ease. There is a trench cut across the road that used to lead to the gate, which, however, may be easily passed. The gateway also, on the north face leading to the pettah, may be attacked with advantage.

‘The road from Dummul to Hoobly and Darwar is good in dry weather; but during the heavy rains it is impassable, as there are about twenty miles of the black cotton soil which I have above mentioned.

‘If the rains should be heavy, the best road for a body of troops, marching from Dummul to Darwar, would be by Sirhitty, Luckmaisir, and Savanore, and along the Soonda hills.

‘Kooshgul lies not far from the direct road from Dummul, by Hoobly to Darwar. This place is strong from its situation and its works. It is situated in the middle of a plain of cotton ground. There is no water within several miles of it for the supply of an army; and it is surrounded by two walls, two ditches, a covert way and glacis. The ditches, however, though deep, are very narrow, and might easily be filled up, particularly that one in the glacis. On the east side of the south face, there is a dam of some water across the outer ditch, over which it would be very practicable to pass; and it ap-

peared to me that it would be most easy to assault the inner fort on the same side. It is to be recollected, however, that after having passed the outer ditch in the glacis, the assailants would have to pass into the covert way, an inner ditch, the outer wall, and afterwards the inner wall, to parts of which there is no ditch.

‘It is clear that this place can be taken by a *coup de main*, and probably in no other manner; but I strongly recommend that it should be avoided if possible, and that its fall should be considered as dependent upon that of Darwar.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Dillon, Envoy at Goa.

‘SIR,

‘Seringapatam, 17th November, 1802.

‘By a letter transmitted to me by Major Budden, I observe that the Governor General has ordered that the troops may be withdrawn from Goa. I hope, however, that you are to remain; and, at all events, I beg that you will remain there, till you receive the further orders of government. In the present situation of affairs, in this part of India, it is essentially necessary that a person should reside at Goa, on the part of the British government, who possesses the confidence of, and has an influence over, the persons at the head of the government of that settlement.

‘I have the honour to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Dillon, Goa.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive.

‘MY LORD,

‘Seringapatam, 1st January, 1803.

‘Captain Mahony, heretofore Resident in Koorg, arrived at Seringapatam some days ago; and, in obedience to the orders of the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, I have, in communication with that gentleman, taken into consideration the proposed plan of remuneration for the services of the Koorg Rajah*. For the reasons stated by the Governor General in

*The Rajah of Koorg was an ally of the Company in the last war of the Mysore, and was present at Tippoo's attack on the detachment of the Bombay army under General Stuart, at Sedaseer. His report of that affair to the Governor General is to be found in the Appendix to Colonel Beatson's War in Mysore. There is also an interesting account of this Rajah of Koorg in Captain Basil Hall's *Fragments of Voyages and Travels*, vol. ii. p. 248. 3rd Series.

Council, in his Excellency's letter to your Lordship upon this subject, I am clearly of opinion, not only that no part of the territories of the Rajah of Mysore ought to be given to the Rajah of Koorg, but that care ought to be taken that the executive government of Mysore should not be informed that it was ever in contemplation to propose an exchange of territory with the Honorable Company, with a view to granting to the Rajah of Koorg the territories which they should cede.

‘The services of the Rajah of Koorg, however, still deserve remuneration. It appears, by Captain Mahony's accounts, that he expended sums of money, and furnished supplies of cattle and provisions, in the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, of a value amounting in the whole to about four lacs of rupees. If he had consented to be reimbursed this expenditure, he would have received bonds of the Bombay government for this sum of money, bearing an interest at twelve per cent. per annum, in the beginning of the year 1799; and in this manner would have added nearly two lacs of rupees to the sum above mentioned. It may therefore be fairly concluded, that by the liberality of the Rajah of Koorg, the Company's Treasury is richer at this moment no less than six lacs of rupees, than it would have been, if he had taken payment of the money expended, and for the supplies furnished by him. In this view of the question, I do not take into consideration the nature of his services, or the time at which they were rendered; but I have stated particularly what the supplies furnished by him would have cost the Company, if they had been furnished by any other person, as I found thereon the amount of remuneration which I intend to recommend to your Lordship to grant him.

‘When the arrangements of the territory of the late Tippoo Sultaun were made, in the year 1799, the Rajah of Koorg was desirous to have the districts of Panjah and Bellary in Canara, to which he conceived he had a claim, as they had belonged heretofore to his family, and they connected with Murca and Soobroo, the same province. It is supposed that these districts are worth about six thousand canterai pagodas per annum, and they might form part of the proposed remuneration to the Rajah of Koorg.

‘The districts in Mysore, to which the Rajah of Koorg in like manner stated a claim, are Penapatam, Betudpoor, and

Akibgoor, the value of which, by the schedule, appears to be 17,500 canterai pagodas. It will not be proper to give the Rajah those districts; and I recommend to your Lordship that others of equal value, connected with Panjah and Bellary, and the Bentwall river, in the province of Canara, may be ceded to him.

‘ Under this arrangement, he will have nearly 24,000 canterai pagodas per annum, which is about the value of the sum which the Company have annually, by his forbearing to demand payment of the money due to him: he will have two districts in Canara, to which he conceived he had a claim, and certain other districts in the same province, connecting him with the Bentwall river, of the same value with districts in Mysore which he is desirous to possess; but which, under existing circumstances, it is not possible to grant him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

In the autumn of 1802, the advance and capture of Poonah, by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the consequent flight of the Peshwah, and the warlike preparations of the several chiefs, led to the interference of the British Government in the affairs of the Marhatta states, in which it will be seen Major General Wellesley bore a conspicuous part.

THE MARHATTA WAR IN THE DECCAN.

It will be necessary to precede the narrative and dispatches relative to the war in the Deccan, which followed in 1803, against the Marhatta chiefs, by a brief geographical and historical description of the country which was the seat of it.

Hindustan Proper is that part of India north of the Nerbudda river;—the Deccan is that part between the Nerbudda and the Kistna;—and south of the Kistna, are the Carnatic, Malabar, and the newly conquered territory of Mysore.

A predatory and formidable race, the Marhattas, had long subdued a great extent of country, both north and south of the Nerbudda, or held the different states composing it under regular tribute. The greatest length of what were termed the Marhatta territories, from Delhi on the northern extremity, to the river Toombuddra on the southern, is 970 miles; and the extreme breadth, from east to west, where they stretched across the peninsula, from the Bay of Bengal to the Gulf of Cambay, is 900 miles. This immense tract of country contained the provinces of Delhi, Agra, Ajmeer, Malwa, Guzerat, Candeish, Baglana, Beejapoor, the Konkar Berar, Cuttack, and part of Dowlutabad. Some of these provinces are very fertile and populous, yielding abundance of the finest grain, thronged with towns and villages, and enriched by a busy internal commerce. The whole population of the Marhatta dominions was computed at about forty millions, composed of different nations of various tribes, of whom nine-tenths were Hindus, and the rest Mahomedans.

Fortunately, however, for the neighbouring states, the power of this immense empire was, soon after its foundation, divided amongst five princes or chiefs; who, although nominally united in one general confederacy, under an acknowledged superior, the Peshwah, had, nevertheless, not only separate but rival interests; and were in the constant practice of supporting against each other their private and individual views. Had it not been for this disunion, their collective military strength, consisting of about 200,000 cavalry, and about 100,000 infantry, would have been extremely formidable.

The principal founder of this extensive empire was the celebrated Sevajee, descended from the Rajahs of Chittoor, the most ancient of the Hindu princes. He had succeeded to his father, the Rajah of Sattarah; when, after various successes, obtained over the veteran armies of the Mogul Emperor Aurungzebe, and the disciplined forces of the Portuguese, he founded the powerful monarchy consisting of the various Marhatta provinces. On his death, he was succeeded by his son Sambajee; whose imbecile son and successor, Sahojee, delegated the whole of his authority to Bellajee, his minister. Gaining a complete ascendancy over the mind of his master, Bellajee was appointed Peshwah, or chief magistrate of the empire; and he so firmly established the power of his family, that his eldest son, Bajee Rao, became his successor in that office without opposition. Bajee Rao, possessing a more adventurous ambition than his father, usurped the government; and the Rajah of Sattarah and his descendants, who regularly succeeded to the titles and dignities of nominal sovereigns of the Marhatta dominions, were actually kept in a state of imprisonment in their palace at Sattarah; whilst Bajee Rao, as Peshwah, having secured the fidelity of the several military chieftains, fixed his place of residence at Poonah, established a court there, and invested himself with every regal insignia.

The military chieftains, however, soon viewed the conduct of the Peshwah with envy; and, encouraged by his example, they successively established their jaghires into independent principalities; but still acknowledged him as the representative of the Rajah of Sattarah. Thus the nominal Marhatta empire became afterwards divided, at different periods, into five separate independent states, under the following princes and chiefs.

BAJEE RAO, the second Peshwah, holding the hereditary dominions of the Rajah of Sattarah, in whose name he and his descendants governed. His grandson Bajee Rao, second Peshwah of that name, succeeded to the musnud of Poonah in 1796.

RAGOJEE BHOONSLAH, the first Rajah of Berar, who had been Buckshee, or Commander in Chief, received from the

Rajah of Sattarah the province of Berar in jaghire, as a reward for his eminent services; but having in his own hands the power of asserting his independence, he converted his jaghire into a separate state, admitting only the political authority of the Peshwah. He died in 1749. Ragojee, his grandson, and fourth Rajah of Berar, succeeded his father in 1788.

RANOJEE SCINDIAH commanded the body guard of the Peshwah, the first Bajee Rao; and on the conquest of Malwa had part of that province granted to him in jaghire, which, with the whole of Candeish, was afterwards formed into a powerful state by that distinguished warrior. Madajee, his fifth son and successor, increased his territory by possessing himself of the person of the Mogul, Shah Allum; and taking the cities of Delhi and Agra with their surrounding districts, the principal part of the valuable province of the Dooab, between the Jumna and the Ganges; and before 1794, actually extending his sovereignty over the provinces of Sirhind and Jallingdoor, on the banks of the Byah or Hyphasis river. His seat of government was at Ougein, in Malwa; but, like his nephew and successor, his court was generally in his camp. Dowlut Rao Scindiah succeeded his uncle, Madajee, in 1794.

MULHAR RAO HOLKAR, another military officer in the service of the Peshwah, Bajee Rao the first, received also a portion of Malwa in jaghire. He likewise established his independence, at Indore, and founded a considerable state. His nephew and successor, Tuckajee, died in 1797, leaving two legitimate sons, and two illegitimate; one of these, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, became the active and enterprising chief in the war which followed with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who had possessed himself of the person of Kundee Rao, nephew to Jeswunt, and pretended to govern in his name.

The GUICKWAR had also contributed, in an eminent degree, to establish the fame of the Marhatta arms, and had obtained, in consequence, some valuable grants in jaghire. He afterwards asserted his independence and usurped the fertile province of Guzerat, which remained in his family.

The Marhatta empire, as established by Sevajee in 1680, had

thus undergone a complete change; for it had become only a nominal confederation of the five powerful chieftains, the Peshwah, the Rajah of Berar, Scindiah, Holkar, and the Guickwar; but, in fact, all independent of each other, yet all acknowledging a sort of honorary fealty to be due to the descendants of Sevajee, on the throne of Sattarah; and respecting the office of Peshwah, as the legitimate executive authority of the empire. In the intercourse between this chief magistrate and his nominal authority, every form of respect was observed; and on the succession of a Peshwah, he received the dress of honor from the Rajah of Sattarah, before he entered on the administration of his government.

By this arrangement of political power, and the forms with which it was administered, the Marhatta empire, in its foreign as in its domestic relations, was considered as a confederation of princes, of which the Peshwah was the acknowledged organ, as all negotiations with foreign states were carried on through him: although, since the death of Bajee Rao, first of that name, no Peshwah ventured to conclude any treaty with a foreign power, affecting the general interests of the empire, without the express concurrence of all the principal chieftains. On the other hand, the Peshwah always exercised the right of contracting engagements with other powers, when involving only his own interest and those of his subordinate military tributaries, without any reference to the other powerful chieftains; who, on their part, uniformly exercised a similar right: thus each of them formed alliances, and made war and peace, as it suited his own particular views.

Madajee Scindiah had been indebted for the success of his enterprises in Delhi and the Dooab to his military establishment, planned, formed, and disciplined by Mons. de Boigne*, a native of Savoy, who entered his service in 1784: and raised eighteen battalions of regular infantry, which he officered by European adventurers, chiefly French, and formed them into

* Mons. de Boigne returned to Europe with immense wealth, which he expended in princely charities at Chambéry in Savoy, where he died in 1830. His enterprising career and subsequent honorable retirement form a singular and interesting memoir.

brigades: these, with a body of cavalry and a train of well appointed artillery, he disciplined on the European system. M. de Boigne afterwards augmented his regular infantry to 38,000, his cavalry to 8000, and his artillery to 120 pieces of iron, and upwards of 150 pieces of brass ordnance. On quitting India, he was succeeded in his military command, authority, and titles, by Mons. Perron*, a native and subject of France. To this officer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah confided the government of his northern provinces; whilst he devoted his attention to the politics of the Deccan, and to the maintenance of that ascendancy over the Peshwah and court of Poonah, which his predecessor had so effectually established. In the exercise of this ascendancy, it was manifestly the main principle of his policy, under the influence of Mons. Perron's advice, to obstruct the interests and views of the British government, by every secret means; and to encourage the introduction of French officers, both into his own army and that of the Peshwah.

The absolute control and direction of the councils of Poonah, by Scindiah, were, however, viewed by Holkar with a jealous animosity, which his inability for a time to prevent seemed to embitter and increase. In order, therefore, to put his army on a footing that might enable it to contend with Scindiah in the Deccan, or at least to bear some proportion to his vast military establishment, Holkar sought also for European officers to discipline and lead his troops; and as at that time there were a greater number of itinerant adventurers from France, than from any other country in Europe, who found their way to India, it consequently happened that three-fourths of the Europeans introduced into his service were Frenchmen.

Thus the infantry establishments of the armies of Holkar, as well as of Scindiah and the Peshwah, were, in the year 1800, principally officered by Europeans, three-fourths of whom were natives of France.

It may be necessary here to remark, that the Marhatta territories of the Peshwah, Scindia, and the Rajah of Berar, were

* Mons. Perron returned to France in 1806, but was not very well received by Napoleon: he died wealthy, in May, 1834.

bounded to the east and to the south by the dominions of the Nizam, Soubahdar of the Deccan, who reigned over the whole of the country between the Kistna, Godavery, and Wurda rivers : Hyderabad being his chief city and seat of government.

Although the court of Poonah had acquiesced in the justice and necessity of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun ; the Peshwah, being under the entire control of Scindiah, did not fulfil the conditions of the treaty of alliance, concluded with him by Marquis Cornwallis : and Scindiah not only maintained a secret correspondence with Tippoo, during the whole progress of the last Mysore war, but, even after the fall of Seringapatam, certain emissaries from Poonah attempted to excite the family and remaining officers of the deceased Sultaun to resist the final settlement of Mysore. Marquis Wellesley, however, on framing the settlement, omitted not to offer a considerable portion of territory to the Peshwah, on the condition of his reviving the alliance between the Marhatta empire and the British government, on a basis calculated to render it secure and efficient. But this proposition, together with others of a like nature, which were also at the same time made to Scindiah, were explicitly rejected ; and, consequently, all the extensive territories of Mysore, formerly conquered by Hyder Ally, were divided between the British government and the Nizam, excepting a portion of the ancient kingdom, which was restored to the Hindu Rajahs.

The unfriendly, if not hostile disposition thus manifested by Scindiah towards the British government ; and the increasing strength and influence of Mons. Perron's army, then stationed on the most vulnerable part of the British possessions in India, induced Marquis Wellesley to form alliances which might tend to lessen the influence of Scindiah, in the event of a rupture. With this view, in the beginning of 1802, he concluded a subsidiary treaty and defensive alliance with the Guickwar, chief of Guzerat ; and no time was lost on the part of the Governor General in exerting every effort of policy to prevent a French influence in the Deccan, which might subsequently extend its authority over the whole of the Marhatta chiefs.

Accordingly, overtures were made, in June, 1802, to the Peshwah by the British resident at Poonah, for forming an alliance: he nevertheless declined to accede, not only to the specific terms, but even to any admissible modification of them. This arose entirely from the known wishes of Scindia on the question of an alliance with the English; for although that Chief was then absent in Malwa, carrying on hostilities against Holkar, yet his opinions and views continued to rule the councils at Poonah.

Holkar, however, in the mean time, having changed his plan of operations, crossed the Nerbudda, and was actually but a few days' march from Poonah, at the head of a powerful army; for the evident purpose, not merely of destroying Scindiah's ascendancy at that court, but of usurping himself the whole authority of the Peshwah, and converting it into a useful instrument for his own aggrandizement.

Scindiah immediately dispatched a force under Suddasheo Bhow, to co-operate in the defence of Poonah; when, after some fruitless negotiation, a general action took place near Poonah, between the hostile armies, on the 25th October, 1802, in which the combined forces of the Peshwah and Scindiah sustained a complete defeat; and the Peshwah fled to the maritime province of the Konkan, leaving his country to devastation and plunder, and the capital of the Marhatta empire to rebels and usurpers.

On the morning of his defeat, the Peshwah sent his minister to the Resident at Poonah, soliciting the aid of a British subsidiary force; and expressing a desire of forming a general defensive alliance, founded on the principles of that concluded between the English and the Nizam, in October, 1800. These propositions were acceded to by the Resident; and an agreement was immediately concluded with the Peshwah, which was ratified by the Governor General on the day he received it at Calcutta. The ratification was returned, accompanied by an assurance from Marquis Wellesley, that it was the determination of the British government to employ every justifiable means for the restoration of the Peshwah's authority. Judging

it also to be a fit opportunity to endeavor to extend this alliance to the other members of the Marhatta empire, Colonel Collins was sent as plenipotentiary to Scindiah, in order to propose terms on which he might be included in the engagement just contracted with the Peshwah.

When Holkar found the Peshwah had effected his retreat to the strong fortress of Mhar, in the Konkan, he placed the son of Amrut Rao on the musnud of Poonah, and invested the father with the office of prime minister; Holkar assuming the command of the troops of the state, and administering the government in Amrut Rao's name. Amrut Rao was the adopted son of Ragobah Rao; and, as such, brother to the Peshwah, whose authority he was thus unwillingly forced to assume.

In this state of the Marhatta powers, it became indispensably necessary, as a measure of precaution on the part of the British government, to assemble a strong army of observation on the southern frontier of the Marhatta dominions, for the security of the British possessions, and those of the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore; for, according to the habitual custom of the Marhattas, the military chiefs attached to the cause of Holkar would undoubtedly attempt to overrun and plunder the territories of their neighbours. The government of Madras, aware of the necessity of this precaution, without waiting for the instructions of the Governor General, judiciously assembled, in November, 1802, an army of 19,000 men at Hurryhur, on the north west frontier of Mysore, under the command of Lieut. General Stuart. The Government of Bombay also prepared for service the disposable force of that Presidency; and, at the request of the British Resident with the Peshwah, the subsidiary force at Hyderabad was held in readiness to take the field.

Ably and zealously supported by Lord Clive and Mr. Duncan, the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, the Governor General had been particularly happy in his selection of officers of ability and reputation, as the Residents at the several durbars of the native princes: and to those only who

are unacquainted with Indian history will it be necessary to mention the names of some of the distinguished diplomatic agents, whose combined talents, at this eventful period, assisted the military successes of Generals Lake and Wellesley in the extraordinary aggrandizement, and successful administration, of the British empire in India by Marquis Wellesley.

The Residents at the different courts, south of the Nerbudda, in 1803 and 1804, were Lieut. Colonel Close with the Peshwah at Poonah; Lieut. Colonel Collins, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah; Major Kirkpatrick, with the Nizam at Hyderabad: Mr. Webbe, first at Mysore, and afterwards appointed to the durbar of the Rajah of Berar, but who died in Scindiah's camp at the end of 1804; and Major Malcolm, who accompanied Major General Wellesley to Poonah, and on the removal of Mr. Webbe to the court of Nagpoor, became Resident at Mysore. The Hon. Mount-Stuart Elphinstone, Mr. Wilks, and Major Munro, employed at this period in the Deccan and Mysore, were also constellations in that galaxy of worth, which shone so conspicuously in the government of India under Lord Wellesley.

It will be seen, by the following letters, that Major General Wellesley was very attentive to the events passing at Poonah; the peculiar importance of which was increased by his local knowledge, and personal intercourse and influence with the Marhatta chieftains on the frontier of Mysore.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart,
Commander in Chief of the Army of Fort St. George.*

' SIR,

' Seringapatam, 2nd December, 1802.

' A vakeel from Goklah, the commanding officer of the Peshwah's troops on the frontier, arrived here yesterday, and, according to the tenor of the orders I formerly received from the Right Honorable the Governor in Council upon this subject, I had a communication with him this morning.

' He brought me a letter from Goklah, and delivered a long message from him, translations of which I shall have the honor of transmitting to-morrow, as soon as I can procure them. The purport of the letter was a history of the late transactions at Poonah; that he and Holkar could not agree; that the Peshwah had fled below the ghauts, and had desired him to join

him with his army; that the road was difficult, and if he should go there, his presence would be useless; that he was then encamped upon the Kistna, and wanted to know what orders I had to give him. I propose to detain the vakeel until I can receive your answer, if I may; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give me your orders on the subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th December, 1802.

‘ It gives me great pleasure to be able to send you so immediately a satisfactory account of the sentiments of the Marhatta chiefs on the frontier. I had a conversation again this morning with Goklah’s vakeel, the purport of which was as follows:

‘ He says that Bappojee Goneish Goklah was the person who arrested the person of Holkar, afterwards put to death by order of the Peshwah; in consequence thereof he has nothing to expect from Jeswunt Rao Holkar; that he is determined to be faithful to the Peshwah, whose troops he commands, and he wishes to know what orders I have to give him.

‘ The vakeel appears to think it probable that his master will be obliged to retreat from his present position on the Kistna; and he wishes to know whether, in that case, he could be allowed to retreat with his troops into the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore; and he promises faithfully, that in case he should receive the permission for which he now asks, his troops shall pay for every thing they might receive, and no depredation shall be committed. The vakeel also requested that an asylum might be afforded within the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore, to the females of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, and those of some of his principal officers. He also presented me a letter from Goklah, and another from Lingo Punt, translations of which I have the honor to inclose. Lingo Punt was the vakeel from the father of Bappojee Goneish, and afterwards from his son to me, during the campaign of 1800.

‘ In answer to these verbal requests, I told the vakeel that it would be necessary that I should refer the matter to government, and I gave him general assurances of friendship and good-will. I desired him to wait here until I should receive

the answers of government to his requests; and I shall be obliged to you if you will honor me with your orders, as well regarding them, as regarding the military conduct of Goklah hereafter. In the mean time I propose to write general answers to the letters, translations of which are inclosed.

‘I took an opportunity this morning of entering into a general conversation regarding the views and objects, and probable line of conduct, of all the Marhatta chiefs in this part of India, in the present crisis of Marhatta affairs. It is obvious that Goklah must be very decided in his conduct; he has no favor to expect from Holkar; and this is probably the reason for which he, so immediately after his success, dispatched this vakeel to me. The vakeel says that the Putwurdun family (Pursheram Bhow’s) are exactly in the state in which you could wish them to be, viz., in anxious expectation of future events, and intending to adopt a line of conduct suitable thereto; or, in other words, to take part with the strongest. He says that it is reported that Holkar intends to place on the musnud a son of Amrut Rao, and that if he adopts that line of conduct, and places some power in the hands of Amrut Rao himself, the minds of people in general may be more reconciled to him than they are under the existing order of things; for that, at present, every man is doubtful, and determined to take part with the strongest. He says that Goklah, although he has no hopes from Holkar, will hold his ground if power should be thrown into the hands of Amrut Rao. I questioned him regarding the strength of the chiefs at present; he says that Goklah’s body of troops consists of 4000 horse, and 3000 foot, with some guns. He says the horse are 2000 good, and 2000 indifferent; that 500 of the good are pagah, and 1500 silladar; 1000 of the foot are good, commanded by two European officers, 1000 are Arabs and Rohillas, and 1000, I believe, of the ordinary peons of the country. This state of Goklah’s force I believe to be true; it is nearly the same as I recollect it to have been in 1800.

‘The Putwurdun have four bodies of troops, nearly of the same strength and description as Goklah’s; and they are situated, for the present, in the neighbourhood of the Kistna. One commanded by Appah Saheb, another by Baba Saheb, and another by Dada Saheb, being three brothers, and sons of Pursheram Bhow, and a fourth by Chintomey Rao, who is the son of Pursheram Bhow’s brother, and is, in fact, the head

of the family. I have no doubt that all these chiefs will join you forthwith ; but I propose to send a man into that country to find out their intentions exactly, and the strength of their troops, and to discover the intentions of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and of the Rajah of Kittoor. Both these chiefs have now bodies of troops on foot.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Purport of a Message delivered by Suddasheo Rao, vakeel from Goklah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ Seringapatam, 16th December, 1802.

‘ As it is probable that Sree Munt Bajee Rao will claim the protection of the English, Goklah has a great desire to join their army and to act in their cause ; and Goklah wishes to make known to General Wellesley, that should he receive orders from Sree Munt Bajee Rao, it is his intention to acquaint him (the General) with the nature of those orders, to take his advice on the subject, and to act accordingly : and should he receive any from Amrut Rao, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar, he will act in the same manner ; as it is his particular desire to act agreeably to the General’s wishes upon every occasion, let his orders from the people above mentioned be what they may.

‘ Goklah wishes that the friendly communication which at present exists between him and the General may continue ; and he will make known to him, in his correspondence, every circumstance, of a public nature, which may occur in the Marhatta country ; and he hopes that the General will be kind enough to let him know any thing of importance, that may be determined on, relative to arranging the affairs of the Marhatta empire.

‘ Goklah has sent his vakeel, Suddasheo Rao, to General Wellesley, not only to request a place for his family to remain in, but also to cultivate his friendship.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive,
Governor of Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 19th December, 1802.

‘ In consequence of your Lordship’s orders of the 8th and 11th instant, I have had a conference with the vakeel sent here by Bappojee Goneish Goklah, the purport of which I am about to lay before you.

‘ I informed the vakeel of your Lordship’s concern at the difficulties which opposed the progress of Bappojee Goneish to the Konkan with his troops, in obedience to the Peshwah’s commands ; and that the state of the connexion between his Highness and the British government did not admit of the junction of any part of the force under my command with that of Goklah. I then pointed out to him the mode of political communication between the British government in India and the Native states ; and informed him that the negotiations, then depending between his Excellency the Governor General and the Peshwah, had been committed exclusively to Lieut. Colonel Close ; and that the result of those negotiations must determine the mode of conduct to be observed by the British government, in the present convulsion of Marhatta affairs. I expressed a sanguine expectation, however, that the events which had recently happened might ultimately tend to augment and corroborate the relations of amity between the two states.

‘ In respect to the specific proposition of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that his army should be received into the Company’s territories ; and that an asylum should be given to his family and to those of his principal officers and adherents, I informed the vakeel, that no application had been made by the Peshwah that any body of Marhatta troops might be admitted within the British territories ; and consequently that the relations at that moment subsisting between the British government and the Marhatta empire did not admit of your receiving an armed force. I told him that I had received your Lordship’s orders to give security, and treat with respect, such persons as might be obliged to seek protection, with their families, within the territories of the Company, or of the Rajah of Mysore, under the present aspect of public affairs ; and I pointed out Seringapatam, in Mysore, as the place to which it would be most convenient that such persons should go. At the same time I told him positively that no armed men would be admitted within the frontier.

‘ The vakeel appeared to be satisfied with this communication ; and then delivered another message from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, of which the inclosed paper contains the purport. In answer thereto, I referred him to what I had before said, by your Lordship’s orders, and expressed myself much gratified by his confidence in British officers. I also stated my san-

guine expectation, that recent events would have the effect of augmenting and strengthening the relations of amity between the two states, and those in the service of each.

‘The vakeel then asked whether, in case the course of events should occasion a junction between the British army, and that under the command of Bappojee Goneish Goklah, it was probable that any pecuniary assistance would be afforded by the commander of the former to the latter? I replied that the supposed junction of those two bodies of troops, as well as every arrangement depending thereon, and the nature and extent of the assistance to be afforded by the one to the other, must depend upon the negotiations between the British government and the Peshwah; which I had before informed him were committed exclusively to Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lord Clive.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Peshwah in the mean time had removed to Severndroog, and afterwards embarked for Bassein, where a treaty of alliance was concluded on the 31st of December, 1802, between his Highness and Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, the Resident at his court.

The restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah, under the exclusive protection of the British power, was very essential; as it would necessarily supersede any preponderating influence at the court of Poonah, by either Scindiah or Holkar, who were known to have had personal and interested views on the supreme magisterial authority of the empire.

The Rajah of Berar had also always maintained pretensions to the supreme authority of the Marhatta empire, founded on his affinity to the reigning Rajah of Sattarah; and convinced that the permanency of the defensive alliance, lately concluded at Bassein, between the British government and the Peshwah, would preclude all future opportunity of accomplishing the object of his ambition, the Rajah of Berar was equally concerned with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the subversion of that alliance.

Although the views ascribed to these chieftains were manifestly incompatible with the accomplishment of their respective

designs; the removal of an obstacle which would effectually preclude the success of either chieftain, in obtaining an ascendancy at Poonah, constituted an object of common interest; and sensible that the combination of their power afforded the only prospect of subverting the alliance, they apparently agreed to compromise their respective and contradictory projects, by an arrangement for the partition of the whole power and dominion of the Marhatta state.

The Governor General lost no time, at this critical period, in forwarding instructions to Lord Clive, and to the Residents at the several durbars of the Marhatta Chiefs. These instructions, with the correspondence of Lord Clive and Lieut. General Stuart, the Commander in Chief, elucidate the preparations made for the advance of a division of the British army to Poonah, and the subsequent war in the Deccan.

The Governor General to the Right Hon. Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.

‘ MY LORD, Fort William, 2nd February, 1803.

‘ 1. I have received from the resident at Poonah, the intimation of his intention to recommend the advance of the British army assembled at Hurryhur into the Marhatta territory, at the earliest practicable period of time.

‘ 2. The situation of the affairs of the Marhatta empire, and the views and intentions of the contending parties, were not sufficiently decided, when my instructions to the Resident at Poonah, of the 29th of November and 30th of December, were issued, to enable me to determine the precise extent of the force which it might be expedient to advance into the Marhatta territory, from the several stations at which troops had been ordered to assemble for eventual service. The regulation of that question was, therefore, entrusted to the discretion of the resident at Poonah, to be guided by future events and circumstances.

‘ 3. The length of time required for the complete equipment of the force which your Lordship had directed to be assembled on the frontier of the Marhatta territory, precluded the necessity of immediate instructions with regard to the ultimate destination of the army. The transactions in the Deccan, and the situations and views of the several contending parties,

having now assumed a more distinct form, I am enabled to apply the general principles by which I propose to regulate the proceedings of the British government in the actual crisis of affairs.

‘ 4. The objects of assembling British troops on the frontier of Mysore were, the effectual defence of our possessions during the convulsed state of the Marhatta empire ; and the eventual establishment of a subsidiary force at Poonah, under the operation of the general defensive alliance concluded with the Peshwah.

‘ 5. Your Lordship is apprised of my intention (in conformity to the system of alliance, founded by the treaty of Hyderabad in 1800) to exert the British influence and power for the restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah, on the basis of the subsidiary treaty, recently concluded by Colonel Close. In pursuing this intention, it is, however, absolutely necessary to attend to the leading principles of policy by which my conduct has been governed. First, the maintenance of peace with the Marhatta states : Secondly, the preservation of the internal tranquillity of the British possessions. Our proceedings, in the present crisis of affairs, must be strictly conformable to these leading principles.

‘ 6. The stipulations of treaty on which I found my intention to facilitate the restoration of the Peshwah’s authority, originated in a supposition that the majority of the Marhatta jaghiredars, and the body of the Peshwah’s subjects, entertain a desire of co-operating in that measure ; justice and wisdom would forbid any attempt to impose upon the Marhattas a ruler, whose restoration to authority was adverse to the wishes of every class of his subjects. The recent engagements with the Peshwah involve no obligation of such an extent ; whatever might be the success of our arms, the ultimate objects of those engagements could not be attained by a course of policy so violent and extreme. If, therefore, it should appear that a decided opposition to the restoration of the Peshwah is to be expected from the majority of the Marhatta jaghiredars, and from the body of the Peshwah’s subjects, I shall instantly relinquish every attempt to restore the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah.

‘ 7. Even under an assurance of a decided support and co-operation from the jaghiredars, it is, however, advisable that such a detachment of British force should advance into the

Marhatta territory, as shall not endanger the internal tranquillity of the Company's territories. The advance of the whole of the British army assembled at Hurryhur, into the Marhatta territory, would greatly diminish the internal security of the Company's possessions in that quarter of India; such a movement would therefore be inconsistent with a principal object of this armament.

‘ 8. Under all circumstances of the case, therefore, I consider the advance of the whole English army assembled at Hurryhur, to Poonah, to be a measure of such hazard to the tranquillity of the English possessions, as could not be justified by any probable expectation of a more speedy and complete accomplishment of our views at that court.

‘ 9. With the view of fulfilling our engagements with the Peshwah, without deviating from the principles stated in this dispatch, it is my intention; First, that the whole of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Nizam, together with the regiment of Europeans, and the regiment of cavalry to be furnished for the service of his Highness, under the orders of the Governor General in Council of the 31st December, 1802, shall proceed to join the troops of the Nizam, assembled on his Highness's western frontier; and that the whole of that force shall occupy, within his Highness's territory, the station nearest to Poonah; and shall be prepared, at a proper season, to advance to that capital. Secondly, that as large a proportion of the English army assembled at Hurryhur, as can be detached consistently with the internal security of the English territories, shall advance, in concert and co-operation with such of the Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars, occupying the southern frontier of the Marhatta territory, as are attached to the Peshwah's cause; and that the remainder of the English army shall maintain its position on the frontier of Mysore, for the combined purpose of eventually supporting the advanced detachment, and of preserving the internal tranquillity of the Company's territory. Thirdly, that the advanced detachment shall proceed from Hurryhur, together with such of the Marhatta forces as may unite with it, either to Meritch, or to any other station where the Peshwah may be enabled to join that force; or that the detachment from Hurryhur shall form a junction with the combined army of the Nizam, and with the English subsidiary troops, on the frontier of his Highness's

dominions. The immediate destination of the advancing army must necessarily be regulated by contingent events; the extent of the force, to be thus detached from the main body of the English army at Hurryhur, must be decided by the discretion of your Lordship in Council, aided by the judgment of the Commander in Chief, and strictly regulated by the principles stated in the preceding part of this dispatch.

‘ 10. Such detachment of English troops, supported by the co-operation of the majority of the southern jaghiredars, or by the force united with the army of the Nizam, will be sufficient to preclude the opposition of any individual chieftain, who may consider the restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah to be incompatible with his separate interests; and who might be disposed to resist or embarrass the progress of that measure.

‘ 11. The actual period of the advance of the proposed detachment from Hurryhur must be regulated by the information which your Lordship may receive of the progress of the subsidiary force from Hyderabad, and of the Nizam’s troops; and also by the tenor of the advices which may be transmitted to your Lordship by the Resident at Poonah.

‘ 12. The co-operation of the majority of the Marhatta jaghiredars for the restoration of the Peshwah to the due exercise of his authority, being considered to form an indispensable part of the arrangement for the accomplishment of that object, it is necessary that your Lordship should be apprised of my sentiments, with regard to the conduct to be observed in encouraging those jaghiredars to co-operate with the English troops.

‘ 13. It may be expected that those jaghiredars will require, as the condition of their support, assurances from the English government of security for their respective rights and interests, in the general settlement of affairs. Without an accurate knowledge of the respective rights of the jaghiredars, and of the Peshwah, we cannot justly pledge the faith of the British government to any special engagement on this subject.

‘ 14. Every practicable means should be employed to conciliate the good will of those chieftains; and to obtain their co-operation in the general object of restoring the Peshwah to the due exercise of his authority; and for that purpose it will be proper to afford to the jaghiredars every assurance, that the

utmost influence of the British government will be employed, after the successful restoration of Bajee Rao, to provide for the security of the interests of each chieftain, to the extent which may be practicable, consistently with the just rights of the Peshwah. Any engagements of a more definite nature might involve obligations, inconsistent with public faith.

‘ 15. In framing any engagements with the several Marhatta jaghiredars, occupying the frontier of Mysore, for the purpose of securing their aid and co-operation on the present occasion, your Lordship may be disposed to avail yourself of the services of Major Malcolm, whose extensive information with regard to the general political system of India, and whose intimate knowledge of my sentiments on this particular branch of policy, will furnish peculiar advantages in accomplishing the measures which your Lordship may pursue, for the purpose of securing the support of the Marhatta feudatories. Your Lordship may anticipate my approbation of any orders which you may issue, for the purpose of employing the services of Major Malcolm in the discharge of any duty of a political nature, connected with the views and interests of the British Government, with the Marhatta chieftains, or at the court of Poonah.

‘ 16. Your Lordship will issue such instructions to the commanding officer of the detachment as may appear to be proper, with the view to conciliate the good will of the inhabitants of the country, through which the detachment may have occasion to pass in the Marhatta territory.

‘ 17. Copies of this dispatch, together with corresponding instructions to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, will be forwarded to those officers with all practicable expedition.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 3rd February, 1803.

‘ Adverting to the power and influence of Ragojee Bhoonslah, as a branch of the Mahratta state, it is expedient that I should possess the means of obtaining timely knowledge of that chieftain’s views in the present crisis; and avail myself of the favorable opportunity of the important object of comprehending the Rajah of Berar in the system of defensive alliance, lately concluded with the Peshwah. These cannot be effectually

ally secured otherwise than by the presence of an able and active resident at the Court of Nagpoor. The talents, knowledge, and activity of Mr. Webbe qualify him in an eminent degree for that station; and I have resolved to appoint him resident at the court of the Rajah of Berar, in which capacity I shall furnish him with detailed instructions for the regulation of his conduct.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Lord Clive.’

‘ WELLESLEY.

Extracts from the Governor General's Instructions to Lieut. Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah, but with the Peshwah.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 3rd February, 1803.

‘ 6. In consequence of your recommendation to the government of Fort St. George for the immediate advance of the English army assembled at Hurryhur, his Excellency has deemed it necessary to communicate to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George his sentiments and instructions on that question; and to state to his Lordship the general principles, by which the further measures to be adopted for the restoration of the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah, are to be regulated.

‘ 8. In pursuance of the plan of operations which his Excellency resolved to adopt, orders will be immediately issued to the resident at Hyderabad, authorising him to direct the advance of the whole of the subsidiary force for the purpose of forming a junction with the army of his Highness the Nizam; and of occupying, in conjunction with that army, a position on the frontier of his Highness's territory, most favorable for the march of that force to Poonah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ N. B. EDMONSTONE, Sec. to Gov.

Governor General's Instructions to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 3rd February, 1803.

‘ 1. I am directed by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, to transmit to you, for your information, the enclosed copy of his Excellency's instructions of this date to the resident at Poonah, and of the documents therein referred to. You will observe, from the tenor of those documents, that his Excellency's intention, with regard to the co-operation

of the whole of the subsidiary force with the army of his Highness the Nizam, coincides with the suggestion upon that subject, contained in your dispatch.

‘2. In conformity to the plan of operations which his Excellency has resolved to adopt, you will direct the commanding officer of the subsidiary force to march with the whole of that force, for the purpose of forming a junction with the army of his Highness the Nizam, having first obtained his Highness’s consent to that measure; for which purpose it will be proper that you should communicate to his Highness the intended plan of operations. You will concert with the resident at Poonah the position which it will be advisable for the combined army to occupy on the Nizam’s frontier, preparatory to its actual advance towards Poonah.

‘3. His Excellency directs that, in conformity to the tenor of the ninth paragraph of his Excellency’s instructions of this date, to the resident at Poonah, you will instruct the commanding officer of the subsidiary force to conform to any suggestions which he may receive from the resident at Poonah, with regard to the time of commencing his march from the Nizam’s frontier towards Poonah; or to any other points connected with the objects of the destination of that force; and you will request his Highness the Nizam to issue orders to the officer in command of his troops, directing him to attend to any suggestions which he may receive from the commanding officer of the subsidiary force, for the regulation of his conduct.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘N. B. EDMONSTONE, Sec. to Gov.

Lieut. General Stuart, Commander-in-chief, to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, Chittledroog, 23rd February, 1803.

‘I have had the honor to receive your Lordship’s letter, dated the 19th instant, together with a copy of a dispatch from the Most Noble the Governor General.

‘The principles and objects of his Excellency’s plans, and the nature of the measures proposed for their accomplishment, are fully described in that dispatch; and I shall be prepared, on receiving your Lordship’s instructions on this important subject, to make the necessary arrangements for carrying them into execution.

‘The actual advance of a part of the subsidiary force, the recent movements of Holkar’s troops towards the southward, and the danger threatened by the disposition of the army of that chieftain to the tranquillity of his Highness the Nizam’s dominions, and to the safety of the southern jaghiredars, who profess attachment to the Peshwah’s cause, lead me to expect that your Lordship will judge it expedient to order the early advance of a considerable proportion of this army, for the purpose of supporting the subsidiary force, and of encouraging the Marhatta jaghiredars to co-operate in restoring the Peshwah’s authority.

‘Under this opinion, I have been desirous of assembling the army at Hurryhur, in order to execute with more promptitude the instructions which I may receive; but I am prevented from adopting that measure by the consideration that the injury which would be occasioned to the public cattle by a want of subsistence in the event of the advance of the troops being delayed, would be of greater extent than any advantage that could result from the formation of the army at one point. I have therefore determined to adhere to the plan, which I reported to your Lordship in my letter of yesterday, of distributing the army into three divisions, until the advance of the British troops shall be finally decided. The divisions of the army will have occupied the positions allotted to them on the 25th instant.

‘Major General Wellesley has reported to me, that the sirdar, whom he employs in the Marhatta districts, has sent, in a recent communication, a very favorable account of the dispositions of the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, every one of whom has declared his intention of adhering to the cause of the Peshwah.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lord Clive.*’

‘J. STUART.

Lord Clive to Lieut. General Stuart (Extracts).

‘SIR,

‘Fort St. George, 27th February, 1803.

‘I have already had the honour of transmitting to you a copy of the separate dispatch addressed to me, under date the 2nd instant, by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General.

‘Your Excellency is apprised that the Resident at Poonah has considered it expedient, in the actual state of the Peshwah’s

affairs subsequently to the conclusion of the defensive alliance, that the British troops should advance without delay into the Marhatta territory.

‘Your Excellency’s absence from the Presidency renders it difficult for me to exercise my discretion in the manner directed by the Most Noble the Governor General, with respect to the extent of the force to be detached from the main body of the British army: it is therefore unavoidably necessary that this question should be determined by the judgment of your Excellency; but deeming it to be indispensably requisite that the detachment should be capable of maintaining itself, under any contingency which may arise, before it can be supported by the main body of the army, or until it may have formed a junction with the subsidiary force from Hyderabad, I deem it to be my duty to express my conviction, that the detachment should not consist of less than 7000 fighting men, with a due proportion of artillery.

‘Your Excellency will be pleased accordingly to form a detachment of not less than 7000 men, composed of such proportion of artillery, cavalry, and European and native infantry, as your Excellency may judge best suited to the intended service.

‘Under the peculiar circumstances of delicacy which attach to the execution of the orders of the Governor General, from the various combination of political as well as of military considerations, arising from the execution of this eventful service, I deem it to be of the highest importance, that the officer appointed to the command of the advancing detachment should possess, in an eminent degree, the qualifications requisite to the successful discharge of this arduous and complicated duty. The practical experience obtained by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the immediate theatre of the intended operations, combined with the personal intercourse established between that officer and the Marhatta chiefs on the frontier, and supported by the great ability uniformly manifested by that officer in various situations of difficulty, renders me solicitous that he should be selected for the command of the advancing detachment.

‘If no emergency should have occurred of a nature to require further reference to me, you will be pleased to issue the instructions necessary for regulating the conduct of the officer commanding the advancing detachment; as well with respect

to the general objects of the Governor General's policy, as with regard to the limitation of the intercourse with the Marhatta sirdars.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lieut. General Stuart.*'

'CLIVE.

Lieut. General Stuart to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.

'MY LORD,

'Camp at Mayaconda, 28th February, 1803.

'I have the honor to transmit for your Lordship's information, a memorandum containing the substance of a conversation between Major General Wellesley, who is now in my camp, and a vakeel arrived from Goklah. The approach of Holkar's troops, the extensive evils incident to the present distracted state of affairs, and the apprehension of further sufferings, render, according to every information which I have received, the jaghiredars and inhabitants of the southern provinces of the Marhatta empire anxious for the advance of the British forces, and the re-establishment of a regular government at Poonah.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lord Clive.*'

'J. STUART.

Translation of a Memorandum given to Major General Wellesley by Goklah's vakeel Ram Rao.

'1. Goklah sent a vakeel to Bajee Rao, the Peshwah in the Konkan, who represented to his Highness the situation of Goklah's affairs. His Highness said, that the country in general was in great confusion; that Goklah must conduct himself according to the wishes of the commanding officer of the British forces; and his Highness was desirous of hearing of his fidelity to his cause through Lieut. Colonel Close. Goklah wished, therefore, that Major General Wellesley would write to Lieut. Colonel Close, and inform him that he had full confidence in Goklah; that he was a brave man, &c.

'2. Accounts to the following purport have come from Poonah. For the settlement of the countries towards the Carnatic, Shekamut Khan, Meer Khan Patan, and Futtu Sing Maunia, have come with their troops into their zillah of Gorkan. Besides those chiefs, others of inferior note are about to take their departure. Holkar himself is with his army in Poonah. For these reasons Goklah's vakeel at Poonah re-

commends it to him to connect himself with the Company, and that speedily, as, without their assistance, there is no safety for him. Goklah therefore requests, that if the army should not enter the country, some battalions might be sent to his assistance, and that a place of safety may be given to him for his family.

‘3. Goklah saw Govind Rao at Hurgoond, who, he concludes, wrote Major General Wellesley an account of his interview with him.

‘4. Goklah’s army is in some difficulties for want of pay, and the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, is at a great distance. Goklah therefore wishes for assistance in a pecuniary way.

‘The conversation which Major General Wellesley had with the vakeel, was to the same purport with the memorandum nearly :—The General told Ram Rao, that he would write a letter to Lieut. Colonel Close as desired. In regard to the second point, he observed to him, that the British army was upon the frontier, and therefore there could be no great danger to be apprehended from the forces of the chiefs mentioned; and in regard to the third, he said, that the Company were not bound by treaty to pay the Peshwah’s troops; that it appeared that his Highness had provided already for the payment of the army under Goklah’s command; that Goklah should take measures to reap the advantages of that provision; and that as no more had been provided for the British troops than was absolutely necessary for them, he was to expect nothing from the Commander-in-Chief.’

The Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors. (Extract.)

‘HONORABLE SIRS,

‘Fort William, 19th April, 1803.

‘Colonel Collins arrived at the camp of Scindiah on the 27th of February, and the advices I received from him, stating the evasive and unsatisfactory conduct of that chief, have induced me to entertain suspicions that he meditated an accommodation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and a confederacy with him and the Rajah of Berar. This suspicion has been corroborated by the artifices practised at the camp of Scindiah. The most effectual mode of frustrating such a system of deceit was to pursue a direct and steady course with firmness and temper, avoiding every deviation which could tend to divert the councils or arms of the British government. This prin-

ciple constitutes the spirit and tenor of my instructions to all the British residents at the courts of the several native powers ; as experience has proved, that a direct and steady course of policy is not less advantageous to our interests, than it is manifestly consistent with our dignity and honor.

‘ Adverting to the expediency of securing the early arrival of the British troops at Poonah, Lord Clive was of opinion, that the time was actually arrived at which it was necessary for the British troops to enter the Marhatta territory ; and his Lordship accordingly instructed his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart, then present with the army on the frontier of Mysore, to adopt the arrangements for that purpose ; and Lord Clive referred exclusively to the judgment and discretion of Lieut. General Stuart the extent of the force to be detached from the main body of his army.

‘ Lieut. General Stuart also appointed Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley to the command of the detachment, in conformity to Lord Clive’s suggestion. For your Honorable Committee’s more particular information, I have annexed to this dispatch a copy of the instructions of Lieut. General Stuart to Major General Wellesley on this occasion, which are strictly conformable to the spirit of my views and intentions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Secret Committee.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

Extract from ‘ The Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire.’

‘ The command of the advanced detachment necessarily required the united exertion of considerable military skill and of great political experience and discretion ; and Lord Clive was therefore of opinion, that it could not be confided, with equal prospects of advantage, to any other person than the Honorable Major General Wellesley, whose extensive local knowledge and personal influence among the Marhatta chieftains (acquired by his conduct in the command of Mysore, and by his victories over Dhoondiah and other refractory chiefs) were peculiarly calculated to ensure success to the intended operations. Lord Clive accordingly desired that General Wellesley might be appointed to the command of the advanced detachment, under instructions to be furnished to him by Lieut. General Stuart, according to the spirit of the Governor General’s orders of the 2nd of February, 1803.

'In conformity to those instructions, Lieut. General Stuart directed a detachment from the main army assembled at Hurryhur, to be formed under the command of Major General Wellesley, for the purpose of advancing into the Marhatta territory.'

Lieut. General Stuart to Lord Clive.

'Head Quarters, Camp near Mayaconda,
3rd March, 1803.

'MY LORD,

'I this day had the honor to receive your Lordship's dispatch by express, dated the 27th ultimo. I have directed the divisions of the army to assemble at Hurryhur on the 6th instant*, and I expect that the detachment under Major

* Force assembled at Hurryhur under the command of Lieut. General Stuart.

CAVALRY.				Eur.	Nat.	Total.	Grand Total.
H. M.'s 19th dragoons	.	.	.	412			
.. 25th do.	.	.	.	562			
				—		975	
1st regiment native cavalry	.	.	.		437		
2nd do.	do.	do.	.		438		
4th do.	do.	do.	.		438		
5th do.	do.	do.	.		421		
6th do.	do.	do.	.		434		
7th do.	do.	do.	.		438		
					—	2606	
						—	3581
Artillery	.	.	.	390			390
Gun Lascars	.	.	.		563		563
INFANTRY.							
H. M.'s 33rd reg. 5 companies				322			
H. M.'s 73rd do.	.	.	.	756			
H. M.'s 74th do.	.	.	.	754			
H. M.'s Scotch Brigade	.	.	.	1013			
				—		2845	
						—	2845
1st battalion 2nd regiment N. I.	.	.	.		1005		
1st do.	3rd	do.	.		1109		
2nd do.	3rd	do.	.		998		
1st do.	4th	do.	.		1010		
2nd do.	4th	do.	.		1010		
2nd do.	5th	do.	.		1014		
1st do.	8th	do.	.		997		
1st do.	12th	do.	.		1014		
2nd do.	12th	do.	.		1000		
2nd do.	18th	do.	.		1014		
1st do.	14th	do.	.		1014		
1st do.	17th	do.	.		997		
					—	12,182	
						—	12,182
Corps of pioneers	.	.	.				800
							—
							Grand Total . 19,798

With 4 iron twelve and 4 iron eighteen pounders; 4 brass twelve pounders; 40 field pieces, 12 galloper guns, and 4 howitzers.

General the Honorable Arthur Wellesley will be able to commence its march into the Marhatta territory on the 8th. I shall have the honor, on my arrival at Hurryhur, of communicating to your Lordship a detail of the arrangements which I propose to adopt relative to that movement.

‘ I have acquainted the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad with the period of time when Major General Wellesley’s detachment will be ordered to advance from the frontier; and I have informed the latter of the arrangement which I have made in regard to the junction of an European corps with the subsidiary force*.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ J. STUART.

Lord Clive to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 7th March, 1803.

‘ I have had every reason to be highly satisfied with the mode in which the intercourse with the Marhatta jaghiredars has been hitherto carried on through the medium of Major General Wellesley; and the same causes which induced me to suggest to your Excellency the expediency of employing that officer in the command of the detachment destined to advance in co-operation with the southern jaghiredars, lead me to recommend your continuing to take every advantage of that officer’s personal influence with these chiefs, and of his extensive knowledge of their views and sentiments, in order to carry the intentions of the Governor General into full execution; and it is by no means my intention, when I recommend to your Excel-

* Subsidiary force attached to the Nizam under Colonel Stevenson.

CAVALRY.					
3rd regt. native cavalry	.	.	.	.	516
6th do. do.	.	.	.	.	502
					1018
INFANTRY.					
2nd battalion 2nd regiment native infantry					1275
1st do. 6th			do.	.	1288
2nd do. 7th			do.	.	1290
2nd do. 9th			do.	.	1286
1st do. 11th			do.	.	1008
2nd do. 11th			do.	.	1035
					7182
Artillery	.	.	.	.	168
					8368
Total					

With 310 lascars and two companies of pioneers.

The 94th, then the Scotch brigade, afterwards joined from the advancing division under Major General Wellesley.

lency, in conformity with the wishes of the Governor General, to employ the abilities of Major Malcolm on such affairs of a political nature as may arise, to limit the powers of your Excellency in authorising Major General Wellesley, or any other officer, to hold direct intercourse, or to negotiate an arrangement with any of the Peshwah's officers, upon the principles prescribed by the Governor General. I am well convinced your Excellency cannot have too great a latitude in this respect, and that it is essential to the success of the public service that you should feel yourself at perfect liberty to act on every emergency that may occur in the mode dictated by your own judgment.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lieut. General Stuart.*

' CLIVE.

Lieut. General Stuart's Instructions to Major General Wellesley.

' SIR, ' Head Quarters, Camp at Hurryhur, 9th March, 1803.

' You have already been apprised of your appointment to the command of a detachment destined to advance into the Marhatta territory, and of the description and extent of the force composing that detachment.* You have also been fur-

* Force composing the advancing division under Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

CAVALRY.				Eur.	Nat.	Total.	Grand Total.
H. M.	19th	light	dragoons	.	412	412	
4th	native	cavalry	.	.	438		
5th	do.	.	.	.	421		
6th	do.	.	.	.	438		
					—	1297	
						—	1709
INFANTRY.							
H. M.	74th	regiment	.	.	1013		
Scotch	Brigade	.	.	.	754		
					—	1767	
1st	battalion	2nd	regt.	native	infantry	1005	
1st	do.	3rd	do.			1109	
2nd	do.	3rd	do.			998	
1st	do.	8th	do.			997	
2nd	do.	12th	do.			1000	
2nd	do.	18th	do.			1014	
					—	6123	
						—	7890
Artillery	.	.	.	.	108		108
Gun lascars	.	.	.	.	.	.	206
Pioneers	.	.	.	.	.	.	704
						—	
						Grand total	10,617

Major General Wellesley had earnestly proposed that his own regiment, the 33rd, to which he was much attached, should accompany the advancing division under his command: but circumstances prevented the desired arrangement.

nished with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General and the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George, relative to the purposes of its movements, and have been supplied with copies of all the public communications that I have received regarding the present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, the strength and disposition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's forces, and the probable objects of his designs. The above instructions from government will fully explain to you the plan of proceedings, by which the Governor General has proposed to re-establish the authority of the Peshwah, and fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance concluded with his Highness. The information derived from these papers, together with your own extensive knowledge of the state of the subject, has therefore obviated the necessity of furnishing you with detailed instructions from myself, on the particular measures to be adopted in pursuit of those objects; more especially as the nature of the service upon which you are proceeding, depending on the sentiments of a people, whose views and opinions are but imperfectly known at this distance, and on events of a contingent nature, precludes the practicability of ascertaining the exact operations which it may be thought proper to undertake.

‘ Although I have considered it to be expedient to avoid prescribing the particular plan of the operations of your detachment, yet I judge it necessary to state certain principal objects which, in my judgment, ought to regulate the course of your proceedings.

‘ 1. To encourage the southern jaghiredars to declare in favor of the Peshwah's cause; to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities, and to induce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment, for the purpose of re-establishing his Highness's government.

‘ 2. To proceed to Meritch, and form a junction with the Peshwah; or, should that measure be deemed inadvisable on the part of his Highness, with such of his chieftains and troops as may be able to meet you there.

‘ 3. To open a communication, and form a junction with the subsidiary force under Colonel Stevenson, and the contingent of his Highness the Nizam.

‘ 4. To proceed eventually to Poonah, and establish an order of things in that capital, favorable to the return of

the Peshwah, and the attainment of the ends of the late treaty.

‘The means of accomplishing those objects must be regulated by your own judgment, in conformity to circumstances. It will require every exertion of your ability to unite the southern jaghiredars in an effectual support of the Peshwah’s cause, distracted as they are at present by internal dissensions and hostilities. The interests and fears, however, of those chieftains will render them solicitous to avert the calamities threatened by the further success of a power, that derives its support from contributions and plunder; and they must be sensible that the retreat or overthrow of that power, and the restoration of a regular government, are the only means by which the dangers to which they are now exposed can be prevented, and the possession of their tranquillity secured. But in encouraging the co-operation of those chieftains, you will carefully abstain from any specific engagements of a nature incompatible with the rule established by his Excellency the Governor General for the conduct to be observed towards them. You will receive herewith duplicates of the letters stated by Lieut. Colonel Close to have been transmitted by the Peshwah to the chieftains in the neighbourhood of Meritch and the Kistna, who are considered to be attached to his cause, enjoining them to join and co-operate with the British troops on their advance. You will forward those letters to their respective addresses, at such times, and accompanying them with such instructions to the chieftains on the subject of their co-operating with you, as you may find to be most expedient.

‘The general state of affairs renders the rapidity of your advance of essential advantage; as your early arrival upon the Kistna, and your junction with the Peshwah’s troops and the subsidiary force, will materially contribute to frustrate any designs which may be meditated against his Highness’s interests, or the arrangements of the late treaty, and to give union and efficacy to your operations. I consider it therefore of importance that you should employ every practicable degree of expedition in collecting the forces of the southern jaghiredars, and proceeding in conjunction with them to join the Peshwah and the Nizam’s force. I attach the greatest consequence to the latter junction, and I request that you will keep the means of accomplishing it at all times in view.

‘ The detachments under you and Colonel Stevenson, while separated from each other, are exposed to misfortunes from which their united strength would effectually secure them.

‘ The subsidiary force in particular, destitute of Europeans, and occupying an advanced position, may be liable to the necessity of acting under very unfavorable circumstances.

‘ Every view of our situation appears to me to require that your junction with Colonel Stevenson’s force should be effected at the earliest practicable period of time, as that measure will secure, more than any other, the safety of the British troops, and the general success of the plans of government.

‘ I have not noticed in the foregoing orders the conduct to be observed on your part, in case of the opposition of any chieftain; and in particular of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from whom we are led to expect most opposition to your proceedings.

‘ The instructions of the Governor General and Lord Clive contain no orders, and afford no positive rule to guide my determination on this important head. I infer, however, from the spirit of those instructions, that if the majority of the southern jaghiredars, and the sentiments of the body of the people, are found to declare in favor of the restoration of Bajee Rao, the British detachment ought to persevere in the endeavors to re-establish his authority; and should the detachment, during the prosecution of that endeavor, encounter the hostility of any individual jaghiredar, that they are to employ, in concert with the well-affected jaghiredars, every practicable means to overcome his opposition. In the event, therefore, of any single feudatory opposing resistance to the restoration of the Peshwah, after you have ascertained that the sentiments of the majority of the chieftains are favorable to that measure, I am of opinion that the instructions which I have received justify me in authorising you to compel his submission.

‘ This authority must, however, be understood to apply to the case only of your experiencing hostility from any of the Marhatta chiefs, for the principle of his Excellency the Governor General’s policy is, to avoid a war; and as his Excellency has directed me to bear this principle in mind, as the rule of our conduct on every emergency that may arise, you will carefully forbear from the adoption of any measure that is likely to involve the occurrence of hostilities with any of the parties of the Marhatta empire.

‘ The numerous considerations which recommend the early and expeditious advance of the detachment, render it unadvisable, in my judgment, to undertake the siege of Darwar.

‘ The reduction of that fortress might be attended with delays extremely detrimental to the success of our cause ; and I do not apprehend that Bappojee Scindiah, intimidated, as he will be, by the vicinity of the army under my command, and afraid to exasperate his future treatment from the Peshwah, will attempt to molest your communications.

‘ I therefore consider it to be expedient that this fortress, notwithstanding the important advantage which would be derived to your operations from its possession, at the present crisis of affairs, should be permitted to remain under its present killadar. It may, however, be proper that you should avail yourself of the impression which the advance of the British force will produce upon the minds of the people, to require of Bappojee Scindiah his probable views.

‘ The instructions to Colonel Stevenson, which I have ordered to be furnished to you, will explain the measures prescribed to that officer. I have instructed him to communicate regular information of his proceedings and situation to you, and to obey your orders. When you shall have opened a safe communication with this officer’s force, you will detach his Majesty’s Scotch brigade to join it ; and consider that corps, from the time of its removal from your detachment, as attached to the establishment of the subsidiary force. Colonel Stevenson, according to the last letter which I received from that officer, was to be at Perinda on the 16th of March.

‘ I have written to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, informing them of your advance, and requesting them to communicate with you ; and I am desirous that you should afford them every information regarding your progress that it may be requisite for them to know.

‘ You are aware of the importance of making me regularly acquainted with your operations, with the sentiments of the people, and the general state of affairs connected with the proceedings of your detachment. It will be particularly necessary for you to transmit to me the earliest possible information of such circumstances as may be expected to occur, to obstruct the progress of the detachment, either from the disinclination

of the people in general to the cause which it supports, or from the opposition of any individual chieftain.

‘ The army will take a position in the ceded districts ready to support your operations, when support shall appear from either of these causes to be necessary.

‘ I shall, on receiving information of the probability of serious resistance being opposed to your advance, anticipate this necessity by a movement of the army to support you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ J. STUART.

Lieut. Gen. Stuart to Lord Clive.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 10th March, 1803.

‘ I have endeavoured, in determining the amount of the force of Major General Wellesley’s detachment, to adhere as nearly as possible, to the principles established for the regulation of that question by his Excellency the Governor General, and by your Lordship; to render the advancing detachment sufficiently strong to maintain its ground until sustained; and to retain at the same time with the army a force capable of moving, when requisite, to its support.

‘ The strength of the advancing detachment, including the regiment destined to join the subsidiary force, is greater at present than that of the army: were the former made stronger, it would be doubtful whether the army, on an emergency, would be able to sustain it, for the same circumstances that might make support necessary to the advancing detachment would render it difficult for a weaker body to effect its relief: and were the detachment weaker, it might be exposed to serious misfortunes.

‘ Upon strict military principles, I should have been solicitous to render a detachment, destined to proceed upon a remote service, sufficiently strong to remove the apprehension of its requiring support; and it has appeared to me that I ought to recur to those principles as the rule of my conduct, in the event of any serious hostility being offered to the force under Major General Wellesley. In that case, therefore, setting aside all secondary considerations connected with the temporary tranquillity of the frontier, I shall deem it to be the principal object of my duty to secure the general safety of the

British army, by a prompt movement, to join the detachment in advance.

‘ I am however led, by a view of present circumstances, to think that the support of the army will not be required ; as the favorable disposition already manifested by some of the southern jaghiredars, and the undecided conduct of those from whom opposition might be expected, will, it is probable, enable the advancing detachment, the Peshwah’s troops, and the Nizam’s force, to effect a junction. After that event, the British army will be equal to the prosecution of any service which it may be required to undertake.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ J. STUART.

Lieut. General Stuart to Lord Clive.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Hurryhur, 12th March, 1803.

‘ Major General Wellesley having been entrusted, previously to my arrival on the frontier, with the management of all communications with the Marhatta chieftains, and selected, by your Lordship’s desire, for the command of the advancing detachment, has been continued in that management ; as I have been desirous to prevent the inconveniences which would result to his proceedings from the delays attending references to me on the subject of his transactions with the chieftains of the Marhatta state.

‘ I have informed Major General Wellesley of your Lordship’s wishes regarding the employment of Major Malcolm ; and I believe no obstacles will occur to impede the exercise of the authority with which your Lordship has judged it expedient to furnish that officer, of cultivating an intercourse with the Marhatta chieftains, if the progress of affairs should render that measure necessary.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*’

‘ J. STUART.

Extract from ‘ The Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire.’

‘ Major General Wellesley commenced his march from Hurryhur on the 9th of March, and crossed the Toombuddra river on the 12th. The progress of the British troops through the Marhatta territories was most successful. They were everywhere received as friends, and almost all the chiefs in the

vicinity of the route of the detachment joined with their forces, and accompanied the British army to Poonah. The amicable conduct of the jaghiredars and of the inhabitants (arising principally from the fame which the British arms had acquired in the campaign under Major General Wellesley's command against Dhoondiah Waugh) contributed to enable our army to perform this long march, at a most unfavorable season of the year, without loss or distress.

'Great merit is also to be ascribed to the ability, temper, activity, and skill of Major General Wellesley, in directing the system of the supply and movement of the troops, in preventing plunder and all excess, and in conciliating the inhabitants of the districts through which his route was directed.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Karisgy upon the Werdah, 13th March, 1803.

'You will be anxious to hear from me as soon as possible, after I have entered the Marhatta territory, and I lose no time in writing to you.

'I crossed the Toombuddra at Havanoor yesterday, and marched to this river, and made another march towards Savanore this day. We have been well received by the inhabitants of the country; the villages are all full, and the camp is well supplied with forage and provisions: I have no doubt whatever but that I shall be able to bring forward, for the service of the Peshwah, all the jaghiredars in the southern part of the empire, and I think that all your plans will be carried into execution.

'This detachment of the army is well supplied with provisions, and every thing it can want; and excepting in forage, for which every large body of troops must depend upon the country which is to be the seat of its operations, is nearly independent of the resources of this country. We owe this state of our supplies to the flourishing resources of Mysore, and to the ease with which they are brought forward for the use of the British armies. But any change in the system of government in that country will be immediately felt, and particularly by that body of troops which will be in advance.

'I hear nothing of any of Holkar's troops, and I do not know that we have an enemy in this country.

'I have the honor to be, &c.
'*The Governor General.* 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

orders. Those which you sent him provided for his safety till I should reach him; and it will not be proper to order him to move till that time, or till I shall ascertain exactly the position of Holkar.

‘ It is now reported, that Holkar is gone towards Ahmednuggur and Chandore; and if the report be true, there will be no inconvenience in Colonel Stevenson’s making a movement towards the Beemah, on the road to Poonah, as I shall advance towards Jejoory. But till I shall approach Jejoory, or till it is ascertained that Holkar is gone off towards Chandore, it will not be proper that Colonel Stevenson should quit his position at Perinda.

‘ I enclose the translation of a paper, which, with the concurrence and advice of Major Malcolm, I have given to Appah Saheb’s vakeel.

‘ He has had 3000 pindarries in his service, to whom he gave no pay, and who subsisted by plundering the Rajah of Kolapoor. In order that all those chiefs may come forward in the service of the Peshwah at the present crisis, I have prevailed upon them to cease hostilities, and of course Appah Saheb’s pindarries can no longer subsist upon the plunder they might acquire in the territory of the Rajah of Kolapoor. If they had been dismissed from Appah Saheb’s service, which would have been the natural consequence of a cessation of hostilities between him and the Rajah, they would have gone into the service of Holkar, or of some of his chiefs, and would have increased the number of that description of troops which have always been found to do our armies most injury; and as these particular pindarries were in Tippoo’s service, they know the mode in which we carry on our operations, and that by which they can injure us, much better than that description of people in Holkar’s army who come from Hindustan. If they had not gone into Holkar’s service, they would have set up for themselves under some independent chief, and would have plundered the Savanore and Darwar countries, and have entirely interrupted our communication with your army. It therefore appeared to me, and to Major Malcolm, to be absolutely necessary that Appah Saheb should retain them in his service.

‘ It is impossible, however, that they should be retained on the footing upon which they have served hitherto; viz., to

subsist by the plunder of the country. We shall pass through the countries of the Peshwah, or of his friends and adherents, and it would be very inconvenient that they should plunder there: indeed, I doubt whether Appah Saheb could venture to lead this description of troops into those countries. Under these circumstances, the only measure that could be adopted was, that Appah Saheb should take them into pay; but as none of the chiefs have much confidence in the Peshwah's gratitude for their services, he was unwilling to adopt that measure without our guarantee that the Peshwah would allow of the muster of those troops, and that his Highness would reimburse the expense of their maintenance while they should be employed in this manner.

'This measure, of which I now request your confirmation, may draw after it a necessity to advise the employment, and to guarantee the payment by the Peshwah, of troops of this description, in the service, at present, of other sirdars; but I do not believe that the number will exceed 1000. It may also occasion a necessity to give an advance of money for their pay; but this sum, under present circumstances, can be afforded.

'I have to observe on this subject, that a month will bring our military operations to great maturity. In that space of time we shall be able to ascertain whether Holkar will acquiesce peaceably in our arrangement with the Peshwah, or whether that Chief must be driven from his Highness's territories by force. In less than that time, also, the measure of hiring those troops can be laid before his Highness, and he can decide whether or not he will retain them in his service. If he should not approve of retaining them, they may either be discharged, or may be employed in the plunder of the enemy without pay, according to circumstances: and, at all events, supposing that his Highness should refuse to pay their expense, which is scarcely possible, the charge to the Company will be trifling in comparison with the benefit which this detachment must derive from keeping this body of pindarries out of Holkar's service, and from cutting off our communications with the army. Upon the whole, therefore, I request your confirmation of this necessary arrangement. Goklah has joined me with his army, and I am to meet him this afternoon.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Engagement given by Major General Wellesley to the vakeel of Appah Saheb.

‘ Narrain Rao, vakeel of Appah Saheb, having represented that his master had in his service 3000 pindarries, to whom he gave no pay, and who had been in the habits of subsisting by plunder, he desires to have Major General Wellesley’s advice and opinion regarding the best mode of disposing of these people in the present crisis, for the service of the Peshwah.

‘ Major General Wellesley is of opinion, that these troops ought not to be discharged; because, if discharged, they might be employed against the Peshwah: and they ought not to be employed by Appah Saheb without pay, because, as they must subsist, they would plunder the countries of the Peshwah, or of his adherents, for their subsistence. Major General Wellesley, therefore, advises that they should be taken into pay at the rate of twenty rupees per month each man; and he guarantees to Appah Saheb that the Peshwah will allow them to be mustered, and that his Highness shall reimburse to him the sums paid to them.

‘ Under this arrangement the pindarries must not be allowed to plunder.’

*The Governor General’s Instructions to Lieut. Col. Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 30th March, 1803.

‘ 1 Advices which his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has received from Europe, of the possible renewal of hostilities between Great Britain and France, render it highly expedient, in his Excellency’s judgment, that you should avail yourself of any state of circumstances which may afford an expectation of obtaining the Peshwah’s consent to a modification of the 11th article of the treaty, lately concluded between his Highness and the British government.

‘ 2. The means afforded to us, by the terms of that article, for the exclusion of the influence and interest of the French in the state of Poonah, even in time of war between Great Britain and France, are defective and precarious; and, in the season of peace, no restraint whatever is imposed by that article, which can preclude the danger of a future connexion between the state of Poonah and the French, through the agency of persons of that nation, or subjects of other European

powers in the interests of France, residing within the Peshwah's dominions, or holding official situations under his Highness's authority.

' 3. His Excellency is anxious to remedy these defects, by obtaining the Peshwah's consent to the dismissal of any Frenchmen who may now be residing within his Highness's dominions; and to the insertion of an article in the present treaty, in terms similar to those of the 6th article of the treaty concluded between the British government and his Highness the Nizam, on the 1st of September, 1798, in the room of the 11th article of the late engagement with the Peshwah.

' 4. A transcript of that part of the 6th article of the treaty of Hyderabad, of September, 1798, which relates to the subject of this letter, is enclosed for your information and guidance.

' 5. His Excellency desires that you will not neglect any opportunity which may be afforded you, for the accomplishment of this important object, at the earliest practicable period of time.

' I have the honor, &c.

' *Lieut. Col. Close.*

' N. B. EDMONSTONE, Sec. to Gov.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

' SIR, ' Camp at Erroor, north bank of the Kistna, 1st April, 1803.

' I have the honor to inform you that I arrived here on the 31st of March, and have halted for two days, in order to establish at this place a field hospital, which is much wanted on account of the general deficiency among the native corps of carriage for their sick. I have the satisfaction to observe, however, that the sick are by no means numerous; and that if the corps were rather better provided with carriage, or if the weather was not so extremely hot, it would not be necessary to have a field hospital at this place.

' I have taken the opportunity of this halt to have a general muster of the cattle, &c., attached to the different corps and departments; and have the pleasure to inform you, that although they have made a long march from Seringapatam in a short space of time, and in a season very unfavorable, they are still capable, with very little assistance, of moving the grain, provision, and ordnance stores, for which they were hired. The Company's draft cattle are in high condition.

‘ I have now in this camp 10,000 brinjarry bullocks with full bags. The daily consumption of the bazaars is 200, so that I have a supply which will last fifty days. Besides these, other brinjarries are following, of whose number I cannot give any accurate account. None of them are at a greater distance than three marches, and they will soon overtake us.

‘ I attribute this prosperous situation of the detachment, at this advanced station, to the supplies afforded us by the depôts formed at Hurryhur upon the Toombuddra, and Hullihall in Soonda; and to the favorable manner in which this detachment has been received by all classes and descriptions of the people of this country.

‘ It is needless to enter into a detail respecting the animosities between the chiefs in whose hands is placed the power over the countries through which this detachment has passed. In order, however, that the Commander in Chief may form a judgment respecting what has been done, it will be necessary to inform him, that since the year 1800, when I was in this country before, it has been one continued contest for power and plunder between the different chiefs who have armies under their command; between the Putwurdun’s (Purserham Bhow’s) family and Goklah, in the countries bordering on the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba; between the Putwurdun and the Rajah of Kolapoor in those bordering on the Gutpurba and Kistna; between Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and the Rajah of Kittoor; between Goklah and the Rajah of Kittoor, and Goklah and Bappojee Scindiah; besides various others of inferior note, either immediately employed under these, or for themselves under their protection.

‘ I have prevailed on all these chiefs to cease their contests for the present, and to join this detachment with the troops, which would otherwise be employed in the plunder of the country, or in the prosecution of their private quarrels, and to co-operate with me in the service of the Peshwah. They have also allowed me the use of the supplies of the countries under their management or protection, on payment; and have protected the people belonging to my camp in their passage through their countries.

‘ For the further protection of the people with supplies, who are on their road to join this camp, I have placed posts on the Werdah, the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna, at the places

at which it will be necessary to have posts hereafter, if this detachment should be in advance of the army, when the rivers will fill which rise in the western ghauts.

‘ I have been joined by the troops of Goklah, of Bappojee Vittell, of Appojee Rao Nepauncekur, (commonly called Appah Dessaye,) of the Putwurdun family, of the Rajah of Kittoor, and of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, whose son is in camp.

‘ I expect to be joined at Meritch by the troops of Prittee Niddee of Rastia, and some others. It is impossible to say to what number the whole will amount, but I imagine not less than 20,000 horse.

‘ My next object must be to join Colonel Stevenson, in the attainment of which I imagine I shall find no difficulty.

‘ It is now reported that Holkar, with the main body of his army, is gone towards Hindustan by the Nimderrah ghaut. If that should be the case, the junction will not be difficult; but even if it should not be true, as this detachment is of sufficient strength to move anywhere, I can march towards the Nizam’s frontier, and then form this junction.

‘ Futtu Sing Maunia, and Meer Khan Patan, are in my front, nearly in the station in which they have been represented to be in the different letters received from Lieut. Colonel Close. It is said that they intend to fall back as I shall advance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major Malcolm to Lord Clive.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp near Meritch, 3rd April, 1803.

‘ When I had the honor to inform your Lordship of my intention to join the Hon. Major General Wellesley, for the purpose of communicating with that officer on a variety of subjects intimately connected with the present service, it was not my intention to proceed farther than a few marches with the British force under his command, and my letter of the 15th ultimo must therefore have conveyed that impression to your Lordship’s mind. Circumstances have, however, since occurred, which have made me determine to accompany this detachment to Poonah; and in adopting this resolution I trust I have not acted contrary to the spirit of your Lordship’s instructions.

‘ As political questions of a serious magnitude seemed likely to arise, and to press for decision as this force approximated Poonah, it was suggested to me by the Hon. Major General Wellesley, that the information I possessed of his Excellency the Governor General’s sentiments, as applicable to the present crisis of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and to the general system of politics in India, might be more required in this quarter than in any other; and that considerable advantage to the public service might eventually be derived from my accompanying him to Poonah; a circumstance which would also enable him to take measures, in communication and concert with me, for the conciliation of the southern sirdars and jaghiredars of the Marhatta empire who were expected to join his corps as he advanced.

‘ As this suggestion of the Hon. Major General Wellesley entirely corresponded with the dictates of my own judgment, as to the mode in which my exertions would best conduce to the promotion of the public interests on the present important occasion, I readily acquiesced in his wishes; and in doing so, I am assured my conduct will be honored by the approbation of his Excellency the Governor General, whose flattering and liberal confidence has left me unrestrained to pursue, in this particular and in all others, the line of conduct which circumstances of the moment lead me to think most likely to contribute to the success of the service in which we are engaged.

‘ I have the honor to inclose, for your Lordship’s information, a memorandum of the state of the southern Rajahs, sirdars, and jaghiredars of the Marhatta empire; which, though perhaps full of small errors, is correct in the leading facts; and will convey to your Lordship a tolerably just idea of the state of the country through which this corps has passed, and in which it still continues.

‘ The march of a British force through this distracted country has had the happy effect of reconciling its contending chiefs, and of giving confidence to its oppressed inhabitants; and the union of all ranks in a sentiment of respect for the English name has occasioned an abundance of supplies of every description, which will enable the detachment to leave the banks of the Kistna with more provisions than it did those of the Toombuddra.

‘ The discipline and conduct of the English troops who have before served in this quarter have, no doubt, contributed much to this favorable general impression. But the confidence and respect of every class in the provinces to the south of the Kistna is in a very great degree personal to the Hon. Major General Wellesley: to the admiration which the Marhatta chiefs entertain of that officer’s military character, and the firm reliance which the inhabitants place on his justice and protection, the extraordinary success which has hitherto attended the progress of this force must be principally attributed.

‘ No specific engagements have been entered into with any of the sirdars or jaghiredars:—they have received general assurances that they shall be recommended in the strongest manner to the Peshwah, if their conduct is such as to merit that mark of favor and friendship.

‘ Several of the chiefs who were under the Peshwah’s displeasure have been excited to action by a promise of the British influence being exerted to restore them to the confidence of their sovereign; and there is reason to expect some of this class will serve with much zeal and activity, as they cannot but view the present opportunity as the only one which could have occurred to afford them a prospect of regaining that favor which their conduct had justly alienated.

‘ Every means has been taken which could be devised to prevent the jaghiredars plundering the districts of each other, while the British troops are in this quarter; as it was obvious that, unless this could be effectually checked, we could neither expect supplies from the adjacent country, nor aid from the different chiefs, whom it was so essential to combine in one general cause. The success of the measures which have been adopted with this view have exceeded expectation; and there is good reason to hope these provinces will enjoy, during the present season, a comparative tranquillity to what they have known for many years.

‘ For the purpose of securing this important object, and of preventing an accession to the strength of Holkar, General Wellesley has engaged both to the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, and to Goklah, that his Highness the Peshwah will admit of their return, and pay all the troops (including pindarries) extra of their quota, with which they accompany the army on the present service: by this measure he has prevented

the dismissal of that part of their horse which is, above all others, calculated to destroy a country, and to distress and harass an army.

‘ I inclose for your Lordship’s information a list of the chiefs, and the number of their troops, who have joined the British force. There is reason to expect that their numbers will be considerably increased in a very few days: they are all professedly warm in their attachment to the Peshwah, but most of them only view the general cause as the means of advancing their particular interest.

‘ The Rajah of Kolapoor, and several others of the chiefs of this part of the country, are under the influence of Scindiah, and likely to act as he dictates; and I am concerned to observe, from the last dispatch from Colonel Collins, there is little prospect of this chief being brought to take a favorable view of our present connexion with the Peshwah.

‘ Your Lordship will observe, in the memorandum which I have the honor to inclose, that Abdul Kher Khan, the Nabob of Savanore, is in a state of the extremest misery. He has represented his situation through a vakeel to General Wellesley, and pressed the General to oblige Bappoo Goklah to pay him part of the arrears of his pension, to prevent him and his family perishing from absolute want. The difficulty and distress which Goklah has to pay his troops upon the present service, made it impossible to urge him upon a point of this nature; and the General has, therefore, in attention to my suggestion, relieved the distresses of the Nabob of Savanore, by a present of 5000 rupees in the name of the Honorable Company.

‘ This act of charity will, I am sure, be honored by your Lordship’s approbation. It relieves from severe distress the representative of a noble family, and the brother in law of the late Sultaun; and is calculated to raise the reputation of the British government.

‘ It was stated some time ago to General Wellesley and myself, by the vakeel of Appah Saheb, that Muraba Furnavees, the cousin of Nana Furnavees, would join the British army, provided he was assured of protection; and that he should hereafter be permitted to retire to Benares, or where else he chose, without molestation, in the event of his not coming to a satisfactory accommodation with the Peshwah.

As Moraba was at liberty to proceed where he chose when he made this overture, his conduct showed a desire to be restored to favor by his master; and as his junction, from his rank and respectability, was an object of importance, and was considered as such by the chiefs who were co-operating with the British army, the assurance he required was given; and I am happy to inform your Lordship, he is in Meritch, and will probably join in a few days, and proceed with the British force to Poonah.

‘ From a general view of the disposition of the Marhatta chiefs in this quarter, of the actual state of the British detachments under the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, and the present distribution of Holkar’s force, I am satisfied the great object of reinstating his Highness on his musnud in Poonah will be speedily effected; and that measure once accomplished, it will be easy to form a disposition of the troops in this quarter that will defy the efforts of any combination which can possibly be formed with the view of defeating the important ends of the present arrangement.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ J. MALCOLM.

‘ Names of Marhatta sirdars and jaghiredars who have joined General Wellesley, and list of their Forces:—

	Horse.	Infantry.
Appah Saheb	2500	1000
Bappoo Goklah	3000	1500
Bappoo Vittell	300	
Appah Dessaye, the Jaghiredar of Nepawnee	300	100
Vakeel of Kittoor Rajah	100	100
Bappoo Scindiah	150	100
Total	6350	2800

‘ N. B. Chintomeny Rao Pandoorung, Gunput Rao Paunseh, Vittell Seo Deo, and Pursheram Pundit Prittee Niddee, are expected to join to-morrow: their force will more than double that already in camp.’

*The Governor General in Council to the Governor in Council
at Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 4th April, 1803

‘ The Governor General in Council has the honor to ac-

knowledge the receipt of your Lordship's official dispatch to the Governor General, dated the 15th of March, enclosing the copy of a letter from his Excellency the Commander in Chief of the army of Fort St. George to your Lordship's address; in which his Excellency has detailed the arrangements, adopted under your Lordship's authority, for the formation and march of a detachment under the command of the Hon. Major General Wellesley, towards Poonah; in conformity to the instructions of the Governor General, addressed to your Lordship in an official letter under date of the 2nd of February.

‘ Those arrangements appear to have been regulated by Lieut. General Stuart, under your Lordship's orders, with the utmost degree of judgment and ability, and to have embraced every object connected with the successful accomplishment of the service on which the detachment is employed. The Governor General in Council entirely approves of the selection of the Hon. Major General Wellesley for the command of the troops detached towards Poonah. The extensive local knowledge and influence possessed by that officer; and the confidence reposed in his approved talents, firmness, temper, and integrity, by the Marhatta chieftains on the frontiers of Mysore, render him peculiarly qualified to discharge the complicated duties of a command, which will require the united exertion of considerable military skill, and great political experience and discretion.

‘ The Governor General in Council observes, with peculiar satisfaction, the judicious arrangements which have been adopted for securing to the detachment regular and sufficient supplies of provisions, independently of the resources of the country through which the detachment will have occasion to march.

‘ Those supplies being principally derived from the resources of Mysore, it becomes an object of the utmost importance to provide, by every practicable precaution, against the decline of that active influence and energy, by which we have hitherto been enabled to apply the resources of Mysore to the exigencies of the army in the field.

‘ The activity and energy which have distinguished the conduct of the executive authority in Mysore, are principally to be ascribed to the influence which Major General Wellesley

has been enabled to establish in that country, by his judicious conduct of the British army stationed at Mysore.

‘ The preservation of that influence is inseparably connected with the continuance of Major General Wellesley in the command of the British forces in Mysore; while that officer shall be employed in the immediate conduct of the operations of the detachment advancing towards Poonah.

‘ The Governor General in Council, therefore, considers Major General Wellesley’s continuance in the military command of Mysore, to be essentially necessary to the successful accomplishment of the service in which that officer is at present engaged. With these sentiments his Excellency in Council deems it to be proper to direct, in this special manner, that Major General Wellesley retain the military command of Mysore, until further instructions shall reach your Lordship from this government. Your Lordship will be pleased accordingly to instruct his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the Coast, to frame, in concert with Major General Wellesley, such arrangements as may appear to be necessary to enable Major General Wellesley to exercise the military command in Mysore, while employed in conducting the operations of the detachment, and other public duties, within the Marhatta territory.

‘ If any officer should have been appointed to succeed Major General Wellesley in the military command in Mysore, previously to the receipt of this dispatch, his Excellency in Council directs that the command in Mysore be restored to Major General Wellesley, immediately upon the receipt of these instructions.

‘ The instructions which his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the Coast has issued to Major General Wellesley are framed with the greatest wisdom and prudence, and are entirely conformable to the views and intentions of the Governor General in Council.

‘ The state of the internal government of Mysore, in all its branches, being intimately connected with the subject of these instructions, his Excellency in Council further directs, that no alteration be made in any civil or military appointments in Mysore (including the appointment of all native officers, civil and military) without previous reference to the Governor General in Council, and without his express authority; and

that no change be suffered to take place in any part of the existing system of the civil or military government of Mysore, without the previous sanction of this government.

‘ The Governor General in Council requests that your Lordship in Council will be pleased to consider the instructions stated in this dispatch, to be intended to form the basis of a permanent system for the future administration of Mysore, and for regulating the extent and nature of the control to be exercised over the affairs of that possession, by the Governor General in Council.

‘ We have the honor, &c.

‘ *The Right Hon. the
Governor in Council,
Fort St. George.*

‘ WELLESLEY,
(and other Members of the Council).

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ Camp at Doondewarry, eight miles N. E. from
Meritch, 4th April, 1803.

‘ SIR,

‘ I heard yesterday that Futtu Sing Maunia, who has been some time on the road between Meritch and Poonah, about twenty miles to the northward of Tasgaun, had moved to the eastward, it is supposed, with an intention to join Meer Khan. As I could not expect that any of the chiefs assembled upon the Kistna would move from the neighbourhood of Meritch, while Futtu Sing should remain in his station on the road to Poonah, I was rather embarrassed until he marched. I am, however, now upon my road to Punderpoor, at which place I shall arrive on the 11th. My junction with Colonel Stevenson, in two or three days afterwards, then becomes certain.

‘ I have received two letters from Colonel Stevenson, the last dated the 20th. He had arrived at Perinda, and had been joined by 6000 horse and 5000 infantry, with 40 guns, of the Nizam’s army. The hircarrahs, who had been in Holkar’s camp, reported, that it was eight or ten coss from Ahmednuggur about the 20th of March, his army moving to the northward, but not with great celerity.

‘ I have apprized Colonel Stevenson of my movement towards him, and shall send him orders regarding the mode in which he is to join me, as soon as I shall see what is done by Futtu Sing and Meer Khan when they will have joined. I

think that they will follow their master to the north, and leave the game in our hands.

‘ Every thing here goes on well. The brinjarries have had a little dispute with their mutaseddee, which has given me some trouble; but after sitting up a great part of last night with them, I have settled it to the satisfaction of all parties. They have desired to have an officer to reside in the gollah with them; and on this account, as well as because by the enquiry it appears that a more active superintendence is necessary, than could be given by the superintendent of the bazaars I have appointed Captain Baynes to do this duty under Captain Barclay. He will reside in the gollah; but whenever his corps is wanted for service, he is to join it, which will not be attended with inconvenience.

‘ All the papers relating to this transaction will be sent by Captain Barclay to Lieut. Blacker, as, in fact, all the brinjarries are generally concerned; and the abuses which have prevailed would sooner or later create discontent among them all.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hungomgaum, 5th April, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, and am happy to find that you approved of the engagement into which I entered with the Putwurdun family. I have not yet ascertained what number of these pindarries they have with them. In the last conversation which I had with their vakeel on this subject, he said that they had sent the greatest number of those they had to Rastia, in the Sholapoor country, not expecting that I should consent to the proposed arrangement. If this is the case, there will be employment for these people without injury to our cause, and at no expense.

‘ I had a conversation with Goklah, two or three days ago, regarding his situation, in which he complained much of his distress for money. In consequence, I wrote to Colonel Close, to request that he would urge the Peshwah to take some steps to relieve their pressing distresses. I also told Goklah to keep his troops together, and that I would engage that he

should be allowed to muster the overplus of his established numbers.

‘As Goklah is in possession of the revenues of Savanore, the Nabob of Savanore has claims upon him for 50,000 rupees per annum, allowed him from those revenues by the Peshwah. This pension, however, is paid very irregularly, or rather is not paid at all; and the consequence is, that the Nabob and his family are starving. He represented his situation to me as I was passing, and has since sent a man here to desire that I would urge Goklah, at least, to provide for his subsistence; but it is obvious, that when I was obliged to refuse Goklah all pecuniary assistance, and at the same time to urge him to endeavor to keep his army together without pay or plunder, when he stated that he was in the greatest distress, I could not ask him to pay money to the Nabob of Savanore.

‘This man is of an ancient and respectable family, and is nearly allied to the house of Hyder. He was married to the sister of Tippoo, and his sons are at this moment living at Seringapatam on a pension which they receive from the British government. Under these circumstances, Major Malcolm has recommended that I should relieve the Nabob’s distresses by a gift of 5000 rupees. To this I have consented; but I have yet given nothing to the Nabob, nor have I made any promise of assistance to his servant.

‘In my opinion, even if the whole of this sum of money is given to the Nabob, it will be well laid out. At all events, his family is an object of charity; and although not to such an extent as Major Malcolm now proposes, I relieved their distresses myself, when I was in this country in the year 1800.

‘In consequence of the general appearance of affairs, I have desired Colonel Stevenson to move towards Punderpoor, if he should not have heard that Holkar is on his return to the southward, or that he meditates an attack upon the Nizam’s territories to the northward.

‘If I should find Futty Sing Maunia and Meer Khan go off to the northward, I shall turn that way also as soon as I reach the main river, and shall not touch upon the Beemah. In that case, also, Colonel Stevenson will turn to the northward, and we shall join upon the Beemah.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.
‘*Lieut. General Stuart.* ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major Malcolm to Lord Clive.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, Nogeze, 7th April, 1803.

‘ In my letter under date the 3rd instant, I informed your Lordship that General Wellesley and myself had agreed that protection should be given to Moraba Furnavees, provided he repaired to camp. Some weeks subsequent to that resolution, the General was informed by one of the Peshwah’s principal officers, that Bajee Rao had written a most urgent letter to the Rajah of Kolapoor, requesting him to seize Moraba’s person.

‘ 2. This communication induced the General and myself to inform the Putwurdun chiefs, that if Moraba Furnavees had manifested such an unreserved confidence in the British faith as to have repaired to camp, previous to the public intimation which an officer of the Peshwah had made to the General, respecting the determination of his master to confine him, that he would have been protected agreeable to the promise given, but it was our wish he should not join the British troops; though we were ready, in compliance with the wishes of his friends, to make every exertion to induce the Peshwah to restore Moraba Furnavees to his favor.

‘ 3. They appeared perfectly satisfied with this intimation; but it seems Moraba Furnavees has some days ago received accounts of the Peshwah’s intended severity, and had in consequence fled with a small party of horse from Meritch towards Poonah; a circumstance which is, perhaps, so far fortunate, as it avoids a question of irritation with the Peshwah, who is, I understand, too inveterate against his old minister to have been easily reconciled to any arrangement which left him the enjoyment of personal liberty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Lord Clive.’

‘ JOHN MALCOLM.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Hutteer, 8th April, 1803.

‘ Appah Saheb called upon me last night, and told me that a carkoon had come in from Futty Sing Maunia, with proposals as follow: viz., First, that Futty Sing should be taken, with his troops, into our service: Secondly, that a country

should be allotted for their subsistence: Thirdly, that if those propositions should not be accepted, he should be permitted to go wherever his fortune might lead him.

‘ I desired that he might be referred to the Peshwah for an answer to his propositions; and that until he should receive that answer, he should go off with his troops to the northward of Poonah, and there wait the Peshwah’s orders. The carkoon was called in afterwards, and I encouraged him to continue the negotiation, which I had understood from Lieut. Colonel Close, that the Peshwah’s durbar had already commenced with him.

‘ It appears by this man’s account, that Futtu Sing is an adventurer, with a body of Hindustanee troops, amounting, as he says, to 40,000, but really about 10,000, with some guns; and is ready, avowedly, to serve any person who is willing to pay him. The result of the communication of last night is, that he is going off from my front; but whether he will enter the service of the Peshwah or not, depends upon his sense of the ability and will of the Peshwah to pay him, or to afford plunder for his troops.

‘ Meer Khan, as well as Futtu Sing, is drawing off.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘ Camp at Hutteer, 50 miles from Meritch,

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

8th April, 1803.

‘ As it is impossible that the service on which I am employed may last after the rivers shall fill, it is necessary that I should make arrangements for having boats upon all of them. I have accordingly written to Purneah, and to Mr. Read, to have some prepared in Mysore and in Soondah; and I must request you to have twenty basket boats made in the Ceded districts. They should be of the size of ten feet diameter, and three feet deep, and I wish that they may be covered with double leather. The leathers ought to be sewed with thong, and of such a size as to cover the gunnels of the boats all round. I intend that your boats should be upon the Malpoorba, respecting which I will write to you hereafter. Besides boats, I shall want boatmen, of which your districts ought to furnish a large

proportion. Purneah says, that when he managed Harponelly, that district in particular furnished a large number of people of this description. The total number that I shall want is three hundred, of which Soondah can give only twenty; Mysore, I suppose, about one hundred; and I must depend upon you for the remainder.

‘The pay which I have given the boatmen is one gold fanam for every day they do not work, and two gold fanams for every day they do; this money paid daily if they choose it. Let me know how many people of this description you can send me for this pay. You will see, by the date of this letter, that I have lost no time; and I am still in high style. I am now moving towards the Nizam’s frontier, to facilitate a communication with Colonel Stevenson, and eventually our junction. As I advance, Futtu Sing and Meer Khan fall back, and I meet with no opposition. I expect to be at Poonah some time about the 20th.

‘Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

‘Lieut. Colonel Munro.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Kowlaspoor, 11th April, 1803.

‘I did hope to be joined by Colonel Stevenson on the day after to-morrow, according to the orders I had sent him to that purport; but I received a letter from him last night, of the 8th, by which I learnt that on that day he had not received the cypher from Hyderabad. A letter from me in cypher had reached him on the 1st; so that I am in great hopes still, that if he then wrote to Hyderabad for the cypher, he will have received it soon after he wrote to me on the 8th; lest, however, he should not, I have sent a party of horse to him, with a letter to desire him to march to Gardoon, to which place I shall send him further orders.

‘I have no news. Holkar appears to be in full march to Chandore. Futtu Sing and Meer Khan cross the Beemah this day, I believe, to follow him: all his troops are withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Poonah; in which city, however, Amrut Rao still remains with about 2000 horse and 2000 infantry, with guns. I shall be at Poonah about the 20th.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General Stuart.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ Camp at Akloos and Sarhatty, upon the
‘ SIR, Neera, 15th April, 1803.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you, that Colonel Stevenson came to this camp this morning. His detachment is encamped near the junction of the Beemah and Neera rivers, and would have joined, only that, owing to a mistake, their baggage missed the road on the 13th, and had not joined till late yesterday evening.

‘ The Scotch brigade, with a third part of the provisions, remaining with this detachment, will join Colonel Stevenson’s detachment to-morrow morning.

‘ The next objects of my attention are to secure the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to Poonah, and to open a communication with the coast, so as to draw from thence the supplies which I may require. I have already arranged with Lieut. Colonel Close a plan for the Peshwah’s march, and in order to secure the execution of it, I shall move immediately towards Poonah, and from thence towards the Bhore ghaut. I shall reach the head of the ghaut before the Peshwah will be at the foot of it.

‘ Holkar himself is near Chandore, about 300 miles from Poonah, and the officers and troops in his service have all followed in the same direction. Amrut Rao alone remains at Poonah with about 1500 men, and I have no doubt but that he also will go off as I shall advance. Under these circumstances, it has appeared to me to be unnecessary to bring to Poonah all the troops; and as the country is much exhausted, and there is but little forage in any place, I have thought it best to dispose of them in such situations as that the whole will procure forage and subsistence, and they may join with facility and celerity in case that measure should appear to be advisable. Accordingly, I have desired Colonel Stevenson to march from his present position up the Beemah to Gardoon; to leave near that place, within the Nizam’s frontier, all his Highness’s troops; and to place himself, with the Company’s troops, farther up that river towards Poonah, near its junction with the Moota Moola.

‘ Hereafter, when the Peshwah shall have arrived at Poonah, and I have received supplies from Bombay, it will be equally convenient and consistent with the safety of all the troops to

make a movement to the eastward, and to place more of them within the Nizam's frontier, and I shall accordingly adopt this measure when circumstances will permit it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adj. General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Akloos, 15th April, 1803.

‘ You will be desirous to hear from me, and to receive my opinion of the state of our military affairs in this country; and I take the earliest opportunity of writing to you, afforded by the junction of the Nizam's army.

‘ My march to this place has been unopposed, and I have received from the country all the assistance which it could afford. I have been joined by some of the southern jaghire-dars, and of the Peshwah's officers, who quitted him by his desire at Mhar, after he had fled from Poonah; but there are many of both descriptions still absent. The jaghiredars who have joined are principally those who served with the troops under my command in the campaign of 1800; and the sirdars are those lately raised by the Peshwah to high offices in the state from very inferior situations. In all it is easy to observe a want of attachment to the cause of the Peshwah, but particularly in the jaghiredars I have observed not only a want of attachment and zeal, but a detestation of his person, and an apprehension of his power, founded upon a long series of mutual injuries.

‘ None of these persons have ever hinted to me the nature of our engagements with the Peshwah, or their sentiments upon them: as, however, these engagements may affect the interests of some, and the objects of ambition of all, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they view them with jealousy. I am far from thinking, however, that if, in consequence of these engagements, we should be attacked by any thing like a confederacy of the greater Marhatta powers, we shall have to carry on this contest unassisted by these chiefs; but the number of those who will assist us, and the degree of assistance which they may give, will depend much upon the Peshwah.

‘ We have, undoubtedly, an influence over those chiefs, one which is daily increasing, to which I attribute our successful progress to this moment. This influence is founded in

some degree upon their fear of our power, but much more upon their hope of our support in forwarding their views, and of our protection against the violence and oppression of their own government, and the greater Marhatta powers.

‘ Here we must depend upon the personal character of the Peshwah, and upon the manner in which the new treaty will work; upon which points I shall defer to write any thing until I am better informed.

‘ Having brought up my corps thus far, and effected a junction with the Nizam’s army, it is my intention to march to Poonah, which place I shall reach about the 20th, and then to bring up the Peshwah from Bassein. I have already arranged a plan for this purpose, which I have sent to Colonel Close, according to which the Peshwah will ascend the ghauts about the 28th. Holkar himself has gone towards Chandore, about two hundred miles from Poonah, and his detachments, under Futty Sing and Meer Khan, which were, the former near Meritch, and the latter on the Nizam’s frontier, near Beejapoor, have fallen back gradually as I advanced. They joined at this place, and went off towards Poonah five days ago.

‘ You will have heard of Futty Sing’s treating with the Peshwah, and Meer Khan’s treating with the Nizam, to enter into the service of those princes respectively. Futty Sing offered himself to me; I referred him to the Peshwah, and I heard last night from the Peshwah’s vakeel at Sattarah, who, I believe, conducted this treaty, that all matters between the Peshwah and Futty Sing were arranged. If, however, they should not be so, and these chiefs should still continue in Holkar’s service, I conclude that they will fall back still farther as I advance to Poonah; and that they will take with them Amrut Rao, who is still in that city with a small force. I intend therefore, at present, to dispose of the troops between the ghauts and the Nizam’s frontier, in such a manner as that all will find forage and subsistence; and that if there should be any appearance of an attack, the whole may form and protect the part menaced without loss of time. The question, whether the supposed confederacy will be formed, and whether we shall have to contend with it, ought to be brought to a decision as soon as possible:

‘ First, because, if we are to have a war, we shall carry it on with great advantage during the rainy season:

‘ Secondly, Because we are ready, and the supposed enemy are not; and every day’s delay after this time is an unnecessary increase of expense to us, and an advantage to them :

‘ Thirdly, Because we shall immediately ascertain the views and intentions of the Peshwah regarding the alliance in general; and we shall leave no time for intrigues among the jaghiredars in his and our interest :

‘ Fourthly, Because nothing but our determined and early opposition to the confederacy can save us from it, supposing it to exist. To withdraw from our engagements with the Peshwah will rather accelerate its attack, with the addition of the Peshwah’s force.

‘ In order to bring this question to a decision, the Peshwah should be urged immediately (if possible before he should arrive at Poonah) to desire Scindiah to re-cross the Nerbudda. This chief ought at the same time to be pressed upon this point by our minister at his camp.

‘ If Scindiah should cross the Nerbudda, and our minister is kept in his camp, we shall know upon what to depend.

‘ We ought immediately to break up our army in this country, taking care to have at Bombay a sufficient number of Europeans to reinforce the Poonah detachment, whenever their services can be required, and to keep our north-west frontier of Mysore and the Ceded districts in strength.

‘ My reasons for thinking that the army here ought to be broke up, if Scindiah goes across the Nerbudda, are,—

‘ First, That it does not weaken us, because the same number of native troops as we have at present will be at Poonah; we shall have the Europeans and train of ordnance at Bombay, to join the Poonah detachment; and the cavalry in the ceded districts can always join the Hyderabad detachment in a short time :

‘ Secondly, Because the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah, thus reinforced, can join as soon as Scindiah shows an intention to cross the Nerbudda :

‘ Thirdly, Because by breaking up the army, and leaving nothing more at Poonah than the usual detachment, the jealousy of our strength will cease in a great degree, and we may then see in what manner the new treaty will work.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

‘I arrived here yesterday with the cavalry of my division, and the Marhatta troops under Appah Saheb, Goklah, and others of the Peshwah’s officers.

‘I had received repeated intimations from Colonel Close, that Amrut Rao, who still remained at Poonah, intended to burn that city, when I should approach with the British troops; and at last, a request from the Peshwah, that I would detach some of his officers with their troops, to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious, that even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poonah, their force was not of the description, or of such strength, as to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao’s design; and I therefore determined to march forward with the British cavalry and the Marhattas, as soon as I should arrive within a long forced march from Poonah. In the mean time I received intelligence that Amrut Rao was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th; and that he had removed the Peshwah’s family to Sevaghur, a measure which was generally supposed to be preparatory to burning the town; and I marched on the 19th, at night, above forty miles to this place, making the total distance which the cavalry have marched, since the 19th in the morning, about sixty miles.

‘Amrut Rao heard of our march yesterday morning, and marched off with some precipitation, leaving the town in safety. It is generally believed here, that he intended to burn it, and that it was saved only by our arrival. The infantry will come here to-morrow.

‘I received a very civil letter from Amrut Rao, in answer to one which I wrote him. He says that he will send a person to talk to me upon his business. I consider it to be very important that he should be brought in, and I will do every thing in my power to induce him to submit to the Peshwah’s government.

‘Matters in general have a good appearance. I think they all will end as you wish. The combined chiefs, of whom we have heard so much, have allowed us to come quietly, and take our station at this place; and notwithstanding their threats, have taken no one step to impede our march, or to divert our attention to other objects. Here we are now in force, in a

position from which nothing can drive us, and in which we shall gain strength daily. On the other hand, they have not yet made peace among themselves; much less have they agreed to attack us, or in any particular plan of attack.

‘If I should be mistaken, and that, in opposition to the conclusions of reasoning upon the state of our affairs with each of the Marhatta chiefs, who, we are told, were to combine to attack us; and, upon a comparison of our means of annoying each and all of them, with theirs of annoying the Nizam (which is all that they can do), we should still have a war with them, you will have the satisfaction of reflecting, that in consequence of the course of measures which you have already pursued, you have removed the seat of war to a distance from the Company’s territories; and that you have the means of carrying it on in such a state of preparation, as to insure its speedy and successful termination.

‘In thus reasoning upon the subject, I conclude that we should have had to contend with this confederacy at all events; or at least, that we should have had a war with the Marhatta powers, in some shape, even if this treaty with the Peshwah had not been concluded.

‘Upon this point I have only to observe, that the establishment of Holkar’s power at Poonah, founded as it was upon repeated victories over Scindiah’s troops, would probably have occasioned demands upon the Nizam. But supposing that I may be mistaken, I declare, that from what I have seen of the state of this country, it would have been impossible for Holkar to maintain an army in the Deccan without invading the Nizam’s territory. They have not left a stick standing at the distance of 150 miles from Poonah; they have eaten the forage and grain; have pulled down the houses, and have used the materials as fire-wood; and the inhabitants are fled with their cattle. Excepting in one village, I have not seen a human creature since I quitted the neighbourhood of Meritch; so that the result of your omitting to make some arrangement for the Peshwah, which was to occasion the re-establishment of his power, must have been the invasion of the Nizam’s territories; if only for the subsistence of those multitudes in Holkar’s suite, or their march to the countries to the southward of the Kistna. This last course might have procrastinated the evil; as they might, in those countries, have found

subsistence for another year : but then their next step would have been to seek for it in the Company's territories, the very sources from which we should have been obliged to draw our supplies in the contest which must have ensued.

'Supposing, therefore, that there is a distant risk that you may have a contest with the Marhatta powers, you have the satisfaction of reflecting, that in consequence of those measures, the scene of action must be at a distance from the Company's territories ; and that you are in such a state of preparation as to insure its speedy success : at all events, it is probable that if you had not adopted those measures, either the Company or their ally must have suffered all the evils of war, without having the same means of averting them, or of limiting their duration.'

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Governor General.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp at Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

'After detaching the Scotch brigade to join Colonel Stevenson, as reported in my letter of the 15th of April, I continued my march towards this place by the road of Baramootty ; I received different intimations from Lieut. Colonel Close, that it was Amrut Rao's intention to stay in this neighbourhood till I should approach with the British troops, and then to burn the city ; and an urgent request from the Peshwah to detach some of his Highness's officers, with their troops, in order to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious that, even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poonah, the force they have with them was not of the nature, or of sufficient strength, to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's designs ; and as I had intelligence that he was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th, and that he had removed the Peshwah's family to Sevaghur, a measure supposed to be preparatory to burning the city, I determined to march to Poonah in the night of the 19th, with the cavalry and a battalion of native infantry.

Accordingly, I arrived here yesterday about three o'clock, having been detained about six hours in the Bhore ghaut, and found the city in safety. Amrut Rao heard of this movement in the morning, and marched off with some precipitation. He is now at Juneer with a small force.

‘ It is generally believed here that Amrut Rao did intend to burn Poonah, and that the city has been preserved by the arrival of the British troops.

‘ The infantry of the detachment under my command will arrive here to-morrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major Malcolm to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp near Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

‘ I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship of the arrival of the whole of the force under the Honorable Major General Wellesley at Poonah; which city, there is every reason to conclude, was saved from total destruction by a rapid movement of the cavalry under the General’s command, who actually marched near sixty miles in thirty two hours to its relief.

‘ 2. The inhabitants have testified, by the most lively gratitude, their sense of the exertions by which they have been saved from entire ruin; and great numbers have already shown their confidence in the protection of the British government, by returning to the habitations which they had deserted.

‘ 3. Few other chiefs, except those who I informed your Lordship were with General Wellesley’s corps when it was encamped near Meritch, joined it on the march; but though there is ground to suppose this conduct in some has proceeded from want of zeal and attachment to the Peshwah, it is, perhaps, to be attributed, in others, more to the rapidity of General Wellesley’s advance, and to their own dilatory habits, than any other cause.

‘ 4. Appah Saheb early intimated to the General and myself, that though he would show his duty to the Peshwah, and his friendship to the English, by accompanying the British force to Poonah, it was his intention to return immediately from that capital to his jaghire; as he had vowed never to pay his respects to the Peshwah till that prince had done him justice on the Rajah of Kolapoor, by whom his possessions had been despoiled and his father murdered.

‘ 5. As the defection of the Putwurdun family, of whom Appah Saheb is, in fact, the representative, would at this moment have been attended with serious injury to the interests

of his Highness, every argument was opposed to the resolution which this chief had taken; but he continued, unmoved, to persevere in his determination, till he was explicitly informed, that the effect which such conduct, at this crisis, would have on the interests of the Peshwah, and the interests of the British government as connected with that prince, was such as must place him in the relation of an enemy to both governments. This communication, which was made after our arrival at Poonah, alarmed him so much, that he has agreed to stay near this city until his case has been recommended to the Peshwah's attention; and he has promised, should that prince attend to his situation, and give him the relief that his circumstances demand, that he will no longer hesitate in paying his personal respects at court, or in remaining there as long as he is required.

' 6. I understand by a letter from Colonel Close that the Peshwah proposes to leave Bassein on the 25th instant. His Highness will therefore be re-established in his capital early in May; and that object, when accomplished, will admit of the disposition of the force in this quarter, that will put an end to those fears now entertained of a combination among the Marhatta chiefs, which I consider as unlikely to be formed, and, if formed, still more unlikely to act with either union, vigor, or effect.

' I have the honour to be, &c.

' *Lord Clive.*

' JOHN MALCOLM.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

' SIR,

' Camp at Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

' I have received a letter from Colonel Close, in which he tells me that the Peshwah was to quit Bassein on the 26th. We may therefore expect him here in the beginning of May.

' I intend to move from hence towards the hills on the 26th, in order to procure forage with more facility; but I shall be obliged to leave here the greatest number of the wheel carriages to be repaired, and the loads of the carriage cattle. There is not now a serviceable wheel in the whole detachment, excepting those in Captain Scott's form, 6 pounder carriages and tumbrils; but I expect that the whole will be put in a serviceable state at this place in a short time; and besides the means here, I have called upon Bombay for assistance,

both of new wheels and materials, and artificers to repair the old.

The carriage cattle, also, are much knocked up; they have been marched hard, and have had no forage for some days; I therefore leave their loads here, and take them on to the hills to forage. A few days' rest will recover many of them, and I am able to get here about 1800 fresh bullocks.

'I leave here a corps to guard these articles, which will be in safety, particularly as I shall not be more than one march or two from them.

'I intend to purchase from the brinjarries all the rice they have left, and to send the whole down to Panwell to receive fresh loads. We have been so well supplied, that the brinjarries are in some degree losers by attending us, and it is therefore necessary to give them this advantage. Besides, by this arrangement, I enjoy the advantage of having at Poonah, before the rains will set in, a larger quantity of rice than I should have, if I were to send down the brinjarries to receive fresh loads, only in proportion as those should be consumed that they have at present. Indeed, as long as we remain in this neighbourhood, we shall not be under the necessity of consuming any of the brinjarry rice, as the bazaar of Poonah is plentifully supplied from the neighbouring countries.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp at Poonah, 26th April, 1803.

'I did not march this morning, as I intended, as I heard last night that Holkar had made three marches towards this place, and I thought it proper to halt this day to ascertain the truth of this report. The result of my enquiries is, that he has marched towards the Nizam's frontier, and he was, on the 21st, at a station about eight coss from the Godavery, and at a small distance from the frontier of Holkar's, of the Nizam's, and of Scindiah's territories. He had not, on that day, had the interview with Ambajee Ingolia, which it is supposed will produce a peace between Holkar and Scindiah; and it is reported that Ambajee Ingolia had sent to the Rajah of Berar the boy Kundee Rao Holkar, who is a great bone of contention between Scindiah and Holkar; and this circumstance may delay

the negotiation for peace. If they are only delayed till the Peswah's arrival here, and that we shall be enabled to take up a better position for the defence of the Nizam's frontier, I think that all will end well.

‘ I intend to-morrow to march towards the hills.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I believe the Peshwah was to leave Bassein yesterday.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 28th April, 1803.

‘ I have received intelligence that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has entered the Nizam's territories, in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad and Dowlutabad. It is said by some, that he has only encamped in the neighbourhood of villages belonging to himself, within the Nizam's boundary; but at all events, the officers in the Nizam's service, with Colonel Stevenson's corps, are much alarmed for the safety of his Highness's possessions, and of those two forts, and have urged strongly that some measures should be taken for their defence.

‘ The Peshwah will arrive at Poonah on the 2nd, and it is probable that the troops which are with him will arrive in a day or two afterwards. Meer Khan, Holkar's sirdar, in command of his largest detachment, still keeps open his negotiation with the Nizam to enter his Highness's service. On the 2nd of May, therefore, we shall be in greater strength than ever at Poonah, and have attained one great object of our expedition; and, if Holkar should not be weakened by the defection of Meer Khan, at least his confidence in that chief must be shaken.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to desire Colonel Stevenson to collect the Nizam's army and the subsidiary force at Gardoon, and to make three or four marches to the northward. If he should find that Holkar is only plundering the villages on that frontier, in the same manner that they have been plundered in every year by every chief who approaches the boundary, he is not to go farther on; but if he should find that Holkar makes a serious attack upon either of the Nizam's forts of Dowlutabad or Aurungabad, he must move quickly to their support.

‘ In the former case, although at some distance from me, we shall still be able to combine our operations, or to join, if necessary; and in the latter case I must move to the northward and eastward, to be at hand to support Colonel Stevenson, in the event of any support being given to Holkar by the other parties. My opinion is, that this is only a plundering excursion of Holkar. It is certain that he has not yet made his peace with Scindiah; and whatever he may do hereafter, he would not venture upon so desperate a course of action as a regular attack on the Nizam previous to that event; and I think that Colonel Stevenson’s first movement to the northward will induce him to withdraw; whether it has that effect or not, Holkar is so much weakened, and Colonel Stevenson is so much strengthened, that the force of the latter must be considered more than a match for that of the former. The only doubt I had upon my mind respecting the propriety of giving Colonel Stevenson those instructions, was occasioned by the Governor General’s wish that all hostilities should be avoided; but I conceive an attack upon the Nizam’s country must be resisted, and that means must be taken to prevent Jeswunt Rao from obtaining such a footing within it, as he would have by the possession of the forts of Dowlutabad or Aurungabad.

‘ As soon as I shall receive a true account of the state of affairs in that quarter, I propose to write to Holkar, respecting his situation on the Nizam’s frontier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

‘ I received last night your letters of the 12th and 24th, the former of which had gone to Madras by mistake.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter from Colonel Collins to the Governor General, of the 25th April, which contains some information of importance. Colonel Collins’s private letter to me contained nothing but the account of Holkar’s movement upon Aurungabad, of which I heretofore informed you. I likewise enclose an extract of a letter from Colonel Close, in which he gives his opinion of the measures to be pursued, if

it should be true that Scindiah is about to march from Burhampoor.

‘ It is my opinion that it is by no means certain that Scindiah will advance to Poonah, and it is most probable that the report of his intended march has been circulated for the purpose of intimidating us, or the Nizam; however, it is as well to be prepared with a consideration of the measures to be adopted in case Scindiah should advance to Poonah.

‘ I have no doubt whatever but that the force which will be here when the Peshwah shall arrive, will be more than equal to contend with his, of which I enclose you an account; I also am of opinion that Colonel Stevenson’s force with the Nizam’s army, are fully equal to the defence of the Nizam’s country against either Holkar or Scindiah. If both should unite in an attack on the Nizam’s country, Colonel Stevenson and I must co-operate or join in the defence of it, leaving at Poonah a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah’s person against straggling parties: on the other hand, if both should approach Poonah, Colonel Stevenson must come nearer to me.

‘ You will probably be desirous that I should give my opinion regarding Lieut. Colonel Close’s proposal contained in the enclosed paragraph of his letter. In the event of Scindiah’s advance, our military position ought to be such as to give confidence to those connected with us, and to show the wavering, and our enemies, that we are really in strength. It would not answer to move at once to Hyderabad, as you would thereby leave open the Rajah of Mysore’s country, and the Company’s; and would remove the check upon the southern jaghiredars. But if you were to cross the Toombuddra, and move to Moodgul, you would be nearer the scene of action at Poonah, within twelve or fourteen marches from Hyderabad, and close upon the southern jaghiredars. You would also be in a better situation to defend the Company’s frontier.

‘ In six weeks from this time the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will fill. I know that native armies are then very incapable of carrying on their operations; and you will be so near the Kistna, that you can decide whether you will cross it, and at once carry your decision into execution.

‘ We are upon very good terms with those of the southern jaghiredars who are with us. I have prevailed upon Appah

Saheb to remain here till the Peshwah shall arrive; and in consequence of a letter from Colonel Close, in which he communicates the desire of the Peshwah that I should distribute 30,000 rupees among his officers who may be most distressed for money, to be repaid on his Highness's arrival at Poonah, I have advanced 20,000 rupees, at two different times, to Goklah. He also appears in very good temper. It is very probable, however, that in case Scindiah should advance towards Poonah, the jaghiredars will become at best neutral, and will return to the southward under various pretences; and if there should be nothing to check their enterprises, their neutrality would very soon degenerate into enmity.

‘I have opened a communication with Amrut Rao, and he has a vakeel in his camp. I have written to him, to recommend that he should separate himself from the Peshwah's enemies, and that he should formally declare that he had done so. In that case, hopes are held out to him that measures will be taken to reconcile him to his brother, according to his request through his vakeel to that purport.

‘The Rajah of Berar is certainly not dead.

‘I am getting on well in the repair or rather re-construction of the carriages.

‘I have called upon Mr. Duncan for a lac of pagodas, which, I believe, I shall receive. I will write to the Adjutant General on this subject as soon as I am certain that I shall get the money. I shall then have money sufficient to go on to the end of July; but I think it will be as well, in the present times, always to have two months' pay in hand.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General Stuart.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

‘Colonel Stevenson will have acquainted you with the orders which I sent him on the 25th of April, to move to the northward, towards Aurungabad, in consequence of the intelligence which I have received, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had approached that place with a body of troops. I also wrote to Jeswunt Rao to urge him to refrain from the plunder of

the Nizam's territories, and to apprise him that I had desired Colonel Stevenson to move in the direction of Aurungabad to give them protection.

‘ I have since been informed that Jeswunt Rao has levied a contribution upon Aurungabad, and that he has gone off to the northward; but I have not received this intelligence from any good authority.

‘ I have perused a despatch from Colonel Collins to His Excellency the Governor General, of the 25th of April, in which Colonel Collins informs His Excellency that it is reported in Scindiah's durbar, that that chief intends to commence his march towards Poonah on the 6th instant. I cannot give credit to this intention; and I am inclined to believe that the report of its existence is circulated with the same view that so many other reports of the same kind have been circulated lately, viz., to intimidate the Nizam, or the Honorable Company's government. However, it is necessary that we should be prepared to meet the hostility which must be intended if the chief should advance.

‘ This operation may be connected with a predatory invasion of the Nizam's territory by Holkar; or both parties may join in an operation against the force at Poonah; or the advance to Poonah may be laid aside, and both may invade the territories of the Nizam.

‘ In any one of those cases it is my opinion that Colonel Stevenson, with the Nizam's army, ought to be placed three or four marches to the northward of Gardoon, nearly in the position in which he will find himself after having made the movements directed with a view to checking Jeswunt Rao Holkar's irruption into the Nizam's territory.

‘ If Holkar alone should operate on the Nizam's territory, Colonel Stevenson will be fully equal to its defence: if both parties should join, either to force the British troops from Poonah, or invade the Nizam's territory, the Colonel and I will be so near each other, that we can combine our operations, or join, if it should be necessary.

‘ I have received several letters from Colonel Stevenson upon the subject of the negotiation between the officers of the Government of his Highness the Nizam, and Meer Khan, to take that chief into his Highness's service. It appears that his Highness consents to take into service only 3000 men,

whereas the number of Meer Khan's followers amounts to 25,000, according to his statement.

‘ From my experience of these native armies, I doubt whether Meer Khan will produce at muster more than double the number of men that his Highness consents to receive; but when I am considering the means of defending his Highness's long line of frontier from the plunder of a light body of horse, I cannot refrain from recommending that, whatever may be Meer Khan's numbers, his Highness should take them into pay. If hostilities should be commenced, the expense will be more than repaid to him and the people under his government; and the very circumstance of the purchase of the service of a chief commanding so large a body of horse, of such repute as Meer Khan, and much in the confidence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will certainly shake the general confidence of his army, and may have the effect of preventing the threatened hostilities.

‘ I repeat that I do not believe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will venture to cross the Godavery, and expose himself to a conflict with the troops in this quarter, and to the certain consequences to himself of hostilities with the British government. I have to observe, however, that if hostilities with Scindiah and Holkar should be the consequence of the present crisis of our affairs, the British government were never so well situated to carry them on with success, and to bring them to a speedy termination. The territories of the Nizam may suffer from their vicinity to the scene of action; but that is a misfortune for which there is no remedy. It is probable that they would have suffered in a greater degree, if hostilities had commenced under other circumstances.

‘ By all that I can learn, the Nizam has apprehended an attack from the Marhattas, at different periods in the last three or four years, and his frontiers have never been exempt from their predatory operations. If the attack had been made when the British troops were not in this quarter the country must have suffered more than it can at present. But supposing that there was no foundation for his Highness's former apprehensions, and that it was not probable, at the different periods supposed, that the Marhattas would attack him, I may safely assert that the certain consequences of the establishment of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's power at Poonah, founded

as it was upon the momentary defeat of Scindiah's armies, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories. It would not have been possible for Jeswunt Rao to support his army for another season, in the countries which I have passed between the river Kistna and Poonah; and he must either have passed the Kistna or have entered the Nizam's territory, if only for their support. The former measure, it is true, might procrastinate the evil for another year, and might divide it between the Nizam, the Company, and the Rajah of Mysore; but within a year, and certainly with smaller means of defence, the Nizam's territories must have been the scene of operations of a Marhatta army.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

'SIR,

'Camp, 3rd May, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 2nd, in which you enclosed a copy of your address to the Governor General of the same date, with a copy of its enclosure.

'It gives me great satisfaction to reflect that as soon as I had received intelligence of the irruption of Jeswunt Rao Holkar into the territories of the Nizam, I took measures for their defence; although, in order to do this, I was obliged to break up the disposition of the allied forces of which his Highness the Nizam and his ministers had approved. The orders for Colonel Stevenson's march were dated on the 28th of April.

'It is unfortunate that his Highness the Nizam's territories should be so situated as to be liable to the predatory invasions of the Marhattas; and it must be obvious to his Highness that no army can give them complete protection. Those places in which there are the greatest riches, and which may happen to be unprotected, must suffer; and for this reason it is advisable that his Highness should at an early period adopt measures for the defence of the rich cities, placed, like Aurungabad, upon his extreme frontier. In case there should be a contest with the Marhatta powers, the operations which may be necessary for the general defence of his Highness's territories must oblige the army to leave some of these places at a distance;

and each of them being at a distance from the army, and not having in itself the means of defence, is liable to, and probably will be plundered.

‘It is easy to perceive from the tenor of the paper which was sent to you by Azim ul Oomrah, that the Nizam is considerably alarmed at the prospect of a war with the Marhattas. A war with the Marhattas must have been the consequence of the proceedings in this part of India in the months of October and November last, and the Nizam’s territories must have been the scene of its operations.

‘The advantageous military positions which we have taken up in consequence of our political arrangements with the Peshwah, and the additional force which those arrangements give us, may, in my opinion, still prevent the hostilities which are apprehended, at all events will considerably alleviate their evil. But this must depend upon our own determination and exertions. We are much mistaken if we suppose that to depart from our engagements with the Peshwah, and to give up the advantageous military position which we have taken, will alter the supposed intentions of the northern Marhatta powers to go to war, or will save the Nizam’s territories. Such a line of conduct not only would expose his Highness’s interests and power, but those of the Honorable Company to the most imminent danger.

‘I beg that you will do me the favor to assure the Nizam’s government that every thing I can do shall be done for the safety of his Highness’s territories. I apprized Colonel Stevenson some days ago of the reported intention of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to move towards Hyderabad; I desired him to watch his movements towards that place, and if he found that he went that way, to march upon Hyderabad with all celerity.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Panowullah, 7th May, 1803.

‘I went out yesterday to met the Peshwah, and I have the pleasure to inform you, that his Highness passed this camp this morning, and is now in a village between this and Poonah. I imagine that he will wait there for a day or two, for a lucky

one, to make his entry ; but, as we have him so near, it is of immaterial consequence.

‘ There has been some difficulty respecting the delivery of the fort of Carnallah in the Konkan, to the Peshwah’s authority, and Colonel Murray has halted below the Ghauts for orders regarding it. As this fort lies close to the communication with Panwell, and there is no middle road to be taken, with respect to this killadar, whose obedience to the Peshwah’s orders and authority must be enforced, I have, in concert with Colonel Close, desired Colonel Murray to put his Highness’s officers in possession of Carnallah. I rather believe that it will be given up to him without difficulty ; but lest it should not, and it should be necessary to attack the fort with guns, I have requested Mr. Duncan to send some to Panwell, from Bombay. Carnallah is but a short distance from Panwell.

‘ I have had only an interview of form with the Peshwah, and I cannot as yet give you any idea of the shape into which he proposes to put his government. But we propose to press him on this point as soon as possible.

‘ I have no news from the northward ; Colonel Stevenson has marched according to my instructions of the 28th April.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 10th May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch of the 2nd instant, from Colonel Collins. The purport of the Persian letter to the Governor General was, an assertion of Scindiah’s claim to choute from the Nizam, and a determination to support it. The paragraph to which Colonel Collins objects is one in which Scindiah declines the interference of the British government in the dispute between him and the Nizam, about choute.

‘ I hope that Colonel Collins will have been induced to remain in Scindiah’s camp : I think that he was rather hasty in his determination to withdraw ; and that, by withdrawing on the grounds of Scindiah’s altering the direction of his march, he has done no good. Scindiah’s ministers will still go on negotiating with Colonel Collins’s native agents, and they will persuade their master that the absence of the Colonel from his

camp is not a novel occurrence, and is not a sign of war. Thus we shall lose all the advantages of the check upon them of Colonel Collins's presence, and of his influence over Scindiah; and by the manner in which he has withdrawn, he has not given Scindiah any reason to fear the commencement of hostilities with the Company.

‘The Peshwah is not yet gone into Poonah; but business goes on here, and his Highness is making the necessary arrangements of his government, and appointing his ministers, and appears determined to adhere to his treaty with the Company and to carry into effect the objects of the alliance.

‘We do not yet know that Scindiah has marched; but as soon as the Peshwah goes into Poonah, and Colonel Murray arrives with a detachment of the Bombay army, I propose to move towards the Nizam's frontier, in order to be rather nearer to Colonel Stevenson.

‘The number of the royalist Sirdars is increasing; I have received messages from two or three this morning, to desire to send vakeels to me to intercede for them with the Peshwah.

‘This moment is critical; the rivers will fill in about a month, and it appears to me that Scindiah, if he intends hostilities, has marched in this hurry, either to establish himself in some post of consequence, or to make a dash at Hyderabad, so as to get back across the Godavery before that river fills. Colonel Stevenson is well placed to impede this operation, and I have desired him to have a watchful eye upon the proceedings to the northward, and march at once on Hyderabad, if he should find that they have views upon that place: but I do not imagine that any of those chiefs would like to incur the risk of the consequences of their being to the southward of the Godavery, when that river may fill. A few days will put that place in safety; as, after the period at which the Godavery shall fill, they will not choose to venture across that river.

‘We are all anxious to receive a communication of your sentiments upon the subject of Colonel Collins's former dispatch, announcing Scindiah's intention to march on the 6th. Major Malcolm is unwell, and is gone into Poonah.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 10th May, 1803.

‘ Since I wrote you this morning, another dispatch, has been received from Colonel Collins, a copy of which I enclose. I do not know where Badowly is. It is very obvious that they are afraid of allowing Colonel Collins to quit Scindiah’s camp, although it is difficult to say what is their object.

‘ Colonel Collins intends to press the Peshwah to desire Scindiah not to advance to Poonah; and I think that I ought to write him a letter to say that such is the Peshwah’s wish, and that it is proper it should be complied with.

‘ Before I determine upon this point, however, I shall see what the Peshwah will write. I am very anxious to know your determination regarding your future position.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Extract from ‘ the Notes relative to the late Transactions in the Marhatta Empire.’

‘ Arrangements were made by the Governor of Bombay, and by Lieut. Colonel Close, for the march of the Peshwah towards Poonah. A detachment, consisting of his Majesty’s 78th regiment, (which left Bengal on the 7th of February, and arrived at Bombay on the 5th of April, 1803,) five companies of his Majesty’s 84th regiment, a proportion of artillery, and 1035 Sepoys, in all 2205 men *, was formed, and placed under the command of Colonel Murray, of his Majesty’s 84th regiment, as an escort to his Highness, who left Bassein, attended by Colonel Close, on the 27th of April.

‘ On the 7th of May the Peshwah passed General Wellesley’s camp at Panowullah, near Poonah. On the 13th his Highness, attended by his brother Chimnajee Appah, and by a numerous train of the principal chiefs of the Marhatta empire, proceeded towards the city of Poonah, and having entered

* European	.	.	.	.	.	.	1170
Natives	.	.	.	.	.	.	1035
Artillery	.	.	.	.	.	.	93

Total 2298

With 177 gun lascars.

his palace, resumed his seat upon the musnud, and received presents from his principal servants.'

Lieut. Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah, to the Secretary of Government, Bombay. (Extracts.)

' SIR,

' Chinchore, 11th May, 1803.

' 5. To yield protection to his Highness the Nizam's territories, secure the alliance alluded to, and perfectly establish his Highness the Peshwah in his government, are objects which his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has committed to the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, whose military authority is not limited to the troops under his immediate command, but extends over the whole of the force headed by Colonel Stevenson.

' 6. Adverting to the nature and extent of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley's situation, I of course considered that as his Highness the Peshwah approached the ghauts, the troops that accompanied him from Bassein naturally fell under the orders of the above officer; and on this principle Colonel Murray is now acting against the fort of Carnallah under his express instructions.

' 7. Having consulted Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the present crisis of affairs, I have received it as his decided opinion, that the services of the whole of the detachment under Colonel Murray are indispensably necessary to afford him the means of accomplishing the great object committed to his charge, to which he conceives all considerations of a military nature must at present be wholly subordinate.

' 8. In so far as my opinion may be considered of any weight, I must say, that my ideas on the present subject perfectly coincide with those of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley; and thus impressed, I have only to add my judgment, that while every possible effort is exerted to cover the Attavesy, and effect the transfer of the lands lately ceded to the Honorable Company in Guzerat, any extremity should be hazarded in regard to these objects, rather than deprive the Major General of the services of any part of the detachment now employed under Colonel Murray.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Secretary of Gov., Bombay.*

' BARRY CLOSE.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 13th May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in answer to one which I wrote to him upon the subject of his conduct at Aurungabad.

‘ It is reported here that Holkar was invited to plunder Aurungabad by the Nizam’s sirdar in charge of that city. From your knowledge of the character of this sirdar and of his connexions, you will be able to form a judgment of the probable truth of this report.

‘ His Highness the Peshwah will arrive at Poonah this day; and I propose to march as soon as Colonel Murray will have joined with the detachment of the Bombay army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dhoondoo Bullall, Killadar
of Loghur.*

‘ Camp, 13 May, 1803.

‘ Governor Duncan has communicated to me the letters which you have written to him, and to Mr. Lima de Souza, and the purport of the verbal message delivered from you by Appojee Punt; and I am happy to observe, from the perusal of these documents, that you are both willing and ready to aid and assist in accomplishing the Peshwah’s views.

‘ The English army has come to Poonah in consequence of a treaty between the British government and his Highness the Peshwah; and, by the blessing of God, his Highness has this day returned to his capital, and has resumed the powers of his government.

‘ The orders which I have received are to support his just and accustomed authority, and I certainly have no intention to do any injury to those who do not oppose his exercise of it.

‘ I am therefore happy to observe, that you do not intend to oppose it, but that you propose to forward his Highness’s views; and as long as you persist in that line of conduct, and that you refrain from communicating with, and giving aid to his Highness’s enemies, which is entirely inconsistent with the

duty of a faithful servant, you may rest confident that nothing will be done to injure you, or Mattoo Sree Baye Saheb.

‘ *The Killadar of Loghur.* ’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY. ’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Bappoo Rao Ingliā.

‘ Camp, 13th May, 1803. ’

‘ Since I wrote to you last, a detachment of the troops under my command has taken possession of, and delivered over, the fort of Carnallah to the officer of his Highness the Peshwah; and his Highness’s colors are now displayed in that fort, and his authority established in the district depending upon it. ’

‘ As there may be still some plunderers lurking about that district, I beg that you will give orders to your officers to exert themselves to prevent them from finding an asylum in your districts. ’

‘ *Bappoo Rao Ingliā.* ’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY. ’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR, ’

‘ Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803. ’

‘ I have received an answer from Holkar to my letter upon the subject of the plunder of the Nizam’s territories. It is very civil. He says that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had for years collected the revenues of two villages, which he names, belonging to him; that he had gone to demand this money, and that he had received some of it; that he had done no mischief to the country, and that he was then going away. It is true that he has two villages near Aurungabad, and it is reported that he has done no mischief to the country; but I believe that he has not moved farther than six or seven miles from Aurungabad. ’

‘ Colonel Stevenson was within fifty miles of the place; but in consequence of the reports of Scindiah’s march, I desired him to be aware of going too far forward, lest he should be exposed to the attack of their united army, or that Holkar should get round him, and march upon Hyderabad. I have desired him to watch the movements towards that place very particularly. ’

‘ The place at which Scindiah was on the 7th, is only one march from Burhampoor; and there are no accounts that the Rajah of Berar has marched, although he has gone into his tents. ’

‘ Colonel Murray will be here about the 18th.

‘ The Peshwah has written to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, to desire that they will not come to Poonah.

‘ When I saw a possibility that we might have to contend with this confederacy, I wrote to Mr. Duncan to request that he would supply us with a bridge of boats, respecting which I sent him a detailed memorandum. He has made but little progress in this work, which is most essential, (in this country so much intersected with rivers, none of which are fordable in the rains,) as well for the protection of the Nizam’s country, as for the safety of the two detachments; nor has he managed our depôt so well as might be wished, or supplied us with other articles called for, so quickly as might have been expected. I have had, therefore, some thoughts of running down to Bombay; and if I can settle matters with the Peshwah in a satisfactory manner for the chiefs this evening, I shall carry that plan into execution to-morrow. I shall be here again on the 18th, and I propose to march on the 20th towards the Nizam’s frontier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Munro.

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

‘ I learn from General Stuart, that he has desired you to supply me with twenty boats for the Malpoorba, and some boatmen.

‘ You know that the rivers will fill between the 14th and 20th of June; and I beg you will take early measures for providing this mode of passing them.

‘ As you are too far from me, and it is possible that you may not be able to send off the boats at a period sufficiently early for my purpose, I have directed that ten of the boats made in Soonda, which were intended for the river Gutpurba, may be left on the river Malpoorba. Ten of your boats consequently are to be sent to the Gutpurba, about thirty miles farther on. I beg you to give orders upon this subject to the people you will send with the boats. Their station upon the Malpoorba will be at Sungoly; that upon the Gutpurba will be at Goorgerry. The boatmen whom you send should be divided equally between the stations on the rivers Malpoorba,

Gutpurba, and Kistna; their pay is to be one gold fanam for every day they do not work, and two gold fanams for every day they do: it is to commence from the day they leave their villages, and to be paid weekly. I will settle with you for them, to the day of their arrival at their posts, as well as for the expense of the carriage of the boats. Afterwards, they will be paid by the officer in charge of the posts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ The Peshwah arrived yesterday, and is going to be seated on his musnud.’

Lieut. General Stuart to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.

‘ Head Quarters, 25 miles north of Bellary,

‘ MY LORD,

23rd May, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to forward to your Lordship a copy of a dispatch from the Hon. Major General Wellesley, bearing date the 15th instant.

‘ The state of my health, which has suffered considerably from fatigue, and the intense heat of the weather, has obliged me to proceed to Bellary.

‘ I have left the army under the command of Major General Campbell, and have furnished that officer with instructions for his guidance. I trust that in the course of a few days my health will be sufficiently re-established to enable me to rejoin the army at Moodgul: in the mean time, my presence at Bellary will be useful in forwarding various necessary arrangements connected with the subsistence of the troops in the positions which they will probably occupy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord Clive.*

‘ J. STUART.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

‘ I saw the Peshwah last night according to his appointment. The object of my visit was to press his Highness to relieve the distresses, and to attend to the requests of those chiefs, who had come forward in his cause with me, and thus to excite them to fresh exertions in his service, and to bring forward others who still remained behind. It was agreed between me and Colonel Close, that he should begin by pressing him to prepare the

army which he is bound by treaty to produce ; and that then he should be informed of the distresses and claims of the chiefs, whose troops it was certain that his Highness would enumerate among those to be appointed to join the British detachment. In the course of the conversation his Highness showed much quickness and ability ; and I observed that he appeared particularly anxious to perform all the stipulations of the treaty, of course at the smallest possible expense to himself. But he gave satisfactory assurances that he would immediately commence to settle with the different chiefs who had come here with me ; and that in proportion as his Highness should satisfy them, he would signify the same to the Resident ; and that they were thenceforward to be considered as part of his Highness's contingent.

‘ By this mode of settlement we shall know whether any progress is made or not ; and as the production of the force is referable to the treaty, it will be possible to urge his Highness to accelerate his negotiations with these chiefs, by pointing out to him, as occasion may offer, that the progress made by him in fulfilling the obligation laid upon him by that instrument, is not so great as might be expected. It is satisfactory to observe, that the Peshwah considers the treaty as highly advantageous to him, and that he is anxious to fulfil all its stipulations. Upon the whole, we were all satisfied with the meeting.

‘ I find that it will not answer to go to Bombay ; I therefore stay here.

‘ It is reported that Holkar has gone to a considerable distance from Aurungabad, which I believe to be true.

‘ Colonel Stevenson was, on the 12th, half way between that place and Gardoon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lieut. Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah, to the Secret Committee of the Honorable Court of Directors.

‘ HONORABLE SIRS,

‘ Poonah, 15th May, 1803.

‘ 1. Agreeably to the instructions which I have had the honor to receive on the subject from his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, I shall proceed to furnish your Honorable Committee with a narrative of the events which have occurred since the date of the last advices received by

his Excellency from the peninsula, at the period of his preparing his dispatch to your Honorable Committee, bearing date the 19th of April, 1803.

‘ 2. In the beginning of that month, when Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley arrived at the Kistna, Colonel Stevenson, with the Hyderabad subsidiary force, and the Nizam’s contingent, occupied a position near Perinda. His Highness the Peshwah remained at Bassein, protected by a detachment, consisting of an European regiment and a native battalion. Holkar having previously moved from Poonah, and left that city in charge of Amrut Rao, lay encamped near the Godavery, on the line between Ahmednuggur and Chandore. In this position he received, on the 26th of March, my letter to his address, noticed by his Excellency to your Honorable Committee; and on the 27th of March, Holkar addressed a letter to his Highness the Nizam, in which he adverted to his late movement to the northward, and stated, that he had left Poonah in compliance with a recommendation to that effect, which he had recently received from his Highness.

‘ 3. In proceeding towards the Godavery, Holkar manifested a strong desire to be joined by his commanders, Meer Khan, Shahamut Khan, Futty Sing Maunia, and Naggoo Jevajee; who, having suffered great distress at Poonah, had proceeded to the southward for subsistence, and occupied, with their several divisions, the line of territory from Punderpoor on the Beemah to the borders of Kolapoor, at the western ghauts.

‘ 4. Though urged by Holkar to follow him, those chieftains continued to plunder the possessions of the Marhatta jaghiredars on the Kistna, till the approach of the Hon. Major General Wellesley placed them in the hazard of being forced in front, and attacked in their rear by the corps at Perinda: they hastily fell back, and the British commanders allowed them to retire peaceably towards Ahmednuggur, by the route at Gardoon. After they had crossed the Beemah at this ford, Meer Khan, suspecting that Futty Sing Maunia had intentions of abandoning Holkar, and attaching himself to his Highness the Peshwah, seized him by stratagem, dispersed his troops, and placed him in close confinement.

‘ 5. The route from Meritch to Poonah being now free from obstruction, the Hon. Major General Wellesley, joined by the

majority of the southern jaghiredars, and some sirdars who had separated from the Peshwah after his Highness had retreated from Poonah, pursued his march to Punderpoor; and having effected a junction with Colonel Stevenson, and disposed of the troops under his command at different points on the Beemah, advanced to Poonah by the route of Jejoory.

‘ 6. On the 18th of April he encamped at Baramootty; on the following day he reached Morishwar, and there learning that Amrut Rao with a small force still remained at Poonah, and threatened to set fire to the city, resolved to make a forced march to save it. After halting a few hours at Morishwar, he moved with one native battalion, and the whole of his cavalry. As he approached towards the little Bhore ghaut, Amrut Rao received intelligence of his march, and fled precipitately to the northward, without attempting to execute his design against the city.

‘ 7. At two o’clock, on the 20th of April, the Hon. Major General Wellesley, though detained for many hours by the roughness of the ghaut, made his entry into Poonah, having marched about sixty miles in thirty four hours. The infantry of his army joined him on the 22nd, and his object was to dispose of the troops at situations most convenient for water and forage, and to make the arrangements necessary for bringing up his Highness the Peshwah with safety to his capital. He accordingly moved to Panowullah, a village one stage from Poonah, on the road leading to the Bhore ghaut to the westward; and having secured the pass by a body of troops, waited his Highness’s approach.

‘ 8. His Majesty’s 78th regiment had previously arrived at Bombay, and joined the troops at Bassein, under Colonel Murray. This officer proceeded from Bassein on the 18th of April, and arrived at Calliany on the 22nd of April.

‘ 9. It was expected that the Peshwah would follow the troops without delay; however, a variety of circumstances, such as the want of equipment, the necessity of regulating his movements by the observance of auspicious hours, and the apprehension he felt from finding that a party of troops in the interest of Amrut Rao had come down to the Konkan, and meant to endeavor to obstruct his march to Calliany, detained him at Bassein till the 27th of April, when, proceeding by water, he reached Calliany on the same day.

‘10. On the 4th instant he reached Panwell; on the following day Kolapoor; and ascended the Bhore ghaut on the 5th. He arrived at Futtugaum on the 6th, and there had a meeting with the Hon. Major General Wellesley. On the 7th he proceeded to Chinchore, a village nine miles from Poonah; and on the 13th instant, made his entrée into that city, attended by the jaghiredars and sirdars mentioned in the annexed list.

‘11. The Hon. Major General Wellesley had previously arrived at this neighbourhood. As his Highness passed to the city, he was saluted from the British encampment by the guns of some of the Marhatta corps, by others planted on different situations for the occasion, and by all the posts on the mountains near Poonah. As he drew near to the city, the inhabitants crowded to meet him with every demonstration of joy, and but one ceremony was now wanting to seal his restoration. He entered his palace, ascended the musnud, and received nuzzers from his ministers and the principal inhabitants of his capital.

‘12. I shall now advert to what has been passing to the northward:—

‘In leaving Poonah, Holkar was probably determined by a wish to avoid a contest with the British troops; by an anxiety to secure the plunder he had collected from Poonah in Chandore; and by the consideration, that on the Godavery he would be conveniently situated for prosecuting the negotiation lately opened between him and Scindiah, by the mediation of Ambajee Inglia. After finishing the arrangements he proposed at Chandore, he appears to have levied a contribution on the Nizam’s districts near Nizamabad. At this period he seems to have sedulously spread reports of his having had a meeting with Ambajee Inglia, and concluded an arrangement of peace with Scindiah; and that this transaction would soon be followed by an union between those two chieftains and the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of forcibly frustrating the alliance between the Honorable Company and his Highness the Peshwah. The same language was held occasionally by Scindiah’s ministers, and Baba Phurkia, Holkar’s vakeel at Hyderabad. A meeting between the three chieftains was talked of as likely to take place soon on the Nizam’s northern frontier; when Holkar suddenly moving in an eastern direction, showed himself before Aurungabad, and demanded a considerable con-

tribution from the town. A part of this levy he is said to have realized; and, by the latest accounts, he continues before Aurungabad, endeavoring to collect the remainder. He has yet delayed to acknowledge the receipt of my dispatch to him, alluded to in the 2nd paragraph.

‘13. Colonel Stevenson’s army, that lay near Gardoon, has, by the orders of the Hon. Major General Wellesley, moved in a northern direction, easterly of Ahmednuggur, in order to meet Holkar should he attempt to cross the Godavery; and the Hon. Major General Wellesley proposes to move his division shortly to co-operate in concert with Colonel Stevenson.

‘14. Although Scindiah gave Colonel Collins the most positive assurances, that he was determined not to interfere in the arrangements lately concluded between the Honorable Company and the Peshwah, his conduct has since been unsteady and equivocal. On the 4th instant he marched from Burham-poor with the declared intention of proceeding to Poonah by way of Badowly, a town about fifty coss to the westward of Burhampoor, and the place where, it is said, the concerted meeting of the three chieftains is to take place.

‘15. No adjustment appears to have been effected yet between Holkar and Scindiah; but Baba Phurkia has quitted the court of Hyderabad; and the objects of the proposed meeting at Badowly appear to be distinctly stated in the annexed translation of a letter, received lately by the Nizam’s minister from the Rajah of Berar.

‘16. Amidst these unsettled appearances, Scindiah’s general, Gopal Bhow, has collected choute from the Nizam’s districts of Bheer, &c.; and Scindiah, in a letter to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, has asserted his right to collect choute from certain of the Nizam’s districts, notwithstanding the declaration of the Peshwah, contained in the annexed copy of a letter from the Resident at Poonah to the Resident at Scindiah’s court.

‘17. No accounts have yet been received here of the Rajah of Berar having actually marched for Badowly; and on the 7th instant Scindiah had made but one march from Burham-poor. He has since been joined by Ballojee Koonger, the agent deputed by the Peshwah to his durbar; and it is not doubted but the exertions of this person, to conciliate Scin-

diah's mind to the alliance, will be attended by desirable effects.

‘18. Amrut Rao has a small force on the southern banks of the Godavery, near Sungum-nair; and Meer Khan, Shahamut Khan, &c., appear to have joined Holkar, who says that his attack on Aurungabad is in retaliation of irregularities committed in his districts by his Highness the Nizam's servants.

‘19. Whether the proposed meeting at Badowly will ever take place, or if it do happen, what may be the result, it must still be difficult to determine. The restoration of the Peshwah; the powerful support afforded to his government by the British forces, joined by so many of the jaghiredars and sirdars subordinate to the Poonah state; added to the cement which the alliance must daily acquire, are circumstances which may influence strongly the deliberations of the apprehended confederacy, and press upon the members of it the expediency, if they do form a league, of making it only defensive. In every event, the approaching season is unfavorable for active operations. The rivers that rise from the western ghauts will soon fill; crossing them, to the native armies, will be dangerous, if not impracticable, but safe and easy to the British forces. Should the apprehended confederacy, therefore, attempt to invade the Nizam's or the Poonah territories during the approaching monsoon, their operations must be liable to great disadvantages.

‘20. That Scindiah should join the confederacy for hostile purposes is certainly improbable. He is supposed to be secretly averse to an accommodation with Holkar; and to engage in a southern invasion in the full prospect of meeting with the most formidable opposition, and leave his northern possessions exposed to an attack at so great a distance from his court, would appear to be a state of things which such a mind as Scindiah's would carefully avoid.

‘21. In regard to the disposition of the Peshwah under the alliance, it appears to be wholly satisfactory. His mind is religious, and given to the observance of superstitious customs, which occupy much of his time; but he shows himself confident in the British honor and integrity, and in the power of his great ally, to maintain his cause against his enemies. As a primary object, he is now engaged in measures calculated to

conciliate the different jaghiredars and sirdars of his state; and there is every prospect that by the time the Honorable Major General Wellesley marches, his Highness will be able to furnish a considerable body of horse to serve under the General's orders.

‘22. Under the late pacific appearances in Europe, I have, with the concurrence of the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Major Malcolm, deferred urging the Peshwah to conclude the supplemental article to the treaty of Bassein, desired by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, for the purpose of restraining the Peshwah from admitting Frenchmen into his service, or forming any connexion with that nation.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Secret Committee of the Hon.
Court of Directors.*

‘BARRY CLOSE.

Lieut. General Stuart to Lord Clive, Governor of Fort St. George.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp at Joak, 17th May, 1803.

‘In a letter from Major Kirkpatrick, of the 13th instant, which arrived this day by express, I have been informed of the extremely dangerous state of health of his Highness the Nizam at that time. This circumstance renders it still more necessary for the army to proceed to the Kistna; as it will be better able, in that advanced situation, to adopt with promptitude such measures as may be necessary to secure the internal tranquillity of the Nizam's dominions, should his Highness's death take place; or to protect them from foreign invasion, if Scindiah attempts to carry into execution the plan which General Wellesley supposes that he meditates. On these points, I trust that I shall soon have the honor to receive your Lordship's sentiments.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lord Clive.*

‘J. STUART.

Lord Clive to Lieut. General Stuart (Extract).

‘SIR,

‘Fort St. George, 19th May, 1803.

‘The considerations of a more active nature, which are connected with the immediate object of our operations for obtaining a settlement of the affairs of the Marhatta empire, are stated with great force by Major General Wellesley and

your Excellency; and the importance of those considerations has been heightened by the danger which now threatens the life of his Highness the Nizam. By the enclosed copy of a dispatch from the Resident at Hyderabad, your Excellency will perceive that danger to be extreme; and in this respect, independently of the menacing posture supposed to have been taken by Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I am of opinion that your Excellency's movement into the Dooab is a measure of prudence and expediency, for the purpose of giving effect to the arrangements dependent on the decease of the Nizam.

‘ On these several grounds, I concur in the reasons stated by your Excellency, and the Hon. Major General Wellesley, for the movement of your army into the Dooab; and I entirely approve your Excellency's intention of taking up a position, either at Moodgul, or on the banks of the Kistna, as circumstances may appear to render most advisable for the purposes of the movement.

‘ It appears to be the opinion of the Hon. Major General Wellesley, that if the supposed invasion should be conducted by Jeswunt Rao Holkar alone, the force under the command of Colonel Stevenson will be adequate to the defence of the Nizam's territories: in this event, therefore, the British troops already in advance can require no aid from the main army. If Holkar and Scindiah should make an united attack, it is still probable, in the opinion of Major General Wellesley, that the force under his own command, joined by that under the command of Colonel Stevenson, will be sufficient to repel the invaders: it is probable, therefore, in these cases, that your position in the Dooab will be adequate to all the purposes suggested by the Resident at Poonah, or by Major General Wellesley.

‘ But if the force to be eventually opposed to the British troops now in advance, should be of such extent as to endanger the detachments under the command of General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson, it will become indispensably requisite for your Excellency to advance without delay for the support of those corps.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ CLIVE.

Lieut. Colonel Close, the Resident at Poonah, to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Poonah, 21st May, 1803.

‘ 1. Agreeably to the arrangement which had been previously adjusted, the Hon. Major General Wellesley visited his Highness the Peshwah on the 14th instant, in Poonah. At this meeting the General recapitulated what he had formerly stated, and, with the view to inspire his Highness with confidence, went into an explanation of the principles which should invariably govern his conduct, in prosecuting the objects committed to his charge, connected with the interests of his Highness’s government. He observed, that although he felt it to be his duty to recommend to his Highness’s notice and favor, such of his sirdars as were distinguished by their attachment to the Poonah state, he had yet been careful not to make any promises to them from himself; assuring them only, that he should represent their conduct respectively to his Highness, in order to their being rewarded, or discountenanced, according to their merits, that he was certainly anxious that his Highness should afford relief to such of his meritorious servants as suffered from want, and adopt measures for conciliating others, who, from different circumstances, might require encouragement and confidence; but that whatever his feelings might be in those respects, he would strictly adhere to the rule he had hitherto followed, by avoiding to make promises to any of the sirdars, and contenting himself with stating their merits to his Highness.

‘ 2. This declaration from the Hon. Major General Wellesley appeared to afford the Peshwah the highest satisfaction. He said, that nothing could be more just or pleasing to him than the principle which the General resolved to follow; and added, that he should be ever attentive to the recommendation of the General in favor of his sirdars, and indisposed towards those who, from misconduct, should incur the General’s displeasure; and that, on these principles, it would be with the General to direct their efforts, and represent their services, and with the Poonah state to favor or discourage them according to his report.

‘ 3. His Highness went on to observe, that a few of the southern jaghiredars were still backward in affording their services; that

as it was requisite to call forth the whole force of the state, he would repeat his summons to those jaghiredars to attend, and would be happy if the General also would address them to the same effect. To this the General expressed his acquiescence; adding, that obedience to his Highness's authority from the subordinate sirdars of the state was indispensably necessary; and that in time it would be only proper to coerce such of them as should be obstinately refractory.

‘ 4. The General now observed that he should soon be prepared to march, and that he looked to be accompanied by his Highness's troops; that the Goklah and the Vinchoor jaghiredars stood in need of most aid from his Highness to enable them to satisfy their troops; and that he would give in a memorandum respecting the claims of those sirdars, which, he trusted, would soon be satisfied. His Highness replied, that the wants of those sirdars should be immediately relieved; and that he would so adjust with the whole of the sirdars, as that they should encamp near the General by the time he should be ready to move, and willingly proceed on service under his orders.

‘ 5. A conversation now took place concerning the Putwurdun family, of whom Appah Saheb in particular has been averse to visit the Peshwah. After his claims had been discussed, it was agreed that an assurance should be given to him, that on the Poonah affairs being finally settled, his Highness the Peshwah would examine into his claims, and proceed to arrange matters permanently on fair grounds between him and the Rajah of Kolapoor, who has gradually stripped the Putwurdun family of a large part of their possessions.

‘ 6. At every stage of the interview it was observable that his Highness's manner was less formal than usual. He showed no disinclination to converse largely on the business of his government; and at the close of the conference he told the Hon. Major General Wellesley, with great cordiality, that he could not permit him to march till he should have the pleasure of giving him an entertainment.

‘ 7. It would now appear that the Peshwah derived the happiest impressions from the foregoing conference. His confidence has increased so much, that he does not hesitate to avail himself of the influence which the Hon. Major General Wellesley has, from a variety of causes, acquired

over the sirdars and jaghiredars of the state; his orders to them on points of importance are generally transmitted through the General, who enforces them by dispatches from himself, an united mode of proceeding which can scarcely fail of efficient operation.

‘ 8. His Highness having arranged with Goklah, paid him a visit yesterday evening, and there is reason to believe that he has satisfied the jaghiredars of Vinchoor. Chintomeny Rao, of the Putwurdun family, has visited the Peshwah a second time, but was received by his Highness with some reserve. Appah Saheb, it is hoped, will be prevailed on to pay his first visit in the course of a few days.

‘ 9. The Hon. Major General Wellesley talks of marching in five or six days, and there is every prospect that he will be accompanied by a handsome corps of Marhatta horse.

‘ 10. Amrut Rao has a party of troops at Sungumnair, on this side of the Godavery; and the Peshwah has intelligence that a corps in his interest has lately invested the fort of Puttun, held by his Highness, and situated south-west of Sungum-nair.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ BARRY CLOSE.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

‘ It is evident that the Peshwah’s confidence in us increases daily. He calls for our assistance frequently, to support and enforce, by our influence over the jaghiredars and other chiefs, his authority and orders; and he pays attention to our recommendation of their claims upon his government. He has consented to give Appah Saheb (the eldest son of Pursheram Bhow, and the chief of the Putwurdun family) the Zerreen Putka to go out with me, provided that chief will present him with a nuzzer of one or two lacs of rupees. By this measure he shews his confidence in us; he secures to his cause this powerful family, and secures the tranquillity of the southern districts, if there should be a war; and as Appah Saheb is known to have been our friend, and the determined enemy of the Peshwah, all the chiefs of the empire will know to what quarter they are to look in future for the favors and honors

of the state. We do not know yet whether Appah Saheb will or can give the nuzzer which will be required from him; but I make no doubt that if he can afford it, I shall be able to prevail upon him to give it.

‘ I have had a correspondence with Amrut Rao, the result of which is that he has written a letter, which he calls an engagement, regularly sealed, &c., as such; in which he promises, that from that moment he will separate himself from the Peshwah’s enemies, and will have no further communication with them; and he requests that the British government will interfere to reconcile him to his brother, and to obtain for him a provision in the state.

‘ All the former letters which passed between Amrut Rao and me were given to the Peshwah some time ago; and this last letter from Amrut Rao was given to him three days ago, with a request that he would take it into consideration, and let me know what answer he wished me to give to it. He was at the same time informed, that the British government was very desirous that he should be reconciled to Amrut Rao, and that that chief should have a provision in the state, as the best mode of insuring the internal tranquillity of his Highness’s territories; and as we expected that he would urge Amrut Rao’s disposition to intrigue, as an argument against a reconciliation with him, we desired that it might be observed to him, that now that his government was strengthened by an alliance with the Company, and that all his subjects saw that the British government was determined to support his lawful and accustomed authority, it was not probable that any of them would venture to enter into intrigues to disturb or overturn it, as they had heretofore; or that, if they did, he had much to apprehend from those intrigues.

‘ We have not yet received his answer, but if we succeed in reconciling the Peshwah with Amrut Rao, the interior of this state will be settled as far as it can be at present; and this defection will shake the nerves of the members of the congress to the northward. This will be a greater object than the disposal of the Zerreen Putka; but the two measures secure every thing within, in case of a contest.

‘ Your instructions to Colonel Collins of the 5th will have arrived just in the proper time. The treaty of Bassein is, in fact, a better security to Holkar and to Scindiah for the possessions which they have extorted from the Peshwah, and

those lying to the southward of the Nerbudda, than either of those chiefs could have under any other arrangement which could secure the Peshwah's power. They will see that clearly; and their sense of their own interest will combine with their fears to prevent a war.

' You will have seen Holkar's letter to me upon the subject of the plunder of Aurungabad. If matters are brought to a peaceable conclusion with Scindiah, and Holkar goes off to Hindustan, towards which quarter he is now moving, in my opinion, it will be most proper to take no further notice of the contribution levied upon Aurungabad; at least not to go to war to force Holkar to pay it back again. In fact, this chief is only a freebooter, and the Nizam's government allow that the soubahdar of Aurungabad had combined with him. They acknowledge that they were aware of the intercourse between Holkar and the soubahdar, some time before the contribution was levied; but they were afraid to attempt to dismiss their own treacherous servant. Upon the whole, therefore, the levy of the contribution upon Aurungabad may be considered as the act of two rebels to the states of the Peshwah and of the Nizam.

' In case Holkar should be considered in the light of a power in India, his conduct at Aurungabad affords ample ground for hostilities against him; but upon the whole, considering that the Marhattas have long been in the habit of plundering the Nizam's territories; that his Highness's government omit to take any measures for their defence; and that, in this particular instance, they were aware of the combination between their own servant and a Marhatta chief, and they were afraid to take the most obvious steps to frustrate their designs; I think that if all parties acquiesce peaceably in the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein, it will not be worth while to commence a chase after Holkar to recover the plunder of Aurungabad.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

' SIR,

' Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

' I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received

from Colonel Stevenson, written in answer to one from me of the 26th instant, in which I sent him a copy of the report of Moonshee Uzzeez Oollah, on the subject of the supposed consent by Colonel Stevenson, that the British government should pay half of the expense to be incurred in hiring Meer Khan and his troops.

‘The transaction has not the appearance of a very candid one, either on the part of the government at Hyderabad, or on that of the Nizam’s officers with Colonel Stevenson. However, he resisted firmly all their attempts to induce him to sign a paper by which he should engage that the British government would pay half of the expense; and at last, when from my letter he discovered that the durbar alleged that he had engaged himself, he got from the Nizam’s officers a paper, which proved clearly that even they had never thought so.

‘I cannot tell, from his letter of the 28th, whether he had dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, of which I sent you the translation. But if he had, an obedience to the orders, given to him in my letter, will prevent any inconvenience from that measure.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P. S. I enclose the copy of a second letter from Colonel Stevenson, upon the subject of his communications with Mohiput Ram, which I have just received.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that I proposed to march on the 3rd of June, being fully prepared for that purpose. From the communications, however, which I have had with the different chiefs in the service of his Highness the Peshwah, who accompanied me before my march to this city, I find that, notwithstanding his Highness’s positive promise to me in your presence, no steps have yet been taken to satisfy the claims of any of them. These chiefs, therefore, appear to entertain great anxiety upon the subject of my approaching march. Some of them have determined to ask for permission to return to their homes, and none are prepared to march with the British troops under my command.

‘ Under these circumstances, I think there is strong reason to apprehend, that the whole of the troops of his Highness the Peshwah will disband, when I shall commence my march from Poonah.

‘ You are well aware how strongly I am urged by the situation of the affairs of the government of his Highness the Peshwah to the northward, and by the advanced state of the season, to commence my march at the earliest possible period. But in hopes that some arrangement will be made, I have no objection to halt till the 4th, on which day I must march.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Poonah, 2nd June, 1803.

‘ I do not know that the Peshwah has concluded anything for any of his sirdars, but he promised that they should have their sunnuds last night. Colonel Collins had asked for an audience from Scindiah, but he had not received an answer on the 27th of May. It appears, from a conversation which passed between Ballojee Koonger, the Peshwah’s vakeel, with Scindiah and a man of Colonel Collins; and from a letter from Ballojee Koonger to the durbar here, that the confederacy has now subsided into a plan to frighten the Peshwah; and by working on his fears to induce him to cede his lands in Guzerat to Scindiah, in order to conciliate that chief; but this will not answer.

‘ Holkar is certainly moving off to the northward of the Taptee. It is said he intends to cross the Nerbudda likewise, and to enter Guzerat, but I doubt it: if he crosses the Nerbuddah at all, it will be with a view to establish himself in the Holkar territory in Hindustan.

‘ I shall march on the 4th: I have made 150 wheels since I came here; by which exertion, and the assistance I have got from Colonel Murray’s corps, I am better equipped in respect to carriages, than I was on the day I quitted the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch from Colonel Collins. It is probable that the advance of the troops will draw a declaration from Dowlut Rao Scindiah; at all events, I have urged Colonel Collins to press him to fix a time when he will make known his sentiments.

‘Our situation is rather critical in this country. The Peshwah has hitherto done nothing for his sirdars who came with me, and none of them have marched from Poonah. He has broken the treaty by not producing an army, and he has broken his word with me. He has told Colonel Close that he has urged Dowlut Rao Scindiah not to come to Poonah; and that chief declares that he has invited him and the Rajah of Berar to his capital. The Peshwah went so far as to communicate to Colonel Close a copy of the letter which he said he had written to Scindiah.

‘I do not believe that the Peshwah is treacherous; on the contrary, I am convinced that he sees that his only safety is in the treaty with the Company; but he is incapable of transacting the business of his government; he is jealous of the influence we have acquired over his chiefs, although he knows that he owes to that influence his restoration to power; and his disposition is so vindictive, that he cannot be brought to pardon those who have injured him, or to whom he has done an injury.

‘Upon the whole, I am concerned that the alliance will not work on the footing of the treaty. But at all events, he has broken the treaty by not producing his army; and the British government must be considered as at liberty to act according to its sense of its own interests.

‘It is difficult to determine what is its interest at the present moment. If Scindiah had made the declaration required of him, and had consented to withdraw his army, I should have no scruple in deciding what is the interest of the British government. In my opinion, it would be to break up the army in this quarter, and to leave that part of it under your immediate directions, at liberty to move towards the Carnatic, in case the war with France should be renewed. The six battalions might be left at Poonah, and government might withdraw them or not, as they might think proper; and as for

Holkar, he might be left in possession of the Peshwah's territories to the northward, till his Highness himself should think it proper to assemble an army to drive him out.

'The troops moving from hence to the southward might be employed to take possession of the district of Savanore. But as long as Scindiah remains in his menacing position on the Nizam's northern frontier, and will let us know whether we are to have peace or war, only when he shall have had a conference with the Rajah of Berar, which may never take place, it is not possible to move away from our position in this country, even if we never had a treaty with the Peshwah.

'I marched this morning, and propose to move on towards the Godavery. If I can get a little forage, the cattle will do well, excepting the brinjarry cattle, which I am afraid cannot live.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

'SIR,

'Camp at Paglah, 7th June, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Stevenson, with a copy of its enclosure. Colonel Stevenson has already had occasion to complain of the conduct of Rajah Sookroodoor, and although there was no cause for it, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has made a complaint to Lieut. Colonel Collins of the conduct of the troops of his Highness the Nizam, in his districts bordering on the river Beemah.

'It is very desirable that nothing should be done by the British government or its allies, which can tend to provoke hostilities at the present moment; and above all, it should be the object of all regulated governments, to prevent the unauthorized attacks of their subordinate officers upon the territories of each other, merely for their individual advantage. The Nizam's government, in particular, should discourage this species of warfare, in which his Highness must be a loser.

'Upon the whole, therefore, I request that you will exert your influence, that Rajah Sookroodoor may be ordered to desist from these practices in future; and, in the mean time, I have recommended to Colonel Stevenson to desire Rajah Mohiput

Ram not to allow any of his Highness's troops to be employed, without previously apprizing the Colonel fully of the purpose for which their services are required.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Memorial addressed to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah by Lieut. Colonel Collins, Chickley, 12th June, 1803.

‘ When Colonel Collins had the honor of an audience with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 6th of Safer (28th May), the Colonel by order of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, urged many cogent reasons and persuasions to induce the Maharajah to declare, without delay or reserve, whether the late negotiations carried on between his court, the Berar Rajah, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, had been entered into for the purpose of obstructing the completion of the engagements lately concluded at Bassein between his Highness the Peshwah and the British government.

‘ But although Colonel Collins was extremely urgent with the Maharajah to give him instant information on this important point, and although the Colonel particularly pointed out the line of conduct which the British Government would be compelled to pursue, should the required explanation be withheld, yet the ministers of this durbar repeatedly declared that Colonel Collins must not expect any satisfactory answer to this question until a meeting had taken place between the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar. Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah also said, that he could not, without a violation of his faith, give Colonel Collins the satisfaction he demanded, until he (the Maharajah) had conversed with Ragojee Bhoonslah; but that after his interview with that Rajah, the Colonel should be informed whether there would be peace or war.

‘ The proposed conference between Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having taken place, Colonel Collins now expects that the Maharajah will, conformably to his promise, explicitly declare whether it is his design to obstruct the completion of the treaty of Bassein, either by means of his own power, or in conjunction with Ragojee Bhoonslah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and Colonel Collins further requires that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will

state, without reserve, whether it be his present wish and intention to maintain and preserve the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between his sirdar and the British Government.

‘ Finally, in performance of his duty, Colonel Collins apprizes the Maharajah, that should he now refuse or delay to give explicit answers to the foregoing questions, and continue with his army south of the Nerbudda, such refusal or delay will be regarded by his Excellency as an avowal of hostile designs on the part of this court against the British government: Colonel Collins therefore hopes that motives of moderation and justice, as well as a proper sense of his own interests, will induce Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to act on the present occasion conformably with the relations of amity which have so long subsisted between the two states, and which have never been violated on the part of the English, and consistently with the declaration that he (the Maharajah) made to the Colonel on the 29th of Zeacadeh (24th March): but should the Maharajah decline giving Colonel Collins the satisfaction which he now demands, in this case the Colonel requests that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will furnish him with a party of horse to escort him as far as Aurungabad, together with supplies of grain sufficient for the subsistence of his sepoy and followers, until their arrival at that city.

‘ J. COLLINS.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 15th June, 1803.

‘ Amrut Rao’s vakeel has just been with me, and has expressed a most anxious wish to have an answer to his letter. He says that Amrut Rao has seen a letter from Anund Rao Holkar to Jeswunt Rao, in which the former states that the Peshwah had informed him that Amrut Rao was in treaty with the English, and his Highness recommended, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar should seize him. Amrut Rao, therefore, pretends to apprehend that he is in some danger in his present situation at Nassuck, and he has desired to have a letter from me, authorizing him to come to Sungum-nair, or even to this camp, for protection; or that I should consent to his increasing his forces so as to provide for his own safety.

‘ In answer I told him, that I saw clearly that Amrut Rao’s situation was delicate, but that I could do no more than urge the Peshwah to state what answer should be given to this letter; that if I advised him to go to Sungum-nair, he might be disturbed by the Peshwah’s troops; that if I advised him to come here, I might be obliged to reduce him to the alternative of staying without a provision from the Peshwah, or of going off again, if his Highness should not consent to pardon him; and that, besides, his Highness might have some reason to complain if I was to receive into my camp, as a friend, a person whom he should consider as an enemy.

‘ In respect to his proposal, that I would consent to his increasing his forces, I could not recommend that measure, as I knew that he must provide for them by the plunder of the country, which would only bring him into fresh difficulties.

‘ The vakeel then remonstrated respecting the plunder of Amrut Rao’s servants at Poonah, and other places within the Peshwah’s reach, in which they resided. In answer to this I observed, that this misfortune was the consequence of the state of enmity in which the brothers were, and that their reconciliation would be the only remedy for it. In answer to his request, that we should interfere in their favor, I observed, that would produce no good, and might probably draw from the Peshwah an observation, that we made friends of his enemies. The vakeel then said, we can retaliate, and have people in our power on whom we can be revenged. I answered, I could not recommend this, because it would be a breach of Amrut Rao’s engagements with me, in consequence of which I had undertaken to make his peace with the Peshwah; that the principle of that measure was a desire on his part to be forgiven by his sovereign, which desire would be but ill manifested by an attack on his servants and adherents. It is very desirable, on many accounts, that this man should have an answer soon; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will urge the Peshwah to come to a decision on the subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Memorandum transmitted by Lieut. Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah, to the Governor General.

‘ His Highness the Peshwah, having been made acquainted

with the substance of the correspondence between Amrut Rao and Major General Wellesley, is satisfied that his brother is disposed to return to his family, and to abandon the rebellious. The Peshwah, therefore, is inclined, from motives of mercy, to forget what has passed, and it is his intention to allow Amrut Rao (on his returning to the path of his duty) country to the amount of four lacs per annum, as long as he continues to obey the Peshwah's orders, and resides wherever he may be directed. This offer will be made to Amrut Rao by Major General Wellesley, who will inform him, at the same time, that he must come up to camp in ten days after the receipt of this offer, or else it will not be considered as valid, and he will be then treated as a rebel, and an enemy to the state.'

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

'SIR, 'Camp at Augah, 18th June, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant and its enclosures. I had already directed Colonel Stevenson to march upon Aurungabad, and I now enclose a copy of the instructions which I have given to that officer with a view to the future security of that place.

'I understand that Meer Khan has withdrawn to the northward, and it is probable that he has heard of the disinclination of the Nizam's government to hire all his troops.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Stevenson, commanding the Subsidiary force of the Nizam.

'SIR, 'Camp at Augah, 18th June, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter, and a copy of its enclosure, which I have received from Major Kirkpatrick, from which it appears that it is the intention of the Nizam's government, that the person who has hitherto been in charge of the fort of Aurungabad, should be deprived of his charge; that it should be delivered to the person who may appear to Rajah Mohiput Ram, and the British officers, to be most fit for the trust; and that such measures and arrangements should be adopted as will tend to the security of that

fort, in case the course of operations should draw the troops in the field to a distance from it.

‘ I observe that Rajah Mohiput Ram is referred to me upon all these points ; but as some time must elapse before I can reach Aurungabad ; and as you know as well as I do, what measures ought to be adopted upon this occasion, I must beg you to consult with Rajah Mohiput Ram, and to make such arrangements for the security of Aurungabad as you may think best.

‘ I think it probable that the garrison at present in Aurungabad will refuse to give up the fort, unless an engagement is made to pay them their arrears. Rajah Mohiput Ram must determine whether the arrears are to be paid or not ; but, at all events, I request that the intention to make a new arrangement for the defence of the fort may be kept secret, till all your measures shall have been prepared to take possession of it by force, if the garrison should refuse to give it up.

‘ If Rajah Mohiput Ram should consent to pay the arrears, and the troops should desire that you would engage that they should be paid, you may make such an engagement, first taking care to have from Rajah Mohiput Ram a paper, by which he will engage that the Nizam’s government shall pay the sum required within a month.

‘ When you have settled this point with Rajah Mohiput Ram, you will call upon the commanding officer of the fort of Aurungabad to give it up, and you will give him two hours to consider of your demand.

‘ If the garrison should refuse to give up the fort on any grounds, you must attack it, and get possession of it by force ; but I request you to give strict orders that the place may not be plundered, and that no disorder may be committed by our troops, who may be employed on this service. The officers must recollect that many females of the Nizam’s family are in Aurungabad, and that his Highness would be more sensible of any injuries that they may suffer from the licentiousness of the troops, than he will be of the benefit which his government might derive from their valor and discipline.

‘ You will strongly urge Rajah Mohiput Ram to satisfy the present garrison of Aurungabad regarding their arrears ; and will point out to him, as a motive for attending to your recommendation, the possibility that disorders may be committed by

the troops on taking possession of the place, if they should be obliged to take it by force.

‘ After obtaining possession of the place, you will examine it, and see what number of men, ordnance, stores, &c., are necessary for its defence; you will call upon Rajah Mohiput Ram to supply those men, &c., if possible without weakening the force which is with you in the field; and you will make an arrangement with him for the quantity of provisions that may be required, which he also must take measures to lodge in the fort.

‘ It is reasonable to suppose that Rajah Mohiput Ram must know best to whom the Nizam is desirous of giving charge of this fort in future, and you will place there as killadar whom ever he may point out.

‘ You will observe, by the enclosed paper, that the present killadar of Aurungabad is to be sent to Hyderabad: of course care must be taken to secure his person at the time that you will summon the fort to surrender, if he should be still in your camp. The troops in the fort may be suffered to depart whenever they please, or may be disposed of in such manner as Rajah Mohiput Ram may think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Rony, 19th June, 1803.

‘ I received accounts yesterday that Holkar has moved to the northward: it is reported in his camp, that he intends to cross the Taptee and the Nerbudda, and to take up his quarters for the rains in the Holkar territories. It is also reported that his march to the northward was made with a view to approach Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar: Amrut Rao’s vakeel, who is in this camp, informed me this day, that Holkar had crossed the Taptee, and that it was his intention to enter that part of Guzerat lying between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda. He certainly moved off from the neighbourhood of Chandore very suddenly, and made long and forced marches, leaving behind every body and every thing that could not keep up.

‘ I know that the rains began to the northward on the 7th, and that it rained violently on the 8th, 9th, and 10th; and

I concluded that his object in making these forced marches, at that very time, was to get across the Taptee before that river should fill, of which there must have been a great probability.

‘ I think that if Holkar has crossed the Taptee there will be no confederacy. There has been no further account of the irruption into Guzerat south of the Taptee, since that which I sent you on the 14th, and I conclude that my conjectures upon that subject are correct.

‘ We have had much rain in this quarter, and I am sorry to say, that I was obliged this day to leave behind 500 loads of stores, and 100 of provisions; notwithstanding that at a muster, taken on the 15th, both departments were complete, and the provision department had 500 bullocks more than there were loads. Since that day, that department has lost 850 bullocks, and the stores about 600. Individuals, brinjarries, bazar people, &c., have suffered in proportion, and the distress is very great. The gun cattle, however, are still in style, but it is the consequence of great exertion.

‘ I have experienced these difficulties before, and have surmounted them; and I shall surmount those which we at present feel, if I can get any assistance from Poonah; or if the Peshwah will only send a man to take charge of the government of the country; or will give the smallest sign of our being friends, and here upon his business and with his knowledge and consent. Under existing arrangements, there is no government in the country; the heads of villages do as they please: I can find nobody to communicate with, and, of course, cannot command its resources.

‘ I do not know how the Peshwah manages his concerns; but we have not yet had the smallest assistance from Poonah of any kind. Notwithstanding my repeated requisitions to Colonel Close, and his request to the government, none of the sirdars have joined us, and as late as the 16th, had not quitted Poonah.

‘ The Peshwah’s servants are very profuse in promises, but very sparing in performance; and we have enjoyed so little of the resources of the country, which it is so obviously the advantage of the inhabitants to supply to us, that I am almost induced to suspect counteraction on the part of the government. I shall be convinced of it, if the Peshwah omits much

longer to write to Scindiah, of which I apprized you of the intention, but he has not yet written. If there are not now counteractions on the part of the Peshwah, certainly his government must be the weakest, and his people the most extraordinary existing in India. It is his interest that this force should be enabled to keep the field ; and that of his people to sell those of the resources of the country which are to enable us to do it. Yet we cannot get them ; and I think it very probable that I shall be obliged to cross the Beemah to be able to subsist upon the stores which I have collected at Poonah.

‘ I have written to all quarters for assistance in cattle, and I am doing everything I can in this country. I have also inquired of Colonel Stevenson, whether he can afford to share with me his supplies of rice. I shall struggle hard to avoid this movement ; but I think it proper to apprise you of the possibility of it, and of the circumstances which may occasion it.

‘ The troops are healthy, notwithstanding the rain to which they have been exposed, and the cavalry horses are in good order ; but our great difficulty at the present moment is, to find grain for them : there is plenty in the country, but it is all hid in holes ; and, notwithstanding the price we pay, we get none that we do not dig up ; in short, we should be better off in an enemy’s country, and so I have told Colonel Close.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Honorable Court of Directors of the East India Company. (Extracts.)

‘ HONORABLE SIRS,

‘ Fort William, 20th June, 1803.

‘ 3. The intelligence of the important event of his Highness the Peshwah’s restoration to the exercise of his just authority in the Marhatta state, under the protection of the British power, must have afforded great satisfaction to your Honorable Committee. Every circumstance connected with that prosperous event justifies a confident expectation of the complete and pacific accomplishment of the beneficial objects of the late alliance with the Peshwah.

‘ 4. It is my duty, on this occasion, to express to your Honorable Committee the high sense which I entertain of the distinguished ability manifested by the Hon. Major

General Wellesley, in conducting the British detachment under his command from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah.

‘ 5. The documents forming the enclosures to this dispatch will afford to your Honorable Committee a full view of the considerable military skill with which Major General Wellesley surmounted the difficulties of his long and arduous march, and combined the various arrangements requisite to secure the supply and movement of his army, and the co-operation and junction of the troops from Hyderabad and Bombay. Your Honorable Committee will also observe with pleasure the prudence, address, and temper, with which Major General Wellesley conciliated the Marhatta states occupying the countries through which he passed; and you will approve the signal success with which he composed the various animosities and dissensions of the several Marhatta chiefs, and united that discordant and turbulent race in the common cause of the Peshwah and of the British government.

‘ 6. The particular attention of your Honorable Committee will be directed to the judgment, humanity, and activity, manifested by Major General Wellesley, in saving the city of Poonah from destruction, by the rapid march and seasonable arrival of the British troops. This happy event impressed the inhabitants of that city with the most favourable opinion of the British power. It is a circumstance equally honorable to our character, and propitious to our interests in that quarter of India, that the first effects of the British influence in the Marhatta dominions should have been displayed in rescuing the capital of the empire from impending ruin, and its inhabitants from violence and rapine.

‘ 7. It will be satisfactory to your Honorable Committee to be informed, that his Highness the Peshwah has expressed the utmost degree of admiration in observing the promptitude, energy, and success of those exertions to which his Highness is indebted for his restoration to his government and dominions; and that the conduct of Major General Wellesley and of Lieut. Colonel Close, on this occasion, has apparently established in his Highness’s mind, the most implicit confidence in the good faith, justice, and power of the British government, and in the valor, skill, and integrity of its officers, with a high sense of the benefits which his Highness must derive from the

operation of the late alliance on every branch of his interests and affairs.

‘ 13. Your Honorable Committee was informed, by Lieut. Colonel Close, of the exactions levied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar upon his Highness the Nizam’s city of Aurungabad. No reason exists to countenance an apprehension that these depredations on the Nizam’s territory are connected with the supposed confederacy between Holkar and Scindiah. Destitute of any permanent resources, Holkar is compelled to supply his exigencies by indiscriminate plunder. It is probable that Holkar has been induced to levy contributions from Aurungabad by the treacherous suggestions of the Nizam’s officer commanding at that station, who is believed to have participated in the booty.

‘ 14. Major General Wellesley, however, deemed it to be proper to direct Colonel Stevenson to advance with the whole of the Nizam’s subsidiary force towards Aurungabad, for the eventual protection of his Highness’s dominions. I have lately received information that Holkar has retired with his army from the Nizam’s frontier towards the northward.

‘ 15. The judicious arrangement which Major General Wellesley has effected for the disposition of the troops under his command is calculated to meet every exigency of affairs. Even under the improbable supposition that Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, have really entertained designs of an hostile nature against the British government or its allies, our early state of preparation, and the formidable force which Major General Wellesley has opposed to every possible operation on the part of any or all of those chieftains, must effectually deter them from the prosecution of the war. In the same spirit of seasonable precaution, Lieut. General Stuart has judged it to be expedient to advance the army under his immediate command to a position which may enable him to co-operate with the troops under Major General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson.

‘ 22. Your Honorable Committee will be enabled to form a competent judgment of the danger to which the tranquillity of Mysore and of the Deccan would have been exposed by the uninterrupted progress of disorder and confusion in the Marhatta empire; and you will estimate the advantages which

have been derived from the success of the measures adopted by the British government for removing the scene of war from our frontier, and for restoring the foundation of peace and good order.

‘ 26. Reviewing the general state of affairs, your Honorable Committee will concur in the sentiments of confidence and satisfaction with which I reflect, that the final accomplishment of the arrangements happily commenced at Poonah is entrusted to the approved abilities of Major General Wellesley and of Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ 27. In closing this dispatch, it will be satisfactory to your Honorable Committee that I should add my expectation, that the necessary expense of the late military operations in the Peninsula is not likely to occasion any derangement in the general prosperity of the finances of the Company in India, or in the accounts or services of the current year.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ WELLESLEY.

‘ *To the Hon. the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.*

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 21st June, 1803.

‘ A man has arrived here from Holkar’s camp this day: he left that chief on the other side of the Taptee, with his treasure, and 7000 or 8000 people, whom he calls maunkaries; one campoo was gone farther to the northward, two other campoos were on this side of the Taptee with the Tope kannah, unable to move on account of the rain, and for want of cattle; and Meer Khan and Shahamut Khan were to the southward of those campoos: the distress in Holkar’s camp was great, the loss of cattle had been immense, and grain as dear as two seers for a rupee; the people were deserting fast, and Holkar had been obliged to bury many cannon.

‘ The reports of the camp are, that he is going to Guzerat, and that he is going to winter and recruit in the Holkar territories north of the Nerbudda: he has much treasure with him on elephants: the Taptee was filling.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th. There appears certainly to have been a mistake or misunderstanding between Colonel Stevenson and Rajah Mohiput Ram, in respect to the share of the expense of hiring the troops under Meer Khan, which it was supposed the British government would defray. In consequence of my orders, however, upon that subject, Colonel Stevenson has set Meer Khan right, in regard to the British government being bound by his letter to that chief, by a second letter, written with the knowledge of the sirdars in the Nizam’s service. It appears, also, that Meer Khan is not inclined to enter the Nizam’s service, even with the number of troops which Colonel Stevenson proposed to entertain. Upon the whole, therefore, I do not conceive that any inconvenience will result from these letters, or from the misunderstanding between Rajah Mohiput Ram and Colonel Stevenson.

‘ It would certainly be desirable to discover whether Rajah Mohiput Ram really misunderstood Colonel Stevenson’s intention, or wilfully deceived his employers. But, considering all the circumstances of the present moment, I believe that it would be best to defer the inquiry to a future period.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 24th June, 1803.

‘ I have received from Sir William Clarke a copy of his letter to you of the 15th. I have no observation to make upon it, excepting in respect to the position which he recommends upon the Tenim ghaut. It might answer from the month of November to the month of May; but during the other months of the year, I imagine, indeed I know, that the rain is more violent in those ghauts than it is in the lower countries; and it is doubtful whether one European would survive, being in camp there during the rainy season. The position upon the Tenim ghaut may be a good one hereafter; but it must be after the rains, and advantage must be taken of the ensuing fair season to build barracks, at least for the European troops.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Close tells me that he sends you copies of the dispatches received from Colonel Collins, so that I do not copy for you those that he transmits me for perusal. As far as the 18th, matters were still in an undecided state in that quarter. Holkar had certainly crossed the Taptee. A man of mine saw him cross that river, and after that he had made one march from it on the 15th, so that the confederacy had not then been formed. I am sorry to observe, however, from the report of a conference between Colonel Collins’s moonshee and the Rajah of Berar, that the former said that I was to attack Holkar; and I see that the Peshwah has written the same to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. These assertions are not founded in fact, and as it is probable that Holkar holds off from the confederacy, they may be very impolitic at the present moment, as the belief of them may oblige that Chief to throw himself upon the others, as the only resource for his safety.

‘ It is obvious, from all the proceedings at Scindiah’s camp, that there is some consideration which operates upon that Chief and the Rajah of Berar, to induce them to delay the decision, whether there shall be a war or not. It cannot be a sense of the risk which they must incur in the contest; because they must be well aware that, although the treaty of Bassein interferes with their projects of ambition, it provides effectually for the security of each against the force of the Peshwah; I conclude, therefore, that the cause of the wished-for delay is, that Holkar has not yet consented to their plans. It is not improbable but that he insists upon certain cessions from Scindiah as the price of his becoming a member of the confederacy. If I am correct in this conjecture, the assertion that I was to attack Holkar may have very bad consequences.

‘ I think that it cannot be sufficiently lamented that we have not a communication with Holkar, or that the Governor General is not nearer the scene of operations and negotiations, or has not empowered some person to conclude with those chiefs at once. Our negotiators are able men certainly; but in apparently trifling points I have observed that they have more than once deviated from the general plan of the negotiation; and when a fault has occurred, it has not been possible to apply a remedy without a reference to Bengal, which takes two months. That which I have above mentioned is one of those errors; and the pains which Colonel Collins took for

some time to persuade Scindiah to march towards Poonah is another.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that my losses of cattle have been so great, and such the conduct of my brinjarries, that I am likely to be reduced to some distress. I marched from Poonah with 4400 brinjarry bullocks, loaded with rice, and 1550 loads of rice in the grain, and 100 loads, or five days’ provisions, in the provision department. Besides this, the sepoy had eight days’ rice with them. By issuing a reasonable quantity daily to the bazaar, this rice would have lasted about sixty days; and if the supplies which I expected by means of the Poonah brinjarries did not come up, it was my intention to stop entirely the issue to the bazaar at the end of a month, and to depend upon the country for the consumption, and to give rice only to the troops.

‘ The great loss of cattle, however, which we have had since the day we marched from Poonah obliged me to begin by leaving behind 500 loads, and to encourage, rather than discourage, the consumption of rice. Besides, the brinjarries have been obliged to leave behind some, and to dispose of other rice in the villages, for the relief of their cattle; and the result of every thing is, that I have not at this moment more rice in camp than will last the troops, at half a seer per diem, eighteen days. We are, however, in a plentiful country, from which we get large supplies of wheat flour, and the bazaar is well supplied with that food. I propose, also, to issue that food to the sepoy alternately with rice.

‘ Under all these circumstances, it is difficult to decide what steps are to be taken. In all views of the question, I am afraid that I have no hopes of a supply from Poonah, although the means of that city are immense; and although I have a depôt formed there, amounting to 8000 bags of rice, Colonel Close has not yet been able either to purchase or hire one bullock to carry off a load of it, nor has one bazaar man or trader from Poonah attended this camp with supplies. It is not possible to believe this fact and that the Peshwah is true to the cause: in fact, it must require more than mere apathy to prevent the traders of Poonah from following a course which must be so advantageous to them.

‘ But if I can expect nothing from Poonah, what must be my plan to save the troops from the distress which is hanging over them? We may be immediately involved in hostility, or

the state of doubt may continue. If we are involved in hostility, I must attack and get possession of Scindiah's fort of Ahmednuggur, which will secure the resources of this country, and probably enable me to carry on war. From the account I have received of the state of that fort, I have no fear of the success of this project.

‘ If this state of uncertainty is to continue, it appears absolutely necessary that I should keep my position north of the Beemah; but I have no resources to enable me to do it. I have written to Colonel Stevenson to know exactly what his resources are, and I have desired him positively to send me a supply of rice to the Godavery. But it is obvious that if I cross that river, I shall soon reduce him to the same level with myself; and it is possible that both detachments may be unable to carry on active operations at the moment at which their services may be required, unless Colonel Stevenson's resources are much more ample than I suspect them to be.

‘ I have also thought of moving into the Nizam's country, to recruit the cattle during the time of this state of doubt; but there is no rice in the Nizam's country, and I may at last be obliged to return towards Poonah, in greater distress than I should be if I were to go back at present.

‘ Another measure of which I have considered has been to divide this detachment, and send part to reinforce Colonel Stevenson, and part back towards Poonah. This appears to be attended with most advantage, and liable to least inconvenience; but then the services of that part of the corps which will be sent back to Poonah would be lost for the campaign. Their junction again, even if it should be possible to recruit them with fresh supplies and means of moving them, would be very difficult, if not impossible.

‘ It is obvious that in my determination upon this occasion, I must be guided in a great degree by what I hear from Colonel Collins. To withdraw the whole corps across the Beemah may be most advisable under certain circumstances; whereas, under others, it would be most advisable to separate and reinforce Colonel Stevenson with a part.

‘ You may easily conceive how unpleasant it is to me to write you these circumstances. Matters have turned out in the most unfortunate manner, and I have been disappointed in all the hopes of assistance which I had formed from Bombay,

Poonah, &c. We have not got one bullock from Mr. Duncan. I formed a large depôt at Poonah, with the hope that I should be able to get some assistance from the Peshwah's government to carry it on, or that my own cattle would have been able to return for it. But I have above informed you of the degree of assistance which I have received from the Peshwah's government; and the forage of Poonah was so expensive, particularly after the Peshwah's arrival, that the cattle got but little; it was of a bad kind, gave them little sustenance, and when they began to march, they died immediately; so far therefore from being able to return for fresh loads, they are not able to carry on those they have got. In short, we have discovered once more, that without assistance from the government of the country in which we are acting, we cannot carry on military operations at the distance of seven hundred miles from our supplies.

‘ I shall write to you again in a day or two.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 26th June, 1803.

‘ Since I marched from Poonah I have sustained a great loss in carriage cattle employed in moving provisions and stores for the troops under my command; and the consequence is, that the stock of provisions which I had, and which would have lasted for three months, is much reduced.

‘ From causes which it is not at present necessary to discuss, I have not been able to procure any assistance from the Peshwah's government, either to replace the loss of cattle which I have sustained, or to bring forward any part of the depôt of provisions which I had formed at Poonah, with a view to the possible want before the return of the fair season; and it appears clearly that I must find means of subsistence, and of bringing forward the provisions collected at Poonah, independently of the Peshwah's government.

‘ Whatever may be my success in effecting these objects, I fear that, when I shall cross the Godavery, I shall be obliged to call upon Colonel Stevenson for assistance; and having taken into consideration the state of his supplies, in order that I might be enabled to judge whether he could afford me the

assistance which I might require, I find that although the provision made for him is so ample as to secure his subsistence for three months, at least, he will suffer inconvenience before that time, if he should be obliged to supply me with any part of it. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of sending towards Colonel Stevenson's army about 5000 bullock loads of rice as soon as it may be practicable; and that a further supply of the same quantity should be sent in the middle of the month of August.

'The cause of the mortality among the cattle attached to the troops under my command has been the great length of the march they made from Seringapatam, in a very dry and hot season; during the greatest part of the march the majority of them suffered from a disorder to which all the cattle were liable in the last year, owing to the scarcity and badness of the forage at Poonah, and to the weather we have had since I marched from that place. The number of cattle lost by the brinjarries on this service has been so large, and the distance from Seringapatam is so great, that I much fear that I shall not be able to order up many more of this class of people from the Mysore country.

'I have no reason to expect any assistance from the Peshwah's government, at least till the conclusion of the rainy season, even if I should receive any at that period; and you will therefore observe, that I must rely in a great measure upon the means which you may be able to prevail upon the Nizam's government to bring forward.

'While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform you, that upon enquiry I find that the store formed at Dowlutabad consists entirely of dry grain and flour, and I believe that those at Kurdlah and Dharore are of the same description. You are aware that our native troops require rice.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'SIR,

'Fort William, 26th June, 1803.

'The present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and the security of the alliance lately concluded between his Highness the Peshwah and the British government, require that a temporary authority should be constituted at the least possible distance from the scene of eventual negotiation or hostilities,

with full powers to conclude upon the spot whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. In such a crisis, various questions may arise, of which the precise tendency cannot be foreseen, and which may demand a prompt decision. The issue of these questions may involve the result of war or peace, and, in either alternative, the delay of reference to my authority might endanger the seasonable dispatch and the prosperity of the public service.

‘ 2. The success of the military operations, now placed under your directions, may depend on the timely decision of various political questions which may occur with relation to the interests and views of the several Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars, and of their Highnesses the Peshwah and the Nizam; on the other hand, the issue of every political arrangement, now under negotiation with the powers of Hindustan or the Deccan, must be inseparably blended with the movements of your army.

‘ 3. It is therefore necessary, during the present crisis, to unite the general direction and control of all political and military affairs in Hindustan and the Deccan under a distinct local authority, subject to the Governor General in Council. These powers could not be placed with advantage in any other hands than those of the general officer commanding the troops destined to restore the tranquillity of the Deccan.

‘ 4. Your approved ability, zeal, temper, and judgment, combined with your extensive local experience; your established influence and high reputation among the Marhatta chiefs and states; and your intimate knowledge of my views and sentiments concerning the British interests in the Marhatta empire, have determined me to vest these important and arduous powers in your hands.

‘ 5. The nature of your military command under the orders of his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart, is not likely to admit any doubt, or to lead to any embarrassment. In order, however, to obviate all possible difficulty on this point, I hereby appoint you to the chief command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies serving in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Nizam, or of any of the Marhatta states or chiefs, subject only to the orders of his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart, or of his Excellency General Lake.

‘ 6. I empower and further direct you to assume and exercise the general direction and control of all the political and

military affairs of the British government in the territories of the Nizam, of the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta states and chiefs.

‘ 7. The instructions addressed to the Resident at Poonah, under date the 30th ultimo, (of which the general substance had been previously communicated to the Resident by the note of the 7th of May,) convey to you full authority to carry into complete effect all the measures therein provisionally prescribed, as far as the accomplishment of those measures may depend upon your proceedings, without previous reference to my authority.

‘ 8. I hereby confirm that authority; and I further vest you with full powers to decide any question which may arise in the prosecution of the measures prescribed by those orders, according to the general spirit of my views and intentions concerning the affairs of the Marhatta state; directing you, however, to refer to me in all cases in which a previous reference to my authority may not appear to hazard the public interests. Under the same reservation, I authorise and empower you to commence and conclude negotiations with any of the Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars on the part of the British government, for the purpose of promoting the general objects of the alliance lately concluded with his Highness the Peshwah, or of that subsisting with his Highness the Nizam.

‘ 9. This general authority especially empowers you, either directly, or through the representatives or officers of the British government, to negotiate and conclude any engagements with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with the Rajah of Berar, or with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which may induce those chieftains to retire with their forces within the limits of their respective dominions, or to afford any other satisfactory pledge of their respective pacific intentions towards the British government and its allies. You will be careful to form any such engagements on principles conformable to the dignity, honor, and interests of the British government and of its allies, and to the spirit and tenor of our subsisting treaties; you are also authorised, under this instruction, to arbitrate, on the part of the British government, the terms of any convention between his Highness the Peshwah and those chieftains respectively, for the settlement of mutual differences or demands, or for the adjustment of relative pretensions, and to pledge the guarantee of the British govern-

ment for the observance of those terms by the contracting parties. You are also empowered to arbitrate and guarantee the terms of accommodation between Scindiah and Holkar, if any points should yet remain unadjusted between those chieftains; and to frame, negotiate, and guarantee any terms between those chieftains, jointly or separately, and the Rajah of Berar. It is my particular intention by these instructions to enable you to conclude such arrangements with any of those chieftains, either separately or combined, as may preclude or frustrate any confederacy, or other measures directed to the subversion of the treaty of Bassein, or to the injury of our rights and interests, or those of our allies.

‘ 10. You are also empowered to conclude such engagements with any subordinate chieftains of the Marhatta state, as may appear to you to be expedient for the purpose of securing their co-operations in the event of hostilities between the British government and Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or any other power; you are authorised further to adopt the necessary measures for conciliating the obedience of the subordinate chiefs to the Peshwah’s authority.

‘ 11. In the actual relation of the British government to the Peshwah, we possess the right of securing to the chiefs and jaghiredars of the Marhatta empire the satisfaction of their just and equitable claims, even independently of any direct act of the Peshwah’s government; the exercise of that right becomes a duty in proportion to the danger with which the tardy, infirm, or erroneous proceedings of the Peshwah’s government may menace the security of the alliance, and the stability of his Highness’s legitimate authority.

‘ 12. The policy of the treaty, and my inclinations, would induce me to limit our interference in the internal affairs of the Peshwah’s government within the most moderate bounds. I am determined, however, to pursue that course which shall lead most directly and speedily to the full restoration and establishment of his Highness’s authority on a permanent basis, and to the efficient operation of the benefits of the alliance. If the imbecility of his Highness’s council, the defect of his personal character, or the intrigues of his servants, should tend to frustrate or to retard the accomplishment of those salutary objects, the provisional interference of the British power must be seasonably and firmly applied, to rescue his Highness from

the immediate effect of evils which cannot be suffered to operate for a moment, without the hazard of every interest which the treaty of Bassein was destined to restore and confirm.

‘ 13. You will therefore proceed without delay to conclude all such arrangements with his Highness’s jaghiredars, and servants of all descriptions, as may appear to you to be necessary to enable you to meet the exigencies of the present crisis; and you will not abstain from the most direct and even ostensible interposition of the British authority, which may, in your judgment, be requisite to secure the exertions, to animate the zeal, or to reward the services of the Peshwah’s subjects and servants in the common cause of his Highness and of his allies. Whatever immediate expense may be necessary for this purpose, will be defrayed at present by the British government, and will hereafter become a charge against the Peshwah, as being inseparably connected with his Highness’s restoration and establishment.

‘ 14. All such engagements as you may conclude with his Highness the Peshwah, and with any of the Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars, or other powers, will be confirmed by me under the limitations and restrictions herein prescribed.

‘ 15. Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at the courts of Poonah, Hyderabad, at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and in the territories of the Guickwar; with directions to those several authorities to assist you, and to co-operate with you in all points connected with the efficient exercise of the powers with which you are hereby invested.

‘ 16. In exercising the powers hereby entrusted to your sole discretion, I direct you to hold the most unreserved and confidential intercourse with the Residents at Poonah, at Hyderabad, and at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and also with the Resident in the territory of the Guickwar; and you will regularly correspond with Lord Clive and with Mr. Duncan.

‘ 17. You will necessarily continue to receive the orders of his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart, and to submit a full view of all your operations to the direction of his Excellency. I particularly enjoin you to submit to his Excellency the earliest information of your proceedings of a political nature under these instructions.

‘ 18. If circumstances should render it necessary for his Ex-

cellency Lieut. General Stuart to unite the whole force of the army in the field, and to assume in person the general command in the Deccan, in that case I hereby vest the authority conveyed to you, by this dispatch, in his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart; under the fullest confidence that he will exercise it with the same advantage to the public service which I have uniformly derived from the exertion of his Excellency's distinguished talents, experience, and virtues.

‘ 19. In the case supposed, I empower his Excellency to delegate the whole, or any part of the said authority to you; and I desire that in exercising the said authority, or any part thereof, in his own person, his Excellency will be pleased to communicate fully with you, and to receive your advice and opinion.

‘ 20. In the execution of these instructions, I authorise and direct you to employ any additional military staff; and to require the services of any civil officers, whose assistance you may deem necessary, to the dispatch of the arduous affairs connected with the subject of this order.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 27th June, 1803.

‘ 1. The conduct of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, requires a special notification to you of my views and intentions with regard to the operations of your army, and to such political proceedings as may be connected with a state of war between the British government and those chiefs.

‘ First. On the receipt of this dispatch, you will desire Colonel Collins to demand an explicit declaration of the views of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, within such a number of days as shall appear to you to be reasonable, consistently with a due attention to the period of the seasons, and to the facility of moving your army, and of prosecuting hostilities with the advantages which you now possess.

‘ 2. If that explanation should not be satisfactory on such grounds as, in your discretion, you may state to Colonel Collins, you will desire Colonel Collins to repair to your camp under a proper escort.

‘ 3. In this event, or in any other state of circumstances

which may appear to you to require hostilities, consistently with the general tenor of my instructions, you will employ the forces under your command in the most active operations against Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, or against both, according to your discretion.

‘ 4. It is probable that the state of the rivers will afford great advantages to your army, and will embarrass the enemy in a considerable degree, if hostilities should commence during the rainy monsoon. In this event, I direct you to use your utmost efforts to destroy the military power of either or of both chiefs, and especially of Scindiah, and to avail yourself of every advantage which circumstances may offer, to the utmost extent of the strength of your army. It is particularly desirable that you should destroy Scindiah’s artillery, and all arms of European construction, and all military stores which he may possess.

‘ 5. In the event of hostilities, you will therefore proceed to the utmost extremity which may appear to you to promise success, without admitting pacific negotiation until the power of the opposing chief shall have been completely destroyed. In such case, the actual seizure of the person of Scindiah, or of Ragojee Bhoonslah, would be highly desirable, and the state of the rivers may perhaps favor such an advantage.

‘ 6. In any crisis which may exist under the terror of your approach, or at any time after hostilities shall have actually commenced, I empower you to conclude peace with Scindiah, or with the Rajah of Berar, jointly or separately, on such terms as may appear to you most advisable. I shall, however, state to you the objects most desirable, in the event of any treaty with either or with both those chiefs, founded on their aggression and on our success or power.

‘ 7. The entire reduction of Scindiah’s power would certainly afford considerable security to our interests; in the event, however, of a peace with Scindiah, which should leave his power in existence among the states of India, the most desirable arrangements would be:—First, That Scindiah should cede to the company all his possessions, rights, and pretensions, within the countries to the northward of a line drawn from the north frontier of Gohud, to the frontier of Jynagur, together with all his possessions, &c., to the northward of Jynagur.—This cession would include Agra, Delhi, and the remainder of

the Dooab, of the Jumna, and Ganges. The Mogul's person would necessarily fall under our protection. This article must be a special stipulation of treaty. Our frontier towards the ceded provinces of Oude would then be formed by the small state of Gohud, and by the Rajpoot states of Jynagur and Jeypoor.—The Ranah of Gohud to become tributary to the Company; Gwalior to be occupied by the Company. Defensive alliances to be formed with Jynagur and Jeypoor. By this arrangement the Marhattas would be excluded from the north of Hindustan, and from communication with the Seiks.—2ndly, Scindiah to cede Baroach, and all his maritime possessions.—3rdly, Scindiah to cede all his possessions, rights, &c., in Guzerat.—4thly, Scindiah to cede all his possessions, &c., southward of the Nerbudda.

‘ 8. Arrangements might be made for a partition of these cessions with the Peshwah and the Nizam. In the event of hostilities with Scindiah and Holkar, and of the complete defeat of those chiefs, the most distinct arrangement would be to take for the Company all the territories, rights, or pretensions of Scindiah and of Holkar, to the northward and westward of the Nerbudda, and to make that river the boundary of the northern frontier of the Peshwah, giving to the Peshwah all the territories, &c., of those chiefs to the southward of the Nerbudda, with the exception of all sea ports, which must be reserved to the Company. Bundelcund is properly subject to the Peshwah. It would be desirable to obtain that province for the Company, with a view to secure the navigation of the Jumna, and to the further security of the province of Benares.

‘ From the Rajah of Berar I should wish to acquire the whole province of Cuttack, so as to unite the northern sircars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal.—This cession, including Balasore, &c., to be made either absolutely, or upon payment of a moderate rent, or as a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominions of the Rajah of Berar. The district of Gurrah Mundela has been an object to the Nizam. This object is to be pursued, according to circumstances, in the event of war with the Rajah of Berar. Without securing one or other of these advantages, you will not make peace with the Rajah of Berar, after he shall have compelled you to resort to hostilities against him, unless, in your discretion, you should deem peace with the Rajah of Berar advisable on different terms.

‘ 9. You are at liberty, generally, to modify the terms of peace herein suggested, at your discretion; or to change them altogether, if it should become advisable to detach any chief from the confederacy.

‘ 10. If Holkar should join the confederacy, you will act towards him on the principles of the preceding instructions. It is not desirable to erect Holkar’s accidental power into an established state of India. This reduction would certainly be the most advisable policy; but the conduct and modification of our relations with Holkar must be left entirely to your discretion. You will not, however, prosecute hostilities against Holkar, merely for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the plunder of Aurungabad, or for any other predatory incursions; such question may be reserved for amicable negotiation.

‘ 11. In the event of hostilities, you will take proper measures for withdrawing the European officers from the service of Scindiah, Holkar, and of every other chief opposed to you.

‘ 12. You are at liberty to incur any expense requisite for this service, and to employ such emissaries as may appear most serviceable. You are also at liberty to enter into such engagements as may appear advantageous with any of Scindiah’s ministers, chiefs, or servants, or with those of the Rajah of Berar or of Holkar; and to afford any useful encouragement to the party of the Bheys, or to any others in the dominions of any of the confederate chiefs.

‘ 13. In the event of hostilities, I propose to dispatch proper emissaries to Gohud, and to the Rajpoot chiefs. You will also employ every endeavor to excite those powers against Scindiah. I propose to engage to guarantee their independence, and to secure to them any other reasonable advantages which they may require. The independence of the Rajpoot chiefs would constitute a power which would form the best security to our north-western frontier in Hindustan, in the supposition of Scindiah’s reduction.

‘ 14. You will apprise his Excellency General Lake, through the most expeditious channel, (if any more expeditious communication should offer than through Calcutta,) of your plan of political and military operations under these instructions.

‘ 15. Scindiah’s retreat across the Nerbudda (after his insolent and hostile declaration to Colonel Collins of the 28th of May) will not alone be a sufficient proof of his pacific inten-

tions : unless, therefore, Scindiah shall have afforded full satisfaction and security in your judgment, you will pursue him across the Nerbudda, if you should deem that movement advisable for the purpose of reducing his means of mischief.

‘ 16. The same principle applies to any movement of the Rajah of Berar or of Holkar. The retreat of Ragojee Bhonslah or of Holkar to any place situated within their respective territories, or elsewhere, will not exclusively amount to a sufficient degree of satisfaction and security, after the recent proofs which the confederacy has disclosed of determined hostility and arrogant ambition.

‘ 17. You will consider what steps may be taken to excite Cashee Rao Holkar against Jeswunt Rao ; and if, in prosecuting hostilities, you should be able to obtain possession of the person of Kundee Rao Holkar, you will avail yourself of that advantage.

‘ 18. The precise time of action from Oude and in Cuttack cannot now be stated ; but I will seize Agra, Delhi, take the person of the Mogul under British protection, and occupy the Dooab, together with Cuttack, at the earliest practicable moment after I shall have learnt that you deem hostilities inevitable, or as soon as such measures of precaution may appear to me to be requisite.

‘ 19. In the movements of your army, and in all your proceedings under these instructions, you will advert to the precarious state of the Nizam’s health, and to the necessity of preserving our interests at Hyderabad, in the event of his Highness’s decease. The Resident at Hyderabad will apprise you of the orders which he has received from me respecting the succession to the musnud of the Deccan.

‘ 20. Although a division of the French troops is already arrived at Pondicherry, and the remainder may be soon expected, I desire that you will not be induced, by that event, to precipitate an accommodation with any of the Marhatta powers. The effectual security of our interests in the Marhatta empire is the strongest barrier which can be opposed to the progress of the French interests in India ; the early reduction of Scindiah (if that chief should compel us to resort to hostilities) is certain, and would prove a fatal blow to the views of France. An imperfect arrangement with the Marhatta

powers, or a delay of active measures, might open to France the means of engaging, with advantage, in the affairs of the Marhatta empire.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’ ‘ WELLESLEY.

*Lieut. Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah,
to the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp near Jumner, 6th July, 1803.

‘ In the afternoon of the 4th instant I had an interview with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and with Ragojee Bhoonslah, at the tent of the latter chieftain. I was attended, on this occasion, by Captain Paris Bradshaw, Moonshee Mirza Bauker Khan, and Gunput Rao ; Sereedhur Punt, Cashee Rao, the eldest son, and the brother of the Berar Rajah, were present at this conference ; also Jadoon Rao Bhasker, Unna Bhasker, Eitul Punt, and Ambajee Ingolia, on the part of Scindiah.

‘ 2. After an interchange of compliments, I commenced the conversation by observing, that I had for some time past been extremely anxious to obtain an audience of those chieftains, in order to learn their final determination respecting the line of conduct which they intended to pursue, in consequence of the engagements lately concluded at Bassein between his Highness the Peshwah and the British government ; and I concluded with expressing my belief, that the result of the present meeting would enable me to assure your Excellency of the friendly disposition of both chieftains towards the British government.

‘ 3. Here I paused, in the expectation of a reply ; but as none was given, I proceeded to state, that the treaty of Bassein was purely of a defensive nature ; that it contained no stipulation whatever injurious to the just rights of any of the Deccany sirdars ; but, on the contrary, had expressly provided for the security and independence of the feudatory Marhatta chiefs ; that the principal object of the treaty of Bassein was to preserve the peace of India ; that your Lordship regarded Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah as the ancient friends of the Honorable Company, and was, on this account, willing to improve the existing connexion between their states and the British government. I insisted on the right of the Peshwah to contract engagements with the English, without consulting with any of the Marhatta sirdars ; I desired the

Berar Rajah would advert to the very clear exposition of the views and principles which induced the treaty of Bassein, as set forth in your Excellency's letter to his address, under date the 13th of last May; I observed, that this letter contained the most satisfactory proofs of the moderation and justice of the British government. Then, addressing myself to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I said, that, conformably to your Lordship's directions, I had already given the same explanation to him verbally; and I reminded the Maharajah of his having positively assured me, on the 24th of last May, that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the engagements lately concluded at Bassein. I then remarked, that I only required from him a confirmation of this assurance, together with a similar declaration on the part of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah; and, in conclusion, I declared, that it was your Lordship's earnest desire to promote the prosperity of their respective sircars; and that they might safely rely on the continued friendship of the British government, so long as they refrained from committing acts of aggression against the English and their allies.

‘ 4. Instead of making any observations on the foregoing discourse, Sereedhur Punt entered into a most tedious explanation of the conduct which ought to have been adopted by the Peshwah, previously to his forming a new treaty with the British government. He said, it had been invariably the usage on such occasions to consult with the Deccany sirdars; whereas Bajee Rao had acted, in the present instance, not only without the concurrence, but even without the knowledge, of Ragojee Bhoonslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, although they were his friends, and confessedly the most powerful chiefs in the Marhatta empire. This is the substance of the only material points urged by Sereedhur Punt. I replied, that his Highness the Peshwah had repeatedly written both to the Maharajah and to the Berar Rajah to repair to Poonah, but that these requisitions of his Highness had not been complied with; that in consequence the Peshwah was left without any means of defence against his enemies, except that which he derived from the English, to whom his Highness was solely indebted for the preservation of his life, honor, and dignity; I further observed, that his (the minister's) reference to old usages was inconclusive, inasmuch as no one instance had been adduced, tending

to prove that the Peshwah had not an undoubted right to enter into new engagements with the English, independently of the consent of any of the feudatory Marhatta chiefs ; and that, in fact, the only point for consideration was, whether Ragojee Bhoonslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah designed to oppose the completion of a treaty actually concluded between his Highness the Peshwah and the British government ?

‘ 5. Here again Sereedhur Punt made a long speech, containing, for the most part, professions of the friendly disposition which his master entertained towards the British government. He ended by remarking, that the English troops, having crossed the Godavery, were advancing towards the ghaut of Adjuntee. In consequence of which, he requested I would write to the Hon. General Wellesley, for the purpose of prevailing on him to recall that detachment. I excused myself from preferring any request of the kind ; and observed, that the British troops generally advanced when any army was approaching them, but never retreated. I then recurred to the question which I had so frequently stated. Sereedhur Punt said, that he had a great many remarks to make on the different articles of the treaty of Bassein ; I replied, that these remarks might be committed to writing, and hereafter be sent to your Excellency ; but in the mean time I expected he would answer my question. The Bhoonslah’s minister then objected, that the Peshwah had not, to this hour, informed either Scindiah or Ragojee of his having concluded a new treaty with the English. I reminded Sereedhur Punt of the duplicate letters which both the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah had received through me from his Highness the Peshwah, and in which his Highness expressly mentions having improved the friendship that had so long subsisted between his government and that of the Honorable Company. Both Jadoon Rao and Sereedhur Punt admitted the correctness of this statement ; but said, that their masters had never received the originals ; and gave me to understand, that they yielded no credit whatever to the duplicates. On this head much warm conversation ensued ; but both Sereedhur Punt and Jadoon Rao declared that it was necessary, for the satisfaction of the Bhoonslah and of Scindiah, that they should receive the foregoing information from the Peshwah himself ; and that, for this purpose, they intended deputing two con-

fidential persons to Poonah. In the mean time they assured me, that their masters had no design whatever to oppose any engagements which the British might have contracted with his Highness; and they also promised that their armies should not advance towards Poonah, nor ascend the Adjunttee ghaut.

‘ After giving these assurances, they requested I would endeavor to prevent the nearer approach of the British troops, under the command of Colonel Stevenson. I replied, that to evince the sincerity of their present professions, it was indispensably requisite that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Nerbudda, and the Bhoonslah repair to Nagpoor; that, while they continued in this quarter with their armies, it was impossible for your Excellency to rely on their friendly promises; and I added, that if the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah would immediately return to their respective capitals, that I had no doubt of obtaining the consent of the Honorable General Wellesley to withdraw his forces also. But although I persisted in contending and urging this point a considerable time, and did not fail to state that the continuance of the Marhatta armies in this quarter would most probably be productive of serious evils, yet I could obtain no satisfactory assurance either from Jadoon Rao or Sereedhur Punt, that Scindiah and the Bhoonslah would shortly return to their respective capitals; and hence I am inclined to infer that their friendly professions are insincere.

‘ 6. Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah both promised to send me letters on the following day for your Excellency, containing the strongest assurances of their determination to preserve and maintain the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between their states and the British government. I waited for these letters during the whole of yesterday: but as they are not yet sent to me, although this day be far advanced, I shall no longer defer the dispatch of my present address.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ J. COLLINS.

The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Governor General.

‘ I have received your Lordship’s friendly letter, testifying the conclusion of new engagements between his Highness the

Peshwah and the English Company, at Bassein, together with a copy of the treaty; and I have been fully apprized of every word of its contents, which have also been fully communicated to me by Colonel Collins.

‘Whereas the engagements subsisting between the Peshwah and me, are such, that the adjustment of all affairs, and of the concerns of his state and government, should be arranged and completed with my advice and participation; by the favor of God, through a regard to what is above stated, the degrees of mutual concord have so increased, that to this time no interruption or derangement of them has occurred on either side. Notwithstanding this, the engagements which may have lately been concluded between that quarter (British government) and the Peshwah have (only) now been communicated; and on the part of the Peshwah, to this time of writing, nothing. Therefore, it has now been determined with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, in presence of Colonel Collins, that confidential persons on my part, and the Rajah, be dispatched to the Peshwah, for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances of the (said) engagements. At the same time, no intention, whatever is entertained on my part to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, consisting of nineteen articles, which has been concluded at Bassein between the British government and the Peshwah, on condition that there be no design whatever on the part of the English Company and the Peshwah to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, which, since a long period of time, has been concluded between the Peshwah’s sircar, me, and the Rajah and the Marhatta chiefs.

‘Further particulars will be communicated by the letters of Colonel Collins. Let the receipt of friendly letters continue to be the means of gratification to me.’

Ragojee Bhoonslah, Rajah of Berar, to the Governor General.

‘I have received your Lordship’s four friendly letters in succession, notifying the conclusion of new engagements between his Highness the Peshwah and the English Company at Bassein, together with copies of the treaty; and I have been fully apprized of every word of its contents, which have also been fully communicated to me by Colonel Collins, who is with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on your Lordship’s part.

‘By the favor of God, since the first establishment of mutual

union, the degrees of concord and attachment have so increased, that, to this time, no interruption or derangement of them has occurred, nor is it in contemplation on this side to interrupt or derange them. Whereas, since a long period of time, the integrity of the Rajah, (meaning the whole Marhatta state,) and the identity of the affairs and concerns of the state and government have been such, that if any momentous affair, or political object arising out of the circumstances of the time occurred, the arrangement of it depending on mutual concert and communication; yet, notwithstanding this, the engagements which have lately been concluded between that quarter (British government) and the Peshwah have (only) now been communicated; and on the part of the Peshwah, to this time of writing, nothing. Therefore it has now been determined with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in presence of Colonel Collins, that confidential persons on my part, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, be dispatched to the Peshwah, for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances of the (said) engagements. At the same time, no intention whatever is entertained on my part to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, consisting of nineteen articles, which has been concluded at Bassein between the British government and the Peshwah, on condition that there be no design whatever on the part of the English Company and the Peshwah to subvert the stipulations of the treaty which, since a long period of time, has been concluded between the Peshwah's Sircar, me, and the said Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Marhatta chiefs.

‘ Further particulars will be communicated by the letters of Colonel Collins. Let the receipt of friendly letters continue to be the means of gratification to me.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Adjutant General.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp, 6th July, 1803.

‘ Affairs in this country have remained nearly in the same state for the last two months.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Holkar has withdrawn gradually from the frontiers of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and has at last crossed the river Taptee, with the greatest part of his army. Scindiah has remained encamped in the same place in the neighbourhood of Mulcapoor since the beginning of May, towards the latter end of which month, his army was joined by that of the Rajah

of Berar. It is reported, that both chiefs moved farther to the southward in the end of June; but I have received no accounts of their movements since the 27th of June. The existence of the combination of those chiefs with Holkar is still reported, but it is certain that there is no confidence yet among them.

‘ Colonel Stevenson crossed the Godavery, near Puttun, when I marched from Poonah, and he is now encamped in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad.

‘ The detachment has suffered a considerable loss in cattle since it marched from Poonah, occasioned immediately by the rain, but remotely by the length of the march which the cattle had made, the dearness and bad quality of the forage at Poonah, and by the want of care of the owners of the hired cattle.

‘ The brinjarries also have lost vast numbers of cattle: they consequently left behind and sold their grain in the villages; and there was some risk that I should be distressed for the want of rice.

‘ In a letter which I addressed to Government on the 24th of June, 1800, I pointed out to them the evils which attended the system in practice of hiring cattle for the service, of which evils the Commander in Chief has had experience in this campaign. It cannot be expected that it will answer for light detachments, or, indeed, for any body of troops which is obliged to move to any distance; and the expense which is incurred affords no security that the troops will enjoy, in the moment of need, the advantages of the stores and provisions for which the carriage is provided.

‘ On these grounds, when it has been necessary to procure additional bullocks, I have not made advances for them to the owners of the hired cattle; but I have preferred to increase the establishment of cattle belonging to the Government of Bombay, which I have brought with me, as you will observe by the orders of the 25th of May, enclosed herewith.

‘ The cattle will be purchased for the sum which I should be obliged to advance to the owners of the hired cattle to replace their losses; and, at least, I shall be certain of having some service for the expense incurred.

‘ I have been very successful in the purchase of bullocks, and have got nearly as many as will carry the stores I have in camp at present. I have also the pleasure to inform you, that

I have been able to bring up from Poonah such quantities of rice as have enabled me to issue that grain entirely to the troops again, and have removed all apprehension of a want.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Adj. Gen.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th July, 1803.

‘ There was a report in this camp yesterday, stating that the officer in command of a detachment coming from the Kalachabootra ghaut, on the river Kistna, with supplies of money and provisions, had been stopped at Perinda, in consequence of a dispute between some of the troops under his command, and those belonging to that fort. I knew that, as Major Dallas had not crossed the Kistna on the 5th, it was not possible that this report could be founded in fact; but it proved at least that the march of the detachment was known, and was a subject of conversation in the country; and as it is imagined that the killadar of Perinda is not faithful to the Nizam’s government, and he may have formed the plan to stop the detachment, which the report supposes that he has carried into execution, I have thought it proper to detach a body of Mysore horse, under the command of Bistnapah Punt, to Perinda, to join Major Dallas.

‘ I mention these circumstances to you, in order that you may apprise the Nizam’s government of them, in case any notice should be taken of the entry into his Highness’s territories of the body of horse under Bistnapah Punt.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 4th July.

‘ The difficulties under which I labored when I wrote to you on the 26th June, have been relieved, in some degree, by the supplies which I have received from Poonah, and by the success which I have had in the purchase of cattle in the country. The arrival of the cattle sent by General Stuart, if they should be in tolerable condition, will remove them entirely. I have besides expectations of the arrival of a convoy, now on its road from Mysore; and the prospect that I shall bring forward the Poonah brinjarries, is better than it was. But still it is very desirable that Colonel Stevenson

should receive some further supplies from Hyderabad. He will have informed you that, upon reckoning the bags in his camp, he found that he had not a supply of rice for his troops for more than twenty days; and, in consequence of this failure, I desired him to take for the use of his detachment the rice which had been collected at Moongy Puttun, and Aurungabad, for the use of my troops. He had also made an advance to the brinjarries for 5000 loads of rice. The supply sent to me by General Stuart is only 2000 bags; but I shall be able to get rice at Poonah to load the remainder of the bullocks.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th July, 1803.

‘ By my letter to the Adjutant General of yesterday’s date, you will observe that my situation is much improved. In fact, I am enabled to move again: and, if I am tolerably fortunate in respect to forage, of which my prospects improve daily, as the green forage is coming in, I hope to be able to get on well.

‘ Before you receive this letter, you will have seen how matters stood at Scindiah’s camp on the 29th June. I have not since heard from Colonel Collins; but I know that Scindiah had not moved farther to the southward on the 1st of July. Holkar was across the Taptee, with all his army, and Scindiah had sent two brigades, and a brigade of Ambajee Ingolia, across that river likewise, and the Nerbudda, as it was said, to Ougein. The report of the camp was, that Holkar was unwilling to join Scindiah; to which measure both Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar were pressing him most anxiously.

‘ It appears now, either that we shall have a war immediately, or a protracted negotiation with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, seated upon the Nizam’s frontier. If there should be war, I must proceed according to the original plan; if there should be a negotiation, I think that I should cross the Godavery, in order to press the conclusion and the result before the breaking up of the monsoon, and the fall of the rivers.

‘ I regret most exceedingly the necessity of your abandoning the excellent position which you had taken at Moodgul. It was that which gave us all strength and security, and pro-

vided effectually for the tranquillity of Hyderabad and the Nizam's territories, notwithstanding the absence of the army, and the expectation of the Nizam's death; and also for that of Poonah and the Marhatta territories, notwithstanding the weakness and the wavering conduct of the Peshwah. It threatened Meritch, by which the Putwurdun family, and all the southern chiefs are kept at least in a state of neutrality; and it provided effectually for the security and tranquillity of the territories of the Company, and the Rajah of Mysore.

'All these benefits, which are not attributed entirely, as they ought to be, to your position, will be lost when you shall recross the Toombuddra; and then, if we should have a war, our situation in this country will be uncomfortable. I should still hope, however, that Government will take this subject into their consideration, and will allot something like a corps of reserve for the security of the objects for which your commanding position at Moodgul has hitherto so well provided.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp, 9th July, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th of June, and I am infinitely obliged to you for the assistance which you propose to send to me. The road which Major Dallas will take will be convenient; and I believe that he will find more forage upon it than he could upon that on the other side of the Beemah. I shall send orders to meet him at Perinda.

'You will have observed by my last letters, that I am much recruited; but the supplies which you have sent are of the utmost consequence. There was a letter yesterday of the 2d, which gives more hopes of peace than we have had hitherto. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had separated, and the latter gone back to Mulcapoor; as he says, for want of carriage for his baggage; as Colonel Collins supposes, to afford another pretext for delay; but, as I believe, it is the prelude of their breaking up entirely.

'Colonel Close sends you a copy of this dispatch.

'There is no doubt but that Holkar is across the Taptee;

and the akbars from Scindiah's camp do not now conceal that the peace between those two chiefs is not concluded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 13th July, 1803.

‘ I think it proper to communicate to you a piece of intelligence, which one of my hircarrahs brought me yesterday. He says that, in consequence of discontent and want of money in the service of Holkar and Meer Khan, 4000 Patans, who had been in the army under the command of the latter, had quitted camp, under pretence of returning to their homes in the Cuddapa, &c., countries south of the Toombuddra. The hircarrah came with them from the camp as far as the neighbourhood of Toka, on the Godavery; where, hearing that I had a guard at Toka, over the boats, with a body of Mysore horse to watch the river, they turned off, intending to cross it below Puttun, in the Nizam's territories. They intended to separate and pass through those territories in different small parties. I have sent out to look after them, and, if they should be within my reach, I will try to take up some of them; but I fancy that they will keep at a distance from me. The name of the principal sirdar with them is Abdoolah Khan, and he belongs to Cuddapa.

‘ It may happen that the story they have told of themselves is true, and that they are going to their homes; as it is very certain that the distress in Holkar's camp, particularly in that commanded by Meer Khan, is great. When Colonel Stevenson's hircarrah went to him lately with a letter, he found him surrounded with armed men, some of whom had their swords and daggers at his throat, threatening to put him to death, if he did not produce money to satisfy their demands; and I have accounts that this was not the first time that he had been threatened in the same manner.

‘ But, on the other hand, it is hardly possible to believe that Meer Khan, Holkar, or even Scindiah, would allow those Patans, who are the best troops in the Marhatta armies, to depart, while there is a chance of a war with the Company's government, or a continuance of the contests between Holkar and Scindiah; which must be the case, if there should be no war with the Company.

‘ I am, therefore, induced to suspect that these Patans are sent to the southward for purposes entirely different from those given out, and that their object is to head a disturbance either in the Nizam’s territories or in the Ceded districts. At all events, their residence in the Ceded districts, while we shall be engaged in a war with the Marhattas, is not desirable; and, even if it should be permitted, they ought to be closely watched.

‘ You will be the best judge whether the force which will remain in the Ceded districts will enable you to seize the horses in that country, or to enforce a regulation to prevent horsemen from travelling through the country without a passport from the collector. At all events, this Abdoolah Khan ought to be closely watched.

‘ You will see by the letter from Colonel Collins of the 9th, which Colonel Close will send you, that the declarations of Scindiah, as well as of the Rajah of Berar, are pacific; but those Chiefs still intend to remain upon the Nizam’s frontier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Collins,
Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th July, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, and I have taken into consideration the subject upon which you have desired that I should communicate to you my opinion.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared in their letters to the Governor General, that they have no intention to obstruct the arrangement concluded at Bassein between the British government and the Peshwah; and that they are desirous of maintaining the relations of amity which so long subsisted between the British government and them, and that they will not ascend the Adjunttee ghaut, or march towards Poonah.

‘ I am sorry to observe, however, that they still intend to advance with their armies to the Adjunttee ghaut, upon the Nizam’s frontier, notwithstanding their peaceable declarations. These declarations have been preceded by others of a directly opposite tendency. The chiefs have declared, that they were united for the purpose of attacking the British government and

their allies; and Scindiah in particular has said, that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the English. Is the advance to the Adjunttee ghaut, which is the acknowledged boundary between the Marhattas and the Nizam, consistent with the hostile or with the pacific declaration? Upon this point there can be no doubt; there can be no use in assembling an army upon the Nizam's frontier, particularly at the present moment, when their services must be required elsewhere, excepting to attack the Nizam.

‘ But it may be asked, for what reason should these chiefs endeavor to deceive the British government, if their intentions are hostile? To this I answer, that their measures are not prepared; they have not yet brought Holkar into them; the British troops are prepared for action, and they are not; some valuable points in Scindiah's territories are exposed to the attacks of the British troops; and the British territories, and those of their allies, are defended at present at all points.

‘ By the delay of the commencement of hostilities, they hope to have matters better prepared; the rivers will fall, and Scindiah will have it in his power to make better arrangements for the defence of his territories; and, on the other hand, those belonging to the Company and their allies will lose the protection which all the forces give them at the present moment. Therefore I conclude that the advantage of delay is theirs; that they have made their pacific declarations in order to gain time; and that their real intentions are to be known only from their actions.

‘ If there had been no hostile declarations from Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, common prudence would have prevented us from viewing with indifference the assembly of their armies upon the Nizam's frontier, and the British government must have insisted upon their withdrawing. Pacific declarations would not, in that case, have been deemed sufficient security for the Nizam; nor can they in that at present under consideration, particularly as I have above pointed out the great advantages which those chiefs will derive from the delay to commence hostilities.

‘ I am therefore decidedly of opinion, that if the Rajah of Berar does not withdraw to Nagpoor, and if Scindiah does not remove his army to stations usually occupied by his troops, north of the river Nerbudda, their intentions must be con-

sidered hostile, and we ought to take advantage of our position to attack them without loss of time. Accordingly, I have written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I enclose, together with a translation of it.

‘ If you should find that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar remain encamped in the neighbourhood of the Nizam’s frontier, I request you to deliver that letter, unless you should be of opinion that a verbal communication from yourself of my sentiments and intentions would be more likely to induce that chief to withdraw ; or unless you should have other solid grounds for believing that he is sincere in his last declaration, and that his intentions are pacific. But, in my opinion, his declaration and his intentions cannot be trusted, unless he separates from the Rajah of Berar, removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences his march to Nagpoor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Collins.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th July, 1803.

‘ Appah Dessaye paid me a visit this morning, and entered much in detail into the situation of his affairs. He represented that he had not been able to obtain possession of any one of the places which had been made over to him by the Peshwah in jaghire, and that when his amildars had gone to the villages with the Peshwah’s sunnuds, they had been ill treated, their troops attacked, and his Highness’s sunnuds torn. He said that the Peshwah’s ministers had refused to consent to incur the expense of paying a proportion of the troops which had marched with me to Poonah. He had been obliged to discharge and pay the arrears of all above the number of 1000, for which he obtained grants of serinjumy lands ; and that, in order to pay those arrears, he had disposed of all the valuable property in his possession. That, under these circumstances, he had no means of paying his troops. He said that he had represented to the Peshwah’s ministers the probability that he should not be able to obtain possession of the districts for which he had sunnuds ; and that, at all events, if he should obtain possession of them, the lands would be in an uncultivated

state, the villages deserted, and that he should derive no benefit from them for some time; and he requested that he might receive 25,000 rupees per mensem to pay his troops, until he should derive some benefit from his jaghire. They had consented to his proposal, but hitherto they have paid him nothing.

‘I request you to ascertain from the Peshwah’s ministers, whether they did give Appah Dessaye to understand that he should receive 25,000 rupees per mensem, till he should be in the receipt of the revenues expected from his jaghire. If they did, I beg of you to urge them to pay him the money. At all events, whether they did or did not consent to this arrangement, it is very obvious that this body of the Peshwah’s troops has no fund from which it can draw its subsistence, and I request you to urge the Peshwah’s ministers to allot one which shall be available.

‘If the Peshwah’s ministers should avow that they had encouraged Appah Dessaye to expect that they would provide funds for the subsistence of his troops till he should receive the benefits to be expected from his jaghire; or if, in consequence of the representation which I now send you, they should consent to provide funds for the payment of Appah Dessaye’s troops, I will endeavor to assist that chief, and trust to future arrangements with the Peshwah for repayment of the sums which I may advance him.

‘I beg you to represent these matters to the Peshwah’s ministers, and to take every opportunity to urge them to provide means for the payment of his Highness’s troops.

‘In the course of the conference which I had with him this morning, Appah Dessaye produced an order which he had received from Suddasheo Munkaiseer, to proceed in concert with Bappojee Goneish Goklah to attack the troops of Amrut Rao, and dislodge them from some stations which they had occupied between Poonah and Nassuck, and to go as far even as to the latter place, to give assistance to the troops stationed there.

‘I beg you to remind the Peshwah’s ministers, that his Highness is bound, by his treaty with the British government, to produce an army of 16,000 men, to act with the British troops; instead of which number only 3000 men have been sent, and no provision has been made for the payment even of that number. You will be so kind as to represent to them,—

‘1st. That when a large body of the enemy’s troops are assembled upon the frontiers, and when the Rajah of Berar has in a public manner asserted his hereditary claim to his Highness’s musnud, it appears to be prudent not to fritter away the small force which his Highness has produced.

‘2ndly. That as long as those armies are assembled upon the frontiers, his Highness may depend upon it that his government will not settle, his orders and sunnuds will not be attended to, and his enemies will remain in possession of the lands which they have seized.

‘3dly. That no partial operation against Amrut Rao, or any other chief, even if it should be successful, can be attended by the benefits which must result from removing to a distance from the frontier the hostile armies which have assembled in the neighbourhood; but that this expedition against Amrut Rao’s troops cannot be successful, as, in fact, there are twice the number of them that there are of the Peshwah’s.

‘4thly. That the only chance of success against the hostile armies which have joined upon the frontier is, that our troops should be united, and that they should have no other object excepting to attack the enemy in the front.

‘5thly. That many rivers will divide these detachments with Goklah and Appah Dessaye from the British troops; that their co-operation with the latter will become impracticable; and that, upon the whole, I have taken upon me to prevent Appah Dessaye from going upon this expedition.

‘It appears by a letter from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that he has marched upon the expedition against Amrut Rao; although, in a letter which he wrote to me, he said that he removed to a distance from my camp only for the sake of forage. I propose, however, to endeavor to stop that Chief likewise, of which I beg you to apprise the Peshwah’s ministers.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘Camp, 14th July, 1803.

‘In consequence of the reports that you had confederated with other chiefs to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein, between the Honorable Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; of your military preparations, and your advance to the frontiers of the Nizam; and, above all, of your declara-

tion to the British Resident with your camp, that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the Company; I received the orders of his Excellency the Governor General to move with the troops to the frontiers, to take means of precaution, and to be prepared to act if you should carry your threats into execution.

‘The treaty of Bassein has since been communicated to you, and you must have observed that it provides amply for your security; and that, in consequence of this instrument, you will hold your territories in the Deccan by the same secure tenure that you have long held those in Hindustan bordering upon the Company’s frontier, notwithstanding your absence from them with your armies.

‘I perceive by your letter to his Excellency the Governor General, of which Colonel Collins has communicated to me a copy, that you have declared that you have no intention to commence hostilities against the Company or their allies, or to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein by the parties who had a right to enter into it.

‘I have accordingly the greatest pleasure in contemplating the probability of the duration of peace between the Honorable Company and your government, which has long subsisted with much benefit to both parties.

‘But if you are sincere in this declaration of your friendly intentions, there appears to be no occasion for assembling your army, and joining it with that of the Rajah of Berar, on the Nizam’s frontier.

‘That measure, uncombined with other circumstances, would at any time render necessary corresponding measures of precaution, the result of which would be either your removal from the frontier of the Company’s ally, or an appeal to arms; but when it has been accompanied by declarations of an hostile nature, when you have declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war between the Company and your government, it becomes more necessary that you should remove your troops to their usual stations.

‘Whatever respect I may have for your word, so solemnly pledged as it is in your letter to the Governor General to which I have alluded, common prudence requires that I should not trust to that alone for the security of the Company and their allies, which has been given to my charge.

‘Accordingly, I call upon you, if your professions are sincere, to withdraw, with your troops, to their usual stations across the river Nerbudda.

‘You were the first, by your hostile measures and declarations, and the expression of doubts of the duration of the peace between the Honorable Company and your government, and by the movement of your troops, to render necessary corresponding measures of precaution by the Company’s government; and you ought to be the first to withdraw your troops, if your intentions are really as pacific as you profess them to be.

‘When you shall have withdrawn your troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I also shall draw back those under my command to their usual stations.

‘But if unfortunately I should have learnt that, after the receipt of this letter, you have advanced towards the territories of the Nizam, or if I find that you do not commence the march of your troops towards their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I must consider your intentions to be hostile, notwithstanding your professions, as there can be no use in keeping your armies in the country, excepting for the purposes of hostility; and I shall immediately carry on those operations against you which are in my power, in consequence of the advantageous position of the Company’s armies.

‘In your letter to the Governor General, you have declared that you do not intend to oppose the arrangement concluded at Bassein, provided the arrangements of the Peshwah with you and Ragojee Bhoonslah, and other chiefs of the Marhatta empire, are respected. The treaty of Bassein secures your interests; and it is not consistent with that treaty, or with the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty: you may therefore be satisfied on that head.

‘*Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Amrut Rao.

‘Camp, 16th July, 1803.

‘I was in hopes that before this time I should have been enabled to communicate to you the final result of the repeated recommendation of your situation, which I have made to the

Peshwah, but hitherto his Highness has come to no decision in respect to your case. I feel most sensibly the difficulties under which you labor, and you must be convinced that I have done every thing in my power to remove them.

‘However, although I cannot at present tell you that any thing is absolutely settled for you with the Peshwah, you may depend upon it that the British government will take care that you shall have such a provision as will be gratifying to you, provided you continue in the manner in which you have conducted yourself since you last wrote to me.

‘*Amrut Rao.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘Camp, 16th July, 1803.

‘Much time has elapsed since I have had the pleasure of hearing from you, although I am anxious to cultivate the good understanding which has subsisted between the Honorable Company’s government and you.

‘With this view, I now send you a copy of the treaty concluded at Bassein between the Honorable Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; from the general defensive tenor of which you will observe, that the peace and security of India are provided for. You will also perceive, that the 12th article provides effectually for the security of all the great Marhatta jaghiredars, and that those of the Holkar family are particularly named. This article will satisfy your mind, notwithstanding the endeavors which have been made to raise your doubts; and you will see that the interest and security of your family are connected with this treaty, and that, in fact, they can be provided for in no other manner.

‘That being the case, whatever others may do, I have little doubt but that you will conduct yourself in the manner which your own interests will dictate, and that you will continue in peace with the Company.

‘I send this letter in charge of Kawder Nawaz Khan, a respectable officer, who enjoys my confidence, and who will explain any thing you desire to know respecting my wishes.

‘*Jeswunt Rao Holkar.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th instant, inclosing the copy of one which you had written to Lieut. Colonel Collins on that day.

‘ When I heard the report that the northern Marhatta chiefs intended to confederate, for the purpose of obstructing the Treaty of Bassein between the Honorable Company and his Highness the Peshwah, I was of opinion that it was necessary for the British government to lose no time in bringing those chiefs to a decision, whether there should be peace or war, and in obliging each of them to place his troops in their ordinary position.

‘ The grounds of this opinion were that two of the chiefs at least were in a state of determined and inveterate hostility against each other which it would require time to pacify. The season in which the rivers fill was approaching, during which the Marhatta armies find it difficult to carry on operations; and some of the most valuable of the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be exposed to our attacks. On the other hand, the rivers would cover the territories of the Company and of their allies, in a great degree, from the incursions of the Marhatta horse, and would protect our convoys.

‘ The most proper time, therefore, to press Dowlut Rao Scindiah to decide whether he would remain at peace with the Company, and to induce him to withdraw his army to Hindustan, as the only proof which he could give of his pacific intentions, would have been in the month of May; and as it appears that the peace between that chief and Jeswunt Rao Holkar is not yet concluded, and at all events, that Holkar is not yet united in councils with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, it is very probable that if Scindiah had been obliged to decide between peace and immediate hostility, he would have found himself under the necessity of adopting the former alternative.

‘ Since that period, six weeks of valuable time have elapsed; during which some progress must have been made in pacifying the hostility between Scindiah and Holkar, and in uniting their councils. We have gained nothing: on the contrary, we have consumed our resources, and the sup-

posed enemy is nearer to the frontier which we have to defend than he was. But still, to bring the question of peace or war to an immediate issue is attended with many advantages.

‘It is certain that the councils of the chiefs are not yet united. Holkar’s army is to the northward of the Taptee; and supposing him to be inclined to hostility with the Company, which I think there is reason to doubt, it is not possible that he can bring his forces to co-operate with those of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for a length of time. The swelling of the rivers still exposes to an attack many valuable points in Scindiah’s possession, and protects the territories of the Company and those of their allies, and the convoys going to the British armies.

‘It is obvious, however, that every day’s delay to bring Scindiah to a decision, and to force him to give the only proof of his pacific intentions, deprives us of part of these advantages; and therefore no time should be lost.

‘The declarations which have been drawn from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in their letters to the Governor General, are favorable, so far as they deprive those chiefs of their favorite pretence of hostility, viz., the injury they apprehended from the treaty of Bassein. They prove also most clearly, that the Chiefs are aware of the disadvantages under which they will labor by the immediate commencement of hostilities.

‘According to these sentiments, and finding by your letter of the 10th instant, that you agreed in opinion with me, I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a letter, a copy and translation of which have been already transmitted to you, and one to Lieut. Colonel Collins, of which also you have a copy. You will observe that in the former I have apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah of my intention to take advantage of the position of the Company’s troops to attack his possessions, if he should advance one step towards the Nizam’s frontier after the receipt of my letter; or if I found that he did not withdraw his troops to their usual stations north of the river Nerbudda.

‘I have not fixed when he should withdraw: First, because I wish to keep in my own breast the period at which hostilities will be commenced; by which advantage it becomes more probable that I shall strike the first blow, if I should find hostile operations to be necessary: Secondly, there is every reason to

expect instructions from the Governor General, applicable to the present situation of affairs in India, as well as in Europe. His Excellency must have received, by the 20th of June, the dispatches from England of the month of March, the intelligence of my march from Poonah, of the state of affairs at the Peshwah's durbar at that period, and of the state of the negotiation with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the end of May.

'Excepting that Dowlut Rao Scindia and the Rajah of Berar have made a public declaration, the sincerity of which must be doubted as long as their actions are not conformable thereto; that those chiefs have approached nearer to the Nizam's frontier; that more progress has been made in effecting the pacification between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Holkar, and more of the resources of the British troops have been consumed; circumstances are nearly in the state in which they were at the period of which the Governor General then received accounts.

'By avoiding to fix a day on which Scindiah must retire, I have it in my power to alter my course of action, in conformity to these instructions, in case that measure should be necessary.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. Col. Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Collins,
Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

'SIR,

'Camp, 18th July, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have received from his Excellency the Governor General, from a perusal of which you will perceive that his Excellency has been pleased to intrust to me extraordinary powers, for the purpose of concluding whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. I request you to be so kind as to communicate this circumstance to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

'You will be so kind, at the same time, to inform those Chiefs that, consistently with the principles and uniform practice of the British government, I am perfectly ready to attend to their interests, and to enter into negotiations with them upon objects by which they may suppose those interests to be

affected. But they must first withdraw their troops from the position which they have taken up upon the Nizam's frontier, and return to their usual stations in Hindustan and Berar respectively; and, on my part, I will withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. You will point out to those Chiefs, that, as they have declared they have no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, to withdraw their troops to their several stations is only consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they are sincere. On the other hand, to retain their position upon the Nizam's frontier is the strongest proof they can give of the insincerity of those declarations.

‘ You will, therefore, again call upon them to retire, as being the only measure by which the peace between the British government and them can be preserved.

‘ It may happen that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will urge the difficulty of crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, as an excuse for not withdrawing his troops at the present moment; that excuse will not apply at all to the Rajah of Berar, to whose return to Nagpoor there are no impediments whatever, and therefore his march to his capital is indispensable. It might be disputed in respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but it is certain, that the passage of the army of that Chief over those rivers will be attended with some difficulties.

‘ Those difficulties, however, are to be surmounted; and at all events, there is nothing to prevent his retiring to Burhampoor, and commencing to send his troops across the Taptee, and making arrangements for sending them across the Nerbudda.

‘ If he should urge these difficulties, you will make known to him my sentiments upon them as above stated, and you will require him to give a proof that his declarations are not insincere, by falling back to Burhampoor, and by commencing to pass his troops over the Taptee and his arrangements for crossing the Nerbudda.

‘ If the Rajah of Berar should return to Nagpoor, and Scindiah should adopt the measures above pointed out, as preparatory to his crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, I shall be satisfied. But if you should find those Chiefs obstinately determined to remain in their positions upon the

Nizam's frontier, you will be so good as to inform them, that I have requested you to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and, accordingly, you will leave it on the following day.

‘ In that case you might proceed to Colonel Stevenson's camp, which you will find about ten coss to the northward of Aurungabad, and from thence the Colonel will furnish you with an escort to enable you to join me.

‘ If you should find it necessary to quit Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, I request you to take the earliest opportunity to acquaint Colonel Stevenson thereof; as I have directed him to take up a position in the neighbourhood of the ghaut, from which he will be able to attack, with a superior force, any party of Scindiah's that may ascend it, and thus prevent that Chief from deploying his army above the ghaut, till I shall have brought to a close the operations I have in contemplation south of the Godavery, and shall be enabled to join Colonel Stevenson.

‘ I have reports from hircarrahs that two brigades of Scindiah's, with guns, are at the Adjunttee ghaut, at this moment; and that Gopal Rao's detachment of cavalry are above the ghaut. But the latter have received orders to retire, which they appear inclined to disobey. Before you quit Scindiah's camp, it would be very desirable that you should endeavor to ascertain the general position of his troops, and the numbers and description in each station, and by whom commanded.

‘ Indeed, this measure would be desirable at all events, whether that Chief consents to retire or not; as, supposing that he should retire, you cannot be certain that he will have withdrawn all his troops, unless you are acquainted with their numbers, and the stations they at present occupy.

‘ I request you also to endeavor to ascertain the same circumstances respecting the troops of the Rajah of Berar, and to communicate the intelligence you will receive regarding the troops of each Chief to Colonel Stevenson, as well as to me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Collins.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Camp, 18th July, 1803.

‘ You will have observed, by a letter addressed to me by his

Excellency the Governor General, on the 26th June, that his Excellency has thought proper to trust me with certain full powers to conclude whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war; and to appoint me to the command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies, in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Nizam, or of any of the Marhatta states.

‘ The troops serving in the territories of the Guickwar are included among those placed under my command; and I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that I may receive from Bombay returns of the strength and state of equipment of those forces, their present distribution, an account of the state of defence of the posts which they occupy, and the names of the officers who command them.

‘ I am also desirous of having a sketch of the territories of the Guickwar, which it is intended that the troops should defend; and any general topographical account of the country from which I may be able to form a judgment respecting its great communications, as well with the sea coast as with the territories of the Holkar family, of Scindiah, &c., and with those lately ceded to the Company by the Peshwah. With the assistance of these documents, I hope to be able to form a system for the defence of those territories, which will tend to their security. It is accordingly desirable that the officer in command in the Company’s territories should communicate with me, and with the officer in command in the territories of the Guickwar.

‘ While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should urge a request before made by the Resident at Poonah, that Lieut. Colonel Reynolds might be ordered to send me a map of the countries which are at present, or may be, the scene of the operation of the troops under my command.

‘ You will have received, from the Resident at Poonah, copies and translations of the letters by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and his Excellency the Governor General, in which those Chiefs have declared their intentions not to obstruct the treaty of Bassein, not to march to Poonah, and not to enter the territories of the Nizam. They still, however, remain in their position upon the Nizam’s frontier.

‘ I have in consequence written to Lieut. Colonel Collins

this day, to request that he would call upon them to withdraw from that position to the stations usually occupied by their troops within their own territories; and that he would promise them, that I also would order the Company's troops to retire to their usual stations.

' In case they should refuse to adopt these measures, I have requested Lieut. Colonel Collins to quit Scindiah's camp; and it is my intention to commence hostilities against that Chief without loss of time. I will make you acquainted with the result of Lieut. Colonel Collins's conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon this subject; and I beg leave to recommend that you should give orders to the commanding officer in the territories of the Guickwar, to be prepared to attack Baroach without loss of time.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor of Bombay.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

' SIR,

' Camp, 21st July, 1803.

' I have received your letter of the 12th, and its enclosures. I had already received, from the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, a copy of the letter which he addressed to you on the 5th instant. In my answer, I apprized him of the state of the money market at Poonah at the present moment, and pointed out the facts which had prevented my reaping much benefit from the permission which I had received to draw bills upon the principal treasuries in the Company's territories, and in those of their allies.

' These are principally the want of cash at Bombay, which has rendered it necessary for the detachment of the Bombay army stationed at Poonah to subsist entirely upon the money resources of that place, and the small amount of those resources at the present moment. I have written to Mr. Buchan to request that, if possible, he will supply the detachment of the Bombay army with cash, which will leave the resources of Poonah for the use of this division; and I have hopes that these resources will increase, as it is certain that many of the soucars found means either to remove their money, or to conceal it there during the Peshwah's absence, and that they had not brought back their treasures when I marched from that city.

‘ It is to be hoped, therefore, that a greater proportion of the money resources of Poonah will be available for the use of this division of the army hereafter than we have had hitherto; but I still doubt whether I shall be able to procure any large sums of money for bills upon any other treasury excepting Bombay. Hitherto I have procured only two small sums for bills upon Benares, although I have apprized the shroffs and soucars that I could give them bills upon any part of India in which it might be convenient to them to make payments.

‘ I am of opinion, however, that it will be very convenient to have at Hyderabad the lac of pagodas to that place from Masulipatam; and that that sum should be increased, as far as may be practicable; as, even if I should not be able to procure money at Poonah for bills upon Hyderabad, there will be no difficulty in transporting the money from that city to camp.

‘ I am much indebted to you for the attention which it appears you have given to this important subject, as well as to the supply of an additional quantity of Batavia arrack, at an advanced station. I have the pleasure to inform you, however, that I am well supplied with that article from Bombay, *via* Poonah; and as the distance to that settlement will always be shorter than to any port on the Eastern coast, I think it will be better to depend solely upon Bombay for that article.

‘ The western coast is deficient principally in bullocks and rice; and I must therefore depend principally for those articles on the territories to the eastward.

‘ I am very sensible of the trouble which you have taken to send forward additional supplies of rice to Colonel Stevenson’s detachment. The brinjarries are so unmanageable, unless their profits are enormous, which the circumstances of the present moment will not allow us to give; and they have behaved so ill to Colonel Stevenson, as well as to me, and, from the nature and state of their cattle, they must be so useless in a campaign carried on by troops lightly equipped, that I prefer the hired cattle. Their owners must at least obey orders.

‘ The time which you have agreed to give is very reasonable; and, for the reasons you have stated, it is more advantageous to give monthly hire, than a sum of money for a trip to any

place. It will be desirable to send those bullocks to Aurungabad in the first instance, and they can afterwards be ordered to any place at which it would be convenient to have them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 21st July, 1803.

‘ Since writing to you this morning, I have received your letter of the 13th. If the bullock owners to whom you allude refuse positively to go farther than Aurungabad, it would be the best and cheapest bargain to pay them eleven rupees for the trip; and in that case, I recommend this measure particularly, because there is reason to hope that they will be a shorter time on the road if paid by the trip, than they would be if paid monthly hire.

‘ But it would be desirable, if possible, to prevail upon them to allow their cattle to go a little farther than Aurungabad; and on this ground I would recommend that you should propose to them to go, on monthly hire, as far as Colonel Stevenson’s detachment, provided they did not quit the territories of the Nizam.

‘ If they should not agree to this proposal, I recommend that, at all events, they should be sent with rice to Aurungabad, hired as proposed for the trip; as, although the rice, when laid down at that city, will cost nearly a rupee for four seers, it can be got in that neighbourhood in such small quantities, that it is better that it should be sent even at that price.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp near Julgong, 20th July, 1803.

‘ 1. Yesterday I had the honor to receive your favor of the 14th instant, covering a letter to the address of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with copies thereof in Persian and English.

‘ 2. As the 19th paragraph of my instructions from his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, under date the

3d ult., directs me to accept of no proof of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's determination to refrain from any attempt to obstruct the complete operation of the Treaty of Bassein, but such as shall be satisfactory to you and to Colonel Close; and it being your opinion, in which Colonel Close concurs, that the declarations and intentions of Scindiah cannot be trusted unless he separates from the Rajah of Berar, removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences his route to Nagpoor: influenced by these opinions, I felt no hesitation in resolving to present your address to Dowlut Rao Scindiah without delay.

' 3. Accordingly, I yesterday apprized Jadoon Rao Bhow, that, having a matter of importance to communicate to the Maharajah, I requested he would name an early hour for my moonshee to attend at the Durbar. Jadoon Rao replied, that the Maharajah was then engaged in the performance of some religious ceremony, and had in consequence appointed the afternoon of the following day for the attendance of Mirza Bauker Khan.

' 4. As the procrastinating spirit which so much prevails at this court may probably prevent an immediate decision on your requisition to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I shall not wait to learn the result of my moonshee's conference, but immediately forward this letter, that you may be speedily apprized of my having received the remonstrance which you addressed to the Maharajah, as well as my intention to have the same fully explained to him without delay.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

' J. COLLINS.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

' SIR,

' Camp, 23d July, 1803.

' Lieut. General Stuart will have informed you that he had sent forward from the Grand Army a second convoy under Lieut. Griffiths on the 12th instant, with orders to proceed by the road on which Major Dallas will have marched.

' That road follows the line of the frontier, and passes through districts which belong to the Peshwah, as well as others belonging to the Nizam. The districts belonging to both powers are in a state of confusion. Baba Phurkia

seized those belonging to the Peshwah bordering on the Beemah, when he went on his embassy to Hyderabad, and has kept them ever since; and Nizam Nawaz Jung's troops are still in possession of the fort of Perinda, and his amildar of some of the neighbouring districts. Under these circumstances, the second convoy, under Lieut. Griffiths, would not be in security in the road on which Major Dallas may have marched; and it may happen to be very inconvenient to me to detach the Mysore cavalry to escort it. I have therefore directed Lieut. Griffiths to alter his route.

‘The route by which he will now march is from Culburga to Naldroog, thence to Tankie, leaving Toljapoor a few miles on his left; thence to Sirpore, on the Mangeyra river, and along that river to Kurdlah. I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to procure orders written in triplicate to the Nizam's amildars in that part of the country, to supply Lieut. Griffiths with whatever he may want, and to give him assistance if he should require it, and to send these orders to meet him at Naldroog, Tankie near Toljapoor, and Sirpore.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter, in which you enclose copies of the orders which you had received from his Excellency the Governor General, relative to the succession of Secunder Jah.

‘I have the honor, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Secretary of the Bombay Government to Major General Oliver Nicolls, Commanding Officer of the Forces.

‘SIR,

‘Bombay Castle, 23rd July, 1803.

‘1. I am directed by the Honorable the Governor in Council to signify to you, that his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has been pleased to institute, in the person of the Hon. Major General Arthur Wellesley, a temporary authority to conclude (in view to the present situation of affairs above the ghauts) whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the prosecution of war, appointing him (General Wellesley), for this purpose, to the chief command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies, serving in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Nizam, or of any of the Marhatta states or chiefs, subject only to the orders of his Excellency

Lieut. General Stuart, or of his Excellency General Lake; and that the government of Bombay have been directed to assist the General, and to co-operate with him on all points connected with the efficient exercise of the powers with which he is thus vested.

‘ 2. By his Excellency’s further instructions, a copy of these commands has been transmitted to Major Walker, the Resident at Baroda, accompanied by a signification of his Excellency’s desire that he will conform to the directions which he may receive from Major General Wellesley, on all points connected with the duties committed to that officer’s charge by the tenor of those instructions.

‘ 3. General Wellesley has, since the receipt of the said instructions, advised the Governor, that the command of the troops in the Guickwar territories has thus been vested in him: and desired that, for the further promotion of the service, a co-operation may be directed between the troops in the Guickwar’s territories, and those in the Company’s (by which is understood those at Surat); and the proper local authorities may be directed to communicate with him on the means of defence in the event of a war breaking out, all which has been ordered accordingly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Nicolls.*’

‘ J. A. GRANT, Sec. to Gov.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 24th July, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letters of the 26th and 27th June.

‘ Before they had reached me, in obedience to your Excellency’s orders of the 8th and 30th May, and in consequence of a reference made to me by Colonel Collins, I had written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to require that Chief to separate himself from the Rajah of Berar, and to retire with his troops across the river Nerbudda. A copy of that, and a copy of the letter which I wrote on the 14th instant to Colonel Collins, have been already transmitted by Lieut. Colonel Close, to be laid before your Excellency.

‘ From the day on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah was called upon, in the name of your Excellency, to declare his views in his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao

Holkar, and that he was urged not to advance to Poonah, it was obvious that his only design was to gain time. He had not concluded his negotiations with Jeswunt Rao Holkar till a late period in this month; and he, as well as the Rajah of Berar, saw clearly the disadvantages under which they would commence hostilities during the season in which the rivers are full. Those disadvantages were so great, particularly as the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar were to the northward of the river Taptee, that it was probable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar would separate, and order their troops to their usual stations. In this they incur the risks of those evils which must result from the commencement of hostilities at that moment. I therefore thought it proper to urge forward the decision, whether there should be peace or war; and at the same time that I gave Dowlut Rao Scindiah every assurance of the pacific views and intentions of the British government, I called upon him to adopt that measure, which your Excellency conceived would give the British government a security that the peace would last.

‘ On the 18th I received your Excellency’s letter of the 26th June; and I wrote a letter to Colonel Collins, of which I enclosed a copy, in which I desired that officer to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar of the powers with which your Excellency had been pleased to trust me. I requested him again to call upon those Chiefs to separate, and to send their troops to their usual stations; and to inform them that, if they refused to do so, he had been directed to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the following day.

‘ Since I have written that letter, I have received your Excellency’s letter of the 27th; and I am induced to hope that you will approve of all the steps taken till that moment, to bring to a decision the question of peace or war.

‘ I have perused a copy of Colonel Collins’s dispatch to your Excellency, of the 18th, which contains a recognition on the part of Scindiah of the benefits which he will derive from the treaty of Bassein, and other symptoms of a change of councils in the durbar of that Chief. But, notwithstanding the contents of that dispatch, the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah cannot be considered pacific, unless they shall separate, and each shall withdraw his troops to their usual stations. I have therefore made no alteration in the instructions

which I gave to Colonel Collins on the 18th, and he will certainly depart from Scindiah's camp if he finds that the Chiefs will not retire.

‘ If, however, they should retire, I consider that the British government will have security for the duration of the peace, as amply as it can have while the power of these Chiefs shall last. On the one hand, it will be obvious that fear of the power of the British government was the cause of their retreat; on the other, it will be equally obvious that the power which will have removed these formidable armies to a distance must increase; that no circumstances of distress from European enemies can prevent the growth of the strength of the British government in this quarter, and therefore that an attempt to attack it hereafter must be hopeless.

‘ The difficulties under which the force of the British government labors at the present moment, and which give the greatest encouragement to the confederate Chiefs, are the state of weakness and confusion of the Peshwah's government; the general unsettled and ruinous state of the country; and the wavering disposition of the majority of the southern jaghire-dars, who alone preserve the appearance and relations of fidelity towards the Peshwah.

‘ The weak and confused state of the Peshwah's government is to be attributed principally to his personal character, but also in a great degree to the rebellions and disturbances which have prevailed throughout the Marhatta empire for the last seven years. It could not be expected that even a government regularly organized would be able to resume its functions and its powers immediately after a revolution such as that effected by the victories of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, preceded as they were by the long usurpation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, much less one conducted by a man so weak as Bajee Rao. But it may be reasonably expected this state of affairs will improve with the assistance of the British government, and that the Peshwah will have an authority for which there will be some respect.

‘ The whole of the Marhatta territory is unsettled and in ruins. Holkar's armies consumed the produce of the last year, and owing to their plunder and extortion, entire districts were depopulated, and the habitations of the people destroyed.

‘ But it is obvious that, for a series of years, the govern-

ment, and even jaghiredars, can have received but little, if any revenue; and both have been obliged to wink at, and even authorize the plunder of their own territories, for the subsistence of their troops. The consequence is, that every man is a plunderer and a thief; and no man, who can find any thing to seize or to steal, will cultivate the land for his subsistence.

‘ The jaghires and forts, many of them close to Poonah, are in the hands of the adherents of Holkar, who are rebels to the government of the Peshwah. His Highness has passed orders for the resumption of these forts and jaghires; but there is no strength to carry them into execution; and thus a set of rebels and adherents of the confederate Chiefs are in the midst of his possessions.

‘ The state of affairs must improve, indeed it has improved already in those parts of the country in which the British army has been; and where the necessity of employing the troops to oppose the confederate Chiefs will no longer exist, it will be possible to enforce the Peshwah’s orders for the resumption of the forts and jaghires, and to place in them those who will be faithful to his Highness’s government. But the possession of these countries by the adherents of the Peshwah’s enemies, at the present moment, must encourage the confederates.

‘ The chiefs of the Marhatta empire have been accustomed to look at a confederacy of the greater powers among them, as a force which nothing could withstand. They recollect its success against the British government in former times, and they anticipate the same success in the expected contest. They do not compare the strength of the British government at this time with its former weakness; nor do they consider the difficulties under which the British government labored at the time of the former contest; nor do they compare their own strength at that time with their weakness at the present moment.

‘ The southern chiefs, and all those connected with Amrut Rao, wish well to the British government, and see clearly that the only chance of security they have, is in the establishment of the power of the Peshwah under British protection. But they dread the power of the confederated Chiefs, and fear to venture into the contest, till they shall see which side is likely to be successful. The first success in the contest will bring those forward who may not be rebels to the Pesh-

wah's government; and will preserve Amrut Rao and his adherents in a state of neutrality, till they can make terms for themselves.

‘ But if the confederates should withdraw, the southern Chiefs will be convinced that the northern Chiefs have no confidence in their own strength, opposed to the British government; and in case of any future contest, they will not be unwilling to come forward in the support of a power to which they will attribute many of the advantages which they might enjoy. The Peshwah's government, also, as it will have more strength, will have more power to enforce obedience to its orders than it has at the present moment; and they will be more fearful of the consequences of disobedience. The confederates are well aware of this wavering disposition of the southern Chiefs, and it is a strong inducement to them to go to war.

‘ Another circumstance of difficulty, at the present moment, which probably could not exist hereafter, is the state of the Guickwar government. The rebels have only lately been expelled from that country, and the government has not yet had time to gain strength. The hopes of the confederates must be founded, in some degree, upon the certainty of a renewal of the rebellion in the case of a war.

‘ The precarious state of the Nizam's health is another circumstance of encouragement to the confederates, which it is probable would not exist at any future period. It does not weigh as a difficulty upon the British force now, and Major Kirkpatrick writes with confidence, that Hyderabad will not be disturbed if his Highness the Nizam should die.

‘ But in the event of a war, particularly if there should not be speedily a signal success on the part of the British troops, it must be expected that the Nizam's death will be attended by the assumption of independence by some of his chiefs, and by confusion and disturbance in parts of his Highness's territories. It may be very certain that the confederates will encourage any symptoms of these evils; and that the hope of success in producing confusion in the Nizam's territories is one of the principal inducements to go to war at the present moment.

‘ Your Excellency will observe, in this view of the question, the improvement of the British strength in this quarter will be owing, and in proportion, to the improvement in the state of the

government of the allies, to that of the country, to that of its interior state, and to the confidence which the southern jaghiredars will have in the superior strength of the British government, from contemplating the effect which that strength will now have upon the northern confederated Chiefs.

‘ No war in which the British government can be involved with an European power can shake this strength. As long as the British troops maintain their formidable position in the territories of the Peshwah, the Nizam, and Guzerat, it must increase with the strength and prosperity of those governments to which it gives protection; and there will be daily a smaller prospect that the northern Chiefs will venture to confederate against it.

‘ The breaking up of the confederacy, therefore, as it will add so much to the strength and reputation of the British government, will be the best security for the duration of the peace.

‘ Although, in considering the various advantages which must result from the retreat of the confederates, and must add to the strength of the British government, I have pointed out to your Excellency certain disadvantages under which we labor at the present moment, I do not wish to impress your Excellency with the notion that I consider them to be of such magnitude as to render doubtful the event of a contest. They are certainly inconvenient, and we should be stronger if the Peshwah’s government was in strength: but if we can strike such a blow during the rains as will give us the superiority, and keep our rear in tranquillity, we shall not probably feel those inconveniences further than in the want of pecuniary resources by the Peshwah’s government.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Close has laid before your Excellency the correspondence which passed between Amrut Rao and me, since my arrival at Poonah; and the memorandum which he proposed to the Peshwah’s ministers that his Highness should give to me, by which his Highness was to consent to give to Amrut Rao a revenue amounting to four lacs of rupees per annum. The Peshwah would not agree to the proposed arrangement, but, on his departure to Wahy, referred the subject to his ministers, who made a proposition to Lieut. Colonel Close respecting Amrut Rao, which he will have laid before your Excellency. This proposition appeared to me inadmissible: it went to place Amrut Rao in the state of a prisoner, under the most degrading circumstances; and I was

convinced that, if I had communicated it to the vakeel of that Chief, he would have instantly joined the confederates. In the meantime, however, this vakeel pressed me for a decision on his employer's case. He urged, that at my desire Amrut Rao had separated himself from the councils of Holkar and of Scindiah nearly three months ago; that those Chiefs were become his enemies; that, in his position beyond the Godavery, he was liable to be attacked by them; and that he was not at peace with the Peshwah.

‘As, in the Memorandum received from the Peshwah's ministers, they consented to give four lacs of rupees per annum to Amrut Rao, (although the gift was to be attended by conditions to which Amrut Rao would never consent,) I thought it proper to write that Chief a letter, of which the inclosed is a translation, in which I gave him assurances that the British Government would take care that he should have a provision which would be agreeable to him.

‘I am convinced that, excepting in the event of the retreat of the confederates, Amrut Rao will not be satisfied with a jaghire of that amount; but I am also of opinion, that nothing will induce him to come forward in support of the British Government, excepting his conviction that, in case of a contest with the confederates, the former will be successful.

‘The promise of some provision will be sufficient to keep him in a state of neutrality for a time; and hereafter, (when it shall be certain that he will come forward in support of the British cause,) will be the proper season to fix the amount of the jaghire which he is to have.

‘I inclose the translation of a letter which I sent to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with a copy of the treaty of Bassein. I sent this letter by soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan, of the native cavalry, with orders to write to Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Amrut Rao's camp, to inform him that he had a letter from me, which he would deliver in person, if Jeswunt Rao chose to receive him.

‘I instructed the soubahdar to tell Jeswunt Rao Holkar, that the British Government had no intention to injure or interfere with him; that I was much pleased at his having crossed the Taptee, and that I should be still more pleased to

hear that he had gone across the Nerbudda, into the territories of his family.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp near Julgong, 21st July, 1803.

‘ 1. A few hours after I had sent off my letter to you of yesterday’s date, I received two dispatches from Mr. Secretary Edmonstone of the 27th and 28th ultimo; the former containing a copy of the instructions of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General to you, under date the 26th of last June, accompanied by orders from His Excellency for the guidance of my conduct, in consequence of the powers delegated to you by those instructions; the latter inclosing an extract of a letter from the Most Noble the Governor General to your address, dated the 27th ultimo.

‘ 2. I trust, Sir, it would be needless in me to offer any assurances that I shall have great pleasure in obeying the orders I have received on this occasion; and which direct me to comply with such intimations as you may convey to me, in conformity to the powers lately delegated to you by his Excellency, as well as to afford you every degree of practicable aid in the exercise of those powers.

‘ 3. I shall now proceed to state the result of the communication made by Moonshee Mirza Bauker Khan, of the contents of the letter addressed by you to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Jadoon Rao Bhow being the only minister at this court who possesses influence and ability, I directed Mirza Bauker to call on him, previously to his repairing to the Durbar, and to represent as follows:—

“ That Colonel Collins, regarding Jadoon Rao Bhow as a man of understanding, and as one desirous of preventing hostilities between the two Sircars, had sent to apprise him of the contents of the Hon. General Wellesley’s letter, before it was presented to the Maharajah, in order that Jadoon Rao might consider maturely its important tendency, and be enabled to give his prince such advice as the present critical situation of his affairs so immediately required. Mirza Bauker

then proceeded to state, that General Wellesley's letter contained a confirmation of what Colonel Collins had so repeatedly stated to this durbar; namely, that the continuance of the united forces of the Maharajah and of the Rajah of Berar in this quarter would speedily involve those chieftains in a war with the English, since their present position could have been assumed for no other purpose than that of menacing the territories of our ally, the Nabob Nizam. That the observations which the Honorable General has made, as well on the conduct as on the language of the Maharajah, were indisputably just, as was also the inference which the General had drawn therefrom, that the offer of General Wellesley to withdraw the British forces whenever Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah should repair to their respective capitals, was a most convincing proof on his part of pacific intentions: consequently, that should the Marhatta chiefs refuse to comply with the General's reasonable requisition, it would be apparent to every power in Hindustan that their designs had all along been hostile towards the British Government and its allies, notwithstanding their late friendly professions; that the assurance contained in the last paragraph of General Wellesley's letter to the Maharajah was so liberal and explicit, as to leave Scindiah and the Bhoonslah no possible excuse for delaying their march towards their respective countries; and lastly, that the Honorable General was of a character not to be trifled with, and therefore Jadoon Rao might depend on it as a positive certainty, that, in the event either of evasion or of procrastination in the present instance, the British troops would enter upon action without further delay."

‘4. The foregoing discourse appeared to make a deep impression upon Jadoon Rao Bhow, who acknowledged that the assurance contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah was very satisfactory. He likewise told Mirza Bauker, that he was much obliged by the confidence I had placed in him. Jadoon Rao then proposed that they both should attend the durbar, and advised the Mirza to repeat the foregoing arguments in the presence of the Maharajah. This was accordingly done, after your letter had been fully explained to Scindiah; and Jadoon Rao took this occasion to observe, that, considering the rank, authority, and connexion of the English sirdar who had written to the

Maharajah, no doubt could be entertained but that his assurances would be confirmed by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General; and then asked permission of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to wait on the Rajah of Berar with your letter, in order to consult with that Chief on its important contents. Scindiah having consented to this proposal, Jadoon Rao immediately set off towards the camp of Ragojee Bhoonslah; and I expected to be informed of the result of his visit during the course of this day."

' 5. Early this morning, Mirza Bauker Khan repaired to the camp of the Berar Rajah, in order to make a representation to that chieftain, and to Sereedhur Punt, exactly similar to that which he had yesterday offered to the consideration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and I must confess that the late change in the language of the ministers of the Maharajah induces me to hope that your requisition will shortly be complied with.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

' J. COLLINS.

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

' SIR,

' Camp near Julgong, 22nd July, 1803.

' 1. I had the honor to apprise you in my letter of yesterday's date, that Moonshee Mirza Bauker Khan had been sent to the camp of the Rajah of Berar for the purpose of representing to that Chief the necessity of his repairing to his capital without delay.

' 2. Mirza Bauker Khan returned from this visit early yesterday, and I am concerned to state, that he did not find Ragojee Bhoonslah well disposed to comply with your requisition, although the Mirza did not fail to urge the same arguments which had apparently made a due impression on the minds of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jadoon Rao Bhow. The Bhoonslah admitted, however, that the assurance contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter to Scindiah was fully satisfactory, so far as it related to the intention of the British Government; but he insisted on it as proper, that his Highness the Peshwah should give similar assurances, as well to Dowlut Rao Scindiah as to himself, before their forces separated, or quitted their present position. The conversation on this occasion was carried on for several hours; at the con-

clusion Ragojee said, that he would consult personally with Scindiah in the evening, after which a reply should be given to your letter. Accordingly, the Maharajah waited on the Berar Rajah last night, and the conference between these chieftains lasted several hours. In consequence of the above intelligence, I this morning addressed a note to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, copies of which, in English and Persian, I do myself the honor to inclose for your perusal.

‘ 3. It being, I think, probable, from the conversation which passed between Mirza Bauker and the Bhoonslah, that Scindiah may be induced to refuse or to evade compliance with your requisition; and as it appears by the extract of the letter to your address from his Excellency the Governor General, under date the 27th ultimo, transmitted to me by Mr. Secretary Edmonstone, that I am not at liberty to leave this court unless by your desire, I have to request your instructions for the guidance of my conduct in the event of refusal or procrastination on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of Ragojee, to separate and retire with their forces to their respective countries.

‘ 4. As I am anxious to learn your resolve on the above question, I shall close this letter without waiting for a reply to the note which I just now addressed to the Maharajah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ J. COLLINS.

Note addressed by Colonel Collins to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 22nd July, 1803.

‘ As Colonel Collins understands that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah held a conference with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah last night, for the purpose of determining on the answer that should be given to the letter addressed to the Maharajah by the Hon. General Wellesley, Colonel Collins requests that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will favor him with a communication of the result of that conference; and as the Hon. General Wellesley expects an early reply to his letter, the Colonel trusts that the Maharajah will no longer delay writing to the General, in order to satisfy him that his requisitions will be immediately complied with.

‘ The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.’

‘ J. COLLINS.

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp, Julgong, 23rd July, 1803.

‘ 1. Since I had the honor to address your Excellency on the 17th instant, I have been favored with the reply of the Hon. Major General Wellesley to the reference that I made to Colonel Close in my letter of the 9th of this month, a copy of which formed a part of my dispatch to your Lordship of the same date.

‘ 2. As the Hon. General Wellesley has given a very clear and decided opinion on the necessity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s withdrawing his troops from the Nizam’s frontier, and in consequence of this opinion has addressed a representation to the Maharajah, calculated to induce that chief and the Berar Rajah to retire to their respective capitals, I deem it my duty to forward to your Excellency copies of the letters which have passed between the Honorable General and me on that important subject.

‘ 3. Dowlut Rao Scindiah has not yet replied to the note that I addressed to him yesterday morning, a transcript of which is contained in the enclosure. Indeed, I understand that the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah are as yet undecided whether to comply with, or refuse the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley. In order, however, to hasten their determination, I shall this day demand an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the express purpose of obtaining an answer to the General’s letter.

‘ 4. Colonel Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg have marched with their corps towards Hindustan, conformably to the intimation which I had the honor to communicate to your Excellency on the 17th instant; but I must beg leave to correct a mistake that I then made respecting the strength of Colonel Doudernaigue’s Brigade, which consists of seven battalions of infantry and five hundred cavalry, instead of eight battalions as before stated.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

The Governor General.

‘ J. COLLINS.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ 29th July, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of letters of the 24th and 25th instant, which I have received from Colonel Collins, and the copy of a letter which I have written to that officer this day.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.* ’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lieut. Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp near Julgong, 24th July, 1803.

‘ 1. I had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th instant, yesterday morning, and conformably to the instructions contained therein, per addressed memorial to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in which every argument and observation you have furnished me with were stated nearly in your own words. I do myself the honor to enclose copies in English and Persian of my memorial to Scindiah; that to Ragojee Bhoonslah was precisely the same, except in one passage, which is noticed in the enclosure.

‘ 2. Yesterday at noon I sent a message to the Maharajah, intimating, that as he had not replied to my note of the 22nd of June, I expected he would grant me an audience that evening; but Scindiah was then engaged at a nautch, and could not be spoken with. This morning early I sent Mirza Bauker Khan to the durbar, in order to explain the contents of my memorial, and at the same time insist on my having a conference with the Maharajah in the course of the day. The Mirza repaired to the camp of Scindiah at seven o'clock, but is not yet returned, although it is now two in the afternoon.

‘ 3. If, after another conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, I should find them actually determined to retain their present positions on the Nizam's frontier, I shall, in compliance with your instructions, inform those chieftains that I have been directed by you to leave the camp of the Maharajah; and in this event, I shall instantly apprise Colonel Stevenson of my departure.

‘ 4. The troops which your hircarrahs saw at the Adjunttee ghaut were sepoy battalions in the service of the Berar

Rajah. These corps have been since withdrawn, and are returned to the camp of Ragojee Bhoonslah. They were commanded by a native officer named Beny Sing. Twenty two guns were attached to these corps.

‘ 5. In my address to his Excellency the most Noble the Governor General, under date the 17th instant, I mentioned that Scindiah had detached Colonel Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg, with the corps which they commanded, towards Hindustan. This intelligence was true, but I made a mistake with respect to the strength of Colonel Doudernaigue’s brigade, which consists of seven battalions and five hundred cavalry, instead of eight sepoy battalions, erroneously stated in my letter to his Excellency.

‘ 6. Allow me, Sir, to remind you that I formerly gave you very particular statements as well of Scindiah’s forces as of the Bhoonslah’s; and although those statements are communicated in private letters, yet I conceived they might have proved sufficiently satisfactory: I shall however take an early opportunity of transmitting to you an official report on this subject, conformably to your wishes. In the mean time I can assure you that Scindiah has only eleven battalions of infantry with him at present, and that no brigade of his was ever posted at the Adjunttee ghaut; my last advices from the camp of Colonel Doudernaigue mention, that he had marched twenty coss on the direct route towards Burhampoor.

‘ 7. I have the honor to enclose a copy and translate of a note I this instant received from the Berar Rajah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ J. COLLINS.

Memorial addressed by Colonel John Collins to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 23rd July, 1803.

‘ Colonel Collins apprizes Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that his Excellency the most noble the Governor General has been pleased to delegate the direction and control of all political and military affairs in Hindustan and the Deccan to the Hon. Major General Wellesley, who is also vested with full powers to conclude a negotiation with the Marhatta chieftains and jaghiredars, on the part of the British Government. Colonel Collins further informs the Maharajah, that all engagements which General Wellesley may conclude will be

confirmed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor General. The Hon. Major General Wellesley has in consequence instructed Colonel Collins to assure Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that he is perfectly ready to attend to the interests of the Maharajah, and to enter into a negotiation with him upon objects by which the Maharajah may suppose those interests to be affected; but that, in the first place, the General expects that the troops of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall withdraw from their present position upon the Nizam's frontier, and return to their usual stations in Hindustan, in which case the General on his part will withdraw the Honorable Company's force to their usual station. The Hon. Major General Wellesley has likewise directed Colonel Collins to observe, that since the Maharajah has declared he has no intention to obstruct the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, to withdraw his troops to their usual stations would only be consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they were sincere; while, on the other hand, should the forces of the Maharajah retain their present position upon the Nizam's frontier, after the friendly representations which the Hon. General Wellesley has made on the subject, such a proceeding would be the strongest proof which the Maharajah could give of the insincerity of those declarations; the Hon. Major General Wellesley has therefore instructed Colonel Collins to repeat his former application to the Maharajah to retire with his troops from the Nizam's frontier, that being the only measure by which the peace between the British Government and his Sircar can be preserved.

‘ *Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘ J. COLLINS.

‘ N.B. A similar representation was presented to the Rajah of Berar, with the exception of one passage, in which he is required to withdraw his troops from the Nizam's frontier, and return to Nagpoor.’

Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to Colonel Collins. (Received on the 24th of July, 1803.)

‘ The letter which you sent to me is received, and the particulars of its contents thoroughly understood; the answer to it depends on a meeting between me and Dowlut Rao Scindiah

Behauder: after we shall have met and personally discussed the subject of it, the reply will then be certainly committed to writing.

Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Colonel Collins.

‘ 24th July, 1803.

‘ Your letter is received, and its contents understood.

‘ Whenever Senah Saheb Soubah Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah and I shall meet, and be seated together in the same place, you will then be requested to attend; and whatever is to be stated will then be discussed: an interview between the Rajah and me is indispensable on this occasion. If you are resolved on having an audience, come to-morrow, when only two ghurees of the day shall remain. My house is your own.’

Colonel Collins to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp near Julgong, 25th July, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to inclose a copy and translate of a note which I received last night from Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ The Maharajah was not visible yesterday, in consequence of his having sat up at a nautch during the whole of the preceding night. But Mirza Bauker Khan had a long conference with Jadoon Rao Bhow, on the subject of my last memorial to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and although this minister did not appear altogether pleased at the idea of his master being compelled to retire from his present position, yet, from the general tenor of his discourse on this occasion, Mirza Bauker inferred, that Jadoon Rao was of opinion it would be more advisable for Scindiah to withdraw his forces from the Nizam’s frontier than to hazard a rupture with the British Government.

‘ I have the honor to forward a statement of the forces of the Maharajah, and of the Rajah of Berar, in which their respective positions are particularly described.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ J. COLLINS.

The Force with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at Julgong : 25th July, 1803.

	CAVALRY.		INFANTRY.		ORDNANCE.	
	Hindustanny.	Deccanny.	Sepoy Battalions.	Matchlock men.	Heavy Guns.	Field-pieces.
Under the command of Colonel Pohlmann	500	—	7	500	8	40
Under the command of Colonel Soliever, in the pay of Begum Sumroo	—	—	4	—	2	30
Under the command of different native Sirdars	12,000	2000	—	—	—	—
Under the command of Bappojee Scindiah, which joined the Maharajah on the 23rd of May last	4000	—	—	—	—	—
Park of Artillery	—	—	—	—	25	100
	16,500	2000	11	500	35	170

N. B.—Each Sepoy Battalion consists of 700 rank and file.

[The Force of the Rajah of Berar : 25th July, 1803.]

	CAVALRY.	INFANTRY.	ORDNANCE.			
			Heavy Guns.	Field-pieces.	Rockets.	Sutanants.
Under the command of different native Sirdars	20,000	—	—	—	—	—
Under the command of Beny Sing	—	6,000	—	35	—	—
Camels carrying rockets	—	—	—	—	500	—
Camels carrying Sutanants . . .	—	—	—	—	—	500
	20,000	6,000	—	35	500	500

‘ The Maharajah, with the whole of his cavalry, is encamped to the north of the range of hills called the Adjuntee ghaut, ten coss from the pass of Ferdapoor, and nine from Adjuntee, which is impassable for guns. On the right of the Maharajah,

at the distance of two coss, Colonel Pohlmann, with his brigade, is posted; and about one coss in the rear of Colonel Pohlmann, Colonel Soliever, with the corps of Begum Sumroo, is posted.

‘Gopal Bhow having been left in the Deccan by Scindiah, on his return to Hindustan in 1801, and the strength of his detachment having at different times varied according to circumstances, the exact number of his forces cannot be ascertained. It is, however, certain that he has been repeatedly and positively ordered to join the Maharajah.

‘The Rajah of Berar is encamped two coss on the left of Scindiah, with the whole of his artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

‘Colonel J. Shepherd, with the whole of the regular infantry and guns of Ambajee Rao, has already crossed the Nerbudda.

‘Colonel Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg, with eleven battalions of sepoy, and a large park of artillery, marched from Julgong towards the Nerbudda on the 18th instant.

‘J. COLLINS.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major A. Walker, Resident at Baroda.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 26th July, 1803.

‘From the tenor of letters which I have this day received from Colonel Collins, it is probable that that officer will have departed from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by this time; and if that should be the case, I propose to commence hostilities against that Chief and the Rajah of Berar immediately.

‘From papers received from the government of Bombay, I understand that you have directed that preparations should be made in Guzerat for the attack of Baroach. I request you to urge forward those preparations as much as possible, and to desire the officer in command of the troops to be in such a state and position as to be able to make his attack upon Baroach, as soon as I shall send him notice that I have commenced hostilities in this quarter.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Walker.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Collins, Resident
with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Sangwee, 29th July, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 24th and 25th instant.

‘I am happy to observe, from the tenor of the last, that the confidence of that minister, who has been most active in negotiating the supposed confederacy among the northern Marhatta Chiefs, is shaken respecting the strength and power of that confederacy, and that even he is apprehensive of the consequences of a contest with the British Government.

‘It is probable that the apprehension of this contest, which will be commenced under great advantages on our side, if not delayed, is general in the durbars of those Chiefs, but still they and their servants must feel sensibly the disgrace and disadvantage which must be the consequence of their retreat to their own territories, after all their preparations for hostilities, and their boast that they would commence them.

‘Under these impressions, it is probable that they will have promised you that they will separate and retire to their own territories, but they may still have kept their armies in one body, and may have delayed that event, which can alone give security to the British Government for the duration of the peace: on the other hand, if they should not be sincere in their intentions of retiring, we shall lose the advantages which we possess at present for the commencement of hostilities.

‘If they should not have manifested their intentions to separate and retire to their own territories, you will of course have quitted the camp, according to my letter of the 18th instant; but if they should have declared their intention, and should still be joined, and should have made no movement towards their own territories, or if they should delay their marches under any pretences whatever, I request you will write letters to inform them, that I can trust them no longer; and that if they do not separate on the following day, and move each towards his own territories, it is my intention to commence my operations, for which I am fully prepared: that I have sent orders to the troops to approach to Baroach, against which place also operations will be commenced; and that I have apprized his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and

the officer commanding the troops in the Ganjam district, of the present state of affairs, in order that they also may be prepared to commence their operations.

‘You will also be so kind as to withdraw from Scindiah’s camp; and you will apprize that Chief that I have made this request, in case he should not immediately separate from the Rajah of Berar, and should not retire towards Hindustan.

‘I have received a letter from Colonel Stevenson, from which I observe, that, having had occasion to write a letter to Gopal Bhow, to desire that Chief to withdraw from the Nizam’s territories, he made use of an expression which is not commonly used to a person of that description, which appears to have offended Gopal Bhow.

‘It is very certain that that Chief ought not to have entered the Nizam’s territories, and that if he had not retired from them, and beyond Colonel Stevenson’s reach, that officer would have shown him that the British army was capable of protecting the territories of an ally of the British Government.

‘However, I cannot approve of the expression inadvertently used in Colonel Stevenson’s letter, and I have desired that officer to take an opportunity of writing to Gopal Bhow to explain it.

‘It is probable that this expression may be made a subject of complaint in Scindiah’s durbar, and I mention the circumstance in order that you may inform the ministers of the steps which have been taken in consequence of it.

‘I have the honor to be, &c,

‘Colonel Collins.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘SIR, ‘Camp, near Julgong, 26th July, 1803.

‘1. Conformably to the intimation which I had the honor to give you in my letter of the 25th instant, I waited on Dowlut Rao Scindiah yesterday afternoon, accompanied by Captain Bradshaw and Bauker Khan; Ambajee Ingolia, Jadoon Rao Bhow, Unna Bhasker, Suddasheo Eitul Punt, and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, were present at the durbar on the part of the Maharajah.

‘2. After an interchange of compliments, I asked Scindiah whether the contents of your letter had been explained to

him, and whether he fully comprehended the substance of my last memorial? Scindiah replied, that the contents of both those papers had been particularly explained to him, and that he perfectly understood the nature of your requisition, as well as the motives which had induced the same. Notwithstanding this positive assurance, I recapitulated every argument and observation with which you had furnished me, and then advised the Maharajah, as he regarded his own interests, to afford you the satisfaction you required without delay.

‘ 3. Jadoon Rao Bhow, in reply, entered into a long discussion on the subject of your requisition, of which what follows is an abstract:—That the forces of Dowlut Rao and of the Rajah of Berar were encamped in their own territories: that those chieftains had solemnly promised not to ascend the Adjunttee ghaut, nor to march to Poonah: that they had already given his Excellency the most noble the Governor General assurances in writing, under their own seals, that they never would attempt to subvert the treaty of Bassein, which assurances were unequivocal proofs of their friendly intentions: that they proposed sending vakeels to the Peshwah, in order to obtain an assurance from his Highness similar to that which they had lately received from the Hon. General Wellesley: lastly, that the treaty now negotiating between Scindiah and Holkar was not completely settled, and that until it was finally concluded, the Maharajah could not return to Hindustan.

‘ 4. In answer to these objections on the part of Jadoon Rao, I observed, that the Hon. General Wellesley had already pointed out to Dowlut Rao Scindiah how impossible it was that he (the General) should trust to promises alone for the security of the Honorable Company and their allies, whilst two large armies occupied a position so near the frontier of the Nabob Nizam: I said, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah derived any advantage from his present position, or if it were in the least necessary for the defence of his possessions, in either of these supposed cases General Wellesley would have made proper allowances; but it was notorious, that the Maharajah had no enemies in this quarter, and was so far from deriving any advantage, that he incurred a most intolerable expense in his present situation, and therefore his retaining it could be only ascribed to hostile designs against the British Government or its allies.

‘ 5. Pursuing my discourse, I reminded Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that at the time when it was proposed at this durbar to give assurances in writing to his Excellency the most noble the Governor General, of the intentions of the Berar Rajah and of the Maharajah to respect the treaty of Bassein, I had then said, that his Excellency would yield no credit to the sincerity of their promises, unless those Chiefs returned to their respective capitals; and that on this occasion I had further declared, that I would not be responsible for the Hon. General Wellesley abstaining from hostilities, if their troops did not immediately retire from the Nizam’s frontier. I then remarked, that as General Wellesley was now vested with full powers, as well political as military, the assurance contained in his letter to the Maharajah was of equal validity as if given by the most noble the Governor General, and consequently ought to satisfy all doubts whatever; however, that General Wellesley would have no objection to the sending vakeels to the court of Poonah, provided Scindiah and the Bhoonslah would, in the first instance, retire from the frontier of the Nabob Nizam: lastly, I observed, that if any part of the treaty with Jeswunt Rao Holkar still remained unadjusted, that Burhampoor was a much more eligible situation for carrying on a negotiation than the Nizam’s frontier; and I concluded with insisting on an immediate and distinct reply to the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley.

‘ 6. As Jadoon Rao Bhow appeared at a loss to answer the foregoing observations and arguments, he evaded the subject by promising to give me the satisfaction I demanded in the course of a few days. I replied, that General Wellesley’s letter had been presented to the Maharajah five days since, consequently that there had been time sufficient for Scindiah and his ministers to consider maturely on its contents; and therefore I should not submit to further procrastination on the part of this court on this head. There was some altercation; but at length Scindiah and his ministers, having solemnly pledged their words that I should have a distinct and pleasing answer on the 28th of this month, in the presence of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, I consented to wait till then for their ultimate decision.

‘ 7. Last night I was favored with your letter of the 21st instant, inclosing a khareetah to the address of the Rajah of

Berar, which I this morning forwarded to the Rajah, accompanied by a note from myself.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ J. COLLINS.

The Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp, 29th July, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 16th, 18th, and 20th, but I defer to reply to them till to-morrow.

‘ I now inclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor General*, with copies of its enclosures. I think we shall settle matters with the northern Chiefs yet.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to his Excellency General Lake, Commander in Chief in India.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Sangwee on the Seenah, 29th July, 1803.

‘ You will have received copies of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General addressed to me on the 26th and 27th ultimo, by which you will have been made acquainted with the means by which his Excellency proposed to bring to a close the important questions at present depending with the northern Marhatta Chiefs.

‘ I had long been of opinion that the only mode by which those questions could be brought to a close was to urge forward the decision whether there should be peace or war. This opinion was founded upon the knowledge I had that the territories of the Company and the allies would be protected, during the monsoon, by the temporary swelling of the rivers which rise in the western ghauts; that several important points in the territories of our enemies were exposed to our attacks during the same period; and that from the nature of their troops and mode of warfare compared with ours, that season was most unfavorable to their operations, and, although inconvenient in some respects, most favorable to ours.

‘ As soon, therefore, as I received the Governor General’s instructions of the 26th June, I wrote to Colonel Collins to desire that he would call upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to separate their armies, and retire to their own territories from the position which they had taken up cou-

* See p. 240.

tiguous to the Nizam's frontier, and to withdraw from their camp if he should find them disinclined to attend to this requisition.

‘ I had previously written to Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon this subject, and had given him every assurance which he had required in his different conferences with Colonel Collins upon points which he stated that he entertained doubts; and from the result of different conferences between Scindiah's ministers and Colonel Collins's native servants, I am induced to hope that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will retire to their respective territories. In one in particular which Colonel Collins's moonshee had with Scindiah's ministers on the 24th, it appeared that he was not confident in the strength and power of the confederates to contend with the British Government, although he had been the person most anxious to form the confederacy; and he appeared to prefer the disgrace and disadvantage of a retreat at the present moment, of the extent of which he was perfectly aware, to the risk to be incurred in a contest with the British Government.

‘ But although the confederates may promise to break up and retire, it will not answer to allow them to delay that measure: particularly as, if they should not be sincere in their intentions to perform their promise, we shall lose the advantages which we now hold. I have, therefore, this day written to Colonel Collins to desire that he will write to apprise them, that if they do not separate and retire to their own territories on the day after they receive that letter, I shall commence operations in this quarter; and that I should acquaint your Excellency, and the officer commanding the troops in the Ganjam district, of this my intention, and of the circumstances which had occasioned it.

‘ The troops under my command are stationed as follows:—the Nizam's army, including the subsidiary force, are posted at Aurungabad, north of the river Godavery. The corps under my immediate command, including about 3000 Marhatta horse, and 2000 excellent horse belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, are at Sangwee upon the Seenah, about twenty miles south eastward from Ahmednuggur, in which fort there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah; there are two battalions of native infantry under the command of Colonel Murray at Poonah.

‘ In the present season it is impossible for the enemy to

make any impression on Guzerat ; but since the troops in that province have been placed under my command, I have not been able to get a return of their number or disposition. I know, however, that the fort of Songhur, which is contiguous to the principal entrance into Guzerat, south of the Taptee, is occupied by our troops; and that a corps is in readiness in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda, to commence operations against Baroach, in which place there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah.

‘ The enemy is posted in the following manner. The whole of Holkar’s army is to the northward of the river Taptee : his troops are in the greatest distress, and I am informed that he has repeatedly refused to join Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘ Scindiah is encamped at Julgong with 18,000 horse, 11 battalions of infantry, and 150 guns. The Rajah of Berar has likewise 20,000 horse, 6000 infantry, and 40 guns. Julgong is in the rear of the Adjunttee pass near the Nizam’s territories.

‘ Scindiah has an advanced corps of a few thousand horse in the Adjunttee hills.

‘ My plan of operations, in case of hostilities, is to attack Ahmednuggur with my own corps, by the possession of which place I shall secure the communication with Poonah and Bombay, and keep the Nizam’s army upon the defensive upon his Highness’s frontier. When I shall have finished that operation, and have crossed the Godavery, I shall then, if possible, bring the enemy to action.

‘ As the passes through the Adjunttee hills are difficult, particularly for the large quantities of artillery which the enemy have, it is probable that Colonel Stevenson may be able to succeed in preventing them from deploying their force on this side of the hills till I shall have joined him. If he should not, he is strong enough to defend himself, and the enemy will find it very difficult to pass through the hills again after I shall have crossed the Godavery.

‘ The corps in Guzerat will attack Baroach, and after having got possession of that place, I intend that the troops in that province should be collected as fast as circumstances may render necessary.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake, Commander in Chief.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Collins,
Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

'SIR, 19110011, 2 ms. A. 7. 'Roore on the Seenah, 31st July, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th instant. I am concerned that there should have been any fresh delay on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to engage to depart with his troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, and particularly that the ministers of that Chief should have given such futile reasons for refusing to comply with my requisition, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should retire.

Although the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are encamped within their own territories, they are in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier, and they have taken up that position after having threatened the Nizam's government, and after Scindiah had declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war. The assembly of so large a body of troops in such a station would at all times have been a subject of discussion between the British Government and those Chiefs, and would have caused hostilities if the troops were not removed; but under present circumstances, it is particularly necessary that they should withdraw; and any pacific declaration, not accompanied by a corresponding act, must be considered insincere, and intended only to gain time.

‘ I have observed that the Chiefs have declared, that they would not ascend the Adjuntée ghaut or march towards Poonah, or attempt to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein; and they are satisfied with the assurance which I had given them, that the British Government has no intention to interfere with them, and will never encourage or give support to the breach of treaties by the Peshwah, or by any of its allies. They now pretend that they want the same assurance from the Peshwah, although they must know that his Highness has no power to do them any injury, excepting that which he derives from the support of his government by the British troops.

‘ In respect to the treaty between Scindiah and Holkar, notwithstanding the boasted union, it now appears that the peace is not yet concluded. But that can be no reason for which Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should be allowed to remain encamped in a position in the neighbourhood of the Nizam’s frontier ; on the contrary, it ought to be a reason by which Scindiah at least should be induced to move with his troops

into those territories which he ought to guard against Holkar's depredations. These futile reasons for remaining with their troops in their positions on the Nizam's frontier, are the strongest proofs of the insincerity of the declarations which the Chiefs have made; and I hope, that if they should not have satisfied you in your interview, you would have withdrawn from their camp, according to the request conveyed in my letter of the 11th instant.

'But in case you should still be in their camp, when this letter shall arrive there, I repeat the request which I made in my letter of the 29th, that you will withdraw forthwith, if they should not commence their march, with all their troops, towards their usual stations.

'The fact that Scindiah has not concluded his peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which is now acknowledged, is the strongest reason for pressing forward at the present moment the decision, whether there shall be peace with security, or war; besides, it is in conformity with the instructions from his Excellency the Governor General.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Collins.' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

'HONORABLE SIR, 'Camp at Roore, on the Seenah, 31st July, 1803.

'1. Lieut. Colonel Close has communicated to me the letters from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay of the 17th and 23rd instant, with their enclosures, and I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant.

'2. I shall take an early opportunity of replying to the letter; but I now think it proper to address you upon some subjects to which the enclosures in the former relate.

'3. I observe that by the proceedings of the Committee at Surat, of the 15th instant, nothing had been done till that day towards throwing into Songhur supplies of provision or ammunition. Reference had been made to European and native officers, but no decided step had been taken.

'4. It appears that the garrison which Lieut. Colonel Callander has proposed to allot to that place, is to be 150 European troops and 100 native troops; and it appears that the Committee have information, upon which they place reliance,

that there are no provisions whatever for this force. It surely requires no reference to find out the quantity of provisions which it will be necessary to place in Songhur for the use of the descriptions and number of troops, for any given number of months; and long before the meeting of the 15th instant, the provisions for those small bodies might have been sent off.

‘ 5. I also observe, that the Committee are disposed to attend to the report upon the state of the ordnance and ammunition at Songhur, although they have taken no measures to remedy the inconveniences reported.

‘ 6. They ought, at all events, to have taken measures to supply the deficiencies of musket ammunition and ordnance carriages, which they believed existed; and it might be proper to send an officer of the engineers or artillery, or any one who might be supposed to be qualified to give an opinion, to examine this fort, and to report particularly on its state.

‘ 7. I advert to this circumstance particularly, because it is my opinion, that the fort of Songhur is most important for the defence of the Attavesy, and for the security of Surat itself.

‘ 8. I have also to observe upon the minute of Lieut. Colonel Callander, upon the subject of the retreat of Captain Bates. I am not certain in what part of the country that officer was stationed; or whether he falls under my command, according to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General; if he should be so, I request to have all the documents upon the subject, and if I find there are grounds for it, I shall order a General Court Martial to enquire into Captain Bates’s conduct.

‘ 9. If you should be of opinion that he is not under my command, I beg leave to recommend to you to have an enquiry into his conduct.

‘ 10. I advert to this circumstance particularly, because it has been reported in a manner very disadvantageous to the credit and honor of the British arms in this country; and I considered it of so much importance, that I took the trouble of tracing the report to its source, and was on the point of bringing to trial the officer who had reported, as I supposed, without foundation, so disgraceful an occurrence.

‘ 11. I have perused the letter from the killadar of Loghur of the 19th instant, and I beg you to inform him, that provided he and the family of Nana Furnavees give no assistance to the enemies of the Peshwah or of the British Government, and he

pays the accustomed obedience to the Peshwah's orders, they shall receive no molestation.

'I have the honor to be, &c.
'*The Governor of Bombay.*' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'SIR, 'Camp near Julgong, 30th July, 1803.

'1. On the morning of the 28th instant, I addressed a note to 'Jadoon Rao Bhow, requesting he would inform me what hour of the day would be most convenient and agreeable to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to grant me the promised audience. The inclosed (No. 1.) contains a copy and translate of the answer of Jadoon Rao Bhow to the foregoing request; and No. 2. transcript (in English and Persian) of my reply to that minister.

'2. In consequence of the intimation conveyed in No. 2, Jadoon Rao Bhow appointed the afternoon of the following day for me to wait on the Maharajah; and as I was desirous to make one more effort in order to induce Scindiah to comply with your requisition, I consented to postpone my departure; partly from the consideration already stated, and partly with a view of resting the responsibility upon this court, in the event of hostilities.

'3. Accordingly I waited upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah yesterday afternoon, accompanied by Captain Bradshaw and Moonshee Bauker Khan. The usual servants of the Maharajah attended on this occasion. The Peshwah's vakeels, Ballojee Koonger, and Kistnaje Bhuwarry, were likewise present. But, contrary to agreement, Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah absented himself from this conference.

'4. I commenced the discourse by observing on the absence of the Berar Rajah, whom I expected to have seen at the durbar, conformably to the promise I had received, as well from the Maharajah as from Jadoon Rao. I then said, that no doubt Dowlut Rao Scindiah was fully apprized of the real opinion of Ragojee Bhoonslah, with whom he had held a conference the preceding day; consequently, that I expected to be informed of the sentiments and intentions of both those chieftains on the subject of your requisitions.

'5. Instead of giving me any direct reply, Jadoon Rao

Bhow merely recapitulated the objections which he had urged at our conference of the 25th instant, against withdrawing the troops of the Maharajah and of the Rajah of Berar from their present position; and my replies to his objections were exactly similar to those which I had the honor to communicate to you in my letter of the 26th instant. In fact, every argument that could be adduced on this question had been already exhausted; this I remarked to Jadoon Rao, and at the same time told him, that he had not brought forward a single new observation.

‘ 6. Scindiah’s minister then said, that his Highness the Peshwah had lately deputed a vakeel to the Maharajah, and that it was indispensably requisite that I should be informed of the objects of his mission. I replied, that I should most readily attend to any report which the vakeel of his Highness might make, and desired that Kistnaje Bhuwarry (the person alluded to) would state whatever he had to propose on the part of the Peshwah. They called Kistnaje, who said that he had been deputed by Rao Pundit Purdhaun to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, of his having entered into new engagements with the British Government to prevent their completion thereof, and to compose any differences that might have arisen between the English and those chieftains.

‘ 7. When Kistnaje Bhuwarry had finished his discourse, I observed to Jadoon Rao, that the friendly intentions of his Highness the Peshwah were very apparent, and that it only remained with the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah to give them effect, by withdrawing their troops from the Nizam’s frontier, in which event all doubts would be removed, and friendship re-established between those Chiefs and the British Government. I further said, that the Hon. Major General’s proposal by no means tended to degrade Dowlut Rao Scindiah or Ragojee Bhoonslah; since, at the same time that the General required of those chieftains to retire with their forces to their respective countries, the Hon. General had likewise promised, in the event of their compliance, to withdraw his troops to their usual stations; and, in conclusion, I strongly urged both the Maharajah and Jadoon Rao not to suffer a trifling punctilio to be the cause of involving their sircar in a war with the British Government. But Scindiah’s minister

persisted in declaring, that his master must again consult with the Rajah of Berar before he could give any decided answer to your requisition, and requested that I would defer my departure for two or three days longer. I replied, that as I now was satisfied this court only wanted to gain time for some particular purpose of its own, I should be deemed inexcusable were I to suffer myself to be further amused. But, independent of this consideration, I was positively directed by the Hon. General Wellesley to leave the camp of the Maharajah as soon as ever I had reason to be convinced that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah were determined to retain their present position on the frontier of the Nabob Nizam; that accordingly, on the 30th instant, I should send off my pesh-kanah and heavy baggage five coss on the road towards Aurungabad, and proceed myself on my journey thither early in the morning of the next day.

‘ 8. As Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jadoon Rao Bhow repeatedly declared that they would not permit me to depart hence, I was obliged to explain to them, that although their opposing my departure might subject me to some inconvenience, on account of the difficulty of procuring supplies of grain, yet that they might be assured no personal consideration whatever should prevent me from paying implicit obedience to the orders of the Hon. General Wellesley. After saying this, I made my farewell compliments to the Maharajah in the most respectful manner, and immediately withdrew from the durbar.

‘ 9. As the Berar Rajah was not present at my last audience with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I thought it proper to apprise him of my determination to leave this camp, and accordingly did so in a memorial, of which the enclosed contains a copy in English and Persian.

‘ 10. My pesh-kanah has been sent on five coss, and I shall follow to-morrow morning at daylight, unless the Marhatta chieftains should, contrary to expectation, assure me of their resolution to comply with your requisition. But as such an assurance would be consistent with good faith and good sense, I almost despair of receiving it. However, I shall not close this letter until sunset.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’ ‘ J. COLLINS.

Jadoon Rao Bhow to Colonel Collins.

‘ 28th July, 1803.

‘ Your kind reply to my friendly letter, with which I have been favored, has increased our friendship. With respect to your request for an answer to the points in question, and that I would repair to the durbar at the time I should appoint, my friend, yesterday was fixed on for the Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to visit the Maharajah; but the interview was prevented by the continuance of the rain. The Rajah will certainly come to-day, and the matter in agitation will be debated, for which reason it will not be proper for you to visit the durbar this day. Should it be necessary for you to attend, I will undoubtedly acquaint you with it, otherwise you shall be apprized of the time that may be settled for this purpose; but to-day is not the 9th; you shall, however, have intimation sent to you at the time that may be agreed on.

‘ *Colonel Collins.*’

‘ JADOON RAO BHOW.

Colonel Collins to Jadoon Rao.

‘ 28th July, 1803.

‘ The friendly letter of the Maharajah, along with yours, in reply to my notes, have reached me; and I comprehend their contents, which plainly manifest both indifference and procrastination on the part of the durbar of the Maharajah; for on Monday it was agreed upon, that on the 3rd day both sirdars, Ragojee Bhoonslah, and the Maharajah would meet together, and desire my attendance at once, whereas the contrary has now taken place. If the Maharajah was desirous of giving me an explicit answer, it is not possible that he would again put it off till to-morrow, which is Friday. But the Maharajah has written to prohibit me from being present at the interview which is to take place this day between him and Ragojee Bhoonslah, from which I conclude, that it is not the intention of the Maharajah to give me an explicit answer. Besides this, it is now the 9th day since the khareetah from the Hon. General Wellesley was presented to the Maharajah; I shall therefore wait till 12 o'clock to-morrow for an explicit answer from the Maharajah. After that, I shall send my pesh-kanah on the road towards Aurungabad, and take my departure from this on the following day, pursuant to the

orders of the Hon. General Wellesley. Of this I trust you will inform the Maharajah, with my best respects.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Jadoon Rao.*’

‘ J. COLLINS.

Memorandum from Colonel Collins to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah.

‘ 30th July, 1803.

‘ On the 4th of Rubee-ul-Saunee (24th July) a memorial was delivered to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah on the part of Colonel Collins, of which the enclosure is a copy*. Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah acknowledged the receipt of this memorial in a note to Colonel Collins, dated the same day, in which the Rajah informed the Colonel, that the answer to this memorial depended on a meeting between him and Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and that after they should have met, and personally discussed the subject of it, a reply would then certainly be committed to writing.

‘ On the 6th of Rubee-ul-Saunee (26th July) Colonel Collins sent a letter to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, written by the Hon. General Wellesley, and addressed to the Rajah. This letter was accompanied by a note from the Colonel, in which he requested that Rajah Ragojee would return a speedy and a proper answer to it. But the Rajah has not to this hour replied to that note, or to the letter of General Wellesley, although Sereedhur Punt immediately acknowledged to Mirza Bauker Khan the receipt of both these papers.

‘ On the 8th of Rubee-ul-Saunee, Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah had a conference with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and, notwithstanding the Maharajah had promised to give Colonel Collins a distinct reply to the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley on that day, in the presence of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, yet Jadoon Rao Bhow, the chief minister of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, apprized the Colonel that it would not be proper for him to attend on that occasion.

‘ Yesterday Colonel Collins had an audience of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, when the Colonel expected to receive a satisfactory answer to the requisition of General Wellesley, and declared, that if it were not then given, he (the Colonel) should send off his pesh-kanah and baggage the next day, and proceed himself towards Aurungabad early on the morning of the

* See page 250.

11th Rubee-ul-Saunee; yet Jadoon Rao Bhow insisted that no determinate reply could be given to the letter of General Wellesley, until the Maharajah had held another conference with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah. Colonel Collins then explained, that he had been directed by the Hon. General Wellesley to leave the camp of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, should the Colonel perceive that the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar were determined not to comply with his (the General's) requisition; and that in consequence of the refusal of Jadoon Rao Bhow to give a direct answer thereto, Colonel Collins should certainly send off his pesh-kanah the next day, and proceed early in the morning of the 11th Rubee-ul-Saunee towards Aurungabad.

‘ Colonel Collins deems it necessary to recapitulate the foregoing particulars, in order that Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah may be fully apprized that the Colonel cannot, without being guilty of disobedience of orders, remain longer than to-morrow morning in the camp of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; unless the Colonel should receive assurances, in the intermediate time, from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, and from the Maharajah, of their intentions to comply with the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley.

‘ In conclusion, Colonel Collins requests an immediate answer to this memorial, a copy of which will be sent to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ *Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah.*

‘ J. COLLINS.

Colonel Collins to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, Julgong, 1st August, 1803.

‘ 1. I little thought I should have the honor of addressing you again from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but the very heavy and incessant rains which have fallen since I wrote to you on the 30th ultimo, rendered it impossible for me to proceed on my journey.

‘ 2. About four o'clock yesterday morning, Captain Lyons, who commands my escort, came to my tent and stated, that in consequence of the great quantity of rain which had fallen since eleven o'clock the preceding night, the roads were become impassable for guns: although I was perfectly satisfied of the justness of this representation, yet I deemed it necessary, for your information, to desire Captain Lyons to address an

official report to me on this subject in writing, and I have now the honor to enclose it.

‘ 3. On the 30th ultimo, at ten o’clock at night, Dowlut Rao Scindiah sent me a note, a copy and translation of which I herewith forward. At the time when I received it, the weather had cleared up, and I had not a doubt of being able to march on the following morning; I therefore told the person who brought the note from the Maharajah, that I would reply to it the next day after my arrival at Tondapoor, to which place my pesh-kanah and baggage had been sent, and where they still remain.

‘ 4. Having, however, been necessarily detained here the whole of yesterday, and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah having prepared a request similar to that contained in the one from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, (No. 2,) I conceived it might be giving those Chiefs an advantage, were I to refuse the interview which they so pressingly solicited, and in this idea I returned an assenting answer. The enclosure (No. 3) contains a copy and translation of my reply to both chieftains.

‘ 5. I arrived at the tent of the Berar Rajah at four o’clock yesterday afternoon, but not without considerable difficulty, on account of the extreme heaviness of the roads. Captain Paris Bradshaw and Mirza Bauker Khan attended me on this occasion, and I was received with great politeness, as well by Scindiah as by Ragojee Bhoonslah, in the fullest durbar that I have yet seen.

‘ 6. Although our conference lasted more than four hours, yet, as the arguments on the part of the Marhatta ministers contained no new matter whatever; and as my replies were, of course, the same as I had so often given at our former interviews, I shall not trouble you with a repetition thereof, but proceed to state the propositions that were made to me by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, after numberless evasions and much disagreeable altercation.

‘ 1st Proposition. That the united forces of the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah should retire to Burhampoor, and that the Hon. General Wellesley should withdraw the Company’s troops to their usual stations. This proposition I rejected, as altogether inadmissible, inasmuch as it was in opposition both to the letter and spirit of your requisition, which demanded that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Ner-

budda, and the Berar Rajah return to Nagpoor. As this proposal was strongly contested on their part, I said at length, that if Ragojee Bhoonslah would repair to his own capital, and Scindiah to Burhampoor, I would not, in such case, leave the camp of the Maharajah, until I received your further instructions. But this concession did not satisfy those chieftains, who then introduced a second proposition.

‘ 2nd Proposition. That I should fix on a day for their marching hence with their respective forces, and at the same time pledge myself that the Hon. General Wellesley should withdraw his troops on the precise day that they moved towards their usual stations. I replied, that you required, in the first instance, the removal of the Marhatta armies from their present menacing position on the frontier of our ally, the Nabob Nizam; and, exclusive of this condition, I observed, that as the political and military authorities were vested in the Hon. General Wellesley, I could not be responsible for the execution of any measure but such as the Honorable General had particularized in his instructions to me, and in his letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah. This remark produced their third and last proposition, and from which they positively declared they would not recede.

‘ 3rd Proposition. That Scindiah and the Bhoonslah would propose to the Hon. General Wellesley, by letter, that he should speedily fix some particular day for withdrawing his armies, and for the removal of theirs from their present position on the Nizam’s frontier; and that, on the day so specified, they would assuredly commence their march. These chieftains further said, that they would also request of the Hon. General Wellesley, in the same letter, to name the time when the forces under his command might be expected to reach their usual station; and that they (Scindiah and the Bhoonslah) would so regulate their marches as to arrive at their usual stations precisely at the same period of time.

‘ 7. I objected to this proposal on the ground of its being different, in one particular, from your requisition, which demanded, in the first instance, the removal of the Marhatta armies from the Nizam’s frontier. But as Scindiah’s ministers declared that, unless you consented to this proposition, their prince could not retire without an indelible stain on his honor, and as the servants of the Berar Rajah maintained the same

sentiments with great firmness, I at last agreed to refer the point in question to your consideration, and to remain with the Maharajah until I received your determination on this proposition, provided letters to your address were sent me for transmission before noon on the following day, and provided those letters were expressed conformably with the terms which they had then proposed. Here the conference ended, and I took my leave, after the usual compliments of attar and paun.

‘ 8. It rained during the whole of yesterday, and until the present hour, which is eleven o’clock in the forenoon. Whatever, therefore, may be the line of conduct pursued by the Marhatta chieftains, with respect to the proposed letters to your address, it will be utterly impracticable for me to proceed towards Aurungabad until an interval of fair weather, as well on account of the heavy roads, as of the overflowing of the nullah, about midway between this and Tondapoor.

‘ 9. I have just received a letter to your address, from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, in which this Chief proposes to retire to Burhampoor with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, instead of returning to Nagpoor, conformably to the proposition that his own minister, Sereedhur Punt, first brought forward. I am too much accustomed to Marhatta tergiversations to be surprised at the disingenuous conduct of the Berar Rajah on the present occasion; but I must confess that I feel extremely hurt at my inability to leave the camp of the Maharajah this very day. I have acknowledged the receipt of the Bhoonslah’s khareetah, and told him that I should march from this the instant that the roads were passable.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
 ‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.* ‘ J. COLLINS.

‘ P.S.—I have the honor to enclose the Bhoonslah’s letter.’

Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Colonel Collins
 ‘ 30th July, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter, together with a copy of your address to Senah Saheb Soubah Behauder, and thoroughly understood the contents of both.

‘ In consequence of the haste with which you require an answer, and urge your departure, Senah Saheb Behauder came to-day to my tent, where we had an interview. I shall return Senah Saheb Behauder’s visit at twelve o’clock to-morrow, on

which day do you also repair to his tent, when only six ghuries of daylight shall remain, that we may, in the presence of each other, discourse of whatever is to be discussed. It is not proper for you to hurry your march. Do not depart, but come to-morrow, at the time appointed, to the tents of Senah Saheb Soubah Behauder. Your going off with such expedition is repugnant to good sense.'

N.B.—Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah addressed a letter exactly to the above purport to Colonel Collins, which was received at three o'clock in the morning of the 31st of July, 1803.

Colonel Collins to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'SIX A. M., 31st July, 1803.

'I have received your favor, and understand its contents. In obedience to the commands of the Honorable General Wellesley, it was my positive determination to march hence early this morning; but Captain Lyons, the commanding officer of my escort, having represented to me that the roads were impassable for guns, on account of the heavy rains, I am necessarily obliged to halt here to-day. It is my chief wish to preserve the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between the two states; and this accident affords me an opportunity of complying with your desire of meeting me at the tent of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah this afternoon, at three o'clock.

'I have the honor to be, &c.
'*Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.* 'J. COLLINS.

N.B.—A note nearly to the same purport was likewise written to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah by Colonel Collins.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

'SIR,

'Camp, 2nd August, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th July, in which you have enclosed the copy of a letter of the 1st July from his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon, in which his Excellency desires to have from Surat the assistance of a regiment of European infantry.

'You will have observed from my late correspondence with Colonel Collins, copies of which have been transmitted to you, that the question of peace or war with the northern Marhatta Chiefs is not yet decided: if there should be a war, there are

not more troops in Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, than are absolutely necessary for their defence; and if there should be peace, as some time will elapse before the large Marhatta armies which are now collected upon the frontier will disperse, and as, in obedience to the order of his Excellency the Governor General, it will be necessary to observe the designs of the French upon Damaun, and to have the means of preventing them from carrying them into execution, I conceive that you ought not to weaken your forces in that quarter.

‘ I am very sensible of the importance of Trincomalee, and regret the misfortunes which have endangered the safety of that place; but I observe, that a very large detachment of the Royal Artillery had arrived there, with which event it is probable that his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon had not been acquainted when he wrote to you on the 1st of July, as that reinforcement, in fact, makes the garrison stronger in European troops than it was before the detachment of the 19th regiment marched upon the expedition to Kandi. I have also heard through private channels, that the Malay troops did not desert to the enemy as was first reported; but that, finding the officer determined to lay down his arms, and being aware of the treachery and cruelty of the Kandians, they expected the disastrous consequences which followed, and fled to the jungles, and that several of them had since arrived with their arms at Trincomalee. If this account should be true, that garrison, reinforced as it has been by the detachment of the Royal Artillery, will be in no danger.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
 ‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Tondapoor, 3rd August, 1803.

‘ 1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, under date the 29th ult., and to apprise you of my having left the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ 2. In my conference with the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar, on the 31st ult., when I observed to those chieftains, that, if they did not instantly retire from the frontier of the Nabob Nizam, you would no longer delay taking advantage of your present position, Sereedhur Punt, without hesitation,

replied, that, should the Honorable General Wellesley commence hostilities, or order the British forces to advance towards the Adjuntee ghaut, in either of these events, Ragojee Bhoonslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah would consider themselves at liberty to march their troops in whatever direction they might think proper.

‘ 3. Although the weather began to clear up yesterday at noon, and no rain fell during the night, yet I found the road to this place exceedingly deep. It is now one o’clock in the afternoon, and my escort is not yet arrived, though it marched at half past four this morning. I propose ascending the Tondapoor ghaut to-morrow morning, and proceeding as far as the town of Adjuntee, provided the gun bullocks are in a condition to perform the journey.

‘ 4. I have apprized Colonel Stevenson that I should this day leave the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in consequence of his refusal to retire from his present position, and of my intention to prosecute my march to Aurungabad with all practicable expedition.

‘ 5. Last night at ten o’clock, I received the enclosed khareetah, to your address, from Dowlut Rao Scindiah. No copy of this letter was sent to me; but I believe it is to the same purport as that which I had the honor to forward to you on the 1st instant from the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ J. COLLINS.

‘ P.S.—You have acknowledged the receipt of my official dispatches under date the 24th and 25th ultimo. I hope my public letters of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd have not miscarried.’

Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ 6th August, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters (here the contents of the Hon. Major General Wellesley’s letters are recapitulated) from Colonel Collins; and, from the Colonel’s verbal communication, I have been further assured of your friendship. No doubt, where the foundations of union and amity have so long subsisted, they must be firm and solid; and there can be no apprehension or suspicion admitted between parties so connected. By the blessing of God, both armies are, to this moment, on their own territory, and no aggression or excesses

have been committed on the countries of his Highness the Nizam. However, to satisfy your mind, and to dispel your alarms, it has been resolved upon, in the presence of Colonel Collins, that the armies now encamped here shall retire towards Burhampoor, on condition that the armies now assembled here, and those of the English Government and the Nizam, shall commence their retreat upon the same date, and that each of the armies shall arrive at their usual stations on a date previously settled; that is, that the army of the English and of the Nizam, now encamped near Aurungabad, the army of the English encamped near the Kistna, and you also with your army, shall all march towards their stations on the same date that the armies move from this encampment; and on the same date that all those different armies reach their respective stations at Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay, Scindiah and myself will reach Burhampoor.

‘In this manner has it been agreed and settled, in presence of Colonel Collins, and I have written it for your information.

‘It was written in your letter, that the English Government and the Peshwah would never destroy the relations and engagements that have long subsisted between the Peshwah, me, Scindiah, and the other Sirdars of the Marhatta empire. This assurance has made me most happy, and tends to confirm friendship. Colonel Collins will satisfy you further upon this subject.

‘Continue to write me accounts of your health.’

[The letter from Scindiah is verbatim the same as that from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah.]

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘SIR, ‘Camp, 1st August, 1803.

‘From the copies of the correspondence between the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and myself, which will have been sent to you, you will have observed that the question, whether there will be peace or war, will be decided in a few days. I think that there is some reason to hope that we may have peace, but we may also be obliged to commence hostilities: even in this event some time will elapse before any impression can be made on the Nizam’s territories; but as I observe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are

sending away their infantry to Hindustan, and retaining, with their camps, only their cavalry and some of their guns, it is probable that, if there should be a war, they will carry on their operations with those troops only.

‘ Even if this should be their plan, I have no apprehensions for the result of the contest; but it becomes more necessary to guard against all sudden attacks on points of importance. Notwithstanding the best intelligence of the enemy’s designs, and the best arrangements, it is obvious that a body of cavalry may pass one of our armies, and that much mischief may be done before a remedy can be applied, unless every point of importance is in some degree guarded. If places of this description should be guarded and prepared for their defence at all, this mode of operation, which I have supposed that the confederates have in their contemplation, cannot have any permanent effect, and will do but little temporary injury to the country.

‘ I therefore most earnestly recommend that garrisons, even of peons, should be placed in all the principal posts and forts in the Nizam’s territories, particularly Aurungabad, Moongy Puttun, Kurdlah, Bheer, Perinda, Beeder, &c. &c., and that a body of troops should be collected at Hyderabad.

‘ Even if the enemy should be able to pass our armies, the adoption of these means will prevent them from gaining any thing by this invasion; the village peons alone will render their subsistence difficult and precarious, and they will be obliged to retire.

‘ But I recommend these measures not only with a view to the defeat of the enemy’s designs, but to ensure the tranquillity of the country in the event of the Nizam’s death. The establishment of the British troops at Hyderabad has been the cause of a great diminution of the numbers of his Highness’s army, and many, who subsisted on the pay they received in his Highness’s service, have been obliged to look for subsistence in other employments not so agreeable to them. There must be many discontented people in those countries, all of whom would be ready to join the standard of any chief who might be desirous to take advantage of the weakness of the new government, and of the moment in which the British troops and those of his Highness should be employed against the enemy upon the frontier, to assume independence. Con-

sidering the ambition of the natives in general, it will not be denied that there may be chiefs disposed to adopt this line of conduct; but the measures of precaution which I have recommended will give employment to a great proportion of the military classes of the community, and will prevent such chiefs from finding instruments to carry their purposes into execution.

‘ General Stuart will have informed you, that a reserve, under the command of Major General Campbell, has been left in the Dooab of the Kistna and Toombuddra, the object of which is in some degree to check the designs of the discontented chiefs, in the event of the Nizam’s death; but still no measure can check them with so much certainty as to deprive them of the instrument which they could use to carry them into execution.

‘ I observe, that the fort of Perinda is still held by Nizam Nawaz Jung’s killadar, and he refuses to give it up to the persons sent there by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to take possession of it. In case Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should retire, according to my requisition, and we should consequently have peace, I have reason to believe that it will not be inconvenient to me to send a detachment to assist Rajah Mohiput Ram’s killadar, and if possible put him in possession of that fort.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ **ARTHUR WELLESLEY.**

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘ **HONORABLE SIR,**

‘ **Camp at Walkee, 2nd August, 1803.**

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23d July; and having taken into consideration the measures to be adopted for the defence of Guzerat, and of the districts depending upon Surat, I proceed to detail my ideas upon that subject.

‘ 2. The line for which a defence is to be provided extends from the marsh which divides Cutch from Guzerat to Parneira, across several large rivers; and the countries which it is to cover are liable to be attacked by different enemies, operating at the same time from different quarters.

‘ 3. The forces allotted for the defence of these countries, are,—

		European.	Native.
Artillery	Surat	78	
	Guzerat	110	
		188	
Gun Lascars	Surat	139	
	Guzerat	200	
		339	
H. M.'s 61st Regiment	Surat	45	
	Guzerat	109	
— 65th . . .	Surat	763	
— 75th . . .	Surat	573	
— 84th . . .	Surat	272	
— 86th . . .	Guzerat	815	
— 88th . . .	Surat	148	
		2725	
1st Batt. 1st Regt. N. I.	Guzerat	625	
2d Batt. 1st Regt. do.	Guzerat	697	
1st Batt. 6th Regt. do.	Surat	1218	
	Guzerat	101	
2d Batt. 6th Regt. do.	Guzerat	763	
2d Batt. 7th Regt. do.	Guzerat	696	
		4100	
		2913	4439

making a total of rank and file, including sick, of 2913 Europeans, and 4439 natives.

‘ 4. Besides these troops, Rajah Anund Rao, I conclude, has a body of cavalry, with the number of which I am unacquainted, and possibly some infantry.

‘ 5. It appears by a paper drawn up by Colonel Reynolds, which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Close, that the districts depending upon Surat can be entered by an army from the eastward only by the road which leads by Songhur.

‘ 6. There are other ghauts, but they are not practicable for wheel-carriages ; and the whole range of mountains is in the possession of Bheels, whose exertions would prevent the invasion of any party of marauding horse.

‘ 7. This fact points out the necessity of cultivating a good understanding with and encouraging the Bheels, so as to attach them to our cause.

‘ 8. When that object shall have been attended to, there will remain to provide for the roads into the districts depending

upon Surat, from the Peshwah's districts to the southward, and from the eastward by Songhur.

‘ 9. It appears by the papers transmitted by Colonel Reynolds, that there is no passage for an army coming from the eastward through the Shatpoor hills, between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, excepting by skirting the province of Malwa; but, as far as I can learn, the country is open north of the river Nerbudda.

‘ 10. Besides these principal passages into these districts, which are to be defended, it appears that the following objects are to be provided for,—

- 1st. The security of Surat.
- 2d. A garrison for Baroda.
- 3d. A garrison for Cambay.
- 4th. A garrison for Kairah.
- 5th. A garrison for Kurrah.
- 6th. Eventually a garrison for Baroach.

‘ Garrisons are also required for Songhur on the eastern frontier, and Parneira on the southern, in order to guard those inlets into the districts south of the Taptee.

‘ 11. It is my opinion that the troops in the districts under Surat, and those in the districts under Anund Rao, ought to be placed under one commanding officer, whose head quarters ought to be at Snrat; they ought all to be liable to be moved from one district to the other, according as he might find it necessary for the security of any part from impending invasion.

‘ 12. From the topographical description of the country received from Colonel Reynolds, to which I have above alluded, it is obvious that the armies which may invade Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, can penetrate either from the northward of the Nerbudda, or the southward of the Taptee, by Songhur only. It is very improbable that a serious invasion will be made from both quarters at the same time. The chief most likely to invade those territories has not forces sufficient to form two armies, either of them capable of meeting the disposable force in the districts, when joined by Rajah Anund Rao's cavalry. Whenever a serious invasion therefore is made, it will be by a large army in one quarter, and by light plundering parties in the other. But if there is one commanding authority in the districts, he cannot be with-

out intelligence of the force and disposition of the enemy's troops; and before the enemy can pass round the Shatpoor hills, he can make a disposition of all the troops to repel the northern or the southern invasion, according to his intelligence of the enemy's disposition.

‘13. In my opinion, therefore, the following arrangement ought to be made,—

‘1st. One Officer of rank ought to be appointed to command in the Attavesy and Guzerat. Lieut. Colonel Woodington may still command the troops immediately north of the Nerbudda, under such officer.

‘2ndly. The works of the castle of Surat ought to be put in a state of repair. If the castle of Surat is in such a position as that it is commanded by the neighbouring grounds, it ought to be destroyed; and field works to be erected in a commanding situation, without loss of time, for the defence of the troops allotted for the security of that important city:

Detachment of artillery	30
H. M.'s 75th Regiment	573
1st Batt. 6th Regiment N. I.	500
	1103

ought to be the troops allotted for the security of Surat.

‘3rdly. The garrison of Baroda ought to be,

Artillery	20
Detachment of H. M.'s 61st Regiment	154
Detachment of H. M.'s 88th Regiment	100
2nd Batt. 7th Regiment N. I.	696
	970

giving detachments as hereafter stated to other garrisons, and leaving 411 native infantry in Baroda.

‘4th. The garrison of Cambay ought to be, as at present, 25 rank and file, from the 2d of the 7th at Baroda.

‘5th. The garrison at Kairah ought to be 3 artillerymen and 100 rank and file, as at present, from the 2d of the 7th at Baroda.

‘6th. The garrison at Kurrah, 60 rank and file, as at present, from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

‘7th. The garrison for Baroach, eventually 48 rank and file of the 88th, 12 artillery, and 100 rank and file from the 2d of the 7th at Baroda.

‘8th. The garrison of Songhur ought to be 12 rank and

file, artillery; 100 rank and file of the 84th; and 100 rank and file of the 1st battalion 6th regiment.

‘ 9th. The garrison of Parneira ought to be 12 rank and file, artillery; 172 rank and file of the 84th; and 200 rank and file 1st battalion of the 6th.

‘ 14. I do not see the advantage of the posts in Dholluah and Gogo, or at Rampore, or of the small detachments, according to the returns, situated in any of the places in the districts ceded by the Peshwah. The officer appointed to command will, however, be the best judge upon this subject, and will post detachments in those places, if he should think it proper: these small detachments are ruinous to the discipline and spirit of the troops; they weaken the corps to such a degree, that they are unfit for service in the field, and they answer no adequate purpose. In my opinion, in time of war, and particularly in such a war as one with the Marhattas, it would be best to authorise the collectors to raise sebundy troops for these services: the expenses would be but trifling, and in fact cannot bear a comparison with the benefit which must be derived from the measure.

‘ 15. In all parts of India, particularly in those territories which have belonged to the Marhattas, there is a numerous class of people, whose only occupation and only mode of procuring subsistence has been the military service. This class is usually entirely deprived of subsistence by the transfer of the government of those countries to the Company; and they are driven to seek for it either in rebellion at those moments when the British troops are engaged in foreign wars, or in the armies of our enemies: these they are ready to lead into our districts, with all the knowledge derived from long residence and service within them, and they become in fact our most dangerous enemies.

‘ 16. The employment of these people, therefore, at such time as sebundy is advantageous, not only as it saves the regular troops, and gives a larger body of troops for field service, and prevents the loss of their discipline, but because it lessens the number of idle and discontented at the time of general invasion and confusion, and that of our most dangerous enemies.

‘ 17. Having thus provided for the principal garrisons and stations in Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, there will remain for service in the field:—

Artillery	99
H. M.'s 65th Regt.	763
86th Regt.	815
1st Batt. 1st Regt. N. I.	625
2nd do. do.	697
1st 6th Regt. do.	519
2nd do. do.	763

‘ 18. These corps ought to be divided into two detachments, one consisting of 50 artillery, the 86th regiment, and two native battalions, to be stationed in a convenient situation north of the Nerbudda, and in front of Baroda: the other, consisting of 49 artillery, the 65th regiment, and two native battalions, at another south of the Taptee, between Surat and Songhur.

‘ 19. In the cantonments with these two detachments ought to be the necessary proportion of ordnance and stores; namely, two six-pounders for each corps, and two twelve-pounders, and two five and half-inch howitzers, for each detachment. Camp equipage for these detachments ought to be in readiness at Baroda and Surat.

‘ 20. In case the commanding officer should receive intelligence that an invasion was threatened to the northward, he should move the southern detachment across the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, and collect all his troops in that quarter; excepting one battalion, which he might leave at Songhur to operate upon the enemy's marauding parties, if the Bheels should be friendly, and should have engaged to stop the passages by the other ghauts; or to be thrown into Surat, to reinforce that garrison, if they should not.

‘ 21. On the other hand, if he should be obliged from circumstances to bring the northern detachment to the southward, he might leave one battalion to reinforce the garrison of Baroda, and to operate, with Rajah Anund Rao's horse, upon the enemy's marauding parties who might attempt to penetrate in the absence of the detachment.

‘ 22. In this manner, and by bringing forward Rajah Anund Rao's horse and infantry, there would be a disposable force for the field purposes in those districts, which in the most essential parts of a British army, namely, British soldiers, would be stronger than that at present under my immediate command; and, with the aid of Anund Rao's horse, and supported by the

strong places, they would in that country be equal to any thing that could be brought against them.

‘ 23. I have also to observe that, under this arrangement, all the principal points in the country are secured.

‘ 24. It is true, that in the absence of the detachment from either the northern or the southern division, that in which there are no troops is in some degree liable to be injured by marauding horse. That is an evil which cannot be entirely avoided so long as the British armies are composed entirely of infantry, and those of the enemy of cavalry; but if the forts in the country are kept up, and in times of war the security of the country are hired and paid, even that evil must be of short duration; as it is well known that no number of horse can find their way into a fort without the assistance of guns.

‘ 25. Having thus considered the disposition and distribution of the troops in these districts, it is proper that I should advert to their means of subsistence.

‘ 26. It is my opinion, that when the commanding officer shall have reason to believe that he may have occasion to employ these troops in the field, sufficient carriage for one month’s provisions ought immediately to be provided for them. Besides this carriage, magazines ought to be formed, and always ready, at Parneira, Songhur, Surat, Cambay, Baroach, Baroda, Kairah, and Kurrah, of all those species of provisions and stores required for the troops, which might be scarce in the country in case of invasion; particularly arrack and biscuit for the Europeans, and rice for the natives.

‘ 27. These would be necessary even for defensive operations: those of an offensive nature would require different measures, and more extensive arrangement, which must be ordered at the time when those operations are in contemplation.

‘ 28. This arrangement, when carried into execution, will be applicable to all purposes, will put the troops in the Guzerat and Attavesy in a state and shape for service, and I shall know how to avail myself of their services in the course of the campaign; accordingly I request, if you should approve of it, that you will give orders that it may be carried into execution as soon as possible.

‘ 29. As his Excellency the Governor General has been pleased to give orders in his letter to you of the 9th July, that the troops in those districts should be placed under my com-

mand, I imagine that Major General Jones will return to Bombay; and as it will be necessary that the officer who will have that extensive charge should be one of character, capacity, and rank, upon reference to the list of the Bombay army, I should think that Sir William Clarke and Colonel Murray are the most fit for such an employment.

‘30. The former already fills a situation from which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to relieve him immediately; and if you approve of the latter, I should recommend him.

‘31. When he may undertake this important charge, it will be necessary that he should have the full confidence of government, all the military power that they can give him, for the exercise of which he should be responsible to them and the Commander in Chief, and therein supported on all occasions.

‘32. He ought to be desired to attend to the requisition of the Resident at Baroda, and of the civil authority of Surat, as far as circumstances will permit him; but as his attention will be entirely engrossed by his military duties, and by the defence of the countries committed to his charge, it does not appear to me to be necessary that he should belong to the committee or commission at Surat, or that he should be troubled with their civil duties or arrangements.

‘33. On the other hand, they all have nothing to do with his duties, excepting to make requisitions upon him for military assistance when they may require it.

‘34. I cannot conclude this letter without requesting that you will urge the gentlemen at Surat to keep on terms with the Bheels: these appear to be a race of the same description with those who inhabit the hills in all parts of India. By conciliation, and refraining from an interference with their concerns, they will prove our best friends, and a contrary line of conduct will make them our worst enemies: it must not be expected that we should involve ourselves in the affairs of these Bheels, or press them for tribute. The number of troops I have above detailed will be sufficient for the protection of the valuable territory of which you have got possession: they will not be sufficient for the subjection even of one of their rajahs; and from what I have seen of the service in other parts of India, I have no hesitation in declaring my opinion, that, as a measure of economy, it would be better to give up all claims of tribute that the Company might have upon any of these

rajahs, than to receive it at the risk of the expense of being obliged to enforce its payment at some future day.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
 ‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp at Walkee, 3rd August, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch dated the 30th of July, and copies of its enclosures which I received this day from Colonel Collins.

‘ I am at present encamped within six miles of the fort of Ahmednuggur, which place I am fully prepared to attack as soon as I shall learn that Colonel Collins has quitted the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
 ‘ *The Governor General.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ 6th August, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter. [Here the contents are recapitulated.] You will recollect that the British government did not threaten to commence hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against the British government and its allies; and when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; and, in conformity with your threats, and your declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam’s frontier.

‘ On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were sincere; but, instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs, and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence.

‘ This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt, in order to repel your aggressions.

‘ I offered you peace on terms of equality, and honorable to

all parties: you have chosen war, and are responsible for all consequences.

'Dowlut Rao Scindiah.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

'MY LORD,

'Camp at Walkee, 6th August, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose copies of a letter and its enclosures, dated the 1st instant, which I received last night from Colonel Collins, and the copy of a letter dated the 3rd instant, which I have received this day.

'I likewise enclose a translation of the letter I received yesterday from the Rajah of Berar, and the translation of one which I have written this day to that chief and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is written in the same terms as that received from the Rajah of Berar.

'Colonel Stevenson has already got orders to move forward, and I have received a letter from him, by which I learn that he proposes to march from Aurungabad on this day. I have sent orders to the officer in command of the troops in the territories of Anund Row Guickwar, to commence his operations against Baroach, and not to suffer them to be interrupted by any negotiations.

'It has rained violently in this part of the country the last three days, and the roads from this place to Ahmednuggur are at present impracticable. But if the weather should become more favorable in the course of the evening or night, and the roads should be tolerably good in the morning, I propose to move to that place.

'I have written to the Right Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George to suggest that the officer in command of the troops of the Ganjam district should receive orders, if possible, to commence his operations against Cuttack.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

'SIR,

'Camp at Walkee, 6th August, 1803.

'The perusal of the papers received from Colonel Collins, which I enclosed to you this day, will have shown you, that it is impossible to delay any longer the commencement of hos-

ilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, without sacrificing the public interests ; and that I have given orders that hostilities may be commenced against those Chiefs, and I propose to attack Ahmednuggur as soon as circumstances will permit.

‘ It is proper that the Peshwah should be apprized of this state of affairs, that you should communicate to his Highness what has passed lately in Scindiah’s camp, the moderate proposition made by me, the adoption of which would have produced peace, and the answers given by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, notwithstanding that they declared themselves satisfied with the assurances which I gave them, and that the former considered my requisition, that he should withdraw, reasonable.

‘ Under the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, it is necessary that his Highness the Peshwah should now consider Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar as his enemies, and that he should cease to hold any communication with those Chiefs. His Highness will also observe how necessary it is that he should complete the quota of troops which he is bound by that treaty to furnish, and that he should adopt every measure that is practicable to forward the success of the operations against the common enemy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.

‘ 6th August, 1803.

‘ His Highness the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, having been obliged to quit his capital, concluded at Bassein with the Honorable Company a treaty, by which the British government bound itself to defend his Highness, his rights and interests, against all who should attack him.

‘ The contracting parties had a full right to enter into this treaty, which is purely defensive ; and it contains an express stipulation that the British troops shall not be employed to attack the great Marhatta jaghiredars, unless they should first commit hostilities against the allies.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah called upon the British government to give assistance to the Peshwah to recover his musnud : subsequently, when informed that the relations between the

Honorable Company and Pundit Purdhaun had been improved, he expressed his satisfaction at that event; and he declared, on the 2nd of March, to the British Resident in his camp, in his public durbar, in the most formal manner, that he had no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to commit hostilities against the British government or its allies.

‘ Notwithstanding this declaration, accounts reached the British government, from various quarters, stating that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had combined with the Rajah of Berar, and with other Chiefs, for the purpose of hostility against the British government and its allies.

‘ The treaty of Bassein was communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 27th of May; and that Chief was called upon to state his objections to it, if he had any. He was also desired to make known the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and other chiefs; and was called upon to retire with his troops to their usual stations, if his designs were not hostile to the British government or its allies.

‘ In answer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah declared to the British resident, that until he had a meeting with the Rajah of Berar, he could not decide whether there should be “peace or war;” but that the British Resident should be made acquainted with the determination of the united Chiefs, as soon as their meeting should take place.

‘ The Chiefs met in the neighbourhood of Mulcapoor on the 3rd of June; and from that day, notwithstanding that the defensive and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein was repeatedly explained to them, and that they had never stated the smallest objection to it, they evaded to give any answer to the just demands of the British government till the 8th of July.

‘ Both Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar then declared, that they had no intentions to attack the Company or their allies; or to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, provided the Honorable Company would not prevent the execution of the treaties subsisting between his Highness the Peshwah and those chiefs: they still, however, manifested an intention of advancing towards the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, and of remaining with their troops in a station contiguous to his Highness’s boundary.

‘ Major General Wellesley therefore, on the 14th of July,

wrote a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which he apprized that Chief, that he could not consider his actions to be consistent with his declarations, if he did not separate his troops from those of the Rajah of Berar, and if both Chiefs did not retire with their troops to the stations they usually occupied. He promised that the British troops should also retire to their usual stations, when the united Chiefs should have retired: but he informed them, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should remain with their troops in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, Major General Wellesley would be obliged to take advantage of the positions which the British troops had taken up, to attack their possessions; an event which he most anxiously deprecated.

‘ Major General Wellesley at the same time declared to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, “ that it was not consistent with the treaty of Bassein, or the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty ;” and, therefore, he might be satisfied regarding the treaties between the Peshwah and his government.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared themselves to be satisfied with this declaration; and the former acquiesced in the justice of the demand of Major General Wellesley, that he should retire with his troops to the stations which they usually occupy; but instead of retiring with their troops, these Chiefs have persevered to retain the position which they took up for the purposes of hostility against the British government and their allies; and they have written letters to propose to Major General Wellesley that he should withdraw to Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay, the troops which had been assembled for the purpose of repelling their aggressions, and of defending the rights and territories of the allies; while they should keep their troops united in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, and in readiness to take advantage of the absence of the troops of the British government and its allies, to carry into execution their hostile designs.

‘ Major General Wellesley offered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, peace on terms of equality, and honorable to all parties: they have preferred war, and they alone must be considered responsible for the consequences.

‘ Under these circumstances Major General Wellesley is

obliged to commence operations against them, in order to secure the interests of the British government and its allies.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Officer Commanding the troops in the territories of Anund Rao Guickwar, Baroda.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 6th August, 1803.

‘Upon the receipt of this letter, you will commence your operations against Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s fort of Baroach.

‘You will not suffer these operations to be interrupted or delayed by any negotiation whatever. You will send the Governor of Bombay a copy of the report which you will transmit to me, of the measures which you will have adopted in consequence of this order.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Officer commanding
the troops at Baroda.’ }

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lord Clive.

‘MY LORD,

‘6th August, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose copies of a letter of the 1st instant, with its enclosures, received last night, and of a letter of the 3rd instant, and its enclosures, received this day from Colonel Collins, with a translation of the letters from the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which are written in the same terms; and a translation of a letter which I have written this day to those Chiefs.

‘I have sent orders to the officer commanding the troops in the territories of Anund Rao Guickwar, to commence his operations against the fort of Baroach. It has rained violently in this part of the country for the last three days, and the roads from hence to Ahmednuggur are at present impassable; but if the weather should become more favorable in the course of the evening or night, and the roads should be tolerably good in the morning, I propose to move to that place.

‘I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship to order the officer in command of the troops in the Ganjam district now to make his attack upon Cuttack, if it should be practicable.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lord Clive.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Honorable the Court of Directors. (Extract.)

‘ 164. The force under the immediate command of Major General Wellesley consists of—

CAVALRY.	His Majesty's 19th Light Dragoons	384	}	.	1731	
	4th	Regiments native cavalry				1347
	5th					
	7th					
	Artillery	.	.	.	173	
INFANTRY.	His Majesty's 74th regiment	}	1368	}	.	
	78th do.					
	1st battalion 2nd regt. native infantry	}	5631	}	6999	
	1st do. 3rd do.					
	2nd do. 3rd do.					
	1st do. 8th do.					
	2nd do. 12th do.					
	2nd do. 18th do.					
					8903	

exclusive of European artillerymen, and 653 pioneers of the establishment of Fort St. George, 2400 cavalry, belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, and about 3000 Marhatta horse. Two battalions of sepoy were detached in the month of July, with a large convoy of treasure, bullocks, and grain, from the army under the command of Lieut. General Stuart to the division under Major General Wellesley.

‘ The British force remaining at Poonah for the protection of that capital, consists of—

His Majesty's 84th Regiment, 5 companies		470
European Artillery		93
Native Infantry		1215
		1778

With Bombay Lascars, and a small park of Artillery.

‘ 165. The forces under the command of Colonel Stevenson consist of the whole subsidiary force, amounting to 7920 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and about 16,000 men, cavalry and infantry, of his Highness the Nizam's troops.

CAVALRY.		3rd and 6th regts. native cavalry	.	.	.	909
		Artillery	.	.	.	120
INFANTRY.		His Majesty's Scotch brigade	.	.	.	778
	2nd battalion	2nd regiment N. I.	}	6113	}	.
	1st do.	6th do.				
	2nd do.	7th do.				
	2nd do.	9th do.				
	1st do.	11th do.				
	2nd do.	11th do.				
						6891
						7920

With 276 gun Lascars and 212 pioneers.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 7th August, 1803.

‘I have received a letter from Mr. Duncan of the 3rd, by which I find that, in consequence of my recommendation, he has sent you 73,000 dollars, and has referred you to me for instructions respecting them. The only instructions I have to give you, are to desire Captain Mathison to make the same bargain with the mints at Poonah and Chinchore, for coining these dollars into Chandory rupees, that Captain Graham made for coining the dollars which I received from Bombay, when I was at Poonah. I will desire Captain Graham to write to Captain Mathison upon this subject.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 7th August, 1803.

‘I have been detained here this day by the badness of the weather, but I hope to be able to march to-morrow.

‘I am delighted with your letter of the 5th, respecting the Peshwah’s intentions and Ragonaut Rao’s disposition. This will be the time for the Peshwah to declare himself. If he is firm in his durbar, and makes a stiff declaration that Scindiah, being our enemy, is his; that he is determined to stand by the alliance, and if he orders away his minister, Kistna Rowanny, the Putwurdun’s and others may be induced to come forward; at all events, they will not like to venture upon hostilities against their own master.

‘I enclose a translation of a memorandum which I intend to circulate among the Chiefs. You shall have a Marhatta translation to show to Ragonaut Rao. I do not know what to say to the coercion of Appah Saheb: it might have good consequences; but on the other hand, it might produce a contest on the frontier of Mysore, which would be ruinous. I am decidedly against any measure of coercion, unless the Peshwah is stout, and speaks firmly, and withdraws his minister. Even then I almost doubt whether it would not do more harm than good,

‘No accounts yet of Major Dallas. Continue to get as much money as you can.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lieut. General Stuart to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Head Quarters, Camp at Cuddapa, 8th Aug., 1803.

‘ Considerable changes in the disposition of the army under my immediate command have recently occurred: and although I am sensible that they have been regularly communicated to your Excellency, yet I judge it proper to submit to your Lordship a short detail of the considerations which have produced them, and of the actual state of the army under this government.

‘ It became an important question for consideration when the conduct of the principal Marhatta Chiefs suggested the probability of a war, whether the forces under the immediate command of Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley were equal to the early prosecution of successful operations against the confederates.

‘ The capture of Ahmednuggur and the possession of the Adjuntee pass were deemed the first objects of General Wellesley’s proceedings; and to enable him to secure these, and to pursue his subsequent advantages over the confederates with proper celerity, an reinforcement of two battalions appeared to Colonel Close and to Lord Clive to be requisite: and although General Wellesley made no application to me for an augmentation to his strength, yet I judged it advisable to detach two battalions to join his army. Those corps marched at different periods in the month of July, and escorted considerable supplies of treasure, bullocks, and grain, which I forwarded for the use of the troops in advance.

‘ The total want of disposable troops in the Carnatic, the ceded districts, and Mysore, the arrival of a French armament in India, and the apparent probability of the renewal of the war with France, excited a great degree of solicitude in the minds of Lord Clive and myself, regarding the means of opposing the designs which might be meditated by that nation. A considerable French force might effect a landing at almost any point of the Carnatic; upwards of six weeks must have elapsed before a detachment could be collected to repel them, and during that time they might accomplish many important purposes, and occasion most serious evils.

‘ Those considerations induced Lord Clive, in the latter end of June, to request, that the army under my command might recross the Toombuddra, and they have since induced his

Lordship, in concurrence with my opinion, to order a division of the army to return to the Carnatic.

‘ The remaining part of the army, consisting of one regiment of native cavalry, five companies of European infantry, and three battalions of sepoy, with five brigades of 6-pounders, and their complement of artillerymen, under the orders of Major General Campbell, has been stationed near Moodgul, in the Dooab, for the purposes of covering the frontier, and ensuring the internal tranquillity of Mysore and the ceded districts, of overawing the southern Marhatta jaghiredars, of supporting the British interests at Hyderabad, and affording every practicable degree of security to the communication with Major General Wellesley’s army. Major General Campbell has received explicit instructions for his guidance, and has been directed to detach the force under his command, or a part of it, to join the troops in advance, or to Hyderabad, on receiving an application to that effect from Major General Wellesley, or Major Kirkpatrick ; but Major General Campbell is ordered in either of these cases to return himself to the ceded districts, as the priority of his rank to that of Major General Wellesley would render his presence to the northward of the Kistna incompatible with a due exercise of the powers which your Excellency has delegated to the latter officer.

‘ Those dispositions have produced a separation of the army under my immediate command, and I am authorized by your Lordship’s instructions to assume the immediate command of the army in advance. The experience gained by Major General Wellesley during his former operations in the Marhatta territories, the extensive knowledge and influence which he has acquired in the present campaign, and his eminent military talents, enable him better than any other officer to prosecute with success the service which he has hitherto conducted with so much ability ; and I have chosen to relinquish the gratification which I should derive from the command of an army, probably destined to undertake very distinguished services, in order to continue that important charge in the hands of the officer best qualified in my judgment to exercise it with advantage to the public.

‘ The situation of affairs in the Peninsula, and the necessity of providing means to check the progress of the rebellion in Malabar, and repel the attempts of the French, require my

presence at the Presidency, and I have accordingly, with the approbation of the Right Hon. Lord Clive, proceeded on my route thither. The troops returning to the Carnatic amount to 400 European, and 400 native cavalry, 1000 European infantry, and 80 artillery.

‘ In the present state of the army it is nearly impracticable to increase that strength should circumstances require a greater force. In the month of March I suggested the expediency of forming three extra battalions and raising 200 sepoy to be added to each battalion within the British dominions under the Presidency of Fort St. George; and in the beginning of this month I recommended that those additional sepoy, who increased our battalions to an unwieldy and unmanageable extent, should be formed into four other extra corps. Both these proposals were adopted by government. They add seven additional battalions to this army: but the great difficulty of procuring recruits on the coast will prevent them from being completed, or applicable to any purpose of the service, for a considerable length of time.

‘ The force in advance of the Toombuddra from the army of this establishment amounts to seven regiments of cavalry, two and a half regiments of European infantry, and nineteen battalions of sepoy, with their proper equipment of ordnance and artillerymen. One regiment of European infantry and three battalions of sepoy have been detached from the duties of Malabar, for the eventual protection of Goa.

‘ I have already stated to your Excellency that the troops remaining within the territories dependent on this government cannot furnish a field detachment, exclusive of the corps on its return from the frontier; and in Malabar the troops find it difficult to prevent the extension of the rebellion. These inconveniences will be alleviated when the seven extra battalions shall be completed; but even this reinforcement will be scarcely sufficient, if a war occurs, to supply the place of the troops removed from the internal defence of this Presidency.

‘ The Hon. Major General Wellesley has experienced difficulties in supplying his losses of cattle and procuring treasure for the use of his army. I have judged it an object of the first importance that his troops should be placed on the most efficient footing; and with this view, I have forwarded to the army in advance during the months of June and July, seven lacs of

pagodas, (exclusive of a lac of pagodas, which Mr. Piel, acting in the absence of the Resident of Mysore, is now forwarding by Purneah's means, and General Wellesley's suggestion, to Poonah,) and 11,000 hired bullocks, with 4,000 loads of rice, and 3000 brinjarry bullocks, also carrying rice.

' I have also dispatched 2700 hired bullocks to the Resident at Hyderabad for the purpose of carrying loads to the army, as Major Kirkpatrick informed me that he was unable to procure cattle of that description in the Nizam's dominions. I trust that those arrangements will obviate for a considerable length of time the want of supplies during the prosecution of the operations which may become necessary against the confederated Marhatta Chiefs.

' I have the honor to be, &c.,

' *The Governor General.*

' J. STUART.

Translation of a Letter addressed by His Highness the Nizam Soubahdar of the Deccan to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, communicated to the Resident.

' Hyderabad, 8th August, 1803.

' By the blessing of Providence all the affairs of the two states are perfectly identified, and we, confidently relying on your judgment and ability, have been pleased to address orders to all our military commanders, placing them under your authority, and to obey all your requisitions until the termination of the present service; and we hereby invest you with the authority even of maintaining or displacing any officers of our Government.

' Rajah Mohiput Ram, the Talookdar of Aurungabad, &c., and Rajah Sookroodoor, the Talookdar of Bheer, Perinda, &c., have also been instructed to consider themselves subject to your authority, and to recollect that your censure or your approbation of their conduct will prove equally efficacious, to the extent even of dismissal from their employments, if you should signify to us your displeasure against them in any instance.

' You will consider yourself as invested with full authority on all affairs during the continuance of the present service, as we repose in you the most unbounded confidence.

What more need be written?

*Translation of Orders issued by Azim ool Oomrah to
Rajahs Mohiput Ram and Sookroodoor.*

‘ In consideration of the identity of the British Government and that of His Highness the Nizam, His Highness has been pleased to address to the Hon. Major General Wellesley, under his own seal, a letter, of which a copy is inclosed to you. It is requisite that you should display an entire obedience to the tenor of that letter, and that you should direct all the military commanders in the army of His Highness to comply without hesitation or demur with the pleasure of His Highness therein communicated.

‘ To inform you was indispensable: what more need be written?’

Proclamation by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ Camp near Ahmednuggur, 7th August, 1803.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having threatened with hostilities the British government and their allies, Rao Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam Ali; and in pursuance of those threats, having advanced with their large armies to a position contiguous to the frontiers, and having refused to depart from it, notwithstanding the repeated representations and entreaties of Major General Wellesley, as the only mode of preserving peace, he at last finds himself obliged to commence hostilities against those Chiefs.

‘ He does not, however, intend to make war upon the inhabitants; and, accordingly, all amildars and others are required to remain quietly in their stations, and obey the orders they will receive; and if they do no injury to the British armies, none will be done to them. But notice is hereby given, that if any of the inhabitants of the country either abandon their dwellings, or do any injury to the British armies or their followers, they will be treated as enemies, and suffer accordingly.

‘ R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen., Mysore.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th August, 1803.

‘ The weather cleared up so much on the 7th instant, as to allow me to march to this place on the 8th. I had in the morning dispatched a messenger to the killadar of Ahmed-

nuggur, to require him to surrender his fort ; and, on my arrival in the neighbourhood of the pettah, I offered cowle to the inhabitants. This was refused, as the pettah was held by a body of Arabs, who were supported by a battalion of Scindiah's regular infantry, and a body of horse encamped in an open space between the pettah and the fort.

‘ I immediately attacked the pettah with the piquets of the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Harness ; in another place with the 74th regiment and 1st battalion of the 8th, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Wallace ; and in a third with the flank companies of the 74th, and the 1st battalion 3rd regiment, under the command of Captain Vesey. The pettah wall was very lofty, and defended by towers, and had no rampart ; so that when the troops had ascended to the attack, they had no ground on which they could stand ; and the Arabs who occupied the towers, defended their posts with the utmost obstinacy.

‘ At length they were obliged to quit the wall and fled to the houses, from which they continued a destructive fire upon the troops. Scindiah's regular infantry also attacked our troops after they had entered the pettah. In a short time, however, after a brisk and gallant contest, we were completely masters of it ; but with the loss of some brave officers and soldiers, as your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return. The enemy's loss was, from the nature of the contest, necessarily much greater than ours ; and on the night of the 8th, all that part of their force, which was not required for the defence of the fort, went off to the northward ; including all the Arabs who survived the contest in the pettah, excepting a small number who attended one of their wounded chiefs, who could not be removed farther than the fort.

‘ On the 9th, I reconnoitred the ground in the neighbourhood of the fort ; and on that evening Lieut. Colonel Wallace, with five companies of the 74th regiment and the 2nd battalion 12th regiment, seized a position within four hundred yards of it ; on which, in the course of that night, a battery was constructed for four guns, to take off the defences on the side on which I proposed to make my attack. This opened at daylight on the 10th ; and it was so advantageously placed, and fired with such effect, as to induce the killadar to desire that I should cease firing, in order that he might send a person to

treat for his surrender. In my answer I told him, that I should not cease firing till I should have taken the fort, or he should have surrendered it; but that I would listen to whatever he was desirous to communicate.

‘Yesterday morning he sent out two vakeels to propose to surrender the fort, on condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison, and that he should have his private property.

‘Although I consented to this proposal, it was five in the evening before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence I refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According to his engagement, however, the killadar marched out of the fort this morning, with a garrison consisting of 1400 men, and the troops under my command took possession of it.

‘In this manner has this fort fallen into our hands: our loss since the 8th has been trifling, which I attribute much to the spirit with which our attacks on that day were carried on.

‘I have to draw your Excellency’s notice towards the conduct of the troops particularly on that occasion, and towards Lieut. Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, who commanded in the trenches, Captain Beauman commanding the artillery, Captain Johnson the engineer, and Captain Heitland of the pioneers, in the short subsequent siege.

‘Your Excellency must be well acquainted with the advantageous situation of the fort of Ahmednuggur on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, covering Poonah, and as an important point of support to all our future operations to the northward. It is considered in this country as one of the strongest forts; and excepting Vellore, in the Carnatic, is the strongest country fort that I have seen. It is in excellent repair, excepting in the part exposed to the fire of the British troops.

‘I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency an account of the ordnance, stores, and grain which it contains.

‘I propose to cross the Godavery immediately, and I shall in a future dispatch lay before your Excellency the measures which I have in contemplation for getting Scindiah’s possessions south of that river, depending upon Ahmednuggur, and for securing their resources for the use of the British troops.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Return of the killed and wounded of his Majesty's and the Honorable Company's troops, composing a detachment in advance of the grand army, under the command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the city of Ahmednuggur, on the 8th of August; and during the Siege of the fort of Ahmednuggur, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of August, 1803.

		Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Drummer.	Rank and File.
19th Light Dragoons	} Europeans.	2	2	1	1	12
Artillery						
H. M. 74th Regt.						
— 78th						
		—	2	1	—	58

				Soubadar.	Havildars.	Naiks.	Sepoys.
5th Regiment Cavalry	1st Bat. 2nd Regt. N. I. 1st 3rd do. 1st 8th do. 2nd 12th do. 2nd 18th do. 1st Pioneers do.	<i>Natives.</i>	{ Killed . . . { Wounded . .	-	1	1	10
				1	7	3	39

R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen.'

*General Orders of his Excellency
the Most Noble the Governor } Fort William, 8th September, 1803.
General in Council.*

The Governor General in Council having received from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley the official account of the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur, by the forces under the command of that officer, is pleased to signify the high approbation with which his Excellency in Council has observed the judgment, promptitude, and skill manifested by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, in directing the operations of the forces under his command on that critical occasion.

His Excellency in Council is pleased to direct Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to notify to the troops under his command, that the Governor General in Council has

derived the most cordial satisfaction from the distinguished alacrity, gallantry and spirit which they displayed in the attack upon the pettah, and in the subsequent siege of the fort of Ahmednuggur; and the Governor General in Council has remarked, with particular approbation, the conduct of Lieut. Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, of Captain Beauman of the artillery, of Captain Johnson of the engineers, and of Captain Heitland of the pioneers.

‘The Governor in Council deeply laments the loss of Captains Grant and Humberstone, of Lieutenants Anderson and Plenderleath, and of the brave soldiers who fell in the successful contest of the 8th of August. The memory of these gallant officers and soldiers, who have fallen with honor in the public service, will be regarded with affection and respect by their sovereign and their country.

‘By command of his Excellency,

‘L. Hook, Sec. to the Gov., Mil. Dept.’

Proclamation by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘13th August, 1803.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having manifested an intention of attacking the British government and its allies, Rao Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam Ali, Major General Wellesley, as a measure of defence, has attacked the fort of Ahmednuggur, and his brave troops have got possession of it.

‘He has appointed Captain Graham to take charge, for the use of the British government and Rao Pundit Purdhaun, of all the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, depending upon that Fort, and he calls upon all amildars and others to attend to and obey his orders, and those of no other persons at their peril.

‘Captain Graham will be at Ahmednuggur.

‘R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen., Mysore.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR, ‘Camp at Ahmednuggur, 13th August, 1803.

‘1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant.

‘2. Upon a perusal of the proceedings of the Committee at

Surat, I observe, that even till the 21st of July nothing had been done for the relief of the wants of the troops at Songhur; the subject had been under discussion repeatedly; but although well canvassed and considered, and the want ascertained, it does not appear that till that day any step had been taken to relieve it.

‘I also observe, that it is proposed that the Quarter Master of the 75th regiment should have a contract for feeding the regiment while detached to Songhur. The Quarter Master is properly an officer of check upon the Commissary, and it is his duty to see that the provisions received for the troops are of a good quality; he therefore, of all other officers, ought not to be the contractor to supply those provisions: but, in my opinion, if it is necessary that there should be a body of European troops in garrison at Songhur, it is necessary that there should be a store of provisions for their supply, and the Quarter Master, or any other private contractor, must be considered incapable of performing the service for which he may contract. If the European troops should be shut up in Songhur, it is my opinion that, under this contract, they will be obliged either to march out, or to surrender for want of provisions.

‘3. In respect to Captain Bates, my reason for wishing that he might be brought to a court martial was, that I wished that the whole case might be made public; for it appeared to me, upon a perusal of the papers, that although this officer commanded a detachment at some distance from Surat, he was subsisting on provisions brought daily, or every two or three days, from that place; and if my notion be correct upon this subject, it is probable that he could have been justified for having retired, and that those who sent out a detachment so supplied would have been blameable.

‘4. The service cannot be carried on in this manner; the troops must have regular supplies of provisions at command, or misfortune and disgrace will be the result.

‘5. In consequence of the success of the troops under my command, and as it is my intention to pass the Godavery immediately, by which means I shall check the operations of any enemy by Songhur towards Surat; and as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has passed the Nerbudda, and it being reported that he intends to attack Guzerat, I should wish, if you approve of the plan which I proposed for the organization of the troops, and the defence of those provinces, and the supply for this purpose of the re-

quisite stores and provisions, that you would allow them all, excepting those allotted for the defence of Surat, Songhur, and Parneira, to move towards the river Nerbudda as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Ahmednuggur, 13th August, 1803.

‘ I request that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will send off to this detachment, wherever it may be on this side of the river Godavery, six hundred bullock loads of rice. Make the people who carry this rice understand that they are not to stop at Ahmednuggur, but to come on as far as the river Godavery, if the troops should be so far advanced.

‘ I also request you to send to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops whom I shall have in that fort, six hundred bullock loads of rice, fifty of salt provisions, and one hundred of arrack. This supply is for immediate consumption; but as we must have forwarded up from Panwell a very large proportion of the stores collected there and at Bombay, I wish you to write immediately to Mr. Duncan and Captain Young, to request that coolies, and bullocks, and every animal that can be procured of the description of a beast of burthen, may be hired and ready to be sent up to Ahmednuggur with loads of military and provision stores, of which I will send the detail hereafter. These must be exclusive of the five thousand bullocks hired to attend this body of troops, which I conclude are by this time about to commence their march from Panwell.

‘ Until the wounded men whom I shall leave at Ahmednuggur should recover, I must have thirty of the 84th here, and I wish you to send them as soon as you can; they shall go back as soon as my wounded may be fit for duty.

‘ I intend to send you one of the coast battalions now coming from the frontier; this, with the fort of Ahmednuggur in your front, and General Campbell on the Kistna in your rear, will make you very strong. I intend to keep your five and a half inch howitzers, but to send back the brass twelve pounders. You need not be in a hurry to bring up the eighteen pounders. Depend upon it that twelve pound shot will breach any wall in this country.

‘ Let four thousand good bullock gunny bags be made at Poonah immediately, and forwarded to the stores at Ahmednuggur.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ Colonel Murray.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ Camp, near Ahmednuggur, 13th August, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I send herewith a dispatch for Major Kirkpatrick, which contains a letter for the Governor General, with a detail of our operations, which I beg you to peruse and forward, sending a copy of it to Mr. Duncan. I also return Mr. Duncan’s papers.

‘ Guzerat is now the point of my greatest anxiety. I wish that the arrangements proposed in my public letter were carried into execution: but I observe that on the 20th of July nothing had been done for Songhur, and it was proposed that the Europeans going there should be fed by contract with their quarter master. This man ought to be the check upon the commissary in the issue of provisions, instead of being the commissary himself; and, at all events, it is not to be expected that any private contractor of this kind can furnish the provisions for the troops in a garrison which is likely to be attacked.

‘ I am very anxious that the Peshwah should feel no jealousy about this place. I have, however, taken possession of it in the names of the Company and the Peshwah, and I shall take possession of the country in the same manner. I intend to appoint Captain Graham to manage the latter. I wish that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao upon this subject, point out to him how necessary the place is for us, and that the country should be kept quiet by means of the management of a gentleman in the Company’s service. You may also assure him that a faithful account shall be kept of the revenues, and credit given to the Peshwah for his proportion of them. You might take the opportunity of again urging him to bring forward his troops.

‘ I write to Colonel Murray this day, to desire him to forward certain articles; but in case he should have gone off, I wish you to desire Coleman to open the letter, and act accord-

ing to the orders which it contains. The cavalry will march to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Captain Graham.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th August, 1803.

‘ You will observe by this day’s order, that I have appointed you to act as collector to the districts heretofore belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah south of the river Godavery.

‘ I have sent directions to Govind Row to give you all the information that he has been able to collect, by my desire, regarding these districts; and I enclose two proclamations, which I recommend that you should transmit to each with the persons whom you will send to establish in them the Company’s authority.

‘ The officer commanding in Ahmednuggur will have orders to afford you every assistance in his power which you may require; and I have given directions that a body of horse, and a body of peons, shall be raised, who are to be under your orders.

‘ You have already so much experience in the revenue duties, that I cannot think it necessary to send you any detailed instructions. I should wish that the accounts may be kept according to the forms which are in use with the government of Fort St. George, and have been approved of by government; and you will transmit them to me at the regular periods, in order that I may lay them before his Excellency the Governor General. I wish, however, that you would bear in mind the fact, that to keep this country in a state of tranquillity, and to secure for the use of the troops under my command its resources, and a free communication through it with Poonah and Bombay, are objects of far greater importance than to collect at present a large revenue from it.

‘ I wish you therefore to refrain from pressing the country with a view to raising the collections as high as they can go. Indeed, as these districts have been the scene of the operations of the different Marhatta armies for many years, it is probable that they will not be able to pay much revenue.

‘ You will correspond with me in the performance of the

duty now intrusted to you, and I will forward your reports to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Graham.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 14th August, 1803.

‘ Since writing to you yesterday, it has occurred to me that it would be better not to hold out to the Peshwah any promise or prospect of having half the revenue of Ahmednuggur, but to tell him generally that the revenues shall be applied to pay the expenses of the war, and that the accounts of them shall be communicated to him. One great object, however, is to reconcile his mind to our keeping possession of the country, which is absolutely necessary for our communications with Poonah; and provided that is effected, I think it immaterial whether he has half the revenues or not. It is probable that, if he does not get half, he will not think of sending his aumils into the country; and that if he does, he will send them.

‘ I beg you to turn this subject over in your mind, and to act in conformity to the sentiments I have above expressed. I will delay to write you a public letter upon it till I shall receive your answer.

‘ We heard from Major Dallas yesterday. He is by this time at Perinda; but I am sorry to tell you that he had but three thousand out of five thousand bullocks.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Collins,
Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th August, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 13th. It is not true that the dawks of Dowlut Rao Scindiah have received the smallest interruption from me, or from any person acting by my orders. But he may depend upon it, that if he should interrupt your dawk I will not allow his to pass through any part on the Godavery.

‘ Colonel Stevenson has my directions to watch closely the movements of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and attack

immediately the troops of either of those Chiefs which may move towards him : he will of course move towards the Badowlee Ghaut, if he should find that they intend to penetrate by that road.

‘It is impossible for me to say that Holkar is not on his march to join those Chiefs ; but if Rajah Mohiput Ram is the soubahdar of Aurungabad, and you have received that intelligence from him, I think it is to be doubted.

‘But even if it should be true, as my cavalry commenced their march from hence yesterday, and the infantry will arrive upon the river before the cavalry will have passed it, I expect that I shall join Colonel Stevenson at least as soon as Holkar will have joined the other Chiefs.

‘The Mahrattas have long boasted that they would carry on a predatory war against us : they will find that mode of warfare not very practicable at the present moment. At all events, supposing that they can carry their design into execution, unless they find the British officers and soldiers to be in the same corrupted, enervated state in which their predecessors found the Mussulmann in the last century, they cannot expect much success from it. A system of predatory war must have some foundation in strength of some kind or other. But when the Chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field ; when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies upon which the remainder depend, to a distance, lest it should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act, and still less of the British officers if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Collins.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th August, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 13th, in which you have enclosed the dispatch to the Governor General of that date. I approve entirely of the proposed change. There is every reason to believe that the people and chiefs of Bundelcund wish to pass under the British government, and the transfer can be

made immediately, without the smallest difficulty. The transfer of the other districts to the southward is very remote, and will be attended with difficulties.

‘I also approve of the proposed mode of raising five thousand Marhatta horse, and I am almost inclined to request you to take measures for raising them immediately. They would be very useful indeed to us.

‘I wrote you a few lines last night respecting money for Goklah. I have given him already 10,000 rupees, and if you will send on the money you have got I will give him 35,000 more. You might give Ballojee Punt an order upon Bombay, Benares, or Hyderabad, for 30,000 more, making the full 75,000 rupees.

‘But I can give no money until I receive some from Poonah; and if you send that, it is obvious that you can give none; but I have no doubt but that Ballojee Punt will find money for one of your bills.

‘I have arranged the garrison for this place. It will consist of a battalion, a detail of artillery, and thirty Europeans, which I have ordered from Poonah. Besides this, I propose to have a large body of peons in the district, and a body of horse under Gahzy Khan’s son. These last to be under the direction of the collector, Captain Graham, in order to keep the peace in the district, and the communications free with Poonah.

‘The fort is in a sad dirty state, and in the utmost confusion. It will not be possible, at present, to do more than arrange its contents, and have them in such a style that we may readily command them. Hereafter, if the Company should keep the fort, the works might be re-formed with great advantage, and the inside ought to be cleared of all the old buildings with which it is at present crowded. The quantities of stores here are astonishing; the powder is so good, that I have replaced from the magazines that which I consumed at the siege.

‘I enclose letters for Appah Saheb and Chintomeny Rao, which may have some effect. They contain copies of the memorandum which I sent you. I beg you to transmit them. Malcolm will let you know that we have made an agreement with Amrut Rao. I do not now state the purport of it, as I have not got a translation, but I expect one from Malcolm, when I shall write to you a letter, in which I will tell you what I wish you to communicate to the durbar.

‘I have written letters to Prittee Niddee and Madhoo Rao Rastia, which I will send you if they should be ready by the time the post leaves.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 16th August, 1803.

‘I enclose the copy of the translation of the engagement made with Amrut Rao, which I received this morning from Malcolm. In my opinion, it will not be proper to communicate this instrument to the Peshwah’s government. The best thing to do will be to inform Ragonaut Rao, that I had reason to expect that Amrut Rao would join the British army, and in that case I was very desirous that the Peshwah should cease all hostility against him; and that I would engage for Amrut Rao’s conduct. If you approve of this plan I request you to adopt it.

‘Appah Dessaye has sent to me this day to inform me that the Peshwah is in negotiation with Neelkund Rao Scindiah and Goorparah to give one of them his place of Manowly and Moorgoor. He likewise has fears that he may be attacked in that quarter by the Rajah of Kolapoor and Succaram Ghautky. I wish that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao upon this subject; but Appah Dessaye is anxious that it should not be known that he has informed me of the above particulars. In respect to the Rajah of Kolapoor, I will send him a letter, which may have the effect of stopping him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Paper referred to in the above.

The particulars of a Treaty between the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Sreemunt Amrut Rao.

‘Art. 1st. It is agreed, that during the natural life of Amrut Rao, and that of his son Venaik Rao Bappoo Saheb, he Amrut Rao (and his son after his decease) shall be ensured the enjoyment of a revenue of seven lacs of rupees. This shall either be granted in territory or in cash. The English Government considers itself responsible for its payment.

'The revenue of all such districts as are at present in Amrut Rao's possession must be included in the amount of his annual revenue, and he shall receive the difference between their amount and the sum fixed on for his support, of seven lacs of rupees.

'Art. 2nd. As a proof that Amrut Rao is sincere in his profession of friendship to the English Government, he must meet the Hon. Major General Wellesley, who means to advance to Aurungabad.

'Art. 3rd. Amrut Rao must, on all occasions, exert himself cordially to forward the interests of the Honorable Company and of his Highness the Peshwah.

'Art. 4th. Whatever friends and adherents may attend, Amrut Rao may be satisfied of their perfect safety; and be assured that they shall receive no injury from any quarter whatever, as they will be under the protection of the British government. After the meeting between the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Amrut Rao shall have taken place, some arrangement will be made for their support.

Note.—'This article refers to Moraba Dada, and other Sirdars now with Amrut Rao, who are particularly obnoxious to the Peshwah. It is from delicacy to his Highness, as well as a regard to the interests of the parties that they are not specified.

'Art. 5th. When Amrut Rao joins General Wellesley, the more force both in cavalry and infantry that accompany him the more will be the General's satisfaction.

'Art. 6th. When Amrut Rao proceeds to join General Wellesley's army, he will send his wife and all his family to the fort of Ahmednuggur, or to Bombay or Salsette, or to such other place, within the territories of the Honorable Company, that he may more approve; and the English Government will adopt the necessary measures for their full protection and efficient security.

'Art. 7th. The meeting between the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Amrut Rao must take place nineteen days after this date.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

‘ If Ragonaut Rao should be satisfied with a general assurance that the conquered territory is to be applied to the benefit of the allies, it will be most convenient, as that assurance leaves the question open for future discussion, and for a decision according to the circumstances of the war. But I consider it to be an object of the utmost importance that the Peshwah’s mind should be satisfied as far as possible, in order that there may appear no wavering in his intention to adhere to the alliance on which the southern jaghiredars might found acts of hostility against the Company.

‘ I know well that the Marhattas have a particular aversion to the Nizam’s government; and I thought it not improbable but that the Peshwah and all the Marhatta chiefs would feel very uncomfortable under the notion that the Nizam was to get any territory so near to Poonah as Ahmednuggur is; particularly as this territory is forced from one of their own chiefs by a body of troops acting in the name and on the part of the Peshwah.

‘ Although, therefore, the benefit of the war must be divided, according to certain principles among the allies, and the Nizam will undoubtedly be entitled to a better share of the spoils than the Peshwah, I cannot think that it would be politic or consistent with the attention which we ought to have for the feelings of the Marhattas, to allow the Nizam to have any part of Ahmednuggur. He might have compensation elsewhere either to the northward or the southward. On this ground it is that I have kept his name out of sight all along in my transactions here; and on this ground, I should have no objections, if you find it necessary for the satisfaction of the Peshwah’s mind, to assure him that he shall hereafter enjoy a share of this conquest, and that he shall see the account of the manner in which the present profits resulting from it are disposed of.

‘ I shall march to-morrow, and arrive at Toka about the time at which the cavalry will have crossed.

‘ I have received rather unpleasant accounts from Colonel Stevenson. On the 13th he heard that a party of horse was passing the Adjunttee hills, but instead of dashing at them, he called in a battalion of infantry and some horse which were in

his front: he afterwards, however, countermanded these orders, and sent forward Salabut Khan and Noor ool Oomrah, and intended to move out with the picquets on the 14th.

‘He had a variety of plans in contemplation, of none of which I entirely approved, because they led him into a long defensive operation in which he must be a loser. I have therefore desired him to move forward himself with the Company’s and the Nizam’s cavalry; to leave the infantry in a central situation for his supplies to collect upon; and to dash at the first party that comes into his neighbourhood. In this manner he will, at all events, have his supplies, and if he cuts up, or only drives off, a good body of horse, the campaign is our own.

‘We must get the upper hand, and if once we have that, we shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys which are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘P.S.—I send you letters for Prittee Niddee and Mahdoo Rao Rastia, which I wish you to forward.

‘I think that it would be advisable to hold out to the killadar of Loghur a prospect that he should be allowed to settle at Bombay, and that his property should be escorted thither for him, provided he remained faithful during the war, and kept the road to Panwell clear for our use. He would make the best check we could have upon Angria and the other blackguards in that quarter. If you should be of opinion that this measure would be of no inconvenience hereafter, I wish that you would send to the Loghur man, and give him a promise in my name accordingly.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to General Lake, Commander in Chief.

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th August, 1803.

‘Before you will receive this letter, you will have heard that I took possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur by capitulation on the 12th instant. I did not send you the details of my attack upon the pettah on the 8th, or of the subsequent operations against the fort, because I feared that the dawk direct through Hindustan would have been stopped,

and I knew that the Governor General would send them to you from Calcutta. The same reasons prevent my going into any details upon the subject of my operations at the present moment. I shall only tell you, that I have possession of all Scindiah's territories south of the Godavery; that my troops are in march towards the Godavery, and I expect to cross that river immediately in force.

'I write to recommend to your patronage Mr. Tew*, to whom I understood you did intend to give an ensigncy. He accompanied the 74th regiment on this service, by permission of Lieut. General Stuart, and distinguished himself in the attack of the pettah of Ahmednuggur on the 8th instant. He has been particularly recommended by Lieut. Colonel Wallace, of the 74th regiment, and Lieut. Colonel Harness, who commanded the division of which the company he belonged to on that day formed a part.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'General Lake.' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp north of the Nimderrah ghaut,
'18th August, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 16th. I shall give Goklah 35,000 rupees of the 80,000 you have sent off; and I beg you to give Ballojee Punt a draft for the remainder of the money, namely, 30,000. If you should not have money to pay the draft in favor of Appah Dessaye, the best thing to do will be to borrow it from Colonel Coleman, who, by the time the draft reaches Poonah, will have received dollars from Bombay.

'The Peshwah's feelings respecting the proposed meeting with Amrut Rao are unpleasant; but I do not think that, under present circumstances, the meeting can be avoided. His Highness must recollect that he was repeatedly informed that the British Government would be obliged to adopt the measures which might appear necessary for its own security, unless he should perform his treaty, and this agreement with Amrut Rao is one of those measures.

'His Highness has no ground on which he can found an objection to this agreement, excepting one sought for in his own implacable resentments. I can never admit these as rational

* Afterwards killed at Assaye.

grounds either for the adoption, or for the rejection of any political measure. The benefits or the evils which the public interest will derive or suffer from such a measure are alone what must decide whether it is to be adopted or rejected.

‘ But in his Highness’s conduct respecting Amrut Rao, there appears to be caprice as well as resentment; for it must be recollected, that when his Highness was at Bassein, he offered to be reconciled to his brother. It is true that Amrut Rao then rejected the offer, by which his Highness’s feelings may have been wounded: but considering the reconciliation as a measure of political expediency, and putting private feelings out of the question, I think it full as necessary at this time, as it was when his Highness was at Bassein; and, excepting that the reconciliation was then refused by Amrut Rao, there is nothing in it more injurious to his feelings at the present moment than there was at that period.

‘ However, all that is asked from his Highness is to refrain from hostility against Amrut Rao, and not to increase the number of his or our enemies. I will engage for Amrut Rao’s conduct; and I will take care in my intercourse with that Chief to do nothing which is inconsistent with the treaty between the British Government and the Peshwah.

‘ I have received from Hyderabad bad accounts of Major Hill: he had lost one third of his bullocks before he had even begun to cross the Kistna. I have got no accounts of Lieut. Griffiths, who is travelling between Major Dallas and Major Hill.

‘ If you should buy any bullocks, and they should have no saddles, let them call at Ahmednuggur for them.

‘ I have written to Coleman to request that he will endeavor to remove the hospital from Erroor on the Kistna; and in case he should be able to make his arrangements to effect that object, it would be very desirable that a party of about 100 of the Peshwah’s horse should go down with the doolies, and return with the sick. Will you endeavor to arrange that matter with Ragonaut Rao?

‘ I am sorry to tell you that the boats at Erroor are in great want of repairs, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send some people there to repair them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S.—I have just heard that Major Dallas arrived at Perinda on the 15th.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

'SIR, 'Camp north of the Nimderrah ghaut, 18th Aug., 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 7th, 8th, and 10th instant, and I congratulate you upon the peaceable succession of his Highness Secundar Jah to the musnud of the Deccan. I have given orders, of which I enclose a copy, that a royal salute may be fired in this camp, and in all detachments and garrisons under my command in the territories of the Honorable Company, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Rajah of Mysore, and the Marhattas, upon this occasion, excepting in those stations in which salutes may have been fired in honor of this event by orders from other authorities previously received.

'The powers enclosed in your letter of the 8th are ample; if they were more extensive they would create jealousy, and I should find it inconvenient and difficult to exercise them. The administration of the government now remains in the hands of his Highness's servants, and I have only to direct their attention to those objects which I may think useful or necessary for the service.

'The excuses of Rajah Mohiput Ram and Rajah Sookroodoor for not procuring large supplies of rice are well founded. In fact, the country does not produce rice in such quantities as to supply the consumption of one of our armies. That grain is never used in the armies of the Marhattas or of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, excepting by persons of a higher class; although the Company's sepoys, who are inhabitants of the countries bordering on the sea, in which the general produce and the common consumption is rice, become dissatisfied, and even unhealthy, if they use any other grain. However, I have great hopes that there will be no want of that grain for their consumption, and the Soubahdar's servants can have no excuse for not bringing forward sufficient quantities of the dry grains, the produce of those countries, for the common consumption of the camps.

'The Soubahdar's servants cannot be too frequently urged to provide for the defence of the forts and large cities in his Highness's territories. I understand that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have sent away their guns, but if his High-

ness's places are well guarded, they must starve, even if they should escape from our swords and the effects of our fire.

' I am now on my march to Toka, on the Godavery, where my cavalry are crossing that river. I shall be at Aurungabad in a few days, and his Highness may depend upon it that I will do all in my power to save his territories from the enemy's depredations.

' I should wish to be made acquainted with your sentiments regarding the objects which, in the event of a peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, his Highness would have in view, supposing that the war should be as successful in its progress as it has been in its commencement. I do not mean this is the proper time to consult the ministers upon this question, but I wish you to take it into consideration, and make me acquainted with your sentiments.

' It appears to me that it would be very desirable for the Soubahdar of the Deccan to be freed from the interference and participation of the Marhattas in the government and revenues of several districts on his frontiers. I should wish to know the names of the districts under the divided government, and the amount of the claim for the revenue of each party, if it should be practicable to procure such information. I should also wish to know what districts in the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar it would be most convenient for his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan to receive, supposing that the operations of the war should be so successful as to enable us to demand sacrifices as the price of peace.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Major Kirkpatrick.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Camp, 19th August, 1803.

' I have received your letter of the 17th. I intended that you should debit the paymaster with the sums of which you sent me the account some time ago. I was always of opinion that the Bombay government was not sufficiently strong in troops. In fact, notwithstanding the treaties with the Guickwar and the consequent demands for service, the increase of territory to the northward, the detachment of the Bombay army at Poonah,

and the war with the Marhattas, the Bombay army has not been increased one man.

‘ But as far as I am concerned, I do not conceive that I want more troops. I only wish that those in Guzerat were complete in numbers, that the army there was properly organized, well equipped, and supplied with provisions in a regular manner from certain sources ; and I should feel very easy, not only regarding the fate of that province, but the result of the war itself.

‘ Under these circumstances, I can give no opinion respecting the proposed alteration, particularly as the Governor General has positively ordered that the Bombay army should not be increased ; and indeed, after all, I do not conceive that the army would gain much in point of numbers by the alteration of the Fencible battalion into a regular one. What we want in Guzerat is organization, equipment, and regular sources of supplies. If we should be able to arrange that, and Holkar should enter into the war, I will lay that corps upon the back of Indore and Ougein, in such a manner as probably will induce the gentry to turn their thoughts to the defence of their own territories, instead of the annoyance of ours.

‘ The capture of Ahmednuggur has made an entire alteration in the nature of Scindiah’s connexion with the Deccan, of which Mr. Duncan does not appear to be aware. Each of the southern chiefs must now see that he has no power, and no means of bringing an army here, excepting as a freebooter ; and they will be less likely to interfere in the war, at least on his side. Angria, in particular, who must know that he is exposed to attack in the manner Mr. Duncan points out, will consider the matter well before he ventures to attack us. Till he shews an inclination to attack us, I am decidedly against interfering with him : first, because the existence of the contest will disturb the communication ; secondly, we have not a body of troops for the service on which we can depend ; and thirdly, because without such a body of troops, the success is doubtful.

‘ Mr. Duncan talks of seamen, artillery, and sepoy. But he has an opinion of Colonel Murray’s judgment, and I beg that he may ask that officer what he thinks of Angria’s forts, and whether a force so composed could get possession of them. Besides, I do not believe they are upon the sea coast, and there must be an equipment of heavy guns, stores, provisions, &c., &c., not one of which has been contemplated. For my part I

will have nothing to do with the expedition, and shall object to all such, for which I do not see sufficient means provided.

‘ In respect to Scindiah’s vakeel at Bombay, it is my opinion that Mr. Duncan ought to write to Angria to inform him that, in consequence of Scindiah’s aggression, the Company were at war with that Chief, and have already expelled him from the hold he had in the Deccan; that under these circumstances it was not consistent with the established usage that Scindiah should have a vakeel at Bombay; that, however, Mr. Duncan felt uneasy respecting the dismissal of this man, as he was also the vakeel of Angria, and that he requested that Angria would appoint some other person to act at Bombay on his behalf. In this manner Mr. Duncan will get rid of the vakeel, and it will not be necessary to quarrel with Angria.

‘ I wish you would try to procure for me some accounts of Chandore, in case it should be necessary to attack that place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Senboogaum, 21st August, 1803.

‘ Since the capture of Ahmednuggur I have taken possession of the districts belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in this quarter depending upon that fortress, in the name of the Honorable Company and the Peshwah, and I have appointed Captain Graham, who was heretofore a collector of the revenue under the government of Fort St. George, to manage them.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of the districts, and an estimate of their value, upon which, however, little reliance can be placed. I likewise enclose a copy of a letter of instructions which I have written to Captain Graham.

Estimate of the Gross Revenue of the conquered Province of Ahmednuggur, late under the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, taken from the verbal communication of the principal Zemindar, immediately after the Conquest.

Pergunnahs.	Villages.	Rupees.
South of the Godavery . . .	146	337,000
North of the Godavery . . .	71	297,000
		634,000

‘ Much reliance cannot be placed on the accuracy of this statement. I think it probable that the revenues are rather under than overrated.

* The reasons for which I have taken possession of these districts are, that the troops under my command should enjoy their resources; that they should be speedily transferred from the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and that they should be kept in a state of tranquillity, while the British troops are in advance. I should have been disappointed in my expectations of enjoying these advantages, if I had delivered the districts to the management of the Peshwah's amildar.

‘As, however, they are part of the territories of the Peshwah, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah held them only as a Chief of the Marhatta empire; and as the fort of Ahmednuggur is most important for the security of Poonah; and the districts are intermixed with those belonging to the Peshwah, I thought it probable that his Highness would desire to have them. I therefore requested Lieut. Colonel Close to explain the causes for which I have placed the districts under the management of a British officer, in case he should find that the Peshwah entertained such a wish; and to assure his Highness that their produce should be applied to defray the expenses of the war, and that the accounts of its expenditure should be laid before him.

‘Although his Highness the Nizam, or his representative, the present Soubahdar of the Deccan, would have a better claim, from the exertions which that government has made to produce an army in the field, than the Peshwah, to a share of the benefits to be expected from the successful prosecution of the war, I have not included his name in the proclamation by which I have taken possession of the country: because I was aware of the jealousies of the Marhattas respecting the possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur, and of the countries depending upon it, so immediately in the neighbourhood of Poonah, which I was desirous not to excite. And as it will remain in your Excellency's power to dispose of the fort, the districts, and their revenue, in any manner you may think proper, it is a matter of immaterial importance to the interests of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, whether his Highness's name is

The dispersed state of the late official servants, as well as the records, will, for some time, prevent us from acquiring a correct insight into the actual revenue resources of the province. An account of the number of villages in each pergunnah cannot be immediately obtained.

‘J. G. GRAHAM, Acting Collector.’

included in the proclamation, although to have inserted it would certainly have excited the jealousy of the Marhattas.

‘ Your Excellency will observe, from a perusal of the orders which I have given to Captain Graham, that it is probable that the net produce of these districts will be but trifling; but I imagine that the resources of money which might be derived from their revenue will not be wanting. I have every reason to hope that the measures which I have therein directed will preserve the tranquillity of the country, and secure, during the war, the communication between Poonah and Ahmednuggur, and also forward to Aurungabad, than which the troops cannot enjoy a greater benefit.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the cavalry of my division have passed the Godavery, and the infantry are now crossing *. The enemy had not entered the Nizam’s territories on the 18th instant. The armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had been in the neighbourhood of the Adjunttee ghaut, but had marched to the eastward, towards the Badowly ghaut. Colonel Stevenson had intelligence of their movement, and had marched towards Jaffierabad.

‘ I have no intelligence that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has recrossed the Nerbudda.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Senboogaum, 21st August, 1803.

‘ You will receive, from Mr. Duncan, a copy of my letter to him of the 2nd instant, detailing my ideas regarding the organization of the troops, and the defence of Guzerat: in addition to which, I have but little to say. The calculations of numbers, which I have made in that letter, have included sick, of which, I am sorry to observe, that there are a vast number at Surat. I recommend this point to your attention and inquiry, and if you should have reason to believe that the station in which are the barracks of the European troops, is unhealthy, you will recommend to government that it may be altered; and that, in the mean time, the troops may be encamped in a

* The Godavery was very wide, and the army was passed over it in wicker boats, made by the troops from the jungle, and covered with bullock skins.

healthy situation. Every attention must be paid to economy, but I consider nothing in this country so valuable as the life and health of the British soldier, and nothing so expensive as soldiers in hospital. On this ground, it is worth while to incur almost any expense to preserve their lives and their health.

‘ I also request you to pay particular attention to their discipline and regularity, and to prevent their getting intoxicating liquors, which tend to their destruction.

‘ You will observe, in my letter of the 2nd, that I have proposed that two detachments should be formed, one in front of Surat, the other in front of Baroda. The sick of the southern detachment may be left in Surat, to the strength of which place they will add in time—those of the northern detachment, in Baroda.

‘ I have perhaps made Parneira too strong, but I did so because it was near Damaun, upon which place it is supposed that the French have an eye. With a view to the necessity of operations at Damaun, to frustrate the designs of the French, I have proposed that there should be a magazine of provisions at Parneira. In other respects, that post is too far to the southward ever to be of any use.

‘ As soon as Baroach shall be taken, I recommend that you should collect your troops in a station in front of Baroda, north of the Nerbudda. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as far as I can learn, is still north of that river, and should he enter into the war, of which I have no certainty, it is most probable that he will attempt to invade the province of Guzerat from Indore. If he should do that, you must attack him immediately. If he should return to the southward, and cross the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee, you might move your corps across these rivers likewise; and you will certainly be beforehand with him, as you will not have one-third of the distance to march.

‘ However, this return to the southward must depend upon circumstances. We must recollect, that Canojee and Mulhar Rao, although enemies of an inferior order, will take advantage of the absence of the troops and prosecute their designs from the northward, and that Anund Rao's troops may not be able to contend with them. It may also happen that although Jeswunt Rao Holkar might return to the southward, he may not intend to enter the Attavesy, and even if he should, he could not do it without my being close behind him. This

state of the case may, indeed, entirely prevent the invasion by the Songhur, or road south of the Taptee, and may leave you at liberty to act as you please.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Secretary of Government,
Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Toka, 22nd August, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th, enclosing two of the 7th instant from Major Walker. I have also received a letter from Mr. Duncan of the 17th ; and Lieut. Colonel Close has forwarded to me copies of a correspondence between Mr. Duncan and Major Walker, in which an important question is discussed, respecting the nature of the alliance between the Honorable Company and the Guickwar state, and how far the latter is obliged to enter into the war with Scindiah, with whose government he is in “close alliance.”

‘ 2. Before I proceed to the consideration of the papers transmitted by Major Walker, it is proper that I should advert to this question ; for if it be true that the Guickwar state is not obliged to take part in the war with the Marhatta chiefs, the question respecting the defence of the Guickwar territories is not referable to me.

‘ 3. I have seen copies of two treaties between the Company and the Guickwar, by which the latter has agreed to subsidize one company of artillery, and two battalions of native infantry : both governments have agreed that there should be true friendship and good understanding between them ; and the British government have agreed to give Anund Rao countenance and protection in all his public concerns, as may appear for the good of the country.

‘ 4. Although it is not immediately specified, it can never have been intended that the Company should protect the Guickwar state, unless the Guickwar should also assist the Company with its forces against the enemies of the British government. Indeed, I cannot understand the words “true friendship and good understanding,” in any other manner. If it were otherwise, the consequence would be, that the Company would be involved in perpetual war for the protection of

the Guickwar state, without any adequate compensation, excepting that of repayment of the expenses incurred; and the connexion between the two governments would be one not very creditable to the Honourable Company. If this doctrine be admitted, it would be such as the petty states in Germany have occasionally had with his Majesty, the foundation of which was the use of their troops for hire, with this additional disadvantage, that the Company is bound to protect the Guickwar state at all risks, for repayment of the expenses incurred.

‘ 5. If the British government are not to have the assistance of Anund Rao against our enemies, I cannot see what advantage it is to us to support his power against Canojee or any other pretender. It certainly will not be considered as an advantage, when weighed with the inconvenience of allotting to that service a large body of European troops, at a moment when the service of every soldier is required.

‘ 6. But although Major Walker has brought forward this construction upon the treaties, I cannot believe that he thinks it correct. In the 13th and 14th paragraphs of the paper enclosed with your letter of the 16th, he talks of the advantage to which we may still look forward, and he recommends that we should give our military aid “promptly, liberally, and extensively,” whenever the necessities of the Guickwar state may require it. He has not stated precisely what the advantages are which may result from giving it; but I conclude that he must expect some other advantage besides the mere payment of the hire of the troops.

‘ 7. He has, indeed, mentioned one consequence of our affording our military aid in the manner he has pointed out, as an advantage, viz., that it will disgust the Guickwar state with their own troops, and render them useless and contemptible; but I can never consider that an advantage. It is certainly an inconvenient consequence of a subsidiary alliance between the British government in India and a native power. But whether we consider these alliances as intended to give real strength to the empire; or, according to the new doctrine, to be only a mode of hiring out our troops, as we are bound by them all to protect the territories of those powers who pay us subsidies, it cannot be good policy to render contemptible, and destroy entirely, their own military resources.

* 8. Indeed, all the subsidiary engagements, excepting that

with the Guickwar state, show that the policy is different; for they all provide that the native governments with which they are contracted shall have a force to act with the British troops.

‘ 9. Upon the whole, as I cannot conceive that the only object in concluding the treaties with the Guickwar state was to obtain payment for the service of a body of British troops; as that construction of the treaties would be discreditable to the reputation of the British government, the treaties affording no advantage adequate to the inconvenience of protecting the government of Anund Rao; and as Major Walker does not appear to be of opinion that the construction is correct, although he has brought it forward, I am decidedly of opinion that the engagement must be considered to be mutual; that the enemies of one state are the enemies of the other; and the Guickwar state is bound to co-operate in a war in which the British government have been forced in their own defence.

‘ 10. The next point to consider, is the plan of operations to be carried on in the prosecution of that war. The Governor General has positively ordered, and there is no doubt whatever of the expediency, that operations should be commenced in Guzerat, by the siege of Baroach. This place is of no strength whatever. Major Walker declares that its garrison is weak; if preparations were made as suggested in my letter of the 26th of July to Major Walker; and if the attack has been made as ordered in my letter of the 6th of August, it will certainly be in our possession before any of the particular enemies of the Guickwar state, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar can know of the war.

‘ 11. After that operation shall have been effected, the orders of the Governor General, as well as expediency, point out the necessity of attacking Champaneer, and any other hold that Dowlut Rao Scindiah may have in Guzerat; and I have to observe, that if the operations against that place are pushed forward, it is very probable that it will be in our possession before the season will permit the enemy to disturb them.

‘ 12. On the 2nd instant, I had the honor of addressing the Governor of Bombay; and I proposed a distribution and organization of the troops in Guzerat, and the countries depending on Surat, which, in my opinion, were likely to secure the defence of the whole. I again addressed him on the 13th, and urged that the disposable troops in those countries should be posted, as in the case supposed, in my letter of the 2nd, of an

invasion, north of the Nerbudda, as soon as possible; as Jeswunt Rao Holkar was gone to the northward, and there was no immediate prospect of an irruption by the southern road of Songhur.

‘ 13. I again urged this measure yesterday, in a letter which I wrote to Colonel Murray; and I repeat, that till the troops are regularly disposed of; till it is decided which of them are intended for the field, and which for garrison; till regular and certain means of feeding them are provided in all parts of the country in which their operations can be required, it is impossible to undertake for the defence of Guzerat.

‘ 14. Major Walker has proposed a variety of operations, viz.: 1st. An expedition against Canojee; 2nd. An expedition against Mulhar Rao; 3rd. An expedition into the Kattywar, combined with one against Bhooj and the Dwarka pirates.

‘ 15. I cannot enter into these operations; 1st. Because the Governor General has given orders, and it is expedient that Scindiah's fort of Baroach should be attacked, and that he should be deprived of his possessions in that quarter. 2nd. Because I do not see adequate resources of men or means for any of these operations. 3rd. Because it is by no means certain that Holkar will not join the confederates; and if the troops should be employed against Canojee, or Mulhar Rao, or in Kattywar, the whole province will be left defenceless to his ravages.

‘ 16. Upon a perusal of the paper B, enclosed in your letter of the 16th, I observe, that after provision shall be made for the carriage of the tents which are in store; and which will be required if the troops take the field, there will not remain three hundred bullocks for the carriage of the provisions and military stores: with such an equipment, the troops, so far from being prepared for the offensive operations proposed by Major Walker, could not, if opposed by an enemy, make even one march from their magazine.

‘ 17. The plan of operations which I should prefer in Guzerat, would be to collect the troops, as proposed in my letter of the 2nd instant, with a view to an invasion from the northward, as soon as they should have taken Baroach, and Scindiah's other possessions; that the magazines should be prepared and collected for them in the different parts of the country in which they might be called upon to act; that they should

have with them the means of moving one month's provisions and a good proportion of stores; that those troops, so collected, should fall at once with their whole strength upon the strongest of the parties expected to invade Guzerat, whenever the invasion should take place.

‘ 18. When employed in this service, some of the weaker enemies may invade the country and may do some mischief; but that is a temporary evil, one trifling in its nature, and which, at all events, cannot be prevented.

‘ 19. To disperse the troops in three different divisions, to make head against the three expected attacks, will not answer. None of the divisions can be strong enough to act with vigour: the consequence must be, that the whole country will be plundered, and very possibly some misfortune may happen to one of the divisions, which might give the enemy a permanent settlement within it.

‘ 20. Under the plan which I proposed, no permanent settlement can be made by an enemy in any part of the country; and if the collected force should be so fortunate as to beat and drive out Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Canojee and Mulhar Rao will certainly not remain in the country; the consequence may be, the possibility of attacking Indore or Ougein; or if Jeswunt Rao Holkar should not enter Guzerat, and the efforts of our collected force should be directed against Canojee and Mulhar Rao, it will be sufficiently large to make such an impression upon them, as entirely to put an end to all apprehensions of future invasions by those enemies.

‘ 21. These are my sentiments upon the plan of operations for Guzerat. I can have but little local knowledge of that country, and Major Walker must have much; but I object, upon military principles, to the separation of our small forces in that quarter, and to undertaking many distinct operations with inadequate means. If the Honorable the Governor in Council should think it proper to adopt the suggestions of Major Walker, they must be carried into execution, and I hope that I shall not be considered responsible for the consequences.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov. of Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY,

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

'SIR, 'Camp at Toka, 23rd August, 1803.

'I received a copy of Mr. Edmonstone's letter to you of the 27th of July yesterday.

'I am informed that Meer Khan has crossed the Nerbudda with his troops, and that he is gone into the province of Malwa. I heard lately that there had been a dispute between him and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, relative to the amount, or the situation, of the jaghire which he was to have in the Holkar territories; and his march into Malwa may have been made with a view to taking possession of, or settling the jaghire given to him; or to be in a proper situation to carry into execution the designs of Jeswunt Rao Holkar for the opening campaign.

'In either case, he is at present at too great a distance, and the difficulty of communicating with him is too great to think of opening a negotiation with him at present. But, in my opinion, you will do well to communicate with the Soubahdar's government upon this subject immediately, and ascertain to what extent of expense his Highness will go, and it may not be difficult to negotiate with Meer Khan hereafter.

'As an inducement to the Soubahdar to enter into the plan of taking Meer Khan into his pay, it would be proper to hint to him, that it is possible that affairs should take such a turn as that the Marhattas would be obliged to make sacrifices of territory for peace, which had been so repeatedly offered to them; and that, in that case, the justice of the Governor General would induce him to consider, in a favorable manner, the pretensions of those of the allies who should have made the greatest exertions.

'For the reasons stated in my dispatch to the Governor General, I have not included his Highness's name in the proclamations which I have issued on taking possession of the districts depending on Ahmednuggur; and I think that it would not be proper to encourage his Highness to expect either that fort or any of those districts. But compensation might be given to him from other parts of the Marhatta territories, for his claims on this conquest.

'Rajah Mohiput Ram has already seized some of the districts depending upon Ahmednuggur, as he says by desire of Colonel Stevenson. As, whatever may be the fate of these

districts hereafter, it is essential to the British troops that they should be under the authority of the British officers during the continuance of the war, I have written to Rajah Mohiput Ram to request that he will produce the authority of Colonel Stevenson for seizing the districts in question, and I propose hereafter to desire him to give them up.

‘In my opinion, you will find it necessary to make an advance of money to the Nabob of Kurnool, to enable him to take the field; and if he should demand it, I recommend that it should be made, as the services of his troops will be very useful.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp at Toka, North bank of the Godavery,
24th August, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the translation of an agreement* into which I have entered with Amrut Rao’s vakeel, to which I have every reason to believe that Chief will give his consent.

‘Amrut Rao had formerly, under the Peshwah’s government, lands in jaghire which produced between six and seven lacs of rupees per annum; of these part have been ceded to the Company in Guzerat, under the treaty of Bassein; and two districts to the southward of the Malpoorba have been given to Appah Dessaye, a chief who is serving with the British troops under my command. The remainder of the lands about Sungum-nair, and bordering on the Godavery, to the amount of about four lacs of rupees per annum, are still in Amrut Rao’s hands, although the Peshwah has given orders that they may be seized.

‘I have requested Lieut. Colonel Close to inform the Peshwah, that I have made an agreement with Amrut Rao, and expected that Chief would join me at Aurungabad; and that, under these circumstances, I requested his Highness to suspend all hostilities against his brother. I did not deem it expedient to apprize his Highness of the particulars of the agreement which I have made with Amrut Rao, at least till I should know whether he would comply with my request to suspend his hostilities.

‘If he should comply with my request, the deficiency of re-

* See page 311.

venue to be made up for Amrut Rao will be about three lacs of rupees per annum, respecting which I hope there will be no difficulty hereafter: in the mean time Amrut Rao's jaghire on the Godavery connects well with the districts under Ahmednuggur, and being in the hands of a friendly Chief, adds much to the security of Poonah.

' I am concerned to have to inform your Excellency that Major Malcolm has been obliged to quit camp and go to Bombay on account of his health; he has hopes that he will be able to rejoin me in the course of a month; but in the interval I shall suffer some inconvenience from the want of information and assistance, which he is so capable of affording me.

' The troops under my command have passed the Godavery.

' Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajar of Berar had not entered the Nizam's territories on the 20th: they have moved from the Adjunttee ghaut to the eastward, towards the Badowly ghaut. Colonel Stevenson was at Jaffierabad, at no great distance from them.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shaue.

' Camp at Toka, North of the Godavery,
24th August, 1803.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 2nd and 3rd.

' Adverting to the Governor General's instructions to Mr. Mercer, and the plan of the campaign, and observing from Colonel Close's dispatch to the Governor General, that he had referred to my opinion, and that of Mr. Duncan, the Peshwah's proposal to cede lands in Bundelcund in lieu of those in Savanore, I have to tell you, that I approve much of that plan. As, according to the plan of the campaign, the Governor General intends to take Bundelcund, it may be supposed that we shall lose, by the adoption of it, all that we should have gained in Savanore and Bancapoor. But I think that the Governor General would alter his plan respecting Bundelcund, as soon as he should find that it belonged to the Peshwah; and that in fact, if we should take Savanore and Guzerat, it is almost the only resource of his Highness's government.

‘ The question, then, respecting Bundelcund, and the whole of the proposition from the Peshwah, contained in Colonel Close’s dispatch, will stand exactly as it would if the Governor General had not determined on the seizure of that province, as a part of the plan of the campaign.

‘ In my opinion, it would have been inconvenient to take Savanore. The southern Chiefs, most of whom are at this moment in a state of neutrality, have all an interest in that province; it would require a large body of troops to take possession of it, and as none can be allotted for that service at present, it must be delayed, at least, till the conclusion of the war.

‘ The resources of the Peshwah’s government are but very small indeed. His sersoubah cannot venture to go into Savanore to take possession of those countries which remain to His Highness, until the Company’s troops can be spared to take possession of those which have been ceded; the Peshwah’s lands about Poonah are waste, and he has only what remains to him of Guzerat, and a part of the Konkan. The addition to his revenues of sixteen lacs of rupees from Savanore, which he has never enjoyed, will attach him to the Company’s government.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Close has explained the situation of the Vinchoor jaghiredar in his public dispatch, and has stated the strong desire of the Peshwah, that he should retain his jaghire of Oolpar, near Surat. In fact, this chief is the only one in the empire, who has been from the commencement faithful to the cause of the Peshwah. While fighting in this cause against Holkar, his troops were entirely cut to pieces, he and his son were wounded, his jaghire of Vinchoor was destroyed, and Oolpar alone remained of all that he possessed, and this was ceded to the Company. I certainly think it desirable that this chief should get back that district. But Mr. Duncan contends, that to return it will be inconvenient to Surat, and that it would be better to provide for Vittell Seo Deo elsewhere.

‘ This chief declares that he never will consent to relinquish his jaghire, and gives several reasons for this determination, referable to his family, his honor, &c. &c. The fact is, that he sees that this district is likely to be in tranquillity, and to be productive, from its neighbourhood to Surat, and the

Company's districts in the Attavesy, and from the connexion between the Company and the Guickwar, and, therefore, he is desirous to keep it. I acknowledge, that I think it would be preferable to suffer a little inconvenience at Surat, and to attach to the British government's connexion such a servant as Vittell Seo Deo, and to gain the credit in the Marhatta empire of rewarding his services and fidelity to his master, to keeping the district only for the convenience of the city of Surat.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the proposal of the Peshwah respecting Bundelcund ought to be accepted.

‘ I come now to consider the memoranda included in your letter of the 3rd.

‘ In case I should have an opportunity of negotiating a peace, I will attend to the first two articles.

‘ In respect to the third, I have no idea that the Peshwah will attempt to fly from Poonah; or that if he should be so inclined, he could carry his plan into execution without the knowledge of his ministers. You will have observed from my letters to Colonel Close, that I have urged him to pay the ministers, in order to have accurate information of what passes.

‘ We cannot contrive to settle the government at Poonah till the conclusion of the war. Bad as the situation of the government is, it must be allowed to continue. If we were to attempt to alter it now, we should have a contest in our rear, which would be ruinous.

‘ It is impossible to foresee exactly in what situation the conclusion of the war will leave us, or what the settlement at Poonah ought to be. The Governor General knows, however, that I have concluded an arrangement with Amrut Rao, and I have opened a negotiation with Holkar, in which I have proposed that he should combine his interests with those of the British government. I have not yet had an answer to my first letter to that Chief; but a hircarrah, come from Amrut Rao's camp this morning, says that it was reported there, that Holkar had gone to Indore; and if that be the case, it is probable that he proposes to remain neutral till he shall see which party is most likely to be successful. This hircarrah also reported that Amrut Rao was coming to join me at Aurungabad.

‘ In respect to the 4th article, before you have received this, the Governor General will have heard that the southern

chiefs have kept aloof; and that all that we can expect from them, is their neutrality during the war. I have written to them since the fall of Ahmednuggur, but I have, as yet, received no answer. If I should find them disposed to join, upon condition that their possessions shall be confirmed and guaranteed to them, I will enter into engagements accordingly.

‘ Mr. Duncan has been particularly anxious to seize Angria’s possessions; a measure which I have vehemently opposed, and in which I have declared that I will not co-operate, for the following reasons:

‘ First, till we establish a plentiful depôt at Ahmednuggur, it is absolutely necessary that we should keep up our communication with Panwell and Bombay, and it would be desirable to keep it up at all events. The road passes through Angria’s country, and he has hitherto suffered the communication to be carried on undisturbed. He will not resign his possessions without a contest; during the existence of which, the road would be interrupted, and he might continue to make it inconvenient, even after he should be driven out.

‘ Secondly, Mr. Duncan has no means of carrying on this expedition; he talks of seamen, artillerymen, and 300 or 400 sepoy, but Angria has two or three very strong hill forts in the Konkan, not immediately on the sea-coast; these must be regularly attacked, heavy equipments must be formed for these attacks, and there must be something better to carry them on, than the troops proposed by Mr. Duncan.

‘ Thirdly, the situation of Scindiah, relatively to Angria and all the southern chiefs, has been materially altered by the fall of Ahmednuggur. They must now see that he has no means of moving a regular army into the Deccan; he may come in with a few horse as a freebooter, and he will be driven out again, but he can do them no harm. On the other hand, they must also perceive that there is no fort so strong, as that the British troops cannot get into it; they are all much attached to, and place great reliance on, their forts; and Angria in particular, who must, from his situation, feel himself exposed to the constant attacks of the British Government, will not like to venture to offend us, by taking advantage of his situation, to cut off our communication with Bombay.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am decidedly of opinion, that Angria ought not to be touched; and indeed, generally,

I am induced to oppose these little expeditions of Mr. Duncan, for the success of which I never see adequate means provided.

‘ I will write to Colonel Close respecting the sixth article in the memoranda.

‘ With respect to the seventh article, I have to tell you, that the confederates have moved to the eastward, and Colonel Stevenson has moved in a parallel line with them, and he will fall upon them as soon as he can. He will continue that course even to Nagpoor, if it should be necessary ; and I shall be able to move in a day or two, which will probably induce Scindiah at least to return. The confederates cannot make any serious impression upon the Nizam’s territories, till the middle of October, when it may be expected that the river Godavery will fall ; and I have strongly recommended to the Resident at Hyderabad, that a corps should be collected at that city, to protect it effectually, in case the enemy should contrive to pass round us. If they should go to the northward to invade Bengal, some of us must follow them.

‘ In case of peace, I will attend to the eighth article.

‘ Twelve days have elapsed since I took Ahmednuggur ; and in that time I have marched nearly fifty miles, and have crossed the river Godavery : having settled our conquests south of that river, I hope to get on equally well in future ; but I tremble for the want of the common country grains for the followers and cattle. The country is completely exhausted, the villages depopulated, and large tracts of excellent land uncultivated. Indeed, I believe that these facts are the principal causes of Holkar’s keeping aloof from the confederates. We have lost such numbers of cattle by the length of our march and starvation, that we have none to carry grain for our followers ; and I learn that we have lost vast numbers of those coming from General Stuart’s army ; I believe nearly one-half of the whole number.

‘ However, large numbers of dealers attend the camp, who came with me from Mysore ; and if the Nizam’s servants afford us any supplies, we shall still do tolerably well. I have plenty for the troops, and it may be depended upon, that I will do every thing in my power to procure what is wanted for the followers.

‘ I do not like our situation in Guzerat ; we have plenty of troops for the defence of that province, but they are not organized or commanded, one party being under the command of a committee, consisting of a collector, a judge, and Colonel Callandar ; and the other, under that of Major Walker : they are not equipped or provided. I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan for the organization and equipment of the troops, and for the general defence of Guzerat. But although he cannot disapprove of it, it interferes with all his little prejudices, plans of operation, Mooluck-geery, conquests in Kattywar, &c. &c., and I see plainly that it never will be carried into execution as it ought ; and that, in fact, it will be thwarted. Under these circumstances, I had serious thoughts of writing to the Governor General, to request him to relieve me from the command in Guzerat ; but I have refrained from doing so, and shall persevere as long as I can.

‘ What do you think of Mr. Duncan and Major Walker doubting whether Anund Rao’s troops, and even the subsidiary force, should go on the expedition to Baroach (which, by the by, after all I believe they have not sent), as the Guickwar government was in “close alliance” with Doulut Rao Scindiah ? Then they have their troops scattered in companies in ten thousand different directions. They have three complete regiments of Europeans, and parts of three others in those countries, but none collected ; and they have neither provisions, ammunition, cattle, magazines, nor any one equipment that the troops want.

‘ The fort of Songhur, an important post for the security of Surat, was attacked by a banditti in the beginning of July ; there were 100 sepoy, and an officer in it. After the attack, the committee of Surat found out that the officer had neither ammunition nor provisions. They deliberated upon the subject, considered it well, referred it to Colonel Callandar, to Bombay, and to the officer at Songhur ; but as late as the 21st July, they had not sent off the provisions or ammunition ; and, as far as I know, they may not yet have been sent. Every thing is to be apprehended from such people.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Shawe.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 25th August, 1803.

Goklah received 45,000 rupees a few days ago, and now he wants 75,000 more. He says that this sum was due eight days, and that it ought to have been paid on the 16th of this month. I shall be obliged to you, if you will inquire at the durbar upon this subject, and let me know whether Goklah is to have this money.

‘ I have desired Bellingham to write to you, to request that 25,000 rupees, for which I signed a bill yesterday, might be sent to Ahmednuggur, to Lieut. Carfrae, the paymaster at that place. If Goklah is to have these 75,000 rupees, it will be necessary that you should send me on as much money as you can conveniently get, besides that sum which is still to go to Ahmednuggur.

‘ Major Dallas is come in, but I have not yet seen him, or learnt the number of cattle he has brought with him. On the 22nd, the enemy marched from the neighbourhood of the Badowly ghaut, back towards Goompeepree, between Adjunttee and Burhampoor, and about ten coss from the former: Colonel Stevenson was at Dewal ghaut, about ten miles from the Badowly ghaut.

‘ I hear that Gopal Bhow went off from the Casserbarry ghaut on the 23rd, but of this I am not certain: a hircarra, who came yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, and left Amrut Rao’s camp on the 22nd, reported that Amrut Rao intended to come to join me. He also said, that Amrut Rao had received accounts that Holkar had gone to Indore: this last report is confirmed by one of a similar purport from Chandore.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 26th August, 1803.

‘ I enclose papers which I have received from Appah Dessaye, regarding the difficulties of his situation. I have sent him word that I have crossed the river, and am about to

advance, and that, until he joins, I can do nothing for him. It is really necessary that something should be determined about the payment of these two parties.

‘ My whole time and attention, which are required by many other objects, are taken up in disputing with Goklah and Appah Dessaye, about their pay. The latter swears that he cannot get possession of his jaghires, and that, till he does get them, his troops must have money; and certainly, what he says upon this subject appears reasonable. But if they must have money, how much are they to have, and who is to pay them? If the Company are to pay them, it would be better for me to hire an equal number of troops at the same expense, than to have these fellows, whom we must always suspect of sending intelligence to the enemy, and from whom I doubt that we shall have but little service; or at once to take them into the Company’s service at certain rates of pay.

‘ At all events, if we are to pay them, (and I do not see how they can keep the field unless we do,) we must either have some assistance from the Peshwah of money, or of influence in procuring it from the soucars for our drafts. We ought also to have a small detachment of his cavalry to accompany the escort which will march occasionally with the treasure from Poonah. Only conceive what a drain upon my resources of money, 75,000 rupees monthly to Goklah, and 60,000 monthly to Appah Dessaye, will be; besides the force collecting at Ahmednuggur, for which provision must be made, as the collection cannot be expected for many months, and two additional battalions coming from the frontier.

‘ I wish you to turn these points over in your mind. It is useless to say that Goklah ought to serve for his jaghire in Savanore, and Appah Dessaye for his in various other places; for they neither can, nor will, serve at such a distance from those places, particularly the latter, who has never got possession of the lands allotted to him. Either they must have money, or they must be sent back; and I wish to have the question decided, as I cannot give up my time daily to argue with these Chiefs, and their carkoons, upon these points, with which, after all, I ought to have nothing to do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

• Camp north of the Godavery,
26th August, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have received your letter of the 23rd. Gopal Bhow is certainly gone off. I have a letter from Colonel Stevenson, in which he informs me that the enemy had returned to Goompeepree on the 22nd. He had sent a detachment down the ghaut to ascertain the fact, and it cut off some of the enemy's supplies. He intended to move, on the night of the 23rd, upon a detachment of Ragojee Bhoonslah, gone to the eastward; and at the same time he sent a body of infantry to Jaffierabad to keep in check the enemy in case they should design to come up by Adjuntee or Ferdapoor. I think it is capital that we should have begun to play the Marhatta game upon themselves; and that, at all events, Colonel Stevenson alone should have contrived to have kept them out of the Nizam's territories, and in their own exhausted countries, for above a fortnight since the commencement of hostilities.

Major Walker's intelligence is much exaggerated, much of it false, and in many instances contradictory. He knows that well, and argues frequently against the probability of the story which he transmits to Bombay. Yet he continues to send out these same hircarrahs, and it does not appear that they are punished for bringing false intelligence, or rewarded for telling the truth. I will give Colonel Murray a hint upon the subject of the nature of this intelligence.

‘ Upon the whole, I think it will be best that the bullocks you may send should have saddles, and should bring two hundred of the loads of arrack and the remainder loads of rice from Poonah. They must also have drivers. I am, however, concerned to observe that the drivers we get in the country are very bad, and desert constantly.

‘ Captain Graham has informed me that the Peshwah’s vakeel, young Rastia, has ordered some of the head men of villages in our districts to attend him. He must have done this by order from the durbar. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this circumstance to the ministers, and tell them that, if the Peshwah is satisfied with the arrangement which has been made at Ahmednuggur, he ought not to interfere in the arrangement of the country in any manner, as a

double local authority will never answer. If he is not satisfied, let him state his wishes, and I will let him know whether I can comply with them. But if there should be any more of this underhand opposition to the management after it had been approved, I shall be obliged to alter my proclamation, and to take possession of the country solely in the name of the Company.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp north of the Godavery, 26th August, 1803.

‘ I wish to warn you particularly against the volumes of false intelligence which you will receive when you go into Guzerat. Major Walker sends out hircarrahs, who return and tell him what they please; he writes the whole down, and sends it off to Mr. Duncan, by whom it is circulated. In frequent instances, Major Walker discovers that his hircarrahs have told him falsehoods; but I doubt whether they are punished when they bring intelligence which is false, or rewarded when they bring that which is true, or consistent with other facts or intelligence.

‘ Very lately, an instance has occurred, in which two cossids relate that they had been to Holkar’s camp, on the Taptee, and he was positively at Myhissur on the day that they said they saw his camp. They also swore that he had 160,000 horse, and vast quantities of guns and military equipments: yet there is no fact better established than that Holkar’s losses of cattle had been so great, that he was obliged to leave behind and bury his guns and military equipment; and as for his horse, I know that his principal partisans, Meer Khan and Nago Jewajee, are gone into Malwa, probably to take possession of the countries allotted for the subsistence of their troops.

‘ I mention these circumstances only to show you how little dependence is to be placed upon these stories, when the people who tell them have no fear of punishment, nor hope of reward; and I am going to mention another fact, to show you what can be done by activity.

‘ Since the beginning of the war, Colonel Stevenson has been exposed, single-handed, to the united armies of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, which I dare say have been reported

to Major Walker to consist of 200,000 men. Not a Marhatta horseman has been able to show himself in the Nizam's territories; and Colonel Stevenson, on the 23rd, played the Marhatta trick upon them, by cutting off some of their supplies.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

'HONORABLE SIR,

'Camp, 27th August, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st instant.

'2. It is to be hoped, that the orders which I have already given, and the measures which you have adopted, will have put the Honorable Company's troops in possession of the fort of Baroach before this time. It will remain with you to appoint a person to manage and collect the revenues of the districts depending upon Baroach; and I recommend that a body of peons should be raised to take possession of the different tannahs in behalf of the Honorable Company.

'3. In respect to the fort of Powanghur, I will send directions that it may be attacked as soon as I shall find that the troops are assembled north of the river Nerbudda, and in a state of equipment fit to undertake that operation.

'4. It does not appear that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has any territories south of the Nerbudda, bordering upon the sea coast, which would become the object of the operations of the troops in Guzerat.

'5. In respect to the Patans, said to be in the neighbourhood of Songhur, I have strong reasons to doubt their being in that quarter at all, and certainly not in the numbers stated by the hircarrahs employed by Major Walker.

'6. It is by no means certain, though very possible, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar will become a party in the war; and for that reason I am desirous not to attack or molest any of the troops supposed to belong to that Chief, at least for a short time.

'I have the honor, &c.

'The Governor of Bombay.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'I have the honor to send herewith the plan of Surat, which you were so kind as to send me some time ago.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘ HONORABLE SIR, ‘ Camp, 29th August, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant.

‘ 2. When I proposed for your consideration a plan for the military organization of the troops in Guzerat proper, and the Attavesy, and for the defence of those provinces, I did not intend to lessen the authority of, or the respect due to, the Resident at Baroda; and I proposed the plan for the subsidiary force in Guzerat such as at this moment is in force in respect to the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

‘ 3. It appeared to me, from your letter of the 12th, that you approved of that plan; and you desired that I would recommend Colonel Murray for the situation which I proposed he should fill, if you should adopt it; but I learn, by your letter of the 23rd, that you disapprove of it, and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution.

‘ 4. I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service. But the measures in question are of a general nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our military situation in the Attavesy and Guzerat. You, who must have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those districts, are of opinion that they are not, and you object to them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous indeed, if, after such an opinion, I were to persist in ordering the adoption of these measures, and I should well deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might happen.

‘ 5. At the same time I have to observe to you, that the communication between me and the troops in those provinces is necessarily very long; that circumstances may render it longer, and may prevent it entirely; and therefore I request that you will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act for the public service, without any reference to me.

‘ 6. In case the circumstances of the war should hereafter enable me to approach nearer those provinces, I shall apprise the authorities there of the manner in which I may be of

opinion that they can co-operate with me in forwarding the public service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Aurungabad, 29th August, 1803.

‘ I have received your two letters of the 23rd. Mr. Duncan’s objection to the proposed arrangement in Guzerat and the Attavesy has surprised me as much as it has you. You probably saw only his private letter to me of the 23rd; had you seen the public letter of that date, you would have been better acquainted with his sentiments.

‘ With the knowledge that you had, I am not astonished that you should have consented to act under the arrangement, and I am convinced that you would have done everything in your power to carry it into execution. But you will be surprised when I tell you that part of that arrangement is to keep General Jones at Surat, and Major Walker in the command of the troops in Guzerat, and the two commands separate.

‘ It is my decided opinion that Guzerat, and even Surat itself, cannot be saved, unless there is an efficient military organization of the troops in those districts,—unless there is one general authority to control the whole and combine the movements of all the troops to one object,—and unless regular and substantial means of supply are established. Mr. Duncan talks highly of the merits of the committee of Surat, because they have taken possession of a province ceded to them by treaty without opposition. I hope he will allow equal merit to my peons, who have taken possession of all Scindiah’s and Ragojee Bhoonslah’s territories south of, and bordering on, the Godavery.

‘ After having objected to my plan, in principle as well as in detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. I am not afraid of responsibility, God knows! and I am ready to incur any personal risk for the public service; but, under such circumstances, I should be mad if I were to order this plan to be carried into execution. I have therefore requested Mr. Duncan to desire the public authorities in Guzerat an

Attavesy to act as they may think best for the public service, without reference to me, and I propose not to have anything to do with the troops in those provinces.

‘I am concerned that you should have been disappointed, particularly after having gone from Poonah, to which situation you will probably wish to return. But I am convinced you will agree in opinion with me that, under all the circumstances of this case, I could not order the execution of my plans; and that, at this distance from the scene of action, and under the difficulties of the communication, I could not pretend to conduct so disjointed a piece of machinery as the military duties in Guzerat and the Attavesy.

‘I have no objection to your seeing all the correspondence upon this subject if you can; and if you do not see it at Bombay, I will take an opportunity of showing it to you, but it is very voluminous, and too troublesome to copy in these busy times.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Bulgaum, 30th August, 1803.

‘I have just received yours of the 27th. There appears a mistake at Poonah respecting the coolies you mention to have been forced to go on to the army. Not one cooley has come in from Poonah since we quitted Ahmednuggur. The rice brought in has come upon asses. The coolies who were paid and intended for the army stopped at Ahmednuggur, and threw down their loads; and these the brinjarries, whom I left behind to bring on six hundred other loads, are now bringing on.

‘I have a good opinion of Goklah, but it will not answer to increase his party. The effect will be to increase the sum to be paid to him monthly, not the number of our force for service. You shall have blank bills for the shroffs, and I request you to send copies of them as you may grant them, in order that the sums received may be carried regularly to account. Jadoon Rao and all Scindiah’s dependents ought to be deprived of their jaghires forthwith, otherwise we ought not to have taken Ahmednuggur or the countries dependent

upon that place, all of which were in jaghire to somebody. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the Nizam's territories, as I before informed you, on the 24th, with their horse only. I do not believe they have done much harm, but they are advancing by long stages towards the Godavery, with an intention to cross that river. They took advantage of Colonel Stevenson's absence to the eastward to enter the country. The Godavery filled again before I left it, but it may have become fordable, and, if that is the case, they declare it to be their intention to go to Hyderabad.

'I have passed to the eastward of Aurungabad, and shall make a march to-morrow to the southward, and I think it probable that I shall reach the Godavery with the cavalry. If the river be not fallen, they will move off either to the northward or eastward, which will afford time to secure our convoys travelling up from the Kistna. I think they will not attempt to cross the river by boats (indeed they are all secured) while I am at all near them. Colonel Stevenson is at Jaffierabad, and I am afraid that he has been deceived by the Mussulmann.

'I have not heard of anything in my rear or at all near me yet. Flour in Scindiah's camp is at two seers and a half for a rupee, so that we have still the most plentiful supplies of the two armies. We must complete the storing of Ahmednuggur as expeditiously as possible. If the river falls, which certainly would be very extraordinary at this season of the year, that operation may be attended with difficulty.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'P. S. It is reported that Holkar is coming forward, but I think that the report wants confirmation. Will you send this letter, with the enclosed, to Malcolm? Mr. Duncan, after having acquiesced in the plan suggested by me for the organization of the troops, and the plan of operations in Guzerat, has informed me that "acquiescence" did not mean "approbation;" and he has detailed his objections to the general system, as well as to the particulars of the plan, which go to fundamentals. He has, however, informed me that I may take upon myself to order its execution, if I think proper. I cannot understand the nice distinction between the acquiescence of a Governor in a plan for the defence of the provinces under

his government, and his approbation of that plan. However, be that as it may, I cannot take upon myself to order the execution of measures which circumstances may render unfortunate, even if they should be regulated as I wish, but to which I am certain that every opposition in the power of every officer in the Government will be given, particularly after I have been informed that those measures are decidedly disapproved of by the Governor. Neither can I, at this distance, undertake to conduct the details of a piece of machinery so disjointed as would be the military duties in Guzerat and the Attavesy under the separated authorities of the Resident at Baroda and the Committee of Surat; I have therefore requested to be relieved from all interference in those concerns.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Munro.

'Camp, 20 miles East of Aurungabad,
'MY DEAR MUNRO, 30th August, 1803.

'Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have entered the Nizam's territories, have passed Colonel Stevenson with an army of horse only, and propose to be upon the river Godavery this day. If the river should be fordable, they may be able to get to the southward; and I give you notice, that you may have your tannahs prepared in your villages, and desire them to defend them. They are starving; already flour and grain sell two and a half seers for a rupee in their camp, because the inhabitants, finding that they have no guns, and that the horse cannot get over their walls, do not choose to give up their property upon the first requisition, and they have no leisure to wait long in any particular place.

'I have received intelligence, that a fellow, by name Mah-tab Khan, who was formerly in Tippoo's service, is employed by the Rajah of Berar to raise horse at Cuddapa: you may probably find this fellow out; and I recommend that he be treated as he deserves.

'I beg you to keep the Werdy bullocks in the service. I shall write to General Campbell regarding them.

'I hope to be able to strike a blow against their myriads of horse in a few days, if I should not be so unlucky as to have the Godavery become fordable about six weeks sooner than usual.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Munro.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Bulgaum, 30th August, 1803.

‘You will have heard that Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, entered the Nizam’s territories by the Adjunttee ghaut on the 24th instant. They have since advanced gradually with cavalry only, and, I understand, were to be this day upon the river Godavery.

‘The report in circulation is, that they intend to march upon Hyderabad; but as I shall be upon the river to-morrow with my cavalry, if I should find they have gone there this day, I think it probable that they will not attempt to cross unless the river should be fordable. It had risen considerably on the day that I left it, and was not fordable: I do not believe it is so now, but if it should be so, I shall cross it as well as the enemy; and although I cannot promise to be at Hyderabad as soon as they will, I can assure you that I shall lose no time upon the road. I expect to be able to hurry them on in such a manner, as that they will not have time to do any material injury to the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

‘They have spread their pindarries over this country, but it does not appear that they have done it much injury. They have been chiefly in Scindiah’s districts of Jalnapoor, and the amildar of Budnapoor has resisted them successfully in his village, and has set an example therein, which I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to urge the inhabitants of the countries on both sides of the Godavery to follow.

‘Notwithstanding this predatory invasion, the enemy are much distressed, and flour and grain sell in their camp at the rate of two seers and a half for a rupee. This fact is a strong proof of the measures adopted by the inhabitants for their defence; and shows, that if they become general, and are persevered in, they must quit the country for want of subsistence.

‘You should write to durbar to issue a proclamation to inform the inhabitants that the enemy have no guns, to require them to defend the villages and property, and to assure them that I am coming to their assistance.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.
Major Kirkpatrick. ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Camp at Unterwarry, 31st August, 1803.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, the enemy have taken advantage of Colonel Stevenson’s march to the eastward, of which I apprized you: they returned suddenly to the westward, and entered the Nizam’s territories by the ghaut of Adjunttee on the 24th, with horse only; they advanced with some rapidity from thence, I conclude, in order to avoid Colonel Stevenson, who returned to Jaffierabad, I believe, on the 25th; and they have been for the last two days in the neighbourhood of Jaulna, a fort in the district of Jalnapoor, which belongs to Scindiah.

‘ The pindarries have been spread as usual to plunder; but, as far as I can learn, they have done but little mischief, and in many instances (particularly at a place called Budnapoor) they have been beaten off by the inhabitants.

‘ Grain is consequently very dear in their army, being at the rate of two seers and a half for a rupee.

‘ I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th; I marched from thence to the eastward yesterday, and have to-day come down towards the Godavery, as it was reported that the enemy had made a march to the southward, and intended to cross that river, to go towards Hyderabad. The Godavery, which had fallen so much as to be fordable on the 26th for a day or two, has risen again, so that I conclude that plan is laid aside for the present, as the passage of the river, unless it can be forded, would be a dangerous experiment. But I conclude that it will be resumed hereafter; and if they attempt to put it in execution, I shall move there likewise, taking care to detach to Poonah a force which will secure everything in that quarter. At the same time, I have in contemplation an expedition into Berar, which will give the Rajah something to do in his own country; and this shall be carried into execution as soon as we have sufficient supplies collected to ensure the subsistence of the troops on this service.

‘ Colonel Stevenson is at present at a place called Donegaum, about twenty coss north-east from Aurungabad. I have desired him to move with expedition upon the enemy; and I shall do the same, as soon as I have secured my baggage at this place.

‘ I saw Colonel Collins at Aurungabad, and had a long conversation with him ; from which it appears clearly, that the war was inevitable, and that the Rajah of Berar urged it on, in order to find a place for the subsistence of Scindiah’s and Holkar’s troops, which must otherwise have entered his countries. The state of Hindustan, and indeed of all the countries in which Holkar and Scindiah have carried on their operations, is shocking.

‘ I have a report that Holkar is coming to join the enemy ; but it is not confirmed, although it may possibly be true.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relinquish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had acquiesced in my plan for the organization of the troops, and the system to be adopted for the defence of those territories, he has written to me to say that acquiescence is not approbation ; and he had objected to the principle, as well as to the detail, of the measures which I had recommended. But he says that if I choose to be responsible for the consequences, they shall be carried into execution. I do not exactly see the distinction between the acquiescence in, and approbation of, a system for the defence of the provinces under his government by a governor.

‘ I should have no objection to taking upon myself to be answerable for any measures that I have recommended, provided I was certain that they would be carried into execution. But I know that these would be impeded ; and I should doubly incur blame when I should not deserve it : first, on account of the failure of a system not properly carried into execution ; and secondly, for persisting in ordering the adoption of that system, when I knew that it was contrary to the sentiments and inclinations of the governor. I have therefore thought it best to request Mr. Duncan to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and the Attavesy to act as they might think best for the public service, without reference to me ; and I have had less scruple in taking this step, because, at this distance from the scene of action, and under all the difficulties of the communications, I am entirely incapable of directing the operations of a piece of machinery so disjointed as the separate commands of the Committee of Surat and the Resident at Baroda.

‘ I should send you all the papers upon this subject, only

that they are very voluminous ; and I know that the Governor General will receive a letter from Mr. Duncan, with numerous accompaniments regarding it.

‘ Believe me, &c. ’
‘ Major Shawe. ’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY. ’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Sec. of Government,
Bombay.*

‘ SIR, ’ ‘ Unterwarry, 1st September, 1803. ’

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd August, in which you have enclosed the copy of a dispatch from the envoy at Goa. In my opinion, none of the troops in this part of India can be spared to add to the means of defence of Goa, and particularly not the 84th regiment ; unless the detachments of that corps, stationed at Poonah and at Parneira, can be replaced by similar detachments of European troops. ’

‘ 2. I observe that Sir William Clarke, in calculating his means of defence for Goa, has not included either the fleet under Admiral Rainier, or the Portuguese troops. It is not very probable that an attack can be made by such a force as will render necessary the extensive defensive operations for which such a large body of European troops are required, without the knowledge of Admiral Rainier, and his proceeding with his fleet in the direction of Goa. However bad the Portuguese troops may be, they cannot be entirely useless in forts which must be garrisoned, particularly if mixed with the British troops, and if the supposed attack should not be made by a force so large as to attract the notice and consequent co-operation of Admiral Rainier. ’

‘ I have the honor to be, &c. ’
‘ The Sec. of Govt., Bombay. ’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY. ’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ’ ‘ Camp at Unterwarry, 1st September, 1803. ’

‘ I have just received your letter of the 29th August. ’

‘ It is certainly true that I do not expect much service from Goklah or Appah Dessaye. Indeed, I have received some extraordinary messages from the former within these few days, ’

pressing me for further advances of money, in such a manner that I was obliged to alter an intention I had formed to go out with the cavalry alone ; and instead thereof to make preparations for moving with a light force of infantry, as well as cavalry. This I shall carry into execution to-morrow morning, if I should find, by my intelligence of this day, that the enemy had not moved off to a very great distance. Appah Dessaye is arrived in camp.

‘ The circumstances mentioned by you are very unpleasant ; and, most undoubtedly, if I knew how to dispense with the services of Goklah and Appah Dessaye, I would forthwith send them about their business. But, bad as they are, and weak as my expectations are from them, I must determine upon keeping them, at least for the present, even at the large expense stated. If they were to go, we should be surrounded in our camp and on our marches by pindarries, and we should lose even the name of a body of cavalry. I shall therefore pay Goklah this month, and give Appah Dessaye some money ; and I shall continue the payment as long as I can, which must be on account, to be settled hereafter with the Peshwah.

‘ The only difficulty I have upon this subject is the money. However, the blank bills have been sent to you, and I hope that you will be able to feed our wants in some degree. I intend also to write to the Governor General to send a supply of money ; and to General Stuart to arrange that the revenues of Canara, which I know are generally paid in gold, and will soon be paid, may be applicable to the service of this body of troops. I think that I have now, and I expect soon to have, as much as will keep me going till these resources come in. I recommend that the money from Poonah should not be sent farther than Ahmednuggur at present. We do not know exactly whether there are many pindarries south of the Godavery ; and, at all events, it may be inconvenient to look out for it north of the river.

‘ In respect to Appah Dessaye’s demands, the pretence of the Peshwah’s government, that he ought to serve for his serinjaumy, is too ridiculous. The fact is, that the man cannot get possession of his lands, and either some other mode of paying his troops must be adopted, or they must be disbanded. The question is, upon whom ought this expense to fall ? Cer-

tainly upon the Peshwah; and it would be a great improvement to the new treaty with him, if it were to contain a clause that he would make a forfeit monthly of thirty rupees for every horseman deficient of the number which he has engaged to supply.

‘ Upon the whole, I cannot well do without Goklah and Appah Dessaye. I have not time to argue and dispute with the latter, whether he ought to serve for the rent of lands of which he has never got possession. I must therefore determine to pay these Chiefs myself.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘ HONORABLE SIR, ‘ Camp at Rackisbaum, 3rd September, 1803.

‘ The enemy having found it impossible to seize any of the districts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan, or to plunder them to any extent, have seized the persons of some of the principal inhabitants of the towns near which they have passed, and have detained them as securities for the payment of certain sums which they have required from the districts.

‘ In order to put a stop to this practice it is necessary to retaliate upon them; accordingly, I request you will be so kind as to give directions that the mother and relations of Jadoon Rao Bhow may be seized, and that they may be informed that they will be detained as securities for the persons of the hostages seized in this unjustifiable manner by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ In case there should be at Baroach, or in Guzerat, or the Attavesy, or in any of the countries which may come into the hands of the Honorable Company’s troops, any other persons of consequence or respectability, related to or connected with Scindiah’s ministers, or belonging to that Chief, I request that they may be also seized and detained for the same reasons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poona.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Rackisbaum, 3d Sept. 1803.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan, in which I have requested that certain persons belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and residing in Guzerat, the Attavesy, and at Baroach, may be seized and detained in retaliation of injuries of a similar nature done to persons residing in the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ As there may be some persons of riches and respectability belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar residing at Poona, I request you to urge the Peshwah to have their persons secured, and delivered over to the officer commanding the British troops.

‘ This mode of warfare is most unjustifiable. In passing through the country as a freebooter, Dowlut Rao Scindiah may seize the property he can find, and take it away; but he has no right to seize the persons of the inhabitants, in order thereby to secure the property which he cannot otherwise touch. There is no mode of guarding against this evil, or of relieving the Soubah’s government from its consequences, except by retaliating upon persons connected with his government.

‘ On this ground I request, that if there should be any such persons at Poona, you will urge the Peshwah that they may be delivered up.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Rackisbaum, 3d September, 1803.

‘ Since my arrival in this part of the country, having found that the district of Jalnapoor did not depend upon Ahmednuggur, and was surrounded by districts belonging to His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, with which it connected better than with those under Ahmednuggur, I thought it proper to give it in charge to His Highness’s officers; and

accordingly I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to take possession.

‘ Although the enemy have not been able to do much mischief to His Highness’s territories, and their bodies of horse have been in general beat off by the peons in the villages which they have attacked, yet they have contrived to seize some principal inhabitants as hostages for the payment of sums of money by the districts through which they have passed.

‘ This mode of warfare is entirely unjustifiable ; they have no right to the resources of the country which they are not able to seize and secure ; and it can be resisted, and its evils compensated to the Soubahdar’s government, only by a system of retaliation. Accordingly, I have written letters to Mr. Duncan and Colonel Close, of which I enclose copies, in order that persons belonging to the enemy residing in Poonah, and in the territories to the westward, may be seized.

‘ I request you to take an opportunity of informing the Soubahdar’s ministers of the circumstances above mentioned.

‘ Upon hearing of my arrival at Aurungabad, the enemy moved a considerable distance to the eastward of Jalnapoor, to a place called Ambergaum. They halted there the day before yesterday. Colonel Stevenson was yesterday at Jalnapoor, and I believe took that place. The enemy have nothing but cavalry, and I am informed are considerably distressed. They have been kept out of the fortified villages by the peons ; and I have circulated letters to the different amildars, in which I have promised rewards to those jemidars who oppose them.

‘ I marched to the river yesterday, and I propose to remain on its bank. By this position, I hope to secure the junction of all the supplies, to check the incursions of the enemy into the southern countries, and as I shall have my boats upon the river, it will be in my power either to fall upon the enemy’s troops as they are crossing, if they should attempt to cross it in boats ; or to cross it myself, if they should be able to ford it. At the same time, I shall draw near to them, and if an opportunity of striking a blow should offer, I shall seize it.

‘ Colonel Stevenson is well placed at Jalnapoor to impede the junction of some of their troops, particularly of their infantry and guns. But I cannot hope to remove this body of horse from the Nizam’s territories, till either Colonel Steven-

son or I am enabled to commence an offensive operation against the territories of the Rajah of Berar, by the junction of our supplies.

‘ These have been much delayed, indeed I may add almost destroyed, by the badness of the weather ; but still I hope that some of them may soon arrive.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th September, 1803.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Stevenson took the fort of Jalnapoor on the 2nd. I have not received the details of the affair, and therefore I cannot tell you whether he sustained any loss.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 31st, I have received intelligence that the enemy have moved to a still greater distance to the southward and eastward. I therefore relinquished the plan which I had formed of moving upon them with a light army ; and I came down to the Godavery, although they still talk of marching to Hyderabad. This movement has disconcerted their measures in some degree ; and as they see that I intend to pass the Godavery likewise, they fear to cross it, being certain that the river will rise again, that they may be cut off from their own countries, and liable to my attacks. The river is now fordable in many places, a circumstance which has never been known before at this season of the year : but I hope by my position to check the proposed expedition to Hyderabad ; and, at all events, it will not have any very bad effects.

‘ Two deserters came in to Aurungabad from Begum Sumroo’s campoo, on the 2nd ; and, from their story, I am afraid that that campoo will have passed the Soubah’s camp, and will have joined Scindiah, either yesterday or this day. They say likewise, that Colonel Pohlman’s campoo was following them at the distance of two days’ march ; but I doubt it, as I believe it was sent to Hindustan.

‘ If these campoos should join Scindiah in safety, they will retard his movements, and give us something more substantial to operate upon, than the cavalry which we have had hitherto ; and we may by good luck bring them to an action.

‘ Holkar has sent for the vakeel whom I dispatched to him in the month of July, and who has been waiting in Amrut Rao’s camp ever since for his passports. It appears, by the papers which have been sent to me, that Holkar has been very anxious that this man should reach him in safety. He wrote them after he had heard that Colonel Collins had quitted Scindiah’s camp.

‘ I have heard nothing of the movements of Holkar’s army since I last wrote to you. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention to the Governor General, that I think it will be very desirable that he should send round to Bombay, for the use of this body of troops, as soon as may be possible, seven lacs of rupees, at least, in gold mohurs. Our expenses increase, and I am obliged to find means of paying the Peshwah’s troops serving with me as well as my own.

‘ Since my arrival in this part of the country, I have found the district of Jalnapoor to be surrounded by others belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan, and to be at a great distance from, and entirely independent of, Ahmednuggur. I have therefore desired the Soubah’s servants to take possession of it and manage it. I shall report this arrangement to the Governor General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Shawe.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I still intend to carry on the expedition into Berar, if Colonel Stevenson’s corps can be sufficiently equipped; or if Sulabut Khan, the jaghiredar of Ellichpoor, will give us any assistance of grain.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Secretary of Government,
Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th September, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th instant.

‘ 2. I am happy to find that the servants of Anund Rao Guickwar did not bring forward the claim that he should be neutral in the existing war between the Company and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which was anticipated by Major Walker. It appears that they consider his engagements with the Company in the same light as I do; and I have no doubt but that,

when all the engagements between the Company and that Chieftain shall be consolidated in one treaty, there will be no objection on the part of his government to bind himself in terms in the manner in which his servants and I consider him to be bound by his present engagements.

‘ 3. If it should be thought material, I beg to observe, that I never doubted the policy of the treaties with the Guickwar state, provided the engagements were considered to be mutual ; my doubts upon the subject were grounded upon those of the Resident, whether the Rajah Anund Rao would take part in the existing war.

‘ 4. The letter which I had the honour of addressing to the Governor on the 29th, contains an answer to the 7th paragraph of your letter of the 28th. The Governor in Council has disapproved of the plans which I proposed to him on the 2nd of August for the defence of Guzerat and the Attavesy, and I cannot think that it would be proper for me to order that those plans should be carried into execution, in contradiction to his declared opinion. If I were in Guzerat, or at Surat, and could be in constant communication with the Resident at Baroda, or the Committee, I should most willingly endeavour to carry on the military duties in the manner preferred by the Governor : but as I am at a great distance, and as the communication may be impeded, it is best for the public service that I should not undertake to conduct business of which it is not possible I should have any knowledge.

‘ 5. Upon a perusal of Major Walker’s paper upon the subject of Guzerat, I observe that the operations recommended therein were connected with the prospect of a war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that the siege of Baroach is particularly adverted to.

‘ 6. I objected to those operations on the grounds stated in my letter of the 22nd.

I have the honour to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 4th September, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 31st of August, which contains news that is very satisfactory.

‘ I have promised Appah Dessaye to give him 25,000 rupees, and I shall repeat the same every month. I will write you a public letter upon the subject, and I request that you will make some arrangement with the durbar for the repayment of this sum, as well as of 75,000 rupees to be paid to Goklah.

‘ I have not yet got a return of the ordnance of Ahmednuggur; but, although there are above sixty pieces at that place, I believe that there are not many serviceable. I therefore recommend that you should make an application to Bombay for ordnance as well as gunpowder, although I know that there are large quantities of the latter at Ahmednuggur, and some of it very good.

‘ If I could give guns to the Peshwah, I could not give him carriages to remove them; for Captain Browne will tell you that he is now employed in the construction of carriages for the guns on the works at Ahmednuggur.

‘ Colonel Stevenson took Jalnapoor on the 2nd. The enemy are at Purtoor, and, it is said, design to cross the Godavery, and to march upon Hyderabad. Begum Sumroo’s campoo have come up the ghauts, and I am afraid have passed by the Nizam’s camp at Jalnapoor, and joined the enemy yesterday. They are much annoyed by my position on the Godavery, as, although the river is now fordable in many places, which was never known before at this season of the year, they are certain that it will rise again, and they do not relish being entirely cut off from their own countries and exposed alone to me.

‘ I am endeavouring to arrange an expedition into Berar, which will succeed if Salabut Khan is honest. This will create a diversion in favor of the Soubah, and will possibly draw at least Ragojee Bhoonslah to his own territories.

‘ If I can arrange that expedition, I propose to reinforce Poonah with three battalions and five companies of the 84th regiment, and to march myself with the remainder of the force towards Hyderabad.

‘ If I cannot arrange that expedition, we must go on as we are doing now, and I shall send Colonel Stevenson towards Hyderabad. Nothing but an expedition into Berar will save the Soubah’s country.

‘ Lieut. Griffiths is coming on remarkably well, and is by this time at Kurdlah. Major Hill is also about Toljapoor.

The former has all his cattle, having replaced his casualties; the latter has lost many.

‘ Mr. Duncan has made a curious kind of half-arrangement respecting the command in Guzerat, and I am convinced that the consequence of it will be that we shall lose all that we have got in that province. However, he is decidedly against my plan, and I shall have nothing to say to the province.

‘ Believe me, &c.,

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Kurcah, 7th September, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th of August, and I shall bear in mind the information it contains, to be applied in due time.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 3rd, the enemy have made a movement to the northward, with a view, I imagine, of effecting a junction with Begum Sumroo’s camp, who has certainly ascended the Adjunttee ghaut, followed, as it is reported, by the brigade under Colonel Pohlman. My division is to the southward of the enemy; but although their movements will certainly be retarded by their infantry and guns, I cannot be certain that they will not be able to pass to the southward of my division.

‘ The river Godavery is fordable, at present, in many places, a circumstance never before known at this season of the year; but it is certain that it will rise again. I have no doubt but that the enemy, at first, intended to cross the river with their cavalry, and that they were prevented from carrying this intention into execution by my march to the river, the certainty that I should pass it at the same time, and the probability that they would be exposed to my attacks unsupported, during the period that the river Godavery would remain full. They are now bringing on their infantry and their guns, and it is possible that they may attempt to carry the same plan into execution. But if they do, it may be depended upon that I shall not be very distant from them, that they will not have it in their power to undertake any enterprise of importance, and that I shall attack them whenever I may have an opportunity.

‘ I recommend that the two battalions stationed at Hyder-

abad should be encamped in a commanding situation, and the camp should be entrenched. It would be very desirable that the Soubah should go into his tents ; and as there are strange reports in Scindiah's camp, respecting the communications between the enemy and some of the Soubah's brothers, which I doubt not are unfounded, it might, perhaps, be proper that these Princes should reside for a time in the fortress of Golcondah, as a security for their persons. However, you must be the best judge of the necessity of this measure, as well as of the propriety of urging it at the present moment.

‘ I recommend that a small store of rice should be prepared for the two battalions ; and as it is possible that the enemy may endeavor to impede the arrival of the supplies at the city of Hyderabad, it would be proper that the public granaries, if there be any, should be filled. If, however, the Soubah's cavalry will lay out and attack the pindarries wherever they find them at a distance from their camp, the supplies for the city of Hyderabad will continue to be as plentiful as they have been heretofore.

‘ I have determined to send Colonel Stevenson to attack the Rajah of Berar's fort of Gawilghur, and eventually Nagpoor. This attack will be a diversion in favor of the Soubah's country, and I think may induce the Rajah of Berar, at least, to return to the northward.

‘ Colonel Stevenson has informed me, that Soubahan Khan's troops are in great distress for want of pay. I have desired him to mention the subject to you, and if he should find that they are so much distressed as that they cannot accompany him upon the expedition into Berar, to send Soubahan Khan and his troops to join me.

‘ I recommend that orders should be given to the amildars, killadars, &c., generally throughout the country, to lay in store as much grain as they can procure. It will be of use to the British troops, if it is not so to those in the Soubah's service ; it will save the grain and distress the enemy ; and, at all events, the loss to the Soubah's government will be but trifling.

‘ I have written to the amildars and killadars of some of the western districts and forts, to request that they would collect, and keep in them, certain quantities of grain for the use of the troops under my command. The quantities which I have

thus required are not very large, as I had no mode of sending them money; and I wish to ascertain their inclination to take any trouble on my behalf, before I give orders that the magazines which I may want might be collected.

‘ They will certainly be more likely to obey the orders of the Soubah’s government, and I shall be glad to hear that they are issued upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Kureah, 8th September, 1803.

‘ I have received a letter from Lieut. Colonel Woodington, commanding the troops in the territories of the Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar, in which he informs me that the fort of Baroach was taken by storm on the 29th of August, with little loss.

‘ I have not yet received a detailed account of the attack upon Baroach, but Lieut. Colonel Woodington mentions that the troops behaved with great gallantry.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan on the 24th of August, by the ghaut of Adjunttee, with a large body of horse only. They passed between Colonel Stevenson’s corps, which had moved to the eastward towards Badowly ghaut and Aurungabad, and they came to the neighbourhood of Jalnapoor, a small fort, the capital of a district of the same name, about forty miles east from Aurungabad.

‘ I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th. As soon as the enemy heard of my arrival they moved farther off to the southward and eastward, with an intention, as it was reported, to cross the Godavery and march upon Hyderabad. I continued my march back to that river, and have since marched to the eastward along its left bank. The river is at present fordable every where, a circumstance never before known at this season of the year. By these movements I have checked the enemy’s operations to the southward, and they have returned again to the northward of Jalnapoor; and, by the position which I occupy at present, I give protection to two important convoys on their march to join me from the river Kistna.

‘ Colonel Stevenson took Jalnapoor on the 2nd of September: he is at present between that place and Aurungabad.

‘ The brigade of infantry belonging to Begum Sumroo has ascended the Adjunttee ghaut, and it is supposed that another under the command of Colonel Pohlman has followed it; but neither of them had joined the enemy’s head quarters on the night of the 6th. The junction of their troops will considerably retard their movements, and I hope that I shall find an opportunity of bringing them to a general action; but, at all events, I am apprehensive that I shall not be able to relieve the Soubah’s territories entirely from their invasion, unless I can send an expedition into Berar. I am making preparations for this expedition, and I propose to send it as soon as possible.

‘ I do not find that the enemy’s pindarries have done much mischief to the country: the villages have, in many instances, been defended by the peons stationed in them and the inhabitants; and grain has sold at a very high price in their camp.

‘ Upon my arrival in this part of the country, having found that the district of Jalnapoor did not depend upon the fort of Ahmednuggur, and that it was entirely surrounded by districts belonging to the Soubahdar of the Deccan, I gave it over to the management of his Highness’s servants. Your Excellency will see the value of this district stated in the paper which I enclosed with my letter of the 21st of August.

‘ Amrut Rao has not yet joined me; it appears that his march has been delayed by certain ceremonies to be performed on the occasion of the recent death of Moraba Furnavees.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Holkar encamped, on the 2nd instant, in a situation between the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee. He has sent for the vakeel whom I dispatched to him in the month of July, and who has been waiting for his passports in Amrut Rao’s camp ever since that time. From the tenor of the passports, it appears that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was very anxious that this person should reach his camp in safety, and that he sent for him at a time when he must have known that Colonel Collins had quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s camp.

‘ I understand that Baba Phurkia has joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Munro.

‘DEAR MUNRO,

‘Camp, 10th September, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 28th of August. I have arranged the conquest of Ahmednuggur exactly as you have suggested. I have appointed Captain Graham to be collector, and I have given him a large body of peons and of horse to forward supplies and preserve tranquillity in my rear. I should have wished to have you in that situation, but you were not on the spot; and it is not impossible but your services will be required in your own districts. I have already put you on your guard.

‘Since I wrote to you last I have given the enemy a turn. By a few rapid marches to the southward, I have shown them that they could not go alone to Hyderabad; and I have consequently forced them to return to the northward.

‘I do not know whether they will come back again, but it is reported that they are going back to Burhampoor; that the silladars are much discontented, and swear that they will not serve unless supported by the infantry and guns.

‘It cannot be expected, however, that I shall be able to march with celerity equal to that of an army of horse only; and some of these may enter your districts. But, on the other hand, it is probable that I may stop them.

‘The Bengal army has commenced offensive operations, and will cross the Jumna. The troops in Guzerat took Baroach by storm on the 29th of August. Colonel Stevenson beat up a horse camp on the night of the 6th; and he tells me that he proposed to repeat the attack upon another last night. I have not yet heard whether he did so or not. No enemy has elsewhere come within forty miles of him.

‘Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

‘Lieut. Colonel Munro.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘Camp, 12th September, 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant, in which you have enclosed the draft of the instructions which you have given to Colonel Murray.

‘2. It appears to me that these instructions provide for every thing. Colonel Murray will be intrusted with sufficient

military authority to enable him to conduct the military duties in the territories which he will have to defend; and the Resident at Baroda will continue to exercise as much military authority as is necessary under present circumstances, and as will ensure the continuance of the respect of the natives for the person filling his office.

‘3. I shall be happy to contribute every thing in my power to forward this system, and I will correspond constantly with Colonel Murray, and suggest to him whatever may occur to me for the public benefit. At this distance from the Colonel, however, I cannot take upon me to do more than give him a general outline; and I must refer him to my letter to you of the 2nd of August, and others of a more recent date.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, 12th September, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose copies of the papers which contain a detailed account of the attack upon, and capture of Baroach. I beg to draw your Excellency’s notice to the conduct of the troops employed on this service; particularly to that of Lieut. Colonel Woodington who commanded, to that of Major Cuyler, and Captain Richardson of the 86th regiment, and of Captain Cliffe of the Bombay engineers.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Lieut. Col. Woodington to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘SIR,

‘Camp before Baroach, 25th August, 1803.

‘I have the honor to acquaint you, that I have this morning attacked and taken possession of the pettah, on the western face of the fort of Baroach. The battery for two eighteen pounders I hope to have finished in the course of the night, and that I shall be able to begin to batter to-morrow morning, when I flatter myself a speedy reduction of the fort will ensue.

‘Agreeably to my communication to you, I marched from Baroda on the 21st, and encamped within two coss of Baroach on the 23rd. It was my intention to have attacked the pettah (on the outside of which I was informed they had brought their whole force) on the morning of the 24th, expecting to

have found the Fury schooner, with the two eighteen pounders, at anchor about a coss from the fort, agreeably to the intimation I had received; but early in the morning of the 24th, one of my cossids, who had been dispatched to Lieut. Hewitson, the commander of the vessel, to give him notice of my approach, brought me the information from him, that on account of the shallowness of the water, it would be utterly impracticable to get his vessel to Baroach until the springs, and that he was at anchor at Bargood, five coss off.

‘ On this intelligence I marched to Bargood on the 24th, and made an arrangement to bring the eighteen pounders and stores up in boats, and I am happy to acquaint you they are just arrived.

‘ We found the enemy in front of the pettah, as I expected, to receive us, and with great ease forced them to a precipitate retreat into the fort.

‘ Our loss in killed and wounded is not great; no European officer is hurt. I should have the honor of sending a return of the killed and wounded, but have not had time yet to collect them, from the troops being so much employed. The loss of the enemy I have not yet ascertained.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ H. WOODINGTON, Lieut. Col.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ P.S. My detachment consists of 500 rank and file of Europeans, and about the same number of the grenadier battalion of native infantry; two howitzers, two 6 pounders, and the two 18 pounders brought in the Fury. I marched from Baroda with two 12 pounders, but I left them behind after the first day’s march, on receiving certain intelligence of the Fury’s arrival in Baroach river, as our march would have been very considerably delayed by bringing them on.’

Lieut. Colonel Woodington to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Baroach, 29th August, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to acquaint you, that at three o’clock, P.M., I stormed the fort of Baroach, and carried it with little loss, although the Arabs made considerable resistance, particularly on our entering the breach. The Arabs have suffered very considerably, and we have taken a great many stand of colors. A more steep ascent to the breach, and of such length,

is seldom seen. I cannot express myself in sufficient terms on the gallantry of the officers and men I have the honour to command. I shall have the honor to address you more fully tomorrow. I write this for your early information, immediately after we got possession of the place, which will, I hope, be an excuse for haste.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ H. WOODINGTON.

Lieut. Colonel Woodington to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Baroach, 30th August, 1803.

‘ I wrote to you yesterday evening, after we had stormed and taken possession of the fort of Baroach. I have now the honor of acquainting you more fully on the subject.

‘ The breach was reported practicable by the engineer at eleven, A.M., when I determined to storm; but delayed it until three o’clock, not only that I might benefit by the assistance of the Fury and an armed boat, which I expected would arrive in time to take their stations opposite the fort, but as I thought that a very likely hour to find the enemy off their guard. The vessel and armed boat, however, did not arrive in time to afford any assistance.

‘ The enclosed orders for the storm will inform you of the disposition I made, as will the accompanying profile and elevation of the western front of the fort. The enemy made a desperate attack in opposing our entrance into the breach; but, by the valor and spirit of the troops, were speedily repulsed, and my orders were carried into full execution. After Captain Richardson had obtained possession of the first gate, Major Cuyler pushed on so rapidly, that he overtook the Arabs before the greatest part, both horse and foot, could get out of the gate, and put to death about 200 of them. Many horses were also killed.

‘ I beg leave to submit to your notice the ready co-operation of Major Cuyler throughout every part of the service, his gallantry and conduct in the command of the storm, as also of Captain Richardson who led.

‘ The whole of the officers and men employed on this service have conducted themselves so much to my satisfaction, that I cannot express myself too strongly in their commendation.

‘ I am now employed in establishing some order in the fort,

in getting the eighteen pounders, and every thing we do not want to move with, into it; also in burying the enemy's dead, amounting to about 250.

'I have great pleasure in informing you that our loss is small. Captain McLaurin, of his Majesty's 86th, is the only officer wounded, and not badly. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the storm, as also a general return of the killed and wounded during the siege.

'We have taken at least twenty stand of colors from the Arabs and Scindians. I have only been able to collect ten, at present, which, together with the colors of the fort, I shall have the pleasure to send to the Presidency by the earliest opportunity.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'H. WOODINGTON.

'P.S.—Since writing the above, I have three more stand of Arab colors brought to me; besides which, I have, at Major Cuyler's particular request, permitted the 86th regiment to keep two, making in all fifteen.'

Field Orders by Lieut. }
Colonel Woodington. }

'Baroach, 29th August, 1803.

'The breach being reported practicable, the fort will be stormed at three o'clock.

'Storming party under the command of Major Cuyler.

'Forlorn Hope. A sergeant and 12 volunteers of his Majesty's 86th regiment.

'1st PARTY TO LEAD UNDER CAPTAIN RICHARDSON.—100 rank and file of his Majesty's 86th regiment, including one flank company; and 100 rank and file of the grenadier battalion, including one flank company.

'2nd PARTY UNDER MAJOR CUYLER.—150 rank and file of his Majesty's 86th regiment, including one flank company; and 150 rank and file of the grenadier battalion, including one flank company; each party to have hoes, pickaxes, and crows with them, carried by soldiers: the scaling ladders (to be used if necessary) to be also carried by soldiers.

'RESERVE UNDER CAPTAIN BETHUNE.—100 rank and file of his Majesty's 86th regiment, and 100 rank and file of the grenadier battalion.

'These parties will parade and be formed in the streets the troops occupy at two o'clock, and then be completed to thirty-six rounds and well flinted; after which they will be marched

up to the rear of the battery under cover from the view of the fort, and wait in the utmost silence until the signal from two six pounders, fired quick one after the other, direct their advance to storm the breach. The reserve will follow the storming party; and after having entered the breach, Captain Bethune will immediately form his men and wait to act as circumstances may direct. Twenty boxes of musket ammunition to be taken in with Captain Bethune's party.

'On entering the breach, Captain Richardson will turn to the left, and march by the works to take possession of the Cut-toopoor gate. Major Cuyler's party will follow, and push on also by the works to take possession of the Jarraseer gate. When these gates are obtained, the works are to be cleared of any parties of the enemy in their vicinity, and the men to be kept under arms ready to act at a moment's warning.

'H. WOODINGTON.'

Return of the killed and wounded in the Pettah, and during the siege and storm of Baroach on the 29th of August, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Woodington.

		Capt.	Serj.	Rank and File.
Artillery	} Europeans.			
H. M.'s 61st reg.		{ Killed, 1	2	4
— 86th do.		{ Wounded, 2	1	12

			Havil.	Sepoys.
Grenadier batt.	} Natives.	{ Killed, —	—	8
		{ Wounded —	3	36

'J. BEETE, Brigade Major.'

General Orders of his Excellency
the Most Noble the Governor } 'Fort William, 14th October, 1803.
General in Council.

'The Governor General in Council derives great satisfaction from the intelligence which he has received of the reduction of the fort and city of Baroach, on the 29th of August; and of the ability, promptitude, and gallantry with which that important service was accomplished by the brave officers and troops under the command of Lieut. Colonel Woodington of the establishment of Bombay.

'His Excellency in Council highly approves the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Woodington, in his judicious and spirited exertions for the early reduction of the place; in directing the operations of the siege; in his seasonable determination to assault the fort; and in the disposition which he made of the

troops under his command, with a view to secure the rapid success of that gallant attack.

‘ The Governor General in Council signifies his particular approbation of the valor and judgment manifested by Major Cuyler of his Majesty’s 86th regiment, throughout the service at Baroach, and in commanding the storm of the fort; and by Captain Richardson of the same corps in leading the assault. His Excellency in Council also observes with particular satisfaction the conduct of Captain Cliffe of the engineers of Bombay.

‘ To all the officers and troops, European and native, employed on this honorable occasion, his Excellency in Council signifies his high commendation.

‘ The Governor General in Council laments the loss of Captain W. Semple of his Majesty’s 86th regiment, killed on the 25th of August, and of the few brave men who fell before Baroach. It is a great satisfaction, however, to observe, that an acquisition so important should have been secured with the loss of only one officer, and of so few soldiers.

‘ In bearing a due testimony to the merits of the officers and troops, employed in the reduction of Baroach on the 29th of August, the Governor General in Council remarks, that on the same day, distinguished by the commencement of the victorious career of the army of Bengal, under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, upon the frontier of Oude, the army of Bombay at the western extremity of the peninsula of India, effected a service of the most arduous nature, with a similar spirit of alacrity and courage.

‘ In the course of an extensive and complicated system of military operations, the glorious success of our arms since the commencement of this war, has been uniform in every part of India. The able and gallant officers and troops of his Majesty’s service, and of the several establishments of the three Presidencies, have been actuated by equal sentiments of public spirit and honor, and have co-operated with equal ardor and success, in an united effort to accomplish the just objects of the allies. The Governor General in Council confides in the justice of our cause, in the unanimous zeal of the three Presidencies, and in the continued co-operation of their respective resources and power, that the views of the confederate Chieftains will be speedily frustrated by the complete restoration of

peace and tranquillity to the provinces of Hindustan and the Deccan, which have been disturbed by the ambition and violence of the enemy.

‘ The Governor General in Council directs that copies of this Order be transmitted to the Right Honorable the Governor in Council at Fort St. George, and to the Honorable the Governor in Council at Bombay, to be published to the army of those Presidencies respectively.

‘ By command of his Excellency, &c.

‘ L. Hook, Sec. to the Gov. Mil. Dep.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 13th September, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 2nd instant. From the length of time which has elapsed since you wrote it, I apprehend that there is some irregularity in the dawk, and, indeed, that some of your letters have missed me entirely. I set down in the margin the dates of all those which I have received from you since the 1st of August.

‘ Whatever may be the state of the Soubahdar’s treasury, I hope that he will not omit to collect a force at Hyderabad for the protection of that city. If its defence should not be better provided for than I imagine it is at present, I apprehend that some misfortune may happen to it.

‘ I am happy to observe that you have noticed to the Soubah’s servants the want of boats at the Kalachabootra ghaut. I feel the consequences of the deficiency of their numbers at this moment, as I am obliged to wait for the supplies on their march to join me, instead of being employed in an offensive operation against the enemy. If there had been on the river Kistna, even one third of the number of boats which the Nizam’s amildars gave General Stuart reason to believe that they had provided, the supplies would have joined me many days ago.

‘ I have, however, the pleasure to inform you, that the enemy are gone off to the northward, and that they are in considerable alarm ; the camps of detachments which they had sent to the neighbourhood of the division under the command of Colonel Stevenson, having been attacked by the Colonel twice in the

night, and the enemy having lost, upon those occasions, many men and horses.

‘ Although it is necessary that there should be boats on the Kistna, and that General Campbell’s troops should be prepared to cross that river if it should be necessary, I do not think that it will be proper to call them across the Kistna under present circumstances. I conceive that the two battalions already at Hyderabad, with the force which the Soubahdar’s ministers proposed to collect at that city, would ensure its security, till assistance would be sent to it from hence.

‘ If General Campbell’s corps should move up to Hyderabad, the territories of the Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore, will be left without defence. They are liable to the same predatory attacks as those of the Soubah of the Deccan, and, in that case, can be relieved only by the march of a division from this quarter. It is obvious that our troops cannot march with so much celerity as the enemy’s horse; and much mischief would be done before our troops would arrive. The same reasoning does not apply to Hyderabad. The security of that place is, in some degree, provided for. At all events, the enemy cannot do much mischief without the assistance of artillery; and if accompanied by guns, their arrival will not precede that of a division of British troops.

‘ I am also of opinion, that if General Campbell’s corps should be drawn off from its present position, before a decided advantage will be gained over the enemy, the southern jaghire-dars will be inclined to join the confederates.

‘ In case you should send forward either money or grain, I request you to let me know when the convoy will leave Hyderabad, and to desire the officer in charge of it to direct his march either upon Bheer or Dharore, giving me notice, from time to time, of his progress, and not to quit either of those places till he receive orders from me. I request that orders may be sent to the killadars of those forts to give protection to any of our convoys that may go near them.

‘ I have ordered Lieut. Browne of the 2nd battalion of the 10th regiment to return to Hyderabad with the detachment under his command without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th September, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th.

‘ My letter of the 23rd of August will have shown you that I was of opinion that Meer Khan was then at too great a distance to hope for any success by opening a negotiation with him. Some of the sirdars and troops in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar have since been collected at Burhampoor, or in its neighbourhood; but I have not heard that Meer Khan is among them, or that he has, since I wrote, returned from Hindustan. There is still, therefore, but little reason to hope for success from a negotiation with Meer Khan.

‘ I am decidedly of opinion, that the services of Meer Khan would be more useful than those of the 6000 cavalry and 2000 infantry which have been offered by the Soubahdar’s government, and this defection from the enemy would distress them considerably. But I acknowledge that I have some doubts whether Meer Khan was ever serious in his intention to enter the Nizam’s service; and even supposing that he was so formerly, whether he would quit the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, having received from that chief the reward of his services, and a jaghire for the maintenance of his troops within the Holkar territories.

‘ Therefore, although the services of Meer Khan would be very desirable, he is at such distance as to render it almost impossible to open a negotiation to obtain them, and if such negotiation could be opened, its success is doubtful. I have no doubt, therefore, of the propriety of accepting the services of the 6000 cavalry and 2000 infantry.

‘ I conceive that the acceptance of their services will not necessarily prevent you from urging the Soubahdar’s servants to bear a part of the expense of entertaining Meer Khan. The measure will certainly be desirable, and may have the effect of shortening the duration of the war, even although the Soubahdar should furnish these additional men.

‘ The question whether you ought to press the Soubahdar to bear part of the expense will, in my opinion, depend upon the state of his finances. Under the treaty he is obliged to make every exertion in his power; and the knowledge of the state of his finances alone can enable you to decide how far the British

government can press him to make additional efforts in the common cause.

‘ If the Soubahdar’s government should be found to be incapable of making further exertions, we are not precluded from negotiating with Meer Khan, or from taking him into the British service during the war. But I should hope that his Highness will be able to allot lands for the support of his troops hereafter, when the war shall be concluded.

‘ In my opinion, the Nabob of Kurnool’s horse ought to be sent and join General Campbell. The duty of convoying our supplies of grain and treasure is the most delicate in which the troops can be employed. The safe arrival of a convoy will frequently depend on the celerity and secrecy of the march; and no troops ought to be employed on that duty excepting those on which we can place the fullest reliance.

‘ I beg that you will be so kind as to inform the Soubahdar’s government, that I have never interfered, in any way whatever with the brinjarries attached to his Highness’s troops, or with those belonging to Colonel Stevenson. I have not at this moment a single brinjarry in my camp, excepting a few hundred who came with me from Mysore.

‘ I cannot conceive what the ground of complaint can be; but I suspect it is that the Soubahdar’s officer used the grain with which the brinjarries were laden during the time the troops were stationed on the frontier, and that they have neglected to replenish the loads, and that they make these complaints to cover their own omission. However, I will make enquiries on the subject.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will send forward four lacs of rupees of the eight lacs which you report that you have in your treasury, in your letter to his Excellency the Governor General of the 5th instant.

‘ The sum of money might come forward in charge of an officer’s party as far as Bheer or Dharore, according to the intelligence of the enemy’s movements which the officer may receive. I will send for it to one of those places. He might bring with him a convoy of grain at the same time. He ought to be directed to consider the measure particularly the object of his care, to march with all practicable celerity, to take post every night, if possible, in a walled village, and to conceal, if possible, the fact that he has treasure under his charge.

‘ I request to be apprized when he will quit Hyderabad, and, as often as circumstances will permit, of his further progress.

‘ I do not comprehend the object of Sirjee Rao Ghautky’s proposal, or what he proposes to effect for the large sums of money which he has required.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Woodington.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th September, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 29th and 30th of August, and I have already expressed in the General Orders my sense of your conduct and that of the troops under your command in the attack of Baroach.

‘ I wish to have from you, as soon as possible, a return of the stores, provisions, &c., which were found in that fort when captured.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Woodington.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th September, 1803.

‘ I have lately received Mr. Duncan’s instructions to you, issued subsequently to the command of the troops in the territories of the Rajah Anund Rao having been placed in your hands.

‘ The system therein laid down will, I think, answer ; and I have no objection to undertake the superintendence of it. I shall therefore be glad to hear from you upon all subjects which you may think proper to refer to my opinion.

‘ I write to you this day upon the subject of certain officers in arrest.

‘ The enemy have made no progress in this quarter ; they had intended to cross the Godavery, but finding that I was in their way, they have returned to the northward, and are now at no great distance from the Adjunttee ghaut.

‘ They have kept at a great distance from me, but they have not treated Colonel Stevenson with so much ceremony. He

has consequently had opportunities of attacking their camp twice in the night with some effect.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th September, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of a charge against Captain H——, of the Bombay Artillery, which has been sent to me by Lieut. Colonel W——. In order that a General Court Martial may be ordered for the trial of Captain H——, it is necessary that the original crime should be sent to me.

‘ Upon the perusal of the papers which have been sent to me upon this subject, I observe that the origin of this difference between Lieut. Colonel W—— and Captain H—— is what appeared on a former trial of Captain H—— by a General Court Martial. Whatever may be the opinion of Captain H—— upon the subject of the falsehood and malignity of the charge brought against him on that occasion, it does not appear that the Commander in Chief considered them to be false or malicious, otherwise he would have ordered Lieut. Colonel W—— to be brought to trial. This charge against Colonel W—— must therefore be considered the consequence of private pique.

The other charge, founded upon Colonel W——’s levy of taxes from the bazaar may, I am afraid, be traced to the same source. It appears by the letters of Colonel W——, upon the subject of these charges, that he had long levied these taxes with the knowledge of the government of Bombay. If he has levied them for a length of time, Captain H—— must have known it; but he never thought of bringing forward the subject till he was relieved from the state of suspension in which he has been placed by the sentence of a General Court Martial. I am afraid, therefore, that this charge also may be attributed to private pique.

‘ I have long observed that the subjects which have come under the consideration of General Courts Martial in this country are in general referable to private quarrels and differences, with which the public have no concern whatever. The character of the officers of the army is undoubtedly a public concern; but in many instances it would be much more proper,

and more creditable for both parties, to settle these differences by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the public by making them the subject of investigation before a General Court Martial.

‘ This period appears to me to be one in which it is probable that the exertions and abilities of every officer in the army will be required for the protection of the rights and interests of their country; and I cannot think it will be the most proper time to take up the attention of officers with the investigation and discussion of subjects which have been submitted to, and have been decided upon by a General Court Martial, or for the gratification of any private pique.

‘ I therefore most anxiously deprecate this trial; and I beg you to inform Captain H——, that I recommend him to withdraw his letters and his charges against Lieut. Colonel W——, and make that officer such an apology as will induce him to consent to his being released from arrest. I enclose you all the papers which I have received upon this subject.

‘ I likewise enclose copies of charges brought against Lieut. M—— and Lieut. P——, by Colonel C——. The original crimes must be sent before I can order these officers to be brought to trial.

‘ The Articles of War require that when a charge of ungentlemanlike conduct is brought against an officer, the fact on which it is grounded shall be specified. This has been omitted in the crime against Lieut. M——, and it must be amended.

‘ I observe that these officers are in arrest for conduct referable to their private life, rather than to their duty as officers of the army; and the observations on the arrest of Captain H—— are applicable, in a great degree, to them. I therefore recommend that Lieut. P——, in particular, should be desired to make such an apology to Lieut. Colonel C——, as to induce that officer to apply that he may be released from his arrest; and that the same desire should be communicated to Lieut. M——; if, upon enquiry, you should find that the fact of which he is supposed to have been guilty is of a nature to allow of its being thus passed over.

‘ If these gentlemen should insist upon being brought to trial, you will be so kind as to send them away from the detachment in the field, and from Surat, Baroda, or any other garrison or post which may be liable to be attacked by the

enemy; and they are to remain at the place at which you will order them, till it shall suit the public convenience to assemble a General Court Martial for their trial.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

C *olonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 15th September, 1803.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, there has been some appearance of a recommencement of the rain, and there is consequently reason to believe that the river Godavery will rise again. If it should rise, I should wish to take advantage of the security which it will afford, to bring on to Dharore as much of the treasure now at Hyderabad as can be spared from your treasury. Although, therefore, I do not wish at present to have a larger sum on the road than four lacs of rupees, I shall be obliged to you if you will have preparations made to send as much more as the state of your treasury can afford, as soon as I shall give you notice that the river has risen.

‘ Advantage might be taken of the same security to forward on as much of the grain as for which carriage may have been provided.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 16th September, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th. Before you will receive this you will have got Mr. Duncan’s further instructions, which will have settled all matters.

‘ If you find Surat too weak in Europeans, I recommend that you should draw the European part of the garrison from Parneira; that fort is out of the way at present, and is not likely to be attacked. I approve of your suggestion to raise a local battalion for Surat, which I have seen in one of your public letters to Mr. Duncan, but not instead of sebundies. Let the sebundies be raised for the purpose of taking care of the country tannahs, and of collecting the revenue, as well as the local battalion to increase the garrison of Surat. In short, every thing must be done to increase our force at all points, and to render most efficient that part of it in the field.

‘ You will now be able to alter Colonel Woodington’s Baroach arrangement. I recommend it to you not to leave there the native garrison which he has allotted to that place. I have no doubt but that force is necessary for the defence of Baroach ; but the question is, is Baroach likely to be attacked, and are not the men required in another place, viz., the field ? As soon, therefore, as the conquest is settled, and every thing in tranquillity, you might reduce the garrison to the number stated in my letter of the 2nd of August ; and if the collector and magistrate of the town and district want more troops, desire them to raise sebundies.

‘ Major Walker’s plan to get possession of Fuddy Sing’s person, before paying his ransom, I consider, between ourselves, to be one of the most unfortunate that has occurred. It may be called what they please ; but as the patans must have brought Fuddy Sing to Berar with a small escort, with the hope of receiving the ransom, and in the certainty that they would not be attacked ; it is, in fact, a breach of faith, than which nothing can be more unfortunate and injurious to us at the present moment. Besides, the consequence of it will most probably be, that Hurky Khan, and a parcel of blackguards who are hanging upon the ghauts, and waiting only for Holkar’s signal to begin their operations, will enter the Attavesy upon the excellent pretence of punishing this act of perfidy of the English, and of collecting the ransom which had been promised to them. Thus they will find us unprepared ; and whatever may be the result of our negotiations with Holkar, we shall be engaged with some of his chiefs.

‘ I do not impute any blame to you or Colonel Watson ; you acted with propriety in complying with the Resident’s requisition, but I tremble for the result. Make friends of the Bheels by all means.

‘ These Courts Martial are distressing indeed at present. I wrote you a long letter upon the subject the other day, and I shall not repeat now what I said then. We must endeavor to stop these trifling disputes, and turn the attention of the officers of the army to public matters, rather than to their private concerns.

‘ It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in your quarter ; this must be put an end to. And there is only one mode of effecting this, and that is for the Commanding

Officer to be of no side excepting that of the public, to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve the public, be they who they may, or in whatever service. The consequence will be that the service will go on; all parties will join in forwarding it, and in respecting him; there will be an end to their petty disputes about trifles; and the Commanding Officer will be at the head of an army instead of a party. I heard yesterday that Holkar had crossed the Nerbudda, five days ago, at Myhissur, but my vakeel is with him; there has not yet been any act of hostilities between him and me, and I am by no means certain that he will join the other confederates.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 16th September, 1803.

‘ I have received a letter from Major Hill, by which I learn that the killadar of Dharore would not allow him to encamp in the neighbourhood of that fort, so as to derive any protection from it for his convoy. This conduct is of little consequence at present, as the enemy have been obliged to draw off to the northward; but it might have bad consequences hereafter particularly if it should be imitated by the killadars of other forts.

‘ I have written a letter to the killadar of Dharore, in which I have enclosed a copy of the Soubahdar’s letter to me, by which his Highness has given me authority to issue orders to the civil and military officers in his service, and I have desired the killadar to allow the British troops to encamp near his fort, and to give every protection and assistance in his power to the convoys of which they will have charge. But as no attention has been paid, indeed no answer has been returned to letters which I addressed above a fortnight ago to this and other killadars, in which I desired them to store grain for the use of the troops, I suspect that no attention will be paid to this letter, and I therefore request you to apprize the durbar of the conduct of the killadar of Dharore towards Major Hill, and urge the Soubahdar’s ministers to send positive orders to the killadars of all his Highness’s forts, and the commanding officers and heads of all his walled towns and villages, to give all the

protection and assistance in their power to the Company's troops and their convoys passing in their neighbourhood, and to communicate to the officer commanding a detachment, any intelligence they may have of the enemy's motions.

‘ If we are not considered and treated as friends in the Soubahdar's territories, we shall find it very difficult, if not impossible, to bring up any important convoy, and his Highness's interests must suffer materially.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 16th September, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 8th instant, with its enclosures, regarding the fort of Parneira.

‘ I have not by me at present the proceedings of the Committee at Surat, which contained a copy of the estimated expense of the repairs of the fort of Parneira, nor do I recollect the amount of that expense. It appears to me, however, that that fort is necessary for the defence of the Company's territories in that quarter, and highly useful as a post to watch the neighbouring Portuguese settlement of Damaun, to which the attention of the Honorable the Governor in Council has been called by his Excellency the Governor General, in consequence of instructions from the Government at home.

‘ If Parneira is to be occupied by troops, with a view to the advantages above described as likely to result from the possession of that fort, those troops will require quarters and other conveniences, and the fort must be put in a proper state of defence. Major General Nicholson, who may be supposed to be well qualified to give an opinion upon this subject, has stated that the expense estimated is reasonable; and I should suppose that the military board at Bombay must have data to enable them to decide whether it is what ought to be charged for the work required to be performed.

‘ The Governor in Council must decide whether it is of that magnitude that it cannot be undertaken without the sanction of the Court of Directors; but I have to observe, that this is a case which could not have been in contemplation when the

orders of the Court of Directors alluded to were given, and that the Court of Directors must expect that the territories lately ceded to them on the west side of India, will be defended, and that their defence cannot be adequately provided for by the means formerly in the power of the government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Government, Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 17th September, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th. I agree entirely in opinion with you, that the Nabob of Kurnool’s infantry will be useless: and I recommend that they should not be employed, excepting it should be to increase the force at Hyderabad. I am still of opinion that it would be most advisable to send the cavalry to join General Campbell.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 19th September, 1803.

‘ I enclose some papers which Goklah sent me yesterday. They contain orders to employ his troops in seizing villages in the districts of Gundapoor and Byzapoor. I shall be obliged to you if you will make arrangements with the Peshwah’s government that the few troops (of the number specified in the treaty) which he has furnished, and which we pay, may not be employed otherwise than as the exigencies of the war may require, and that they may not be diverted from this service by the orders from Poonah.

‘ To-morrow morning two corps go from hence on their road to Poonah with their field pieces. They will arrive at Poonah in the first days in October.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Golah Pangree, 20th September, 1803.

‘ I have received last night your Excellency’s orders of the

30th of August, and I have now the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written this day to Major General Campbell.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major General Campbell,
Commanding the Reserve at Moodgul.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Golah Pangree, 20th September, 1803.

‘ 1. I have received a dispatch from His Excellency the Governor General, in which His Excellency has ordered me to convey to you my sentiments upon the object and expediency of reducing the number of the troops under your command at the present moment; in order to do this, it will be necessary to review our situation in this country.

‘ 2. The Company are involved in a war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; Holkar's troops have not yet committed hostilities against the Company or their allies, but the confederated Marhattas declare that that Chief will join them, and from the difficulty of communicating with him, I cannot say what line of conduct he will adopt.

‘ 3. When the enemy first entered the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, they appeared disposed to carry on a predatory war; their movements were checked; and they have been since joined by a body of infantry, with artillery; it is to be hoped, therefore, that this plan has been relinquished, and it is probable that it will be in our power to conduct our operations in such a manner as to make some impression upon the enemy in a short space of time. If Holkar should co-operate in the war, I think it most probable he will not join his troops with those commanded by Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; he will probably carry on a distinct operation, and keep at a distance from our troops; he is most likely to carry on a predatory war.

‘ 5. In my opinion, he will move to the southward, keeping as far to the westward from my corps as he can; with a view to this operation, I have reinforced Poonah, which place will be quite secure; but there is nothing to prevent him from passing on to the southward of the Kistna, and invading the Company's territories, excepting the division under your command. I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that that division ought to retain its position, at least till it shall be seen what

part Holkar takes in the contest, and what plan of operations he will adopt, if he should be an enemy.

‘ 6. Supposing that, under present circumstances, we might be able to make any important impression on the other two members of the confederacy, it would still be necessary to guard against this supposed operation of Holkar. If he should enter into the war at all, he would be more likely to carry it into execution.

‘ 7. Success against the other confederates would certainly leave more troops of those now in this quarter, at our disposal to watch and check Holkar’s operations; but still, as his movements would be much more rapid than those of the Company’s troops, the Company’s territories would be exposed to his depredations, if your corps were withdrawn.

‘ 8. All the southern Chiefs have written me friendly letters in answer to those that I wrote, in which I informed them of the commencement of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of its causes. Their situation in relation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah is much altered since the fall of Ahmednuggur, and at all events, I believe they are aware that they have no chance of retaining their possessions, excepting under the English protection. Their actions have hitherto been in conformity with their professions, as supplies for my camp have been suffered to pass through their countries since the commencement of the war.

‘ 9. These Chiefs, however, are all either declared, or concealed enemies of the Peshwah. I know, also, that they have been strongly urged by the confederates to join in the contest. We cannot conceal from ourselves, that our cause in this war is very unpopular among those who generally guide the councils and conduct of these Chiefs; and that each individual of them is strongly urged by every motive of national and family pride, to oppose the British Government in a war which will certainly destroy the national power of the Marhattas.

‘ 10. These facts and arguments are laid before them upon all occasions; and although they see that their personal interest depends in a great measure upon the success of the British Government, and they are aware that there is every reason to believe that the British Government will be successful in this contest, I doubt much whether they would not enter into the

war, if they did not see your corps encamped at their gates ready to fall upon, and destroy them the moment they should appear as enemies; at all events, supposing that their hatred of the Peshwah, the solicitations of the confederates, and their notions of family and national honor, which I have above noticed, should have no effect upon their minds, and that they are sensible that their interests are involved in the success of the British Government, the position of your corps at least affords them a plausible excuse for declining to join their countrymen in the war.

‘ 11. The greatest difficulties with which we shall have to contend throughout this war, will be the want of power and authority by the allied governments of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. Every killadar, and the head of almost every village and district, acts as he thinks proper, and this conduct may have very unpleasant consequences: your division, the position of which is well known, tends to check this disposition.

‘ 12. Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion, that a body of troops in the position occupied by the division under your command, is absolutely necessary for the security of the Company’s territories; that they render probable the continuance of the neutrality of a class of people who might do us much mischief, and that they check the dispositions of the officers of the government of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan, to assume independence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp at Sailgaon, 21st September, 1803.*

‘ Although more rain has fallen, the river Godavery still continues to fall, and I am afraid that it will not fill again in this season. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it will not be proper to send off from Hyderabad a greater sum than the four lacs of rupees I originally requested from you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

*Lieut. Colonel Woodington to the Officer commanding the Forces
in Guzerat.*

‘SIR, Baroda, 21st September, 1803.

‘I have the honor to address you on the surrender of Powanghur by capitulation.

‘After a breach had been effected in the wall of the inner fort, as also, that another was almost practicable in a tower at the angle of the outer fort, the garrison offered to capitulate on the morning of the 17th, on condition of being protected in their persons and private property.

‘To these terms I agreed, on condition of immediately taking possession of the breach in the inner wall with a company of sepoy; they, however, tacked other stipulations to the capitulation, viz., that I should agree to pay them the arrears due from Scindiah, and that two of the commanders of the Guickwar cavalry, with me, (amounting to about 3000 horse,) should sign the agreement. To these latter articles I would on no account agree; and it was not until four P. M., when they found, from our continuing to batter, that I would admit of no delay, that they agreed to the original terms, which were immediately carried into full effect by their evacuation of the fort and mountains, of which we took possession.

‘If this had not taken place, I had made the necessary arrangements for storming both breaches on the morning of the 18th, and I conceive that the garrison were intimidated from a knowledge, that if they opposed us on our entering the breaches, their communication with the upper fort would be cut off, and they had no other way to escape than the road which led down by our battery.

‘Could they have obtained possession of the upper fort or balla killa, at the top of the mountain, I am inclined to think it utterly impregnable.

‘I have left Captain Cliffe of the engineers to take a plan and view of the forts and works on the mountain, which, I doubt not, from his known abilities, will be ably executed.

‘It is with the greatest pleasure, that I embrace this opportunity of submitting for your notice, the merits, zeal, and great exertions of all ranks on this service.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘HENRY WOODINGTON.

‘The Officer commanding the Forces in Guzerat.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

‘ I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna on the 18th; and on the 20th was enabled to move forwards towards the enemy, who had been joined in the course of the last seven or eight days by the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander* I have not ascertained. The enemy’s army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad.

‘ I was near Colonel Stevenson’s corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy’s army with the divisions under our command on the 24th in the morning; and we marched on the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna.

‘ On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about six miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

‘ I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual; accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

‘ We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy’s left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines,

* M. Dupont.

with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

‘ The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack ; it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna ; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The picquets of the infantry and the 74th regiment, which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly, from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regiment at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken infantry ; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body of infantry, which had retired and was formed again, in which operation he was killed ; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands ninety pieces of cannon.

‘ The victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return, that our loss in officers and men has been very great ; and in that of Lieut. Colonel Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.

‘ I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops ; they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest

steadiness under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet; and notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry.

'I am particularly indebted to Lieut. Colonel Harness and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, for the manner in which they conducted their brigades; and to all the officers of the staff for the assistance I received from them. The officers commanding brigades, nearly all those of the staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry, had their horses shot under them.

'I have also to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry conducted by Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons.

'The enemy are gone off towards the Adjunttee ghaut, and I propose to follow them, as soon as I can place my captured guns and wounded in security.

'Colonel Stevenson arrived this morning at Bokerdun, and I imagine that he will be here this evening.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

A Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Detachment of the Army under the Command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley at the Battle of Assye, against the Army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 23rd September, 1803.

		Europeans.						
H.M.'s 19th Lt. D.		F. O.	Cap.	Sub.	Serj.	Drum.	R. & F.	Horses.
1st. bat. Madras Art.	Killed	1	6	7	9	—	141	77
2nd do. do.	Wounded	3	6	20	33	6	343	3
Det. Bombay do.	Missing	—	—	—	—	—	8	—
H. M.'s 74th regt.								
—— 78th do.								
4th regt. Cavalry								
5th do. do.								
7th do. do.								
1st bat. 2nd regt.	Killed	—	5	3	13	—	224	228
1st do. 4th do.	Wounded	—	12	16	39	6	1138	75
1st do. 8th do.	Missing	—	—	—	—	—	18	1
1st do. 10th do.								
2d do. 12th do.								
Pioneers.								

Natives.

Subi	Jem.	Havil.	Trum.	R. & F.	Horses.
—	5	3	13	—	228
—	12	16	39	6	75
—	—	—	—	—	1

R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to General Lake, Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I beat the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday, but sustained a very considerable loss in the action.

‘ As the shortest mode of making you acquainted with the particulars of the action, I have the honor to enclose the copy of the report which I have made on the subject to his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ I have desired the Commanding Officers of regiments to recommend officers to your notice for promotion, in consequence of the vacancies which have occurred; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity to recommend to your favor Major Kennedy, of the 19th Light Dragoons, who commanded the regiment during the action; as also those of the 74th regiment, the majority of whom, I am sorry to say, are wounded.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Wallace, who is also Major of the 74th regiment, has applied to me to request that I would recommend him to you to obtain one of the vacant Lieut. Colonelcies in the 19th Dragoons, as it is understood that the establishment of that regiment is now two Lieut. Colonels. I have requested the Colonel to give me a memorandum of his services, which I have now the honor to enclose; and I have only to add thereto the testimony of my perfect approbation of Colonel Wallace’s conduct since he has been detached with me, and of my knowledge that the facts alluded to in the enclosed memorandum are true.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

‘ I have just time to inform you that I attacked the enemy’s army with my division yesterday, the result of which was, that I took about sixty pieces of cannon and defeated them. I have lost many men.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

imperfect. We cannot send out natives in the Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

‘ 2. All the hircarrahs reported, that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Colonel Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun.

‘ I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted; and Colonel Stevenson their right.

‘ Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above six miles to Assye, where was its left; it was all in the district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

‘ 3. My march of the 23rd was so directed, as that I should be within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within six miles of them. I there received intelligence that they were going off; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnoitred. I could not have reconnoitred without taking the whole of my small force; and when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.

‘ 4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning according to the plan.

‘ 5. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harrassed me all that day; and as I had only

ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it.

‘During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was; and although it was so close to them, they never went near it.

‘6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night.

‘I therefore determined to make the attack.

‘7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed; from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy’s position, and consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd with my camp, baggage, &c.

‘8. The enemy’s first position was as shown in the plan.

‘The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaon and Warsor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy’s left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaon.

‘I intended at that time to throw my right up to Assye.

‘9. For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye, and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye; but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaon: if they had, I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

‘10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must fall when the right should be beat.

‘Orders were given accordingly.

‘11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the picquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of

Assye : the 74th regiment, which were on the right of the second line, and were ordered to support the picquets, followed them.

‘ There was a large break in our line between these corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible cannonade from Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campoos ; consequently, in the picquets and the 74th regiment we sustained the greatest part of our loss.

‘ One company of the picquets, of one officer and fifty rank and file, lost one officer and 44 rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah.

‘ 12. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy’s cavalry hanging upon our right ; and luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the picquets. It was thus brought into the cannonade ; horses and men were lost ; it charged among broken infantry, and separated ; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the victory still more complete than it was.

‘ 13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon by the centre and left of our line ; notwithstanding the movement of the picquets, the 74th, and the cavalry ; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.

‘ 14. The annexed plan* is correct, excepting in the following instances : 1st, we came upon the enemy farther to the westward—it ought to be where I have marked in pencil. 2ndly, the formation of the Marhatta and Mysore horse ought to be as I have marked in pencil. 3rdly, our left, when we formed and advanced, was nearer the Kaitna ; and the 74th was not in an echellon, as represented in the plan. 4thly, the enemy had more than one line of infantry.

‘ N. B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

* The plan, corrected agreeably to this suggestion, is to be found in the Appendix to the Marhatta War.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

• MY DEAR SIR, *207/100 100/100* • Camp, 25th September, 1803.

‘ You will be surprised to see in my report to the Governor General, that we have taken ninety pieces of cannon, instead of sixty, as I told you. The fact is, that I counted sixty seven myself, on the morning of the 24th ; I was not certain that I was correct ; but now I believe that we have taken nearer one hundred than ninety pieces. I know that we have got seventy brass guns and howitzers, and above twenty iron. I intend to destroy the latter, and to send the former first to Dowlutabad, and then to Ahmednuggur.

‘ The enemy are down the ghauts in great consternation. Colonel Stevenson follows them to-morrow. I must halt till I can get back my doolies, after placing the sick in Dowlutabad.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Major Shawe.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'Your brother's wound is doing well. He will not be obliged to quit the army.'

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

' MY LORD, ' Camp, 30th September, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an account of the ordnance taken from the enemy in the action of the 23rd inst. I have reason to believe that there are still four more guns, which were thrown into the river by the enemy in their retreat.

‘ We have taken seven stand of colors, and the enemy lost all their ammunition, although, the tumbrils having blown up, some during the preceding night, we have got nothing but the shot. The ordnance is very fine ; but I have destroyed the iron guns, and shall put the brass guns in a place of security.

‘ The enemy lost 1200 men killed in the field of battle, and their wounded are scattered in all parts of the country. It is reported that Jadoon Rao, Scindiah’s principal minister, received a wound, of which he died the day before yesterday. Their army is in the greatest confusion, and retiring to Burhampoor. Colonel Stevenson has followed them down the Adjunttee ghaut, and I propose to descend the ghauts, as soon as I shall have placed the wounded soldiers in security.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

A Return of Ordnance of different calibres, taken from the Enemy in the Battle of the 23rd of September, 1803.

Camp, 29th September, 1803.			
Brass howitzers.	Brass guns.	Iron guns.	Total.
7	69	22	98

‘The number of tumbrils, and quantity of ammunition and stores taken, cannot be ascertained, as after the action, and during the night, a great number of the tumbrils were blown up.

‘M. BEAUMAN, Capt. Com. Artillery.’

General Orders of his Excellency,
the Most Noble the Governor }
General in Council.

‘Fort William, 30th October, 1803.

‘The Governor General in Council has this day received from Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, the official report of the signal and splendid victory obtained by the troops under the personal command of that distinguished officer, on the 23rd of September, at Assye in the Deccan, over the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success and glory in every quarter of India, this transcendent victory demands a testimony of public honor, equal to any which the justice of the British Government in India has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

‘The Governor General in Council highly approves the skilful plan formed by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the 21st of September for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action.

‘His Excellency in Council also signifies his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment with which Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23rd of September.

‘During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled and never surpassed.

‘The Governor General in Council signifies his warmest applause of the exemplary order and steadiness with which the troops advanced under a most destructive fire, against a body of the enemy’s infantry considerably superior in number, and determined to oppose a vigorous resistance to our attack. The numerous infantry of the enemy were driven from their powerful artillery at the point of the bayonet, with an alacrity and resolution truly worthy of British soldiers; and the firmness and discipline manifested by our brave infantry, in repelling the great body of the enemy’s cavalry, merit the highest commendation.

‘The Governor General in Council has remarked, with great satisfaction, the gallant and skilful conduct of the cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, and particularly of his Majesty’s 19th regiment of light dragoons, a corps distinguished by a long and uninterrupted course of arduous service, and of progressive honor.

‘His Excellency in Council directs Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to signify to all the officers and troops employed on this glorious occasion, and especially to Lieut. Colonel Harness and to Lieut. Colonel Wallace, who commanded brigades, and to the Officers of the staff, the high sense entertained by the Governor General in Council of their eminent and honorable services.

‘The important benefits arising from the triumph of our arms in the battle of Assye are not inferior to the splendor of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate Chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of an hostile and predatory army from the territory of our ally, the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the enemy.

‘The prosperous result of these advantages must be accelerated by the auspicious progress of our arms in other provinces of India, and it may reasonably be expected that the decisive victories gained at Delhi and Assye, on the 11th and 23rd of September, will speedily compel the enemy to restore peace to Hindustan and to the Deccan.

‘The achievements of our commanders, officers, and troops,

during this campaign, and especially in the signal victories of Delhi and of Assye, must inspire a general sentiment of just confidence in the vigor of our military resources, and in the stability of our dominion and power. Our uniform success in frustrating every advantage of superior numbers, of powerful artillery, and even of obstinate resistance opposed by the enemy, constitutes a satisfactory proof of the established superiority of British discipline, experience, and valor; and demonstrates that the glorious progress of our arms is not the accidental result of a temporary or transient advantage, but the natural and certain effect of a permanent cause.

‘ From these reflections, consolation is to be derived for the loss of those lamented and honored officers and soldiers, who, animated by the gallant spirit of their General, and emulating the noble example of his zeal and courage, sacrificed their lives to the honor and interests of their country.

‘ The Governor General in Council greatly regrets the loss of Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, of his Majesty’s 19th dragoons, who fell at the head of the British cavalry, bravely charging a large body of the enemy’s infantry. With the utmost concern his Excellency in Council records the names of the valuable and excellent officers, who have fallen with glory at the battle of Assye, in achieving the complete defeat of the enemy, and in establishing the triumph of the British arms in the Deccan—Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, Captains R. Boyle, H. Mackay, D. Aytone, A. Dyce, R. Macleod, and T. Maxwell, Captain Lieuts. Steele and Fowler, Lieuts. Bonomi, Griffith, J. Campbell, J. M. Campbell, J. Grant, R. Neilson, L. Campbell, M. Morris, and J. Douglas; Lieuts. Brown, Mavor, Perrie, and Volunteer Tew*.

‘ In testimony of the high honor acquired by the army under the personal command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, at the battle of Assye, the Governor General in Council is pleased to order, that honorary colors, with a device properly suited to commemorate that signal and splendid victory, be presented to the corps of cavalry and infantry employed on that glorious occasion. The names of the brave officers and men who fell at the battle of Assye will be commemorated,

* Mr. Tew had been recommended by Major General Wellesley to the Commander in Chief, for his conduct at Ahmednuggur.—See Letter to General Lake, 17th Aug. 1803.

together with the circumstances of the action, upon the public monument to be erected at Fort William, to the memory of those who have fallen in the public service during the present campaign.

‘The honorary colors granted by these orders to his Majesty’s 19th regiment of dragoons, and to the 74th and 78th regiments of foot, are to be used by those corps while they shall continue in India, or until his Majesty’s most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

‘His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, Captain General and Commander in Chief of all the land forces serving in the East Indies, is pleased to direct, that these orders be publicly read to troops under arms, at every station of the land forces in the East Indies, and that the European officers of the Native corps do cause the same to be explained to the Native officers and troops.

‘By command of his Excellency, &c.

‘L. Hook, Sec. to Gov. Mil. Dept.’

The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Hon. the Court of Directors. (Extracts.)

‘HONORABLE SIRS, ‘Fort William, 31st October, 1803.

‘52. A copy of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley’s dispatch, containing the details of the most brilliant and important victory of Assye, is enclosed for your Honorable Committee’s information, together with a copy of the General Orders issued by the Governor General in Council on that memorable occasion. The Governor General in Council solicits the particular notice of your Honorable Committee, and of the Honorable Court of Directors, to the distinguished merits of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and of the officers and troops under his command, in that extraordinary exertion of British discipline, valor, and skill.

‘53. The satisfaction with which the Governor General in Council contemplates the late rapid and glorious success of the British arms, in every direction in which they have been opposed to the enemy’s forces, is augmented by the reflection, that, under the pressure of accumulated defeat, with aggravated loss of resources, power, reputation, military strength and dominion, in every quarter of India, the confederate Chieftains

must speedily be compelled to accede to such reasonable terms of pacification as shall sufficiently provide for the safety of our allies, for the future security of the Honorable Company's possessions, and for the permanent establishment of tranquillity in Hindustan and the Deccan.

‘ 56. The public duty of the Governor General in Council also demands a testimony of justice to the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley. The attention of your Honorable Committee has already been solicited to the merits of Major General Wellesley, in conducting the British troops from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah; in establishing his Highness the Peshwah upon the musnud; and in the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur. The conduct of Major General Wellesley, in the exercise of the extensive political and military powers vested in him by the Governor General in Council, also deserves the highest approbation of your Honorable Committee, and of the Honorable Court of Directors.

‘ 57. At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success and glory, in every quarter of India, the transcendent victory obtained at Assye, in the Deccan, on the 23rd of September, appeared to the Governor General in Council to demand a testimony of public honor equal to any which the justice of the British Government in India has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

‘ 58. The Governor General in Council highly approved the skilful plan formed by Major General Wellesley on the 21st of September, for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action.

‘ 59. His Excellency in Council also signified his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment, with which Major General Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23rd of September.

‘ 60. During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major General Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled, and never surpassed.

‘ 61. The important benefits resulting from the triumph of

our arms in the battle of Assye are not inferior to the splendor of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate Chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of a predatory and hostile army from the territory of our ally, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the enemy.

‘ 62. Under these circumstances, the Governor General in Council is induced to recommend the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the particular approbation of the Honorable Court of Directors, and to the gracious notice of his Majesty.

‘ We have the honor to be, &c.

‘ WELLESLEY

(and other Members of the Council).

‘ *The Secret Committee.*’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Assye, 25th September, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a packet of papers which I have received from Lieut. Procter, the Fort Adjutant of Surat. I beg that you will let him know that I cannot receive any letter from him, unless sent through his Commanding Officer; and, at all events, I cannot order a Court Martial to assemble for the trial of an officer for conduct at his (Lieut. Procter’s) trial, the proceedings of which have been approved of by the Commander in Chief at Bombay.

‘ It appears to me that Lieut. Procter is of a very litigious disposition, and a very improper person to fill the situation of Fort Adjutant at Surat. If you should be of this opinion, I request you to report it to the Government of Bombay, and recommend that another officer may be appointed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘ MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘ Camp at Cheesekair, 1st November, 1803.

‘ As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am

* This letter is inserted out of order of date as relating chiefly to the battle of Assye.

desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th October, in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts.

‘ Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jualna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary,—first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to be apprehended, that if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward, while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or probably avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than twelve miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than eight miles.

‘ As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy’s position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous, that without an army their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

‘ The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from Bokerdun.

‘ I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen

miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than five or six miles from it.

‘ I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground : at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points ; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprized Colonel Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

‘ When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately, or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy’s cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss ; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning ; and at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy’s camp, in which they should know it was : I therefore determined upon the attack immediately.

‘ It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on ; but some were ; and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

‘ Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one-half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the picquets which were on the right of the first line.

‘ When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the picquets to keep out of shot from that village ; instead of that, he led directly upon it : the 74th,

which were on the right of the first line, followed the picquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies.

‘ Another evil which resulted from this mistake, was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which that corps lost many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the picquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

‘ After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy’s right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made.

‘ However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the picquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge, that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the picquets on that day against Assye.

‘ After the action, there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

‘ Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight in the morning of the 24th.

‘ The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off and never stopped till they had got down the ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so

until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men.

‘I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam’s sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam’s forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

‘Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam’s territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad; I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, and descended the Adjunttee ghaut, and stopped Scindiah.

‘Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army.

‘I ascended the ghaut on the 25th, and have marched a hundred and twenty miles since, in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam’s territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If that is the case, I shall soon begin an offensive operation there.

‘But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have anything to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Munro.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp at Assye, 26th September, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 18th, so that the missing tappall is come in.

‘ In consequence of what you say respecting your strength at Poonah, and of Scindiah’s defeat, I shall call back one of the battalions which I had sent away. You will therefore have only one.

‘ I do not think any thing with cannon will venture near us again. I believe we have taken one hundred pieces of ordnance; they have gone down the ghauts. Jadoon Rao is said to be missing.

‘ I shall be obliged to send my wounded and the captured guns to Dowlutabad. I have got about a thousand of the enemy’s draft bullocks, by means of which I hope to be able to move all the latter to Ahmednuggur. I intend to destroy all the iron guns.

‘ I enclose the account of the capture of Baroach. Colonel Stevenson follows the enemy, while I remain here waiting for the return of the doolies and bullocks from Aurungabad.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Assye, 27th September, 1803.

‘ I am concerned to be under the necessity of making a formal complaint of any of the officers in the service of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, but justice to the troops under my command, and to the service, the conduct of which is entrusted to me, obliges me to do so.

‘ Some time ago, having observed that the city of Aurungabad was by no means in a state fit for defence, and as it was probable that the course of the operations of the war would draw the troops to a distance from it, I desired Colonel Stevenson to remove the hospital to Dowlutabad, and to place the sick in the lower fort. Application was accordingly made to the killadar in my name, by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to admit the hospital into the place proposed for them, and he positively refused to receive them.

‘ Rajah Mohiput Ram has made a report upon the subject to the durbar, and possibly orders may be sent in consequence of this report. But I think it proper to mention the subject to you now, as the consequence of this refusal to admit the sick and wounded troops into Dowlutabad at present is, that I must

either send them to Ahmednuggur, and thereby delay my operations for a month, or I must leave these brave men exposed in an open place to the violence and ferocity of a barbarous enemy.

‘ I have also with me above seventy pieces of brass ordnance, having destroyed the iron ordnance captured. These must likewise be sent to Ahmednuggur, or I must leave them exposed to be retaken in Aurungabad.

‘ While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform you that I am by no means satisfied with Rajah Sookroodoor. He throws all kinds of difficulties in the way of my people sent into the districts under his management to purchase supplies of dry grain; he has not yet taken any steps whatever to collect the magazines which I requested him to prepare in different situations in the end of last month; and when I spoke to him upon the subject, he sent me a paper which contains an account of the value of grain which he says the Soubahdar’s government have laid in at different forts, no part of which, however, can be got for the service of the troops.

‘ I have also to mention to you, that there is a man in charge of this part of the country, on the part of Rajah Ragotim Rao, by name, I believe, Anund Rao, whose conduct, if it were guided by Scindiah’s ministers, could not be more inimical to us than his has been. It is reported that this man has fled with the enemy’s army; and I sincerely hope that he will not return.

‘ We may win battles, and may drive the enemy before us; but all that I can do will not save the Soubah’s country from destruction, if his servants are not true to his cause, if they do not exert themselves in his service, if the British troops are not treated with confidence as friends, and if they do not enjoy the resources which the country can afford.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Camp, 27th September, 1803.

‘ 1. As nearly all the men who were wounded in the action between the British troops and the united armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, on the 23rd instant,

were struck by cannon shot, and it is probable that some of them will be disabled entirely, it will be a great convenience if an early opportunity is taken of removing those of this description from the field hospital to Bombay. From hence the Europeans may be sent to England, and the natives to the coast of Coromandel, as opportunities may offer.

‘ 2. I cannot at present say the number of cases of this description which there will be, but I think it almost certain that there will not be less than one hundred; neither can I state exactly the place at which I shall establish the hospital, on account of the difficulty of prevailing upon the killadars of the forts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan to receive our wounded soldiers, or the time at which the men will be sufficiently recovered to be moved without injury.

‘ 3. But I request you to have one hundred doolies prepared to be sent off to such place as I may hereafter point out; and to have all the arrangements made for procuring bearers for those doolies, so that no time may be lost in sending them from Bombay, when I may find it necessary to call for them.

‘ 4. I am greatly in want of medical assistants, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give orders that six assistant surgeons may be sent to Ahmednuggur without loss of time, to place themselves under my orders.

‘ 5. The cavalry lost many horses in the late action, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that as many as four hundred may be purchased at Bombay to remount the cavalry. When purchased, I request that they may be sent under charge of a careful officer, and provided with proper attendants, to Ahmednuggur, where the officer will receive further orders from me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 28th September, 1803.

‘ I have received a letter from Mr. Thomas Pakenham, a writer on the Bengal establishment, respecting whom I am particularly interested. He is the son of Admiral Pakenham, a very old friend of Lord Wellesley and of me. I believe him to be very young and inexperienced; I therefore most anxiously

recommend him to your care and attention. I have also given him a letter of recommendation to my friend Mrs. Ross, whom I have requested to have an eye upon his conduct, and, above all things, to prevent him from keeping bad company.

‘ Should the college last, of course he will attend that institution; if not, I have desired him to acquire a knowledge of the country languages. I request you to urge him particularly upon this point, and do not allow him to be idle. Desire him to show you the letter which I have written to him.

‘ Do not allow him to run in debt; if he should want money, I have desired him to apply to David Ross or you. Pray supply his wants, if he should require it, and apply to David Ross for any sums you may give him.

‘ I have nothing new to tell you. The destruction of the enemy’s army was almost complete. It is now said that they had in their camp one hundred and twenty eight guns, of which number a few were at Scindiah’s quarters, which, being in the cavalry camp, were not attacked. These few were taken off: they have lost the remainder, amounting to one hundred and twenty. Of these we have got about one hundred. The remainder are thrown into nullahs, and scattered along the road between this place and Adjunttee; and they will be destroyed by Colonel Stevenson on his march in pursuit of the enemy.

‘ Their cavalry are dispersed in different directions, plundering each other and their own bazaar. There were not more than two hundred of their infantry collected in their camp below the ghauts yesterday morning when they marched towards Burhampoor.

‘ It is said that they lost one thousand two hundred men killed; the wounded and dying are scattered throughout the country in all directions.

‘ I give you the hircarrah reports. God knows whether they are true, but I believe they are.

‘ The Nizam’s servants are behaving ill, and I cannot get a place of security for my wounded soldiers. This delays my advance; but Colonel Stevenson has gone after the enemy, and will push them with activity as far as possible.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Shawe.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp, 28th September, 1803.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from the killadar of Dharore, in answer to one which I wrote to him, in which I remonstrated against his conduct to Major Hill, and requested that, when any of my troops or convoys should go near his fort, he would give them the protection they might require.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday to complain of the conduct of the Soubahdar’s servants, another instance of their hostility has been communicated to me. The killadar or amildar of Budnapoor fired upon a detachment of British troops under Captain Baynes, on his march to join me with a convoy.

‘ I attribute these repeated instances of hostility to a disaffection to the cause, and to our own forbearance. But they certainly require the notice of the Soubahdar’s government; and if they are continued, I shall be reduced to the necessity of treating the country as an enemy’s, or of withdrawing from it altogether.

‘ At this moment I am in the greatest distress for the want of dry grain, because Rajah Sookroodoor will not permit the people in his districts to sell what they have got.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Assye, 28th September, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 21st and 23rd. In my opinion, the best arrangement will be to get the Ahmedabad farm into our hands, if we can defray the expense incurred for Goklah and Appah Dessaye; if we cannot do that, we must endeavor to get a mortgage upon it from the Peshwah, and to get the payments regularly from the Guickwar government; if that cannot be done, and the expenses of Goklah and Appah Dessaye are to fall eventually upon the Company, we must reckon their numbers among the five thousand.

‘ In the mean time, you will do well to begin to raise men, but I must have plenty of money to pay them.

‘ I think that Oolpar must be given to Vittell Seo Deo; it might be well in so doing to take from him an engagement that he would exchange it for an equivalent at the peace, if one

could be found which would suit him. I doubt, however, whether he would enter into this engagement; if he would, I recommend that he should have the district at all events.

‘ Lord Wellesley has taken up the question of paying the Peshwah’s ministers upon a great scale. The Peshwah is certainly sincere in his intentions to adhere to the alliance; but there is a crookedness in his policy, and the feelings of his mind are so far different from those which guide our conduct, that with the best intentions it must be expected we shall frequently clash. Besides, under the instructions from the Governor General, we have adopted measures in respect to Amrut Rao and Holkar, which must be highly disagreeable to him, and might occasion a desire to alter the alliance.

‘ The Peshwah has no ministers. He is every thing himself, and every thing is little. In my opinion, therefore, we ought to pay those who are supposed to be and are called his ministers, not to keep the machine of government in motion, in consistence with the objects of the alliance as we do at Hyderabad, but to have intelligence of what passes in the Peshwah’s secret councils, in order that we may check him in time when it may be necessary.

‘ The defeat of the enemy is most complete. Not half of their army is yet collected. They had not above two hundred infantry when they marched yesterday morning from the bottom of the ghaut towards Burhampoor. They had twelve hundred men killed here, and the wounded and dying are in all parts of the country. I have one hundred guns, and many more are on the road between this and Adjunttee, which I have ordered Colonel Stevenson to destroy.

‘ I am still much distressed for dry grains. The Nizam’s aumils behave very ill, and his killadar of Dowlutabad refuses to receive our wounded; so that I have been obliged either to leave my brave fellows exposed in an open town, or to send them to Ahmednuggur, and to wait till I can get my doolies, &c. back again. Thus are all our best plans thwarted, and yet these are the best of our allies!!!

‘ Amrut Rao’s vakeel is here. I have not yet conversed with him, but I will do so this day: I shall speak to him upon the subject of his troops in the Konkan.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp, 29th September, 1803.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th.

‘ 2. Since the commencement of the war with the northern Marhatta Chiefs, every hircarrah who has come in from the enemy’s camp, every intelligencer who has written news, has stated that Rajah Sookroodoor was in communication with the enemy, and the vakeels and Mysore and Marhatta Chiefs not connected with that person, (for many of the latter are connected with him,) have repeatedly advised me to put Colonel Stevenson on his guard, in order that the public interests might not suffer from his defection.

‘ 3. Although there was no proof of Rajah Sookroodoor’s treachery, I did apprise Colonel Stevenson of the reports, and desired him to watch Rajah Sookroodoor closely; and I am clearly of opinion that Colonel Stevenson would not have done his duty, if he had suffered him to quit his camp with his troops at that moment, under the pretence of escorting grain, particularly as those troops, having been in the service of Nizam Nawaz Jung, are by no means free from suspicion of being disaffected towards the government of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

‘ 4. I have besides to observe, that although there is no positive proof that Rajah Sookroodoor was in correspondence with the enemy, there are unanswerable proofs, not only that he has omitted to supply the British armies with the resources of the country, but that he has taken measures to prevent them from procuring them. In which he has done, and may do, more mischief than if he were to go off to the enemy with his troops.

‘ 5. Notwithstanding these reports, and this conduct, I do not believe that Colonel Stevenson put any restraint on the person of Rajah Sookroodoor. Colonel Stevenson and I having resided together for some years, and having been in habits of intimacy, our communication is generally carried on by private notes or letters, in none of which he ever mentioned that circumstance. I reviewed his division at Budnapoor on the 21st, and on that day I recollect that he told me that he had de-

tained Rajah Sookroodoor, contrary to his inclination, when his troops had gone for the grain, and that he had pitched a small tent for him in the neighbourhood of his own; he added, that he had been strongly inclined to place a guard over him, but had refrained from that measure, not to create fears and jealousies among the troops. I am, therefore, induced to believe that the story told by Rajah Sookroodoor's brother is at least considerably exaggerated.

‘ 6. While writing upon this subject, it is necessary that I should advert to the situation of Colonel Stevenson and myself in respect to the sirdars in the service of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

‘ 7. It would be very agreeable to me, and would be by far the best arrangement, if a person were appointed by the Soubahdar, and vested with full powers to control all his killadars, amildars, sirdars, &c. He might reside either with Colonel Stevenson or me, as might be most convenient; but if his Highness cannot find a subject whom he can trust with such power, or if he will not move up to the army himself, he must expect either that Colonel Stevenson or I will use the military power with which we are entrusted by the Company's government, to secure the public interests, or that they should suffer by the delay which must attend a reference to Hyderabad upon every subject of complaint.

‘ 8. The powers which I hold from the Nizam's government are entirely nugatory; not a man in the country pays the smallest attention to them. The letter which I sent you yesterday from the killadar of Dharore, shows that it is thought necessary by that person to make a reference to Hyderabad before he will comply with my request to give an asylum under the guns of his fort to a convoy coming up to the army, notwithstanding that with the request I sent him a copy of the Soubahdar's letter. The killadar of Dowlutabad also has refused to receive our sick and wounded into that fort.

‘ 9. Under these circumstances, I earnestly intreat that a native, with full powers over every body, may be appointed by the Soubahdar's government to reside in the army; and if that is objected to, I beg that you will apprise the Soubahdar's ministers, that in cases which, from their urgency, cannot wait for a reference to Hyderabad, they must expect that Colonel

Stevenson and I will use the power which we have in our hands for the security of the public interests.

‘10. I observe in the 6th paragraph of your dispatch to his Excellency the Governor General, that the Soubahdar’s minister complains of the loss of revenue by this Marhatta warfare. In case this complaint should be brought forward again, it may be proper to inform them, that, in fact, the enemy have not been with the main body of their troops at all in the Soubahdar’s country, excepting for a few days at Purtoor, in the jaghire of Soubahan Khan, and their pindaries have done but little mischief. Since they ascended the ghauts, they have been generally in Jalnapoor, or other districts to the northward, belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘11. They may possibly allude to the loss sustained by the plunder of Aurungabad in April last, by Jeswunt Rao Holkar. But I cannot think that that loss can be attributed to the war, particularly as I believe it is strongly suspected it was occasioned by the treachery and misconduct of the person in charge of the city and district.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.
 ‘Major Kirkpatrick.’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
 Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘SIR, ‘Camp, 30th September, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your latter of the 23rd instant.

‘2. The enemy appear to be much alarmed, and are gone towards Burhampoor. It is probable that some time will elapse before they can equip another army for the invasion of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and indeed, that they will not be able to do so at all, if I can establish my wounded soldiers in a place of security at an early period. I therefore think that it would be advisable to send off the remaining four lacs of rupees to Dharore as soon as may be convenient.

‘3. I have perused your letter of the 21st August, and its enclosures. The hircarrahs from the enemy’s camp report, and I believe it to be true, that Jadoon Rao died on the day before yesterday, of a wound that he received in the action of the 23rd. I had before heard that he was missing, and that

Dowlut Rao Scindiah had sent persons to seek for his body in the field of battle.

‘4. If it be true that this man is dead, it is probable that Sirjee Rao Ghautky may regain his lost influence in Scindiah’s Durbar. At all events, it is very desirable that you should keep up a communication with him, not only with a view to that event, but because Sirjee Rao Ghautky has considerable influence over the Rajah of Sholapoor.

‘5. The territories of this chief are upon the Kistna, and the road by which I communicate with Mysore, leads through them. It is therefore of importance to me, that he should remain at least in a state of neutrality. I have some means of controlling his actions, and I have but little doubt that he will not interfere in this contest, but it is as well to add to those means by keeping up our communication with Sirjee Rao Ghautky.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to General Lake, Commander in Chief.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 30th September, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by Lieut. Campbell *, of his Majesty’s 78th regiment. This officer is already known to you, and his claims upon the service, in consequence of the misfortunes of his family, have been acknowledged. I am concerned to say, that another instance of this misfortune occurred in the action of the 23rd instant.

‘From the conduct of Lieut. Campbell at the attack of the pettah of Ahmednuggur, I was induced to appoint him to act as my Brigade Major; and since that time, and particularly in the action of the 23rd, he has conducted himself much to my satisfaction. He had two horses killed under him, and was struck himself in that action; I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your favor.

‘Since I last addressed you, the enemy has continued their retreat in confusion and disorder towards Burhampoor, on the Taptee. Their loss has been very considerable in men, as well as in ordnance and ammunition. Among others, it is reported

* Major General Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., &c.

that Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's prime minister, and the principal negotiator and cement of the confederacy, died on the 28th, of wounds he received on the 23rd. Colonel Stevenson has pursued them with his division. I am still detained by the difficulty of finding a place of security for my wounded soldiers.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *General Lake.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Munro.

' MY DEAR MUNRO,

' Camp, 1st October, 1803.

' I inclose a memorandum which I have received from Bistnapah Pundit, the commander of the Rajah of Mysore's horse, serving with me, relative to a claim which he has upon the Rajah of Harponelly. It appears that the Rajah gave him a village in enaum, which he has now taken from him; Mr. Cochrane knew that the grant had been made, and confirmed it; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will inquire into the circumstances, and let Bistnapah keep his village, if possible.

' I entirely agree in the opinions expressed in your letter, upon the subject of offensive and defensive war; however, I think that you are mistaken respecting the possibility of checking, by defensive measures, a predatory war, carried on by horse only; indeed, I have done it already in this campaign. The fact is, that a predatory war is not to be carried on now as it was formerly. All the principal villages in the country are fortified (excepting in our happy country, in which our wise men have found out that fortifications are of no use); a few peons keep the horse out; and it is consequently necessary that they should have a camp and a bazaar to resort to for subsistence, in which every thing they get is very dear; besides, this necessity of seeking subsistence in the camp prevents them from extending their excursions so far as they ought, to do any material injury.

' The camp, on the resources of which an army of this kind must subsist, must be rather heavy; besides, there are great personages in it. They must have tents, elephants, and other sewary; and must have with them a sufficient body of troops to guard their persons. The number of cavalry retained in such a camp must consequently be very large.

' Large bodies move slowly, and it is not difficult to gain intelligence of their motions. A few rapid and well-contrived

movements, made not directly upon them, but with a view to prevent the execution of any favorite design, or its mischievous consequences, soon bring them to their bearings; they stop, look about them, begin to feel restless, and are obliged to go off.

‘ In this manner I lately stopped the march of the enemy upon Hyderabad, which they certainly intended; they were obliged to return, and bring up and join their infantry: and you will have heard that, in a most furious action which I had with their whole army, with one division only, on the 23rd of September, I completely defeated them, taking about one hundred pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, &c. They fled in the greatest confusion to Burhampoor. Take my word for it, that a body of light troops will not act, unless supported by a heavy body that will fight; and what is more, they cannot act, because they cannot subsist in the greater part of India at the present day.

‘ It is reported that General Lake has defeated Perron. After that, he will of course open a communication with the Rajpoot chiefs, and will move into Berar. I have designs upon that quarter also. The only difficulty I feel now is the entire want of magazines in the Rajah’s territories, but I shall surmount that difficulty.

‘ I wish that I could have you with me; but I see no mode of effecting that object.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ We have taken Powanghur, a strong hill fort belonging to Scindiah, in Guzerat.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 3rd October, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 30th of September, and I proceed to give answers to the several points to which it relates.

‘ Ist. I do not see any reason why the British government should not assist the Peshwah in taking possession of Savanore, and this service shall certainly be performed at some time or other. General Campbell’s corps will be the proper body of troops to be employed upon it, and when the proper time comes, I will write a suggestion to General

Campbell upon the subject. But you know that this is the time when all the Marhatta armies take the field, and before I suggest to General Campbell to move from his present position, or to occupy his attention with any local subjects, I should wish to see what effect the victory of the 23rd of September will have upon the southern chiefs, what will be their probable occupation during the campaign, and particularly what line Holkar will take.

‘ In the mean time, the Peshwah may prepare for us a memorandum, stating what he wishes to have done, of what places he wishes to have possession, whom he wishes to appoint his soubah or amildar, and he might collect the troops necessary to take and keep possession of the districts for him.

‘ I beg, however, that he may be informed, that I hope he will not forget Goklah’s claim upon Noulgoond, &c., or Appah Dessaye’s, upon the two places granted him as serinjaumy.

‘ 2ndly, I will not mention to any body, that Savanore is restored to the Peshwah’s government.

‘ 3rdly, I wrote a letter to Malcolm the other day, that I sent to you, in which I stated an intention to entertain the horse now in Amrut Rao’s service, as part of the five thousand horse to be paid by the Company. I conceive that the Peshwah can make no objection to this arrangement, as one horseman must be the same to him as another. I have no objection to Vittell Seo Deo being the commander of this body of horse; but I conclude that he is to join this camp; I imagined it was the Peshwah’s intention that that Chief should command a body of horse, to be stationed in the neighbourhood of Poonah.

‘ 4thly, You are already in possession of my opinion respecting Oolpar. Vittell Seo Deo must have that district, and that immediately; but I think it would be very desirable to prevail upon him to engage to treat for an equivalent to be given to him at the end of the war; or at least, to enter into such engagements regarding the communication through his district, the passage of provisions, &c., to the town of Surat, as will make the cession as little inconvenient as possible to that town.

‘ I think that Mr. Duncan’s proposal respecting the possession of Panwell or Bassein ought not to be made at present; it would only tend to create jealousy; and as Mr. Duncan

would insist upon taking immediate possession, the cession would create a breeze in the Konkan, which would be very unpleasant at the present moment.

‘ I enclose the list of the killed and wounded, which was forgotten.

‘ While talking with the Peshwah and his ministers, about the four points contained in your letter, it might be proper to take that opportunity of pointing out to them the position in which his Highness has found himself from the exertions of the British troops, and the readiness which he saw we all had to improve his interests, and to forward them whenever it was consistent with other public objects. You might then throw in a word respecting Amrut Rao, and say how anxious I am respecting his reconciliation with his brother ; from a thorough conviction, that, till they should be reconciled, the Peshwah’s government will not settle, and he will still be liable to be disturbed by the intrigues of the disaffected.

‘ I mention this subject now, because, in a conversation I had yesterday with Amrut Rao’s vakeel, he mentioned that Amrut Rao had possession of Poonadur, (the first time, by the bye, that he ever acknowledged that he had it,) and in discoursing upon the advantages of the reconciliation to all parties, he pointed out the great one it would be to the Peshwah, to get this fort immediately, which, he remarked, I could take from him whenever I pleased. He said that Amrut Rao would give up this fort if I wished it, provided the Peshwah would desist from his attacks upon Sungum-nair, and would make some arrangement respecting a fort in the ghauts to which they both have a claim.

‘ It occurred to me, that the object of the discourse was to find out whether I would assist the Peshwah in taking Poonadur ; and as Amrut Rao is not yet come in, I thought it best to conceal my intentions on this subject. I therefore answered generally, that I must consider Amrut Rao in the light of a subject, and the Peshwah as his sovereign ; that there were so many points of dispute between them, it was impossible for me to pretend to settle them, unless both parties were cordially inclined to be reconciled ; that it was necessary that Amrut Rao, as the subject, should begin to show his dutiful inclinations by coming into the British camp, and by conducting himself in the manner he had engaged to

do by treaty; that, after a time, I might possibly be able to reconcile the Peshwah, and that then all these questions would be easily decided and settled for ever, under the guarantee of the British Government. I think, however, that I shall be able to get the fort of Poonadur from Amrut Rao when he comes in. Indeed, I shall oblige him to give it up, now his vakeel has acknowledged that he has possession of it. But I think that the Peshwah might be induced to make some concession, in order to obtain immediately so great an object.

‘ I wish that you would sound the ministers upon this point. I believe I omitted to mention to you that it is reported in the enemy’s camp, that Jadoon Rao is dead of the wounds he received in the action of the 23rd of September. He was missing for two or three days, was then brought in wounded, and is now reported to be dead.

‘ Believe me to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I am tolerably supplied, although in a desert in which the enemy have been so long. Some of Ragojee Bhonslah’s brinjarries have joined me, to the number of fifteen hundred bullocks: one thousand more will be in to-morrow, and I have given cowle to six thousand who have promised to come in—they are at a distance of about twenty coss from hence. If I get them, I shall indeed be in very great style.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Hon. H. Wellesley.

‘ Camp 50 miles North of Aurungabad,
3rd Oct., 1803.

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ I wrote to you on the 17th of September, and since that time I have completely defeated the enemy, and have taken from them ninety eight pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, &c. I enclose a copy of my letter to the Governor General on this subject, which will give you an idea of the action.

‘ I have little to add thereto, excepting to tell you, that Scindiah’s French infantry were far better than Tippoo’s, his artillery excellent, and his ordnance so good, and so well equipped, that it answers for our service. We never could use Tippoo’s. Our loss is great, but the action, I believe, was the most severe that ever was fought in this country; and I believe such a quantity of cannon, and such advantages

have seldom been gained by any single victory in any part of the world.

‘ The enemy had twelve hundred men killed on the field of battle, and I suppose about four times that number wounded. They plundered one another after the action, and many of their troops have deserted—the whole have fled to Burhampoor, about eighty miles from hence, in the greatest confusion.

‘ I lost two horses. Diomed (Colonel Aston’s horse, who has carried me in so many campaigns,) piked, and another horse shot under me. Almost all the staff had their horses either killed or wounded, or were struck in some place or other.

‘ In the enclosed letter, I only report ninety pieces of cannon taken; but when I dispatched it, I did not know the extent of our gains. In fact, I believe we took one hundred and two, but we destroyed some, and there is a mistake respecting the number; I know there are ninety eight.

‘ Holkar has hitherto taken no part in the war, and I fancy that he will now remain neutral.

‘ I intend to move forward immediately. I have been detained hitherto by the difficulty of providing a secure place for my wounded soldiers; but I have got one at last; Colonel Stevenson, with the Nizam’s army, is pushing the enemy forward.

‘ I am well supplied with every thing. I have already got some of the enemy’s supplies, and I have great hopes that I shall get more*.

‘ Ever your’s affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* ‘ Within these two days we have been joined by another convoy of 2000 or 3000 bullocks loaded with grain, which supply was not expected or known of: they are a brinjarry tribe, who say they collected the grain to the eastward and southward, and were looking out for one of the armies, where they would be sure of a market; it is most likely that they were going to Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, as they rarely put themselves to much trouble on speculation. The cutwahl, or head native civil magistrate in camp, heard of their approach when at a distance, and by his dexterity induced them to come to this army—a step which it might not have been convenient or politic, anticipating its effects on other brinjarry communities, to have forced them to take.

‘ General Wellesley has always made it a point to encourage these people, by promises, kindnesses, presents, indeed, by every kind of liberality of which he possesses the means, to attend our camp, and collect grain for the army. He advances them money; takes their grain when not immediately wanted; gets the duties on its transport remitted; procures permits to collect it in our allies’ territory; gives or orders escorts; provides guards in camp or whenever re-

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 5th October, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that Amrut Rao’s vakeel arrived in camp some days ago, bringing with him his employer’s consent to abide by the treaty which I had made with him; at the same time, he brought forward a demand, that measures should be adopted to provide funds for the payment of ten thousand men, who were with Amrut Rao; and he intimated that Amrut Rao could not remain in camp, unless in the command of that number of men, to be paid by the British Government.

‘ I at first explained to the vakeel, that Amrut Rao, having omitted to join me according to the stipulation of the treaty, inserted at his (the vakeel’s) express desire, the treaty might now be considered void; and at all events, that the British Government must be considered at liberty to execute it, or not, as they might think proper; and that I was astonished that, instead of giving any reason for the breach of the principal stipulation, they should come forward with a fresh demand, which could be supposed to be founded on the treaty, only by forcing the construction of the fourth and fifth articles.

‘ The vakeel then explained, that the reason for which Amrut Rao had omitted to join, was, that Moraba Furnavees had died at the moment at which he ought to have marched; the ceremonies usual upon such occasions had detained him for some time, that he had then heard I had not halted at Aurungabad, and that the enemy’s pindarries were in that country.

‘ An argument then ensued upon the subject of the demand of payment for ten thousand horse, the detail of which

quired; whenever they meet extraordinary losses he balances them by the price; and not seldom has he ordered two or three rupees a head as a reward for each bullock brought. In the case above mentioned, he was generous to the brinjaries, who cannot well be considered as the subjects of any particular prince, who could revenge himself upon them. To the cutwahl he gave a heavy pair of gold bangles, of which he considerably enhanced the value by putting them on his wrists with his own hands. Marks of favor are highly esteemed by inferiors in all countries, but in none more than in India: this simple attention of General Wellesley has, no doubt, raised the cutwahl very much in his little city, the bazaar; which his valor at Assye, and his late successful negotiation, will make him feel the importance and advantage of, and give him energy to increase the former, and credit to improve the latter.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B., written in the field, 5th Oct., 1803.*

your Excellency will find in the enclosed translation of a memorandum upon the subject, which I delivered to the vakeel on the following day.

‘ In respect to the excuse made by Amrut Rao’s vakeel for not joining, it is certainly true that Moraba Furnavees died at the period stated, and that I did not halt at Aurungabad. But I do not attribute Amrut Rao’s omission to join to these events: it is to be attributed to the usual shuffling and timid conduct of a Marhatta, in every important transaction of his life.

‘ The demand for the pay for ten thousand men, is only an attempt to get more money. Amrut Rao has not really three thousand men in his service; but he has made the demand for ten thousand, under the fifth article of the treaty, and a notion that I should not order that the men might be mustered. To pay Amrut Rao in this manner would be ridiculous: but supposing it were necessary, I have not the means.

‘ Considering the success which has attended the British arms in this quarter lately, I rather imagine that Amrut Rao will be satisfied with the proposition contained in the enclosed memorandum, and that he will join; but if he should persist in expressing his desire to quit camp, and proceed to Surat, I propose to consent to that step.

‘ In consequence of it, we shall fail in obtaining some of the advantages which I had in view when I made the treaty; but I conceive, that, till some settlement is made with Amrut Rao, the government of the Peshwah will not gain strength; and, therefore, I am of opinion, that the degree of security for his conduct which will be derived from his residence within the Company’s territories is an object; and preferable to his living, as at present, in rebellion against the Peshwah’s government, and giving encouragement to his Highness’s discontented subjects.

‘ I propose, that the troops which I have consented to take into the Company’s service, shall be considered as part of the five thousand to be paid by the Company, under the modification of the treaty of Bassein. As Amrut Rao will have nothing to do with them, the Peshwah can have no objection to this measure.

‘ I have the honor to be &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

MEMORANDUM.

‘ 30th September, 1803.

‘ An engagement was made by Major General Wellesley, to Amrut Rao, under which Amrut Rao was to enjoy a revenue of seven lacs of rupees per annum, and he was to join Major General Wellesley’s army. Amrut Rao has consented to the arrangements contained in the engagement.

‘ His vakeel, Prubbaukur Bellall, has, however, come forward with a proposition, that means should be provided for the payment of an army of ten thousand men, which Amrut Rao has with him, which proposition it is now necessary to discuss.

‘ It is founded upon the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty; by the first of which, an engagement is entered into, that a provision shall be made for the adherents of Amrut Rao; and in the last, it is expressed, that the greater the number of troops Amrut Rao shall bring with him to Major General Wellesley’s camp, the better.

‘ The intention of the fourth article, was to secure a provision for Moraba Furnavees, and other persons of that description, adherents of Amrut Rao; and that engagement will be strictly fulfilled.

‘ In respect to the fifth article, Prubbaukur Bellall must recollect, that in the last year Amrut Rao had no troops whatever; that lately, when Major General Wellesley arrived at Poonah, Amrut Rao had but a small party, less than two thousand men; and that upon more than one occasion, Major General Wellesley has pointed out to Prubbaukur Bellall, the inconsistency of Amrut Rao’s increasing the number of his troops, when he was not able to pay those troops already in his service.

‘ The fifth article of the treaty, therefore, cannot be construed to apply to more than two thousand men at most.

‘ But Prubbaukur Bellall contends that these men are old adherents of Amrut Rao’s, and he is obliged to see that they are provided for. Adherents, none of which are more than of a year’s standing, and some of which are not of six months’ standing, cannot be considered as ancient servants; but at all events, under the notion that they are the old servants of the Peshwah’s family and government, and that they are now desirous to serve their master with fidelity, Major General Wel-

Wellesley is willing to take them into the service, to give them their monthly pay during the war, and to endeavor to prevail upon the Peshwah to receive them into favor, and to restore to them their lands as soon as it shall be concluded; and in order to carry this proposition into effect, he has called upon Prubbaukur Bellall to produce a list of the names of the Sirdars, with accounts of the number of their troops.

‘ Prubbaukur Bellall objects to this proposition, on the ground that it is necessary that Amrut Rao, who is a man of high rank, should have with him a considerable body of men, under his immediate command, who are always to remain with him, although to serve with the British army and to be paid by the British Government.

‘ Major General Wellesley cannot discern the necessity that Amrut Rao should have ten thousand men as an appendage to his rank.

‘ At all events, the General is sensible that the British Government would never consent to incur the expense of maintaining ten thousand men as an appendage to the rank of any man, although they are willing to entertain men for service.

‘ It is also to be observed, that the seven lacs of rupees agreed to be given to Amrut Rao by the first article, is for the support of his rank, and for the payment of his personal expenses; the demand of the support of ten thousand men for the same purpose, is, therefore, entirely inadmissible.

‘ Major General Wellesley, therefore, cannot consent to adopt this proposition, although he is willing to entertain in the service, and pay the troops of any sirdar attached to Amrut Rao; and when the war is concluded, he will recommend to the Peshwah, that such sirdar may be restored to his lost lands, under the Poonah government.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 6th October, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose translations of papers received yesterday from the enemy’s camp, and translations of my answers to them. I likewise enclose translations of papers received by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to which reference is made in those addressed to Colonel Stevenson and myself. Colonel

Stevenson wrote an answer to those which he received, that he had referred them to me, and that he had no authority to correspond with any body. I have not learnt whether Rajah Mohiput Ram has returned any answer to those letters addressed to him.

‘It is impossible to say whether the object in making the proposition contained in the enclosed papers was really to commence a negotiation for peace; or to raise the spirits of the enemy’s troops, by showing a British officer in his camp, respecting whom, it would be industriously reported that he had come to sue for peace. I rather believe that they had both objects in view, as Captain Johnson, the Persian interpreter to the commanding officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, whom they have expressed a wish to see, is an officer much respected by the natives, particularly by Salabut Khan, who has been heretofore connected in friendship with the Rajah of Berar; and it is probable that the enemy would not have particularly desired his attendance, if they had not intended to commence a negotiation for peace.

‘However, the desire that he should go there is expressed in so extraordinary a manner, and as there is no mention made of the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar for writing at all; and above all, as I am convinced that the presence of a British officer in the enemy’s camp at the present moment would tend to raise the spirits of their troops, and to keep their army together, I have thought it proper to decline to send one.

‘In my answer to Ballojee Koonger, I have thought it necessary to explain once more the cause for which Colonel Collins quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s camp, as your Excellency will observe, that he alludes to the manner in which he quitted it, in his letter to me; and I know that the enemy have been very busy in circulating reports on that subject among the servants of the allied governments, equally distant from the truth, and prejudicial to the British government.

‘In refusing to send a British officer to the enemy’s camp, I have deemed it proper to point out the mode in which they might open a negotiation for peace, if they wished it; upon which I have only to observe, that if they should send here a sirdar, the exertions of their troops hereafter will be but trifling.

‘By the last accounts I had of the enemy’s movements,

they had left the remains of their infantry brigades in the neighbourhood of Burhampoor; and had marched with cavalry only, or, if accompanied by infantry, by only a small body, to the westward, and with an intention of passing through the Casserbarry ghaut.

‘They were in great distress, and the price of grain in their camp one seer for a rupee. Their situation will not be improved by proceeding in that direction; and I rather suspect that this movement has been made with a view to divert our attention from Burhampoor, and the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Ballojee Koonger.

‘5th October, 1803.

‘I have received your letter (its contents recapitulated). When Colonel Collins was the British Resident in the camp of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, you were there in the character of vakeel on the part of the Peshwah: it is probable, therefore, that you were not so well acquainted with what passed at the durbar of that Chief as you are at present, when you write in the character of one of the Maharajah’s ministers; * if you had been, you would not have written that Colonel Collins had quitted the camp without apprizing the Maharajah of his intentions, or going through the customary forms.

‘For above two months, Colonel Collins was employed in vain endeavours to induce the Maharajah to comply with the just requisitions of the British government; and he repeatedly, both verbally and in writing, apprized the Maharajah and his ministers, and the Rajah of Berar, that he should be obliged to quit the camp if they did not comply with those requisitions.

‘The object of those requisitions was, that the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should separate,

* Ballojee Koonger was originally dispatched by his Highness the Peshwah from Bassein to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of explaining to that Chieftain the nature of the engagements concluded between the Peshwah and the British government; but, with the accustomed versatility and treachery of a Marhatta politician, Ballojee Koonger has subsequently attached himself to the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.—*Postscript of the Governor General’s dispatch to the Secret Committee, dated 1st Nov. 1803.*

and should withdraw from the frontier of his Highness the Nabob Nizam the large armies which they had assembled avowedly for the purpose of invading his Highness's territory, after they had declared their intentions were pacific.

‘ But supposing that there might have been a mistake respecting the verbal communication of Colonel Collins, which is very improbable, there could have been none respecting those in writing, or respecting my letters to the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar, in which, in the most friendly terms, I urged the adoption of a measure which would have been honorable to all parties, and which would have ensured the peace of India.

‘ I refer you to the papers upon this subject, which you will doubtless find in the dufter. You now desire that I should send Captain Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram to the camp of the Maharajah, agreeably to the desire of the Nabob Moein ool Moolk, who says, that, by God's grace, every thing between the governments may be settled. I am not acquainted with the Nabob Moein ool Moolk, or in what character, or by whose authority he writes: nor does it appear that these gentlemen would be received by the Maharajah, even if I had any propositions to make, and should be inclined to send them; but I have no proposition to make to the Maharajah, and therefore must decline to send Captain Johnson and the Rajah Mohiput Ram, as you have desired.

‘ The Maharajah has many sirdars in his service, and if he or the Rajah of Berar has any proposition to make to me, he may select one of them to convey it. Any person whom the Maharajah may think proper to send shall be treated with the respect and attention due to his rank; and I shall lose no time in taking into consideration the wishes of the Maharajah, which he may communicate.

‘ *Ballojee Koonger.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Nabob Moein ool Moolk.

‘ 5th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter (its contents recapitulated); you do not inform me by authority from whom, or at whose desire you have written to me, nor do I recollect to have heard your name among those of the confidential servants of

the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; you will therefore excuse my declining to give any answer whatever to the proposition which you have thought proper to write to me.

‘Ballojee Koonger is, I know, an old servant of the Maharajah, and is, I am informed, at present one of his ministers: I have therefore written him a full answer to the proposition which is contained in your letter and his; and I must refer you, and those who employed you to write to me, to the letters which I have written to Ballojee Koonger.

‘*The Nabob Moein ool Moolk.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 5th October, 1803.

‘I have received yours of the 1st instant. The Peshwah shall have six guns. Forty are gone to Ahmednuggur, and I shall order six 6 pounders to be sent to the Peshwah, which I will request you to present to him. It will be some time, however, before they arrive at Poonah, and in the mean while, you will do well to keep the Bombay guns.

‘I enclose a letter which I have written to General Campbell, which may probably bring him back to the westward. I propose also to write to Piele to quiet Purneah’s apprehensions.

‘I shall give orders that all parties may in future march by Poonah. It was an unfortunate business at Ahmednuggur.

‘A proposition has come in from Ballojee Koonger, that I should send Captain Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram to hear certain propositions tending to establish peace. The object of this proposition is probably to revive the spirits of the enemy’s army, by showing that we have an agent in their camp, and are desirous of peace. I propose, therefore, to decline sending those persons to their camp, on the ground that I have no proposition to make to them; but shall intimate, that if they have any propositions to make to me, they may send a sirdar, who shall be treated with due respect and attention.

‘Thus, I shall turn the tables upon them—and it may be depended upon, that when once their army shall know that

they have began to treat for peace, they will not be very ready to fight.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Honorable Court of Directors. (Extracts.)

‘ HONORABLE SIRS,

‘ 1st November, 1803.

‘ The Governor General in Council entirely approves the judgment and prudence manifested by Major General Wellesley, in refusing to comply with the request of the enemy, as announced in his dispatch of the 6th October, and is satisfied that the duplicity and debased art of the Marhatta councils would have perverted the acquiescence of Major General Wellesley, in this insidious proposition, to the purpose of impairing the reputation of our arms and power.

‘ The Governor General in Council, however, is inclined to believe that the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the confederate Chieftains have received such a check, as must compel them to abstain from the prosecution of their inordinate designs; and we therefore expect to receive early intelligence of the disposition of the confederate Chieftains to dispatch directly from their respective authorities, to the British camp, an embassy duly authorized to negotiate the terms of peace, conformably to Major General Wellesley’s proposition.

‘ We have the honor to be, &c.

‘ WELLESLEY

‘ *The Secret Committee.*

(and other Members of the Council).

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to General Lake, Commander in Chief.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Waukory, 7th October, 1803.

‘ I take the liberty of addressing you again in favour of an officer belonging to a regiment in the division of the army under my command. In case you should think it proper to promote Major Kennedy to the Lieut. Colonelcy of the 19th dragoons, you may be induced to promote the eldest Captain, Fortnam, to the majority of that corps. Captain Cathcart, who is the next captain, was wounded in the last action. He has served in the 19th for many years, in the first and second

Mysore wars, and upon all the different occasions in which the 19th dragoons have distinguished themselves since the year 1799. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your favor for the second majority of the regiment, which is still vacant.

‘ Since the action of the 23rd, the enemy have retired in much confusion to the Taptee. The infantry corps went to Burhampoor, and the cavalry made one or two marches to the westward; with an intention, as it was stated, of entering again the Nizam’s territories by the Casserbarry ghaut, near Aurungabad. I suspect that this report has been circulated with a view to draw away our attention from Burhampoor and the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have been much embarrassed by the difficulties of establishing an hospital for my wounded men. The Nizam’s officers will not admit us into the forts which have any strength; and at last I have been obliged to place them at Adjunttee, a place of inferior strength, and upon the extreme frontier. However, I think they will be in security; the last of them have gone in this day, and I am now at liberty to resume my operations.

‘ I beg leave to congratulate your Excellency upon the success of your campaign, and the prosperous state of affairs to the northward. I have seen official accounts of your operations only as far as the 30th of August, but the private accounts of soucars of Jynaghur, have been sent to me from Surat, of as late a date as the 19th of September.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th October, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum I have received from Captain Baynes, who is employed in the command of a detachment giving convoy to bullocks carrying grain from the countries south of the river Godavery to camp, and back again empty, in which he details the names of some places in the Nizam’s territories where duties were levied upon grain for the army, on the passage through them.

‘ I imagine that the levy of those duties is contrary to treaty;

at all events, it is a great impediment to the service, and I suspect from the exorbitancy of that in particular levied at Collum, which in ordinary times must amount to one-eighth of the value of the article carried, they have been laid on only to derive an advantage from the consumption of the British troops in this quarter.

‘ I am concerned to be under the necessity of troubling you so often with complaints of the conduct of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan; and I shall be obliged to you if you will take measures for remedying the evil to which I have above alluded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Adjunttee, 8th October, 1803.

‘ I have just returned from seeing my wounded men; they are tolerably comfortable, and I hope safe in the fort; but I wish they were at a greater distance from the frontier, instead of being upon the boundary, and on the high road by which every body enters the Nizam’s territories from Hindustan. However, I have done the best I can for them, and have secured them as far as is in my power.

‘ You will see by my correspondence with Major Kirkpatrick, that the Soubah’s killadars have behaved shamefully ill.

‘ Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, after making two marches to the westward along the Taptee, have turned to the southward, and, it is said, intend to pass the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them the greatest part of their horse, some infantry, and some guns which they got out of Burhampoor. They have sent into that place the remains of the campoos.

‘ It is possible that this movement may be intended to draw my attention away from Burhampoor and Asseerghur; and they may return to the northward upon finding that I do not follow them. On the other hand, these things called allied governments, are in such a state of deplorable weakness, they depend so entirely on us for the defence of their territories, and their power is so feeble over their own servants, who have so much connexion with and even dependence on the enemy, that I have not means to move forward, at once, upon Asseerghur with my whole force; although I know that if I

could take that step with safety, it would put an end to the war.

‘ But not one of the Soubah’s forts is sufficiently garrisoned. He has not a soldier in the country, excepting those belonging to the Company; and his killadars and amildars would readily pay the money they may have, just to be allowed to sit quietly in their forts and towns. As for the Peshwah, he has possession of his palace at Poonah, and nothing more, and he spends the little money he receives, either upon the Bramins or upon women, rather than give any to his troops, or even to his menial servants.

‘ The consequence, then, of my proceeding to the northward with my whole force might be, that the enemy would get possession, or levy contributions upon some important place belonging to the Nizam; or they might move down upon Poonah itself. They would certainly stop our supplies, and the consequence of such a movement might thus be fatal to us. In this manner does the radical weakness of these governments operate against us.

‘ I have therefore determined to return to the southward, and to send Colonel Stevenson to Burhampoor. No accident can happen to his corps, as two out of three of the campoos are, I am told, entirely destroyed: such of the men as were not either killed or wounded in the action, having thrown away their arms in the retreat and disbanded. It is said that there remain two battalions of Begum Sumroo’s campoo, which were not engaged, having been on guard at the quarters of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. However, supposing that there should be more than are supposed to remain, still no accident can happen to Colonel Stevenson; and if Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should return to the northward, I shall follow them.

‘ Colonel Stevenson is already equipped for a siege. I have had proposals from Cashee Rao Holkar; but as Jeswunt Rao Holkar is, I am told, most laudably employed in levying a contribution upon Ougein, I do not think it prudent to have any thing to do with Cashee Rao.

‘ I wish you would let me know, at an early period, what progress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. This is important, because our engagements with them must have a great effect on the negotiations for peace.

‘ By the bye, does the Governor General know that the Pesh-

cush, paid by the Rajpoots, does not belong to Scindiah only but to the Peshwah and the Holkar family. Of every rupee paid, six annas belong to the Peshwah, five to the Scindiah, and five to Holkar. It is true, that, for these many years past, Scindiah has collected and applied the whole to his own use; but he has lately consented to allow Holkar to collect his own share and half the Peshwah's; and I understand that the dispute between these Chiefs, and the cause of Holkar not joining the confederates, is, that Holkar claimed the right to collect all the peshcush for the number of years that Scindiah had received the whole. He refused to join, unless Scindiah acquiesced in the exercise of this right, or paid him the sum of money which he ought to have received, as peshcush, from the Rajpoots, for the number of years that Scindiah had collected the whole.

'If this story be true, and I believe it is, the protection that we shall afford to the Rajpoots may involve us with Holkar. However, on the other hand, should Holkar be really inclined to remain at peace with the English, which I think he is, we may be able to satisfy him upon that point.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp at Adjunttee, 8th October, 1803.

'Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have made one or two long stretches to the southward, and it is said intend to pass through the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them the greater part of their horse, some infantry and guns, but how much of the latter I cannot tell.

'Our allies are deplorably weak on every point; and as we depend for our supplies on the security of the countries south of the Godavery, it will not answer even to risk that security by throwing my whole force forward in an offensive operation against Burhampoor and Asseerghur; I therefore propose to return to the southward myself, and to send Colonel Stevenson forward upon the Taptee.

'If our allies were in any degree of strength, a movement of our whole force upon Asseerghur, and then upon Gawilghur and Nagpoor, would put an end to the war; but

under the present circumstances I must be satisfied with something less brilliant.

‘Colonel Stevenson will be in no danger at Burhampoor, as it is said that two of the campoos are entirely destroyed. Two battalions of the Begum’s campoo escaped; they were not engaged, having been on guard at Scindiah’s and the Rajah of Berar’s quarters. However, supposing that there are more even than is reported, no accident can happen to Colonel Stevenson.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp, 30 miles N. of Aurungabad, 10th Oct., 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain O’Donnell of the 1st regiment of cavalry, in which he gives a detailed account of an affair of no very great importance; but in which he and the detachment of troops under his command appear to have conducted themselves in an exemplary manner.

‘I likewise enclose the copy of an order, which I have issued to the troops under my command upon this occasion.

‘The party that attacked Captain O’Donnell, are a banditti, which infest the frontiers of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of his Highness the Peshwah; and are formidable from their number and boldness. It does not appear that they belong to any particular chief, although it is said that they belong to the late killadar of Ahmednuggur; but I have reason to believe that this person discharged all his troops, and that he joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah in camp.

‘As there is no established authority, or even an acknowledged boundary on any part of the frontier, and the killadars and other officers on both sides have been in the habit of carrying on private wars against each other, I am induced to believe that they have encouraged this banditti for the purposes of their own wars. While I was on the frontier of course their operations ceased; but they have now recommenced them, and I suspect that they are too strong for their former employers.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have continued to march to the southward towards the Casserbarry

ghaut, with nearly all their cavalry, and a small body of infantry with guns, which joined them from Burhampoor. It is reported in camp that they intend to pass through the Caserbarry ghaut to the southward, as there is nothing to oppose them in the territories of the Peshwah, and but little in those of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ I have thought it proper to move to the southward with my division*, and I am now at no great distance from Aurungabad. Colonel Stevenson, with his division, will march to the northward, and I think it probable that when the confederates learn the direction of his march, and that I have come to the southward†, which may prevent the execution of any design they may have formed, they will return again towards the Taptee.

‘ It is unfortunate that I should have been obliged to return to the southward, as I think that by carrying our whole force to the Taptee we should bring about a peace on advantageous terms. But there are many weak points in the territories of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan, all of which

* ‘ The generale was beat at half past-four, the assembly at half-past five, and we marched immediately after. Since the 8th of last month, General Wellesley has left off the usual mode of announcing the march or halt of the army, in order “to prevent the enemy from having intelligence of the intended marches of this division.” At present, no person can with certainty foretell whether the army is to move or not, except when the General has positively determined that he will not, and then he acquaints the heads of departments, that they may profit of the time.’—*Extract from the Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B., written in the field. Dated 8th October, 1803.*

† ‘ Marched by the left in the following order, which is the usual one. A body of Mysore horse, about four hundred, leads the column of march; this, at some distance, is followed by the cavalry; the new piquets of infantry march in their rear, then the line of infantry, followed by the park, store, and provision carts; the guns of the allies close the line of carriages, the ammunition and park bullocks follow them, and the rear guard, consisting of the old piquets; a squadron of cavalry, which moves on the reverse flank, and another body of four hundred Mysoreans close the line. Detachments of pioneers attend the leading divisions of the cavalry, advanced guard, the line, and the park. Guides are sent every morning before the assembly beating, to the heads of the cavalry advanced and rear guard. The baggage is ordered to be kept on the reverse flank entirely, and in a great measure it is so. The horsemen, &c., of the allies march on either flank, as most agreeable to their leaders. The Brigadier of Cavalry is ordered to halt whenever he may exceed the distance of three quarters of a mile in front of the infantry; the long roll for a halt is to be beat by any corps the march of which may by any accident be so long stopped as to occasion a break of one hundred yards: this to be repeated from front to rear by every corps; and when ready to move again, the taps are passed, as before, along the line, which proceeds.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

would be exposed to risk, and we might lose by this operation more than we should gain.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ *The Governor General.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Captain O'Donnell to the Deputy Adjutant General.

‘ SIR, ‘ Ahmednuggur, 3rd October, 1803.

‘ I have to request you will acquaint Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley with my return to this station, accompanied by Lieuts. Bryant and Morgan, and the detachment of the 1st battalion 12th regiment native infantry, as also the circumstances which obliged us to adopt this plan.

‘ On the morning of the 27th ultimo, as the detachment approached the mud fort of Korget, about twenty two coss to the S. S. E. of this place, we perceived a body of peons drawn up a little to the left of the place. I immediately ordered a jemidar and twelve sepoy to conduct the followers and baggage, then up, under the walls of the fort, and with the remainder I advanced to reconnoitre and learn who they belonged to. As we advanced they continued to retire.

‘ On ascending a small rising ground, I was much surprised at discovering a large body of horse, drawn up in the bed of the nullah, and not more than seven hundred yards in front of the ground which our little party then occupied. In this situation I was under the necessity of returning to the fort. While marching back, the horse made two efforts to get between us and the place, but failed in both, and suffered some loss in the attempt. It was some time before I could get admittance into the fort; on entering I ordered Lieut. Morgan, with twenty five sepoy, to take post at the principal gateway, and, accompanied by Lieut. Bryant and the remainder of the sepoy, I proceeded to examine the size and state of the place. We had not proceeded more than half way round, when we were obliged to return to the assistance of the party left at the gate.

‘ I had just joined Lieut. Morgan and formed the whole of the sepoy, when about three hundred of the enemy's infantry entered at different parts of the fort, and advanced within one hundred yards of us; they kept up a galling fire upon our people for about half an hour, killed one sepoy and wounded two more. Our situation at this time was extremely pre-

carious, without some immediate step was taken to oblige the enemy to leave the place. We could spare but fifty men to oppose three hundred, without giving up the gate through which the whole of their cavalry might attack us in rear. However, with this little party we sallied out on them, and pursued them from street to street, until we drove them entirely out of the place.

‘ Their loss must have been very considerable; they left twenty five men killed behind them, mostly Arabs. About two hours after this they entered the fort a second time, more in numbers and we again drove them out with great loss on their side.

‘ From the great extent of the place, and its being accessible at so many different places, even for cavalry, I found it utterly impossible to keep them out; added to this, our ammunition was nearly expended. The villagers would render no assistance, on the contrary, encouraged the enemy to come in, and gave them every information regarding our situation.

‘ During the night of the 27th I employed the whole of the followers of every description in barricading the different streets leading to the post we had taken up, procured water for the people to serve them during the day, and acquainted Captain Graham, at Ahmednuggur, with our situation.

‘ About seven o’clock in the morning of the 28th, I learned that a large party had taken post in the second killadar’s house; though the day before he had positively refused to admit a small party of sepoy, even to procure a little water, for the want of which we were much distressed. About eight I could plainly see from the works over the gate, that the place was crowded with both horse and foot, and that they were preparing to attack. At ten they opened a heavy fire of musketry on us from the tops of the principal houses in the fort, and continued this for the space of two hours without being able to hurt any of our people: gaining confidence from our silence, they advanced on us from all the places accessible around. By this time I had sixty brave fellows to receive them, which they did in the most gallant manner, and in return attacked them and drove them from every part of the fort; took their standard, killed one of the sirdars, and about fifty of the men.

‘ This was the last time they attempted to disturb us, and we remained this and the whole of the next day perfectly quiet. The cavalry, to the amount of ten or twelve hundred, still con-

tinued to hover about the place. Captain Lucas, with three companies of the 2nd battalion 3rd regiment, arrived on the morning of the 30th, and relieved us from our disagreeable situation.

‘ I feel it a duty, which I most cheerfully fulfil, in reporting to you, Sir, the cordial and able assistance I received during this short but active service, from Lieuts. Bryant and Morgan, and I in part attribute to their gallant exertions the saving of our little detachment from total destruction. I have reason to be pleased with the conduct of the sepoy in general, as also of that part of the native officers belonging to the 1st battalion 12th regiment native infantry.

‘ Allow me now, Sir, to entertain the pleasing hope, that our little exertions on the present occasion may meet with the approbation of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ Herewith I beg to enclose a return of the killed and wounded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ H. O'DONNELL,

‘ *Captain Barclay, Dep. Adj. Gen.*’ ‘ *Capt. 1st Reg. of Cavalry.*

General Orders by Major General }
the Hon. A. Wellesley. }

‘ Camp at Binkenholey, 10th
October, 1803.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley has received a report from Captain O'Donnell of the 1st regiment of cavalry, from which it appears that being on his march from Ahmednuggur to join the division of the army under the command of Major General Campbell, with a company of the 1st battalion 12th regiment, under Lieut. Morgan, and the supernumerary native non-commissioned officers, heretofore belonging to the corps in camp, and lately drafted into the extra battalions, he was attacked by a body of horse and of peons, of such numbers as to induce Captain O'Donnell to think it necessary to take post in the village of Korget Coraygaum.

‘ Here the attack was renewed upon this party with additional violence, and Captain O'Donnell finding that his post was a bad one, and at all events too large for his party, barricaded and otherwise strengthened such parts of it as he was of opinion he could defend. He there remained with his small party without throwing away his ammunition, excepting when he could do it with effect in judicious sallies, in three of which he killed a number of the enemy, far exceeding that of his

party, which remained in security till it was relieved from Ahmednuggur, at the distance of about forty miles.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley returns his thanks to Captain O’Donnell and Lieut. Bryant of the 1st regiment of cavalry, and to Lieut. Morgan and the company of the 1st battalion 12th regiment under his command, for their conduct upon this occasion.

‘ He has been particular in detailing the circumstances of this affair in General Orders, in order that all Officers may know the advantage which, with a small party of men, they may take, even of the most ruinous village, to protect themselves and the parties of troops under their command.

‘ To the divisions of the army under his command it was scarcely necessary for Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to point out, that a small body of infantry that keeps its order, and reserves its fire, has but little to fear from cavalry. But in case any Officer, in charge of a party, should be obliged from circumstances to take post, he may see, in the example set by Captain O’Donnell, the advantages he can take of the numerous fortified villages in this country, the credit he can gain, and the service he can render, by thus defending himself.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander in Chief his sense of the conduct of Captain O’Donnell, and of the party under his command.

‘ R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,
Camp, 30 miles north of Aurungabad,
10th October, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose translations of letters which I have received from Cashee Rao Holkar, and the translation of my answer to one of Cashee Rao’s agents. Koosh Haul, the Arab, did not come on farther than Colonel Stevenson’s camp; and Dokul Sing, the other agent, had but little to say, except that Cashee Rao Holkar was in great distress at Jehanabad, near Burhampoor, and was apprehensive that Dowlut Rao Scindiah intended to shut him up in the fort of Asseerghur.

‘ This man had so little to urge in favour of Cashee Rao Holkar, that I am inclined to suspect that he is not his agent, but one employed by some other person, possibly Jeswunt Rao

Holkar, to discover whether the British Government had any intention to interfere in the concerns of the Holkar family.

‘As Jeswunt Rao Holkar has hitherto kept aloof from the other confederated Marhatta Chiefs; and as, at all events, I doubt whether we should derive any advantage from the assistance of Cashee Rao Holkar, which I imagine that we can command at any time, I have thought it best to decline to have anything to do with him at present.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Cashee Rao Holkar.

‘As Colonel Collins is gone to Hyderabad, and as I am charged by his Excellency the Governor General with the direction of the affairs of the British Government in this quarter, I have opened your letter, and have listened to the verbal communications of Dokul Sing.

‘The British Government is not at war with the branches of your family with whom you are at variance; and that being the case, it is inconsistent with the principles by which its conduct is always guided, to interfere in the concerns of your family.

‘When attacked, the British Government adopts every method allowed by the law of nations to defend itself and annoy its enemies; but till it is attacked it does not interfere in the concerns of others.

‘*Cashee Rao Holkar.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘Camp, 11th October, 1803.

‘1. I have received letters from Lieut. Colonel Coleman, by which I learn that we are not to expect any further supply of grain from Panwell.

‘2. I had the honor of addressing you on the 20th of January last, and requested that six hundred garces of rice might be collected at Bombay for the use of the army, then about to march to Poonah under the command of General Stuart; and I have reason to believe that General Stuart requested that even a larger quantity of rice might be prepared.

‘3. Since that time, owing to a variety of causes, but principally on account of the great mortality among the cattle

which accompanied me from Mysore, I have not been able to take away the quantity of rice which I requested you to have prepared; and some of it has, with my knowledge, been issued to the troops forming part of the garrison of Bombay: still, however, I had hoped that I might find a supply of rice at Bombay, to the full amount of the six hundred garces.

‘ 4. I have now to inform you, that there is every reason to apprehend a great scarcity of all kinds of grain in this country in the next season, if there should not be a famine. Whatever may be the result of the military operations, therefore, it is certain that the troops which will be stationed in this country will require grain from Bombay.

‘ 5. On this ground, I most anxiously recommend that a communication should be opened immediately between the government of Bombay and the collectors in Canara upon this subject, in order that early measures may be adopted to secure, for the consumption of the troops, the surplus produce of that fertile province. The quantity which ought to be provided for this purpose only ought to be six hundred garces.

‘ 6. I wrote to the collectors in Canara upon the subject, and as I have several memorandums upon the mode in which the rice countries in Mysore, those of Bullum particularly, influenced the state of the markets in Canara, I wrote to the assistant with the Resident at Mysore to request him to correspond with the collectors in Canara, and so to arrange with the government of Mysore as that the market in Canara may be kept full, at the same time that the supplies for the army, which still come from Mysore, may not be discontinued.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Phoolmurry, 11th October, 1803.

‘ I return the letter from Major Shawe, which contains some very interesting intelligence. I think the attack of Allyghur the most dashing service that has been performed for some time.

‘ I hope that General Lake will not stay long at Delhi. You will have heard that a body of Perron’s horse have struck an unpleasant blow at Shekohabad in the Dooab, and as I have

lost sight of Holkar, I am much afraid that he also is gone towards the Bengal territories. He and all his troops are certainly on the other side of the Nerbudda: the last accounts I had of him stated that he was plundering Ougein, which is hardly credible. It is now said that he is gone far to the northward.

‘ I am within one march of Aurungabad. The enemy have not yet passed the Casserbarry ghaut. The majority of my intelligence hircarrahs have either deserted or have been taken, and four days have elapsed since I heard from their camp; but they were then on their road to that ghaut, and, as far as I can learn, forty miles from it.

‘ The stoppage of the supplies from Bombay is very unpleasant. I wrote to Mr. Duncan upon the subject. Indeed, our prospect, if the war continues, is not very favorable. The crops have failed every where, and there will certainly be a famine in this country next year. I learn from the intercepted letters from Hindustan, that their prospects are even worse than ours.

‘ Goklah is coming here this evening; I understand, to complain that the pay his men receive is not sufficient. However, I have sent him a message to inform him that if he mentions to me one syllable about pay or money in his proposed visit, I shall quit the tent; as I before informed him that I had, and would have nothing to do with his pay, excepting to give him regularly the money which the Peshwah had desired he should have.

‘ I wish that the Peshwah would settle with his own sirdar, and take this trouble off my hands, in which I have certainly as much business already as I can well manage. I think that Goklah has no reason to complain: he gets his money regularly, which does not happen to any other Marhatta party in India: he has nothing to do, forage is plentiful, and he does not pay for it; and grain is at this moment, and, with very few exceptions, has always been, at the price which it bore at Poonah when we were there. I understand that he has already discharged five hundred of his people, and he talks of discharging more. I wish that you would let me know how many he ought to have; and I shall inform him that I propose to recommend to the Peshwah that a proportionate reduction should be made from his pay for every man he discharges.

‘But not only does the Peshwah throw upon me a business with which I ought to have no concern whatever, but he counteracts the execution of that business as much as he can. Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, notwithstanding his insolence to me, which is perfectly well known to all their chiefs, has been sent to the southern countries by the Peshwah, to take possession of certain districts, among others of Nurgoond and Nulgoond from Goklah.

‘A letter has been written by Sirjee Rao Ghautky, who is now, I see by the ackbar, in high favor and great confidence, to Appah Dessaye, to communicate to him the Peshwah’s orders that he should relinquish possession of Manowly and Anantapoor, a district which he holds near the Kistna. These districts are to be given to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur.

‘I should not care one pin about all these transactions, of which, from your situation at the durbar, you must have a knowledge, if they were not the cause of immediate complaints and reference to me, from the sirdars serving with the British troops under a treaty, and who the Peshwah most solemnly promised should be satisfied in every respect.

‘I attribute the Peshwah’s conduct in regard to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur to something worse than ignorance. Considering the manner in which that chief behaved to me, and his being employed again to seize the districts belonging to the chiefs serving with this army, it cannot tend to secure the credit of the British Government in the Peshwah’s durbar.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will send me six pairs of intelligence hircarrahs, besides those sent lately to Mr. Elphinstone.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th October, 1803.

‘I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th of September, and I am glad to find that you are getting on in a manner so satisfactory to yourself.

‘I certainly approved of your instructions as involving all the material points at issue between the government at Bombay and me; and I believe you will experience no inconvenience from the paragraphs to which you particularly object.

In fact, it is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the native princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword; and it follows that if these political agents have no authority over the military, they have no power whatever.

‘The natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the Residents would lose their influence over their councils. It may be argued, if that is the case, the military Commanding Officer ought to be the Resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say, that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive government; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning upon this subject is, that the British Government in India is a phenomenon; and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded.

‘There is nothing in the instructions to you which does not exist at this moment at Hyderabad, and would not have existed at Poonah, if the subsidiary force had ever been established at that place; and as far as I am acquainted with Major Walker, I will venture to say that he will act with you cordially for the good of the service.

‘I am glad that you intend to attack Canojee. Move upon him with the utmost celerity as soon as you can, and attack him whatever may be his numbers. We must get rid of that domestic war in Guzerat, before we can expect to derive any advantage to the general cause from the troops in that province. If you had not Canojee upon your hands, I should long before now have requested you to move upon Ougein.

‘Take care that, in establishing your frontier, you do not interfere with Holkar. He has not hitherto committed hostilities against us, and I have cautiously avoided to touch upon him. I wish you to bear this in mind.

‘I ought to have written you an account of our action on the 23rd of September; but I really had not time, and I knew that Major Walker or you would receive the particulars from Mr. Duncan. It was the most severe battle that I have ever seen, or that, I believe, has been fought in India. The enemy’s cannonade was terrible, but the result shows what a small num-

ber of British troops can do. The best of it is, that if it had not been for a mistake of the picquets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner also we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did.

‘ We took either ninety eight or one hundred and one pieces of cannon on the field of battle, besides others lost on the road by the enemy, and I believe all their ammunition. Since the action they have fled to Burhampoor, where they left the remains of the defeated infantry. They brought out two or three fresh corps of infantry, with guns, and made first a march or two to the westward, along the Taptee; they then turned to the southward, and threatened to pass to the southward through the Casserbarry ghaut.

‘ I consequently moved to Phoolmurry to meet them again, and I have sent Colonel Stevenson to Burhampoor. I think that he will drive the defeated infantry into Hindustan; and possibly the cavalry, with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, will follow them; at all events, these movements must stop their southern trip.

‘ You must be the best judge what ought to be done for the defence of Surat. I should be afraid that these detached redoubts would be weak, and that the men in them might be exposed to the want of water, &c. If the castle is in a commanding situation, by far the best mode would be to repair it, and raise sebundy for the defence of the town wall. If the Company have these places and are at war, they must incur the expense of defending them.

‘ In one of Mr. Duncan’s letters, I think he said that there was a position near Surat, for a small body of troops, which defended the only avenue to the place. If that is the case, I would recommend that the position should be strengthened, and that the town should have nothing in it except the sebundy. However, at present there is little probability of Surat being molested.

‘ You must have many depôts of provisions besides Baroach and Surat. Mr. Duncan misunderstood that part of my letter to him respecting the depôts. He thought that the places mentioned were to be supplied with provisions only for their

garrisons ; whereas I intended that they should be depôts for the corps in the field, to be used in case the line of operations should take them towards these places.

‘ I have the honor, &c.
‘ *Colonel Murray.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th October, 1803.

‘ I received a letter yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, the person whom I sent to Holkar. He had not been able to get on to that Chief, as the country was much overrun by Scindiah’s pindarries, and he says that Holkar is gone to the northward to Boondy and Kota. He sends me a copy of a letter which he had received from Holkar on the 6th of this month, in which Holkar desires him to join with the troops of a chief who was about to march from the Taptee. Kawder Nawaz Khan was, however, unable to join this chief, on account of the pindarries and thieves, who literally swarm in the countries bordering on the Taptee and Nerbudda. He says that the hircarrahs who brought Holkar’s letter, told him they had left that Chief on his march towards Boondy, at a place 20 coss north from Ougein.

‘ I have recalled Kawder Nawaz Khan ; and I have written a letter to Holkar, in which I have informed him that I have so done, as I find that his army has gone to a considerable distance ; and as the enemy’s pindarries infest the country between Kawder Nawaz Khan and his army, it is therefore impossible for him to join.

‘ I think it would not answer to allow the person sent on this mission to remain any longer in the place and state in which he has been for the last two months ; and indeed, at all events, it is necessary to bring him back, in order to supply him again with money, of which he is in great want. I have therefore desired him to join Colonel Stevenson’s camp.

‘ I think that General Lake’s capture of Allyghur is one of the most extraordinary feats that I have heard of in this country. I never attacked a fort that I did not attempt the same thing, viz., to blow open the gates, but I have never succeeded. I have always taken them by escalade, which appears to have been impossible in this instance.

‘ I hope soon to hear that the General has again returned from Delhi. We must watch Holkar closely. His sudden

march to the northward shows no good intention; and it may be depended upon that he will enter into the war, if he should see a prospect of advantage.

‘ Holkar has now a stake in India, which depends upon the existence of his reputation as a soldier; and I think that he will not venture to risk it, by crossing the Jumna or the Ganges, and being on the same side of these rivers with General Lake. But how is your province of Bahar defended? That, in my opinion, will be the point to which he will direct his march, in case he should enter into the war.

‘ The rain, which usually falls in this country in the months of September and October, has, in this year, entirely failed; the consequence will be a great scarcity of grain, and there is every reason to apprehend a famine. This is a bad prospect for us. The same misfortune is apprehended at Bombay, and Mr. Duncan has accordingly stopped the supplies of rice for the army, in order to feed the settlement; although the grain which he now issues to the latter was laid in for the use of the former, at my suggestion, made so long ago as the month of January last. However, I have a tolerable store for the fighting men in Ahmednuggur; and I have written to the collectors in Canara, and have requested Mr. Duncan to commence a correspondence with those gentlemen, in order to secure for the army the surplus produce of that fertile province.

‘ The enemy have not yet passed the Casserbarry ghaut: I believe that my movement to this quarter has stopped them; and there is a chance that Colonel Stevenson will drive the infantry entirely out of the Deccan.

‘ Kawder Nawaz Khan writes me that the enemy’s cavalry are deserting; some of them pass daily through the place in which he is, and they say that the army is in great distress for food.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Shawe.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I wish I could hear what progress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. It is possible that Holkar may have gone to Boondy to act as a check upon them.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Phoolmurry, 14th October, 1803.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have written to the Secretary of Government at Bombay, respecting Captain Bates, from the perusal of which, you will observe that Captain Bates did what he was ordered, and could not avoid what happened.

‘ I likewise enclose an extract of a letter which I have written to Major Shawe, in which you will see an account of the intelligence which I received yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, also my opinion respecting Holkar’s designs.

‘ It is possible, however, that Holkar may have gone to Boondy only to keep in check the Rajpoots, on whom he has claims, and with whom the Governor General has opened a negotiation. But he ought to be watched closely. Send Malcolm this last paper.

‘ There is some intrigue going on at Poonah, through the medium of Sirjee Rao Ghautky. I have had intelligence of it from two or three quarters; he certainly is a dangerous fellow, and ought to be sent away.

‘ Appah Dessaye writes to desire that Neelkund Rao Scindiah and Jolebah Goorparah, two fellows in his service, may be sent from Poonah to join him. He says that they are intriguing against him, and they are the cause of the attack which has been lately made upon his country and the fort of Manowly, by the polygar of Jalloor, in which the Rajah of Kolapoor and some other rascals are concerned.

‘ I have written to General Campbell upon the subject; but it would be as well if the Peshwah were to give a hint upon it to the Rajah of Kolapoor, and I shall write him a letter also.

‘ I believe I told you that Sirjee Rao Ghautky has written, as he said, by the Peshwah’s orders, to Appah Dessaye to give up the fort of Manowly. I desired Appah Dessaye to tell him to mind his own business, and that, if any body should venture to attack that fort, the English would defend it.

‘ There is no understanding these Marhatta intrigues. The Peshwah and his government always appear to be concerned as individuals against his subjects, instead of as the head of the government.

‘ Goklah also appears very uneasy respecting Nurgoond. He was here again the night before last upon the subject; and I should not be at all surprised if, in consequence of the intrigues of Poonah, both Goklah and Appah Dessaye were to desire to go off to their own countries.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th October, 1803.

‘ In addition to the other difficulties I experience in this country upon the subject on which I have troubled you at different times, the people attached to my camp experience one of considerable magnitude in taking gold coins in the Soubah’s country. The people are willing to take them, but at a very depreciated rate of exchange; in some instances, at the rate of one half, at others of two thirds of their value, and of that rate under which I am under the necessity of issuing them to the troops.

‘ 2. The consequence is, that the price of every article is much increased; and in many instances, the dealers have returned without loads, rather than submit to this extortion of the inhabitants, and thereby a distress is occasioned in camp.

‘ 3. It is not possible to avoid the issue of these gold coins to the troops. Very lately, General Stuart sent to Colonel Stevenson and me six lacs of pagodas in gold coins of different descriptions, and I really believe, that at this moment there is not a rupee in the camp of either.

‘ 4. Under these circumstances, I shall be much obliged to you if you will request the Soubah’s ministers to issue proclamations as soon as possible, requiring the people of the country to receive these gold coins in payment of articles required for the camp of the British troops, and holding forth engagements that those coins will be received in payment of the revenue at the same rates of exchange.

‘ 5. I have the honor to enclose the nerrick of the rates at which the coins are issued to the troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘Rate at which the undermentioned coins are issued to the troops :

	R.	A.	P.
Star Pagodas	3	8	0
Behaudry, or Hydry, or Rajah's Pagodas	3	12	1
Porto Novo, or Feringhy Pet Pagodas	3	0	0
Gold Fanams, 3½ per	1	0	0
Bombay Gold Mohurs	15	0	0
Hydry, or Behaudry, or Rajah's Gold Mohurs	16	0	0

‘ N. B. These are the coins principally in circulation at present ; and if they should be received in the country at the rates specified above, no inconvenience will be felt. But besides these coins, there are a variety of others in circulation, upon all of which there is a loss*.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 15th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 30th September, and

* ‘ Rupees have lately become so plentiful, that their value has fallen in camp : this at first sight appears very extraordinary, but we carry a set of men about with us, whose power is superior to the general's in this branch, and to their exercise of it, it is necessary to submit : the shroffs, or bankers of India, are well known, and are a very well-connected body of men, who live on the mercantile transactions of all other classes. From the southward, many of these men have accompanied the army ; and here, in a strange country, they not only rule the camp exchange, but form connexions which enable them to supply money when it is not to be procured by any other means. For General Wellesley's bills on every part of India, which, for the convenience of the service, he is authorized to draw, they constantly procure money ; not that of the country, but of Madras, and the southern parts of India, which are not in use, or known here ; these, of course, made part of the treasure on setting out, or have since been received ; yet its re-collection by the shroffs, and the substitution of coins current in the country for the purchase of all the necessary articles, must demand an attention, and be the effect of a system, of which it is very difficult to form any idea without their assistance. I dare say they make a profit by the bills ; they regularly do a monthly one upon some of the coins most in use : as soon as they know the proportion of coins in the treasury in which we are to be paid, the value of that coin unalterably falls, and continues depressed until the issue of another, then the first is poured back into the treasury at its real value, if not more. The loss falls on the soldiers, a little perhaps on government ; but the ability it gives to the latter to make the payments with punctuality, as they always have been in the army, overbalances the objection on its side, and the soldiers readily acquiesce from the regularity and certainty with which they get their month's pay, in a week or less after it is due, when in garrison they may be three or four months in arrear. The difference of price on account of prompt payment may be equivalent to the

2nd instant. It is very probable that you will do nothing with Canojee by negotiating. I suggested the means only because I observed that he was extremely weak in troops, and was absolutely destitute of money, and that he could procure none. At the same time, the few troops he has were likely to keep in employment all our troops in Guzerat, during the most precious time of the campaign, and thus divert them from the prosecution of the general war, to domestic purposes. If you should negotiate, I anxiously hope that you will not stop your operations on that account; that mode will never answer any good purpose.

‘ It is heart-breaking to see the state of the 65th. I foretold to Mr. Duncan the consequence of sending that corps to Surat at that season, and afterwards putting them in the field without any means necessary to secure even their existence, much less their comfort, during a monsoon.

‘ I have had no report regarding the deserters of the 75th regiment. Your account of the manner in which the troops are treated at Baroda is very unpleasant. It is positively contrary to all rules, diminishes the respect for the troops, and their sense of their own character, to allow them to run after palanqueens and horses, and ought not to be permitted. However, the subject is a very delicate one at Baroda; I will take an opportunity of bringing it before Mr. Duncan, who alone can apply a remedy.

‘ I suspect that you will not find the Patans of much use; however, a few of them can do you no harm, and they may be the means of opening the communication with their friends on the frontier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

loss. The coins generally current in camp are, star, Behaudry, Sultauney, and Porto Novo pagodas, Venetians, Chandory, and Company's rupees; there are also the gold and silver fanams—the copper coins are those of the country, called piu, which are continually varying in size and value; at times we receive nearly sixty piu for a rupee, at others not more than thirty-six. The troops are paid in the six first-named coins, in proportions named monthly in General Orders. The natives of the interior part of India have but very little gold current amongst them; silver is soon lost in their buried hoards or family ornaments; copper, and the exchange of superfluous articles, seem to be their mediums of traffic.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 15th October, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th. It gives me great pleasure to have it in my power to do anything to gratify Azim ool Oomrah, and accordingly, I request that you will be so kind as to return to him the enclosed letters, and beg of him to intercede with the Soubah of the Deccan for the killadar of Dowlutabad.

‘ 2. It will be proper, however, to take this opportunity of impressing the mind of this killadar with the necessity which exists that he should have full confidence in the British officers, that he should treat as friends the British troops, and that he should obey the orders which he may receive from Rajah Mohiput Ram.

‘ 3. On the other hand, I declare that I have no intention whatever to make use of the fort of Dowlutabad, excepting on occasions which may be absolutely necessary to forward the service, in which the interests of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan are more involved than are those of the British government.

‘ 4. I have the honor to enclose another memorandum which I received yesterday from Captain Baynes, on the subject of difficulties experienced by the brinjarries; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will urge the ministers to give orders that the grievances complained of may be redressed.

‘ 5. I shall take an early opportunity of forwarding to Rajah Mohiput Ram and Rajah Sookroodoor the letters directed to them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 15th October, 1803.

‘ I have received intelligence from more than one quarter, that a carkoon, by name Ballojee Punt, or Babajee Punt, has been sent from the enemy's camp to Poonah. He has with him ten or fifteen horse. It will be well to watch this fellow,

and ascertain the object of his mission. It is said, also, a Frenchman is gone to Poonah, but that I doubt.

‘Be so kind as to send the enclosed to the Rajah of Kolapoor.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Bombay.*

‘Camp 16 miles North of Phoolmurry,

‘SIR,

16th October, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th instant.

‘2. It is but justice to you to express, that I am perfectly sensible that you have done everything in your power to induce the servants of the Soubah’s government to attend to my requisitions for the public service; but whether they are unaccustomed to obey the orders of any person, or whether they have a particular objection to receive orders from an European officer, it is very certain that they do not attend to me: and, therefore, I most anxiously recommend that one of the sirdars in the Soubah’s service should have power over all persons under the Soubah’s government in this part of the country.

‘3. I believe Salabut Khan to be a man of the first rank, consequence, and family at present serving with the Soubah’s troops; and Colonel Stevenson has always mentioned him with respect and regard. But it does not appear that he is trusted by, and that he enjoys the confidence of the government to the same degree as Rajah Mohiput Ram. The latter also is more accustomed to business than the former, who trusts the management even of the business he has at present, to Fatty Jung Khan.

‘4. Under these circumstances, I should recommend Rajah Mohiput Ram to be the person vested with this authority by the Soubah’s government. But if Salabut Khan, or any other sirdar, either with the army or at Hyderabad, should be preferred by his Highness, I shall be ready to co-operate with such person for the general good.

‘5. I agree in opinion with you, that it would be very inconvenient for his Highness to join his army on the frontier

in person; and for the reasons you mention, the measure ought not to be proposed to him. I suggested it only as an alternative, that the armies might enjoy the resources of the country in case it should not be possible to prevail upon his Highness to trust any of his sirdars with sufficient powers over the killadars and others in this part of the country, to bring forward those resources.

‘6. I think it will be advisable to send forward the five lacs of rupees alluded to in the seventh paragraph of your letter of the 8th, and any rice, &c., for which you may have carriage, to Dharore, as you have proposed.

‘7. My letters to his Excellency the Governor General will have apprized you that I had marched towards Aurungabad, and with my reasons for moving in that direction. If the enemy ever intended to pass to the southward by the Casserbarry ghaut, they have now relinquished that intention; as I heard in the course of last night, that on the 13th a part of their cavalry had moved to the northward. I consequently marched towards Adjunttee from Phoolmurry this morning, and I have since received accounts from persons whom I had sent to examine the Untoor ghaut, from which I think there is reason to believe that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar made a march in a northerly direction on the 14th.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Pahlood, 17th October, 1803.

‘I am concerned to have to inform you, that thirty of the dooley bearers attached to the 78th regiment deserted on the night before last, and one hundred last night; I am therefore under the necessity of requesting that measures may be taken to obtain at Bombay at least two hundred and fifty dooley bearers for the service of that regiment.

‘2. As I observe in a late letter from Government to the Military Board, upon the subject of the desertion of the camp followers hired at Bombay, that the Honorable the Governor in Council is of opinion that this practice among that class of people had been very unusual, I am apprehensive that the

degree to which it has prevailed among those hired at Bombay only, in this camp, may be attributed to improper interference in the management of them, or to the extraordinary hardships under which they labor.

‘ 3. The Honorable the Governor in Council will have observed, by the orders which I formerly transmitted for his confirmation, that I left the Bombay establishment exactly as I found them, under the management of the officers appointed by the regulations of the Bombay Government to superintend them. The dooley bearers attached to the 78th regiment, in particular, have always been under the surgeon of that regiment, and employed solely in carrying the sick of the corps, although all the other dooley bearers with the army, in the pay of the public, whether from Mysore or the Carnatic, are under charge of the Staff Surgeon, and are applicable to the general service as they may be required.

‘ 4. Indeed, I was anxious to prevent their too frequent communication, as the former receive ten and a half rupees per mensem, and the latter only seven; and I was apprehensive that those who received least pay, and did most work, would desert.

‘ 5. Besides the dooley bearers attached to the 78th regiment, their watermen have gone also; and I believe every private follower in the regiment raised at Bombay.

‘ 6. As our operations have been carried on in countries entirely exhausted, and as the season has been very unfavorable, the price of grain has been high; but the average price has not been higher than at Poonah, when the army was in the neighbourhood of that city; and I have the satisfaction to reflect, that although certainly dear, grain has always been plentiful. If its high price was likely to occasion desertion, it is probable that it would occasion it among that class of people who have the lowest, rather than among those who have the highest pay.

‘ 7. I believe, therefore, that this distressing desertion of the followers hired at Bombay is to be attributed rather to the nature of the people, to the ease with which they have it in their power to return thither, and to the fact that, however numerous the desertions, the police of Bombay have not the power of applying a remedy.

‘ 8. I have not had much experience of the service in this

part of India; but wherever I have seen the Bombay troops employed, whether in this quarter or on the coast, complaints have always been sent of the desertion of their followers; and I believe that upon a reference to the letters received from officers commanding escorts or detachments, in this part of India, since the beginning of April last, it will be found that not one has marched and performed the service on which he was sent, without making a complaint of the desertion of his public followers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,

Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Adjunttee, 18th October, 1803.

‘ 1. As the season for reaping the harvest is now approaching, I wish to draw your attention to the state of the magazines of grain in the forts on the frontier of his Highness the Soubah.

‘ 2. It is very difficult to get any account of what those magazines contain; and the accounts which I have received are imperfect, and so indistinct, that I am not certain at this moment whether it is intended to express the value of the grain each magazine contains, counted in rupees, or a certain number of measures or what those measures are: they were given to me at the moment when Rajah Sookroodoor was about to march with Colonel Stevenson’s division, and I had no opportunity of having from him a personal explanation, and I have never received an answer to the letter which I wrote to him upon this subject.

‘ 3. I am therefore of opinion, that there is some reason for concealing from the officers of the British government the real state of these magazines.

‘ 4. That state, however, becomes every day more important; there is great reason to apprehend a scarcity, if not a famine, in the next season, in the countries north of the Godavery, and particularly in Hindustan it is said that the crops have failed entirely. Measures ought to be immediately adopted, therefore, to find out the real state of the grain magazines at Dowlatabad, Puttun, Dharore, and all the smaller forts to the northward in particular, and to have them filled with jowarry wheat and chinna, if they should not be so already.

‘ 5. There appears to be no doubt but that under the treaty

the Soubah is obliged to fill his magazines with grain; and it is certainly intended that the British troops should have the use of the grain which the magazines contain. But excepting a small quantity which Colonel Stevenson received from Dowlutabad, we have got none; and from the difficulties we have experienced, even in approaching the forts, I think it probable that the Soubah's servants do not understand that the contents are intended for the use of the British troops.

‘ 6. Under these circumstances, and considering that a great expense will attend the filling of the magazines, that the Soubah is supposed to be fond of money, and that he had already shown some indisposition towards the British government, it is a question which I wish you to decide, whether these magazines shall be filled at the expense of the British government, or at that of the government of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ 7. At all events, it appears to me to be proper that you should have an explanation upon the subject with the minister, and that you should ascertain his sentiments. The first point to be ascertained, is the real state of the magazines, and whether it is understood that they are resources for the use of the British troops, and by what means their contents are to be procured. The next point to be ascertained is whether his Highness is willing to replenish the magazines at the present moment.

‘ 8. If there should be any doubt upon this subject, or whether the contents of the magazines were considered as resources for the use of the British troops, it will become necessary that they should be filled on account of the British government; and I shall be obliged to you if you will urge the minister to give the necessary orders to the killadars and amildars, if you will settle with him the mode in which the grain is to be paid for, whether to the government at Hyderabad, or to the amildars in the countries in which it is collected, that in which the quantities are to be ascertained, and that in which the grain is to be drawn from the magazines by the British troops.

‘ 9. If the grain laid into the different forts is considered a resource for the British troops, I understand it is to be paid for in proportion as it is drawn out.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Mirza Wahed Bey.

‘ 19th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 10th of October, written to Captain Johnson, in which you say it is written in the presence and by desire of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I never heard and knew nothing of any letter written by Colonel Collins from the top of the ghauts. I have already written fully to Ballojee Koonger on the subject of sending a sirdar to the camp of the Maharajah, and I still entertain the same sentiments that I did when I wrote that letter.

‘ The desire of the British government to remain at peace with the Maharajah cannot be doubted; and I repeat what I said to Ballojee Koonger, that if the Maharajah had complied with the reasonable requisition which I made to him to withdraw his troops from the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, the peace of India would have been insured.

‘ But the Maharajah listened to the advice of evil counselors, and the consequence is, that he is involved in a war with his oldest and most faithful allies.

‘ If the Maharajah has any proposition to make to me, let him send here a sirdar. Whatever that proposition may be, it shall be attended to and answered with respect.

‘ In regard to the designs entertained in the Maharajah's camp, and the threats which you communicate in your letter, I have to observe, that it does not become you to write them, and I shall certainly not throw away my time by noticing them.

‘ *Mirza Wahed Bey.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,

Resident at Poonah.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Ferdapoor, 21st October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 9th, 14th, and 15th, and I will endeavor to reply to them, although weak from the effects of a fever, which I have had for the last two days.

‘ I never imagined that Bundelcund was in the hands of the Peshwah, and I concluded that our government must take possession of that province either by force, or in consequence of the influence which it had acquired there. That becomes still more necessary, as the only shadow of influence which the Peshwah has, is through the carkoon of the late Ali Behauder.

As that province must be taken possession of by British force, in consequence of British influence, and as I do not see any reason to apprehend that our force will fail in taking possession, or to believe that the policy of government will induce them to delay to attempt it, and all this must have been foreseen and known by the Governor General at the time that he consented to the modification of the treaty of Bassein, under which we are to have Bundelcund, I do not think there is any necessity for delaying the cession of Oolpar, merely on account of the defects of the instrument by which the Peshwah has conveyed to the British government the province of Bundelcund.

‘ Indeed, these defects show an unusual honesty in the Peshwah’s government, for if they had wished to have deceived us, they might have addressed their orders to amildars, sersoubahs, &c., instead of the carkoon of the late Ali Behauder.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I think that Oolpar ought to be ceded immediately to Vittell Seo Deo. I am sorry to observe that that chief will not accommodate with us at all; however, it might be well to give him a hint that the British government, after the favor shown to him, will not submit to his being the object of that favor to the prejudice of the city of Surat; and that if his amildars and people did not accommodate with the gentlemen of Surat for the benefit of the city, the place would be taken from him.

‘ The Peshwah is too bad: it is really discreditable for the British government to have anything to say to him. There is no going on, unless thieves are punished, whoever they may be, or by whomsoever they may be employed. These thieves at Ahmednuggur were plundering in our districts, and I shall send orders that they may be hanged.

‘ By the tappalls come in last night, I see that our intercourse with the southern countries is re-established. The letter which I have written to the killadar of Poonadur, and the posting the companies on the road, may keep it up, and I should wish it to continue by the direct road if possible. Indeed, in point of security, I do not think much would be gained by altering the direction, as the road through the Bhore ghaut, as well as every other road in this blessed country, is infested by thieves, and certainly much would be lost, in point of time. Besides, it is discreditable to have even our tappalls

interrupted or removed by such a set of rascals. Therefore, although I wish the runners to be posted on the Bhore ghaut and Baramooty roads, I wish the tappalls still to continue to run by the direct road, and not to be sent by the circuitous route, unless it should be absolutely necessary. I request you to give directions upon this subject to Mr. Frissell.

‘ I am obliged to you for Mr. Stuart’s report. I have sent orders to Poonah that he may enjoy the benefits held forth in the Governor General’s Proclamation of the 29th of August.

‘ The only brigade that escaped on the 23rd, was part of Begum Sumroo’s. They were with the baggage, and got off in safety. I knew this on the day of action, and saw them go off. There may also have been one battalion of Pohlman’s with the baggage, but I am not certain of that. Dorsan was certainly killed, and the bodies of other Europeans, who did not belong to us, were seen.

‘ Your sepoy joined me, and I detained them in case I should find it necessary to attack the place, of which they were able to give a description. One of them was taken sick, and they are at present both absent by leave, but Barclay knows where they are.

‘ Stevenson took possession of Burhampoor without opposition on the 16th, and he was going the next day to look at Asseerghur. By the last accounts the enemy were still about Parola. They have made another offer of peace, in the same style with the last, which has been answered in the same manner; and Colonel Lang met Colonel Collins’s news writer in the road between this and Eedlabad, with letters for me, which he said contained propositions for peace. This man is arrived in Colonel Stevenson’s camp, but he has not produced these letters, although he certainly has them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Sec. of Government of Bombay.

‘ HONORABLE SIR, ‘ Camp, 22nd October, 1803.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th instant, in which you have enclosed the proceedings of a Court of Enquiry on the conduct of Captain Bates of the 65th regiment, in retiring from Bardoly in the month of July last.

‘ 2. From a perusal of these proceedings, of which I enclose extracts, it is my opinion that the following facts are established.

‘ First. That Captain Bates withdrew his detachment from Bardoly in consequence of orders from Lieut. Colonel Anderson and Colonel —, his commanding officer.

‘ Secondly. That he left his tents behind him because he had no means of carrying them off the ground; the coolies who had carried the ammunition having deserted, he was obliged to employ the tent bullocks to carry ammunition.

‘ Thirdly. That Captain Bates had informed the commanding officer at Surat, of the desertion of his coolies two or three days previous to his march, and that information was received.

‘ Under these circumstances it is my opinion that great injustice has been done to Captain Bates by Colonel —; and that if anybody is to be blamed because the tents belonging to Captain Bates’s detachment were left at Bardoly, he is the person, for having omitted to make arrangements to bring in those tents, when he ordered Captain Bates to march to Surat, an order which that officer must have obeyed at his peril.

‘ 4. I therefore most anxiously recommend that ample justice should be done to Captain Bates, and that if the Honorable the Governor in Council should agree in opinion with me upon this subject, he should give orders that a copy of this letter should be published in orders by the commanding officer in Guzerat.

‘ 5. When making extracts from the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, which tend in my opinion to establish the facts stated in the second paragraph of this letter, I have thought it proper to make others which, in my opinion, ought to meet the eye of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

‘ 6. The detachment of European troops under Captain Bates, some of which had not been six months in India, when only one march from Surat, were not supplied with their regular provisions. It appears that the committee were not unapprized of this fact, and that the complaints of the troops were loud, and that they were becoming sickly in consequence of the want of provisions.

‘ 7. This want appears fully established; and as it could not have occurred in such a situation unless some person was in fault, I hope that the Honorable the Governor in Council

will mark with his decided disapprobation the person who has been guilty of a neglect of duty in this instance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ G. O.

‘ By Government. }

‘ Bombay Castle.

‘ The Court of Enquiry, of which the proceedings are now published, preceded by a letter from Major General Jones, in his capacity of commandant of the garrison of Surat, having, some time ago, been instituted at the recommendation of the Honorable Major General Wellesley, and that officer having expressed his opinion on the merits of the case, an extract of his letter to the secretary to government stands after the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry, which include the other extract to which his observations make reference.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd October, 1803.

‘ I have derived great satisfaction from the perusal of your letters of the 4th and 7th, and I assure you that you are getting on much better than I could have expected with your defective means.

‘ I think that Canojee will not engage in an action with you, but he will retire; you must then guide yourself according to the circumstances of the country, the state of your supplies and resources, and of your force compared with that of the enemy, whether you will move upon Ougein.

‘ It is not possible for me, at this distance from the scene, to do more than give you a general outline, and to communicate to you the information I have of the enemy’s actual force. To beat or drive away Canojee must be your first object; the security of Guzerat your next.

‘ If there were not in that quarter a number of little low objects which are always in view with the native governments, and which the British influence in that quarter rather encourage and promote than discourage, I should think it very possible to connect the security of Guzerat with an invasion of Ougein.

‘ However, I have not sufficient information upon the subject, and I must leave the decision to yourself.

‘ Scindiah was levying a new brigade at Ougein, he has

besides I believe there two or three battalions of Filosé's corps. Besides this, I learn from Colonel Stevenson that the beaten infantry has gone that way from Asseerghur, sixteen of their European officers and serjeants have come over to the Colonel, and he says that they are entirely ruined by the battle of the 23rd of September, and never can be formed into corps again.

‘ Holkar certainly went in the beginning of this month to Boondy and Kotao, far to the northward. Scindiah had two brigades of infantry to the northward of the Nerbudda besides Filosé's, and the one to be newly raised; but I believe that they went to the Rajpoots countries, and at all events their European officers have left them.

‘ Ougein is a large city, surrounded by a wall in a ruinous state in many places.

‘ Communicate with Major Walker upon the subject of all your treaties with the Bheels and other rajahs, in order that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements with them and Anund Rao respectively.

‘ In regard to your revenue concerns, I approve entirely of your settling the country as you go on, as I know that it is the only mode of securing and of having a tranquil rear. But the Bombay government have thrown into Major Walker's hands the revenue management of all the districts conquered from Scindiah, and it will be necessary that you should make them over to him. This will save you a great deal of detailed trouble; and as Major Walker must have good revenue servants, it may be a beneficial arrangement for your military operations.

‘ I have received an hircarra report, which I believe, that Colonel Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st. He certainly got possession of Burhampoor without opposition on the 15th. Scindiah is at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, about fifty miles west from hence. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and is gone towards Chandore, with what view I do not know. As Scindiah, however, intended to impede Colonel Stevenson's operations at Asseerghur, and I came down this ghaut to stop him, it is possible that they may be separated, and the Rajah may move more south in order to draw me off again, and leave Scindiah at liberty to act against Colonel Stevenson.

‘ I wrote yesterday about Captain Bates.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel Murray.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Ciose,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 23rd October, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 18th. I have no reason to suspect Goklah of disaffection. Like every other Marhatta, he wants money. Poonah is the focus of his intrigues, and he is worked upon by the reports which come from thence.

‘ If we could establish any thing like a cordial communication or a solid community of interest with the Peshwah which would be apparent to the world, or if we could even know what the Peshwah is about, or what is going on at his durbar, in the first case, there would be an end of these intrigues; and in the second, they would give us no anxiety, and we should be able with one word to calm that of our friends. But we know more of what passes in the durbar of the enemy than we do of what passes in that of the Peshwah.

‘ There is no doubt whatever of the communication between the enemy and the southern chiefs, and that the former are moving heaven and earth to prevail upon the latter to act against us. Our victories and successes and the disposition of our troops to the southward have kept them in check hitherto, and they will continue to have that effect. But would it not be advisable to employ agents to observe the councils and intentions of these chiefs, and to spend money and exert ourselves for this purpose?

‘ The Marhattas have been famous for corruption, but we have never touched them upon that point.

‘ Mulwa Dada has not 500 men, instead of 5000, and if Captain Graham would only exert himself to raise the peons I ordered two months ago, he would drive out in one day the rascals who have kept us in hot water in that district ever since I left it; merely because Captain Graham began upon a principle of employing small detachments of infantry against them, ill formed in every respect, which were obliged to retreat. I have ordered a detachment out against Chumargoonda, which will relieve that place; but I must give you notice that one-eighth of the disasters of which you have heard from Captain Graham need not be believed.

‘ The worst article of intelligence in your letter is the stoppage of the supply of money for bills on Bombay. I have desired

Bellingham to send you blank bills drawn at short dates, which I hope will produce it again. But if they do not, we must give the game up almost immediately as lost, for without money I cannot carry on the war.

‘ In return for your bad news, I have the pleasure to inform you that I have reason to believe that Colonel Stevenson took possession of the fort of Asseerghur on the 21st. He writes on the 19th, that the infantry which had collected between that place and Burhampoor was gone off towards the Nerbudda. Sixteen of the European officers, serjeants, &c., had come in to him on the terms of the proclamation, among whom were Colonel Dupont, Captain Mercier, and Captain Mann. The Colonel says the infantry had been so completely destroyed, that they never could be collected again in corps, or be of any use to Scindiah.

‘ Scindiah has come as far as Ahoonah, and intended to make an effort to relieve Asseerghur. But he halted when he heard that I had come down the ghaut, and he was still at Ahoonah yesterday. Ragojee has separated from him, and it is said is gone towards Chandore, to pass to the southward through that ghaut.* This report is circulated, I imagine, to induce me to return to the southward and leave Scindiah at liberty to pursue his plans against Colonel Stevenson, or he may pass the ghaut with that view. However, I shall hold my ground till I am certain that we have Asseerghur, and then possibly I may ascend the ghaut again, and wait till I see what are decidedly Ragojee’s plans.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

* ‘ Six roads up the ghauts are now open. Here it may not be out of place to mention, that, immediately on coming to our ground each day, the neighbouring villagers, or rather some of the most consequence amongst them, are sent for, and the Captain of the Guides, after comparing their accounts, takes down all the necessary information relative to the roads to the flanks and front, where and in what quantity water is procurable; this is the main object of enquiry, unless where ghauts are to be passed, or rivers forded; the latter, however, rarely occurs. After the camp has been pitched and the men been refreshed, the Officers of Pioneers examine the adjoining roads, and take care that a passage to the front and one to each flank are prepared, at least for the distance of one mile. Such, or nearly similar precautions, are of course in general use.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR, ‘Camp at Adjunttee, 25th October, 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant and its enclosures.

‘2. When I had the honor last to address you, by desire of Lieut. General Stuart, upon the subject of the supplies to be furnished by Bombay for the use of the troops about to march from the Toombuddra to Poonah, I calculated them for the whole army which was assembled at Hurryhur, under the command of his Excellency in the month of March, but for a limited period of time, and for a state of operations far within that on which the troops under my command have since been employed.

‘3. I was aware that General Stuart had made a requisition for a still larger supply, for the use of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, which I had not included in my calculation.

‘4. My address of the 11th instant was intended to recall these circumstances to your recollection, to point out to you that I had reason to expect a supply of rice at Bombay to the amount of 600 garces; that I had no other resource; and that consequently I hoped you would give orders that the supply might not be discontinued, and that it might be replenished from Canara.

‘5. In the letter which I have had the honor to receive from you, it appears that the statement in my letter of the 11th is erroneous, and that I have received the quantity of rice which I expected: I do not deny that it has been received by the troops, all of whom are placed under my command; but not by those for whom it was calculated, and whom I must have had in contemplation when I wrote that I had not yet received 600 garces of rice.

‘6. Upon this occasion those troops may be classed in three divisions: first, those serving in the territories to the northward; secondly, the division which marched to Poonah under Colonel Murray, and is now commanded by Lieut. Colonel Coleman; thirdly, the division of troops under my immediate command.

‘7. In respect to the troops serving to the northward, I never could include them in my calculation of supplies required for those serving in this quarter. Indeed, I never imagined that it could be necessary that they should be supplied

from Bombay, as the scene of their service has the reputation of being the most plentiful spot in India. At all events, supposing it to be necessary to supply them from Bombay, their food could not be called an extraordinary call upon the resources of that presidency, as it must have been supplied at all events if I had never appeared in this country. Their supply, therefore, in my opinion, ought not to be included in the 600 garces respecting which I had the honor of addressing you.

‘ 8. When I was approaching Poonah, I had the honor of addressing you respecting the arrangement to be made for the food of the troops under the command of Colonel Murray ; and in answer to my letter upon that subject, I was informed that it was not necessary that I should make any arrangements for their subsistence, and that every thing that was necessary should be done by the Government of Bombay. These troops likewise subsisted on the resources of Bombay before I arrived at Poonah ; and in making a calculation of the extraordinary call upon those resources, it was not to be expected that I should include their consumption ; in my opinion, therefore, the consumption of the troops of this division ought not to be included in the 600 garces.

‘ 9. It is true that the stores from which that division and those which the division of troops under my immediate command have been fed, have been received ; but the accounts of the issues from those stores have been kept separate, and it will not be difficult to ascertain what quantity has been issued to the troops of Colonel Murray’s or Colonel Coleman’s brigade.

‘ 10. The remainder of the grain sent to Panwell which has been the consumption of this division of the army, and forms the store at Ahmednuggur, or the store at Poonah (although that is applicable solely to the consumption of the brigade under Colonel Coleman) is what ought properly to be carried to account against the 600 garces upon which I calculated.

‘ 11. I have the same objection to the account of the salt meat and spirits said to have been received on my requisition, that I have to the account of the rice ; a great proportion of the former, and the greatest proportion of the latter, have been consumed by Colonel Coleman’s brigade. However, I should have made a further requisition for measures to be taken to provide larger quantities of salt provision and spirits, if I had imagined there could have been any want of them, when I

made the first requisition in January last; as I mentioned in the second paragraph of this letter, although I provided for a larger body of troops, I had not in contemplation operations of such extent or duration.

‘ 12. I beg leave to allude, in this place, to the enclosure, No. 4, in your letter, being an account of the number of bullocks which have been sent from Bombay for the service of the army above the ghauts. I have not received one of the 10,351 bullocks specified in that return, excepting 1000 carriage bullocks which were received from Colonel Murray’s corps when I marched from Poonah. I am not aware of the number that have been received for the Pontoon establishment.

‘ 13. In respect to our future demands, in my opinion I ought to have 4000 bullock bags of 144 pounds each, in each of the months of November and December; and I imagine that when the deductions which I have above specified have been made from the consumption, more than that quantity will remain of the 600 garces.

‘ 14. In the next year, if Colonel Coleman’s brigade is to be included, provision ought to be made to supply 1000 garces instead of 600, for which I wrote in my letter of the 11th. I cannot include the troops in the territories to the northward, as I can make no calculation of their consumption.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th October, 1803.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that Colonel Stevenson took possession of the city of Burhampoor, without opposition, on the 16th instant; he marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, took possession of the Pettah on the 18th, opened a battery against the fort on the 20th, and obtained possession of it on the morning of the 21st. I have not yet received a detailed account of the manner in which Colonel Stevenson obtained possession of this important fortress, or whether he sustained any loss in the attack of the Pettah on the 18th, or of the fort.

‘ After I had arrived at Phoolmurry, about sixteen miles north from Aurungabad, I found that the enemy did not advance to the southward, as I had been informed they first

intended; and in the night of the 15th I received a particular account of the disposition of their troops, baggage, &c., which convinced me that they intended to interrupt Colonel Stevenson's operations at Asseerghur.

‘ I therefore marched on the 16th to the northward, and descended the ghaut on the 19th. Scindiah had moved to the northward, but he halted as soon as he found I had returned; and he was yesterday at Ahoonah on the Taptee. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and it is said has gone towards Chandore. I suspect that the report has been circulated with a view to draw me to the southward again; but as Colonel Stevenson has got possession of Asseerghur, and is fully equal to any thing that can be sent against him, it is my intention to re-ascend the ghaut immediately.

‘ Sixteen officers and serjeants belonging to the Campoos have joined Colonel Stevenson under your Excellency's proclamation of the 29th of August. I will hereafter send a list of the names, and an account of the pay each is to receive. The infantry retired towards the Nerbudda when Colonel Stevenson approached Burhampoor, and by all accounts it is completely destroyed and disorganized. It is impossible to form it into corps again, and it is not probable that it will ever be of any service to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I have directed Colonel Stevenson to leave a garrison in Asseerghur, and to deliver the districts depending upon that fortress to the charge of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan. Your Excellency will observe that this is the last of the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the Deccan; and the operations of the troops will now be directed against those of the Rajah of Berar.

‘ By reports which I have received from Colonel Murray, I observe that he was likely to be at Godra about the 9th or 10th instant, which place is on the road to, and, I imagine, not more than 100 miles distant from, Ougein. But as the troops in that part of India are incomplete in numbers, and the troops remarkably unhealthy, the 65th regiment in particular having only 100 men fit for duty, although they had 900 when they arrived at Bombay in May last, I fear that Colonel Murray's corps is not sufficiently strong to advance upon Ougein.

‘ Besides this deficiency of strength, the existence of the domestic war in Guzerat against Canojee, which might be fatal

to Colonel Murray if he should advance, unless he should be so fortunate as first to defeat Canojee, must prevent this desirable movement, even if, by the recovery of the health of the troops, Colonel Murray should become sufficiently strong.

‘ On the other hand, an attack upon Ougein from this quarter would leave exposed the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and would render it necessary to defer, or possibly to forego altogether, the attack which I propose to make on the territories of the Rajah of Berar, which is, in my opinion, the most likely to produce a peace.

‘ Since I forwarded to your Excellency the copies of my correspondence with Ballojee Koonger on the subject of peace, I have received various messages and letters through different channels on the same subject, but all written or delivered by persons not having any official character, and unauthorized, which are not deserving of your Excellency’s notice, and, therefore, I do not transmit copies of them. I have uniformly referred them to the answer which I wrote to Ballojee Koonger.

‘ It is reported that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have quarrelled; that the latter intends to endeavor to obtain a peace through the mediation of Amrut Rao, and the former through that of the Peshwah, or by secret negotiation. Excepting that these Chiefs have separated their armies, I have no reason to believe that they have quarrelled, and I can give your Excellency no information to enable you to form a judgment of the truth of the remainder of the report.

‘ I think it probable, however, that negotiations for peace will soon be commenced by both those chiefs. I can only assure your Excellency that I shall not suffer them to be carried on in any channel in which the result can be influenced or the conclusion delayed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Adjunttee, 25th October, 1803.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant, in which you have enclosed copies of your dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ 2. These contain intelligence of a most important and

delicate nature. It is very obvious that his Highness the Soubah is not aware of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British Government. In fact, his government could not stand, and would not have stood one day without the powerful support which it has received.

‘ 3. The war in which the British Government is engaged is in support of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Marhatta Chiefs to remove from his Highness’s territories the large armies which they had collected for the purpose of invading them. The remote cause may be supposed to be the treaty of Bassein; but however desirable in other respects to the British Government that treaty might have been, the completion of it was a most essential object with a view to the security of the Nizam, and his Highness derives the advantage of that treaty at this moment.

‘ 4. In the war thus entered into for his Highness’s interests, in which the greatest exertions have been made by the British Government, and the most complete success has attended them, his Highness calculated how far the terms of his treaty with the British Government are to lead him. I do not recollect the terms of the treaty, but the principle and spirit of it is, protection on the part of the British Government, which his Highness has received, and co-operation and assistance to the fullest extent on that of his Highness. Without quibbling upon words, it would not be difficult to show that, in such a war as this, the admittance into his Highness’s forts of our small detachments and convoys is an essential assistance, which his Highness is bound even by the terms of the treaty to give.

‘ 5. However, considering the coolness which exists between his Highness and his minister, and the declared sentiments of his Highness at the time at which he was partially reconciled to him, it is my opinion, that it will be useless to make any representation to his Highness at present upon the subject either of his declaration upon that occasion, or of his erroneous conception of his engagement under the treaty of defensive alliance. For the same reason, I think that it would be prudent to defer to come to any explanation with his Highness upon the subject to which I drew your attention in my letter of the 18th and 24th instant.

‘ 6. It appears to me, that his Highness’s mind is irritated, and that he has no notion of his real situation, or his true interests. The agitation of the topics above alluded to, however desirable, will only increase this irritation, may be the cause of the adoption of some violent step respecting the Minister, and will certainly answer no good purpose. In time, his Highness will perceive the candor and honor of the British Government in all its transactions; and the delivery of the territory depending upon Asseerghur and Burhampoor to the officers of his Highness’s government, will be a striking proof of those qualities, as well as of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British Government.

‘ 7. I must endeavor to work through the war without the assistance of his magazines; and in case of negotiations for peace, to bring them to a successful conclusion, notwithstanding the intrigues which I anticipate.

‘ 8. The Rajah of Berar has passed through the ghauts, and was near the Godavery. I have therefore returned to the southward, and have apprized the killadars of my movements, in order that they may hold out. I have gone so far as to threaten them, in case they should pay any contribution that he may attempt to levy before I can reach him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Pahlood, 26th October, 1803.

‘ In my opinion, Purneah’s thieves ought to be hanged. There is no other way of putting a stop to these robberies; and I am not quite certain that it would not be best to send six to be hanged at Saugoly, two at Goorgerry, and two at the post on the Kistna, and the remainder at Hurryhur. If you agree in opinion on this subject, I will give orders that the thieves may be escorted and executed accordingly. Coleman should keep his post at present; hereafter, when I shall have brought up the Rajah of Berar, I will write respecting the attack you have proposed. I am moving to the southward with all expedition.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Pahlod, 26th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th, and Sydenham’s report of the campaign to the northward, up to the 17th September. Every thing appears to prosper, and I hope we shall soon bring the war to a conclusion.

‘ Since the battle of Assye, I have been like a man who fights with one hand and defends himself with the other. With Colonel Stevenson’s corps I have acted offensively, and have taken Asseerghur ; and with my own, I have covered his operations, and defended the territories of the Nizam and the Peshwah. In doing this, I have made some terrible marches, but I have been remarkably fortunate : first, in stopping the enemy when they intended to pass to the southward, through the Casserbarry ghaut ; and afterwards, by a rapid march to the northward, in stopping Scindiah, when he was moving to interrupt Colonel Stevenson’s operations against Asseerghur ; in which he would otherwise have undoubtedly succeeded.

‘ I moved up the ghaut as soon as Colonel Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur ; and I think that, in a day or two, I shall turn Ragojee Bhoonslah, who has passed through to the southward. At all events, I am in time to prevent him doing any mischief.

‘ I think that we are in great style to be able to act on the offensive at all in this quarter ; but it is only done by the celerity of our movements, and by acting on the offensive or defensive with either corps, according to their situation, and that of the enemy.

‘ Sydenham’s account of Scindiah’s force is tolerably correct. We understand, however, that Pohlmann’s brigade of eight battalions was called the 1st, which was destroyed on the 23rd of September : the two other brigades in that action are not accounted for by Sydenham ; they were four battalions of Begum Sumroo, and four battalions of Dupont. The latter was formerly Filosé’s, and was entirely destroyed by Holkar, in the action at Ougein. It was raised at Poonah, and was not under Perron’s command.

‘ Doudernaigue’s brigade, the 4th, of six battalions ; and

Brownrigg's, as the 5th, of four or five battalions, are in Hindustan; I believe, at present, in the Rajpoot countries.

'According to Sydenham's, and this account, these are the only two brigades that have not been engaged, and are not destroyed; excepting, possibly, one or two battalions of Begum Sumroo's, and one of Pohlmann's which were sent off with the baggage at the commencement of the battle of Assye.

'Besides these, I understand that some of the troops of Dupont's brigade, and some belonging to a brigade now raising, are at Ougein.

'How unfortunate it is that we have not Guzerat in style! If we had, I should immediately have a corps from that province on the back either of Scindiah's troops on the Taptee, or of his brigade in the Rajpoot countries; and thus put an end to the war by one blow.

'You will see that we shake at Hyderabad; but Heshmut Jung*, with all his faults, certainly manages well that durbar; and I have written to him to suggest that he should, for the present, desist from all teasing remonstrances upon trifling objects, and endeavor to convince the Nizam that a sense of his true interests, as well as the spirit of his treaty with the Company, should lead him to co-operate heartily in the common cause.

'I saw your brother yesterday, and he is doing well: indeed, all the wounded officers and men are fast recovering†.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

'Pray do not forget to send us money round to Bombay, as that presidency is in great distress. That is the only want which I now fear; for I believe I have settled the rice concern, but that very settlement creates a want of money.'

* Major Fitzpatrick.

† 'Visiting the sick officers and the wounded, we heard of General Wellesley's liberality to them: the evening we left this last, he sent into every one a dozen of Madeira from his stock, and that wine is neither cheap nor plentiful; to-day, he was in amongst them before the camp was pitched, making enquiries which are as honorable to his feelings as they are agreeable and gratifying to the poor invalids. The men have every comfort which can be afforded from the camp, or procured here, which I fear are not very numerous; indeed, the refugees from the adjoining parts, and Scindiah's wounded men, are dying here every day, in want of the commonest or coarsest food.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR, ‘ Phoolmurry, 28th October, 1803.

‘ I lose not a moment to apprise you, that I have received intelligence that Scindiah has returned across the Taptee, and it is said that he is going up the Sindwah ghaut, and then across the Nerbudda to Ougein. We have taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur, and Scindiah has lately been deserted by vast numbers of his horse. His infantry are entirely destroyed, that is to say, those corps which were engaged at Assye.

‘ I am now employed in driving out the Rajah of Berar, who has come into the southward upon a predatory excursion. Colonel Stevenson is watching Scindiah to the northward. As soon as I shall have got rid of the Rajah of Berar, I shall take up Colonel Stevenson’s place, and send him into Berar to besiege Gawilghur and lay hold of Nagpoor. We cannot venture into Hindustan till I shall thus have secured our right flank.

‘ I have the honor, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Ballojee Koonger.

‘ 30th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter (its contents recapitulated), and Colonel Stevenson has transmitted to me a Persian letter, in which you have informed him that Mahomed Meer Khan was about to be sent on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see Meer Khan. I will receive him in a manner suitable to his rank, and I will pay every attention to what he may have to communicate.

‘ *Ballojee Koonger.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Mahomed Meer Khan.

‘ 30th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter, and Mirza Wahed Beg has communicated to me what you desired he should, and Colonel Stevenson has sent me different letters which you have written to him, and one which Ballojee Koonger has written to him in the Persian language, by which I learn that you are coming here on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see you, and

will receive you with the honors due to your rank and character, and I shall pay every attention to what you may have to communicate.

‘ Mirza Wahed Beg will inform you of the arrangement which I have made for a guard to meet you. I enclosed a letter to the officers in the service of the Company, and their allies, to desire that you may be suffered to pass in security to my camp.

‘ You will hear at Adjuttee at what place you may find my camp.

‘ *Mahomed Meer Khan.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 31st October, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 19th instant with its enclosure, being the copy of one from Messrs. Forbes and Co., and Messrs. Bruce, Faucett, and Co.

‘ 2. As far as I am concerned in the property captured at Baroach, I am of opinion that the proposition of those gentlemen is very reasonable, and that it ought to be complied with.

‘ 3. In respect to the letter from those gentlemen, it might probably have been as well to have omitted all the injurious expressions and reflections which it contains.

‘ 4. I have not by me at present any papers or documents to which I can refer, and I write solely from memory. But as well as I can recollect, his Majesty has reserved to himself the disposal of the property in all forts captured in India, in the operations against which his troops may be employed with those of the Company, excepting military stores, half of which are by charter granted to the Company.

‘ 5. His Majesty has been graciously pleased, from time to time, to grant this property to the troops employed in the capture of the fort in which it might be found, and occasionally the Supreme British Authority in India has taken upon itself to anticipate his Majesty’s intention, and to give the property to the troops; and this is the claim which the troops have to prize property.

‘ 6. The question respecting the property belonging to British merchants found at Baroach is, whether it is included in that reserved by his Majesty in his Royal Charter. Those

concerned in the capture, I conclude, think it is; the merchants think it is not. But surely there is no occasion for interference or acrimony of expression, on reflection, in urging the claim of either party.

‘ 7. Whatever may be the fate of the property hereafter, it is certain that, if it had not been for the gallantry of the troops who took Baroach, it would never have come into the hands of the British merchants; and it might be as well, possibly, to refrain from accusing of injustice and unjustifiable measures, those to whom such benefits are to be attributed, only because they state their doubts respecting the real ownership of the property, which, according to the writers of the same paper that contains these accusations, is a question involving points of a peculiar and delicate nature.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Government, Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ Camp at Naundair Barry, four Coss N.E. from

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, Puttun, 31st October, 1803.

‘ As soon as I was certain that Asseerghur was in our hands, I determined to march to the southward to give a check to Ragojee Bhoonslah, leaving Colonel Stevenson to watch Scindiah.

‘ This is my second halt from the bottom of the Ferdapoor ghaut; the distance is, I believe, nearly one hundred miles. Ragojee Bhoonslah’s camp was in my sight from a hill at the distance of twenty miles all this morning, but he went off when I arrived within seven miles of him. It is said that he has escaped along the Godavery. I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th. He heard of it on that night. He marched three times, on the night before last and yesterday, and once this day. He has a vast quantity of baggage and a number of tents, and I do not despair of coming up with him. I have pushed him so hard already, that he has not had time to do much mischief, excepting to the small villages*. A large convoy of Colonel

* ‘ In the rear of the left of our regiment there is a rose garden (I am told they are numerous and extensive in Hindustan); a Mussulman came to protect it; but the stubborn hearts of the bullock drivers could not be softened by any thing he said; they drove the artillery of the park through it. This reminds

Stevenson's and mine, 14,000 bullocks, is safe on the Godavery, within reach of me, and Ragojee dares not go near it.

' Amrut Rao has not joined him, but is at Toka. The alarm in Ragojee's camp is very great. There is no occasion for Colonel Coleman sending the detachment to protect the tappall.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

' SIR,

' Camp, 2nd November, 1803.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th October. The enclosed letter to his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward after perusal, will show you the state of our military operations in this quarter.

' 2. In addition to that letter, I have to inform you that I have brought Captain Seton to trial before a General Court Martial, for disobedience of orders, in omitting to march from Dharore on the 21st of October, according to the orders he had received, by which the risk to which the convoy was exposed would have been avoided, and my movements against the enemy would not have been cramped by the necessity of taking care of it.

' 3. The officer in charge of the treasure is at Dharore, and I shall send a detachment to-morrow to bring him in.

' 4. I cannot express to you how much I am distressed, and how much the public cause suffers by the total want of means of defence in this country. In order to save it this last time, I have been obliged to march 120 miles, and to pass through the Adjunttee and Chowka ghauts in eight days; and when I arrived, all the amildars were in treaty with the enemy to pay me to mention in this place, that although this division, which, including followers, who are the most determined plunderers, cannot be reckoned at less than 40,000 men, has now marched three times over the same road, and been encamped near Phoolmurry for four days, not a village has been pillaged or injured, indeed, rarely entered, except by the lower servants of the public departments: stacked grain remains now untouched; that in the village granaries has never been drawn from thence, but at fair prices; not a man has fled from any village on this line, as far as I know or believe. Had any native army passed once, it is not improbable that it could not, without difficulty, have subsisted itself a second time on the same route.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

contributions. Notwithstanding that I had announced my intention of marching in this direction, desiring that they would defend themselves, and threatening them if they should make any accommodation with the enemy, those who received the notice paid no attention to it, and, at all events, did not communicate it to their neighbours.

‘ 5. As a proof of the ease with which the country could be defended, and our troops employed in the enemy’s districts, I mention that a jemidar and twenty men, who had been posted at Rackisbaum in charge of boats, and whom I have detained there since the river has fallen, in order to give confidence to the grain dealers going to the southward to purchase grain, saved that town, although Ragojee Bhoonslah was encamped near it with his army; when he marched off, the jemidar sallied out, took an elephant, some horses, and threw the baggage into confusion. If the Government of Hyderabad would have attended to your recommendation, this would have been the case with every village in the country.

‘ 6. In respect to the minister’s letter, I have again to observe, that I have been particularly cautious not to suffer any grain to be consumed in this camp which is brought by the grain dealers attached to the Nizam’s troops. It frequently happens that they come to this camp, and as regularly I send them off with an escort to that of the Nizam. Colonel Stevenson informs me that he is equally cautious upon this subject.

‘ 7. I am fully aware that it is very desirable to carry the war into Berar, and I have no doubt but that, unless we do carry it there, we shall have no peace. But the question is, can the war be carried into Berar unless the Soubah of the Deccan defends his country? and is he, or his ministers, willing to submit to the loss, which must be incurred, by exposing it to invasions, undefended by a British army, in its present state *?

* ‘ To describe the means used by the natives of India to remove calamity, far exceeds my ability; they are, however, generally such as cunning and intrigue dictate, rather than any generous efforts, either of resistance or resignation. A fellow to day offered two hundred rupees to our advanced guide if he would lead the army a little to either hand, so as to avoid the village in which his property lay. General Wellesley is at all times extremely particular in his attention to the villages; he has always from twenty to forty orderly men who march in front and on the flanks, and two or three of them are ordered into every place we pass, where they stay at the gates until the whole army and

‘ 8. If the war should be carried into Berar, I conceive that the Soubah will not be exonerated from the necessity of storing his forts with grain ; and I certainly should think the expedition into that country a matter of some risk, if the only dependence of the subsistence of troops was the grain which they should find in the Rajah’s territories.

‘ 9. Although the smaller forts are in the hands of the zemindars and others, it is to be supposed that there is some mode of obliging them to keep them in repair, to have garrisons in them, and to defend them. If something is not done on this subject, I must confine the operations of the troops to a strict defensive.

‘ 10. I conclude that the Soubah’s mind will have been satisfied upon the subject of the division of the conquered territory, since that depending upon Burhampoor and Asseerghur has been delivered over to the officers of this Government. But he has no occasion to complain respecting the territory depending upon Ahmednuggur, as the district of Jalnapoor, which was included in that territory, has been given over to him.

‘ 11. But this question respecting territory ought not now to be taken into consideration at all. Under the treaty, the parties have agreed that they will adjust the rule of partition of all conquests, and that his Highness the Nizam shall be entitled to participate equally with the Company. But the meaning of the treaty is that they may adjust the rule of partition of conquest after the war ; and, therefore, putting out of the question all considerations of the Nizam’s right to participate equally with the Company, connected with the non-performance of his engagements, it does not appear to me necessary to give any other answer to this part of the minister’s letter excepting to state the fact, that the Soubah’s servants have possession of Jalnapoor, which is part of Ahmednuggur, and of the districts depending on Burhampoor and Asseerghur,

followers have gone by : these men resist the entrance of any of the lower orders, and even of the officers, if it seems to occasion alarm to the inhabitants. In villages near camp, they are also always placed for the same purposes. The natives derive not only confidence from this treatment, but their reliance on his protection makes them pass the bounds of respect to any officer occasionally going in, as I have often experienced in my evening rambles. I admire the cause, and can easily perceive that the effect must, in the end, claim the favorable opinion even of the persons who now abuse generosity which they cannot justly estimate, and which it is foreign to their nature to return.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

and that the question of participation in conquests is one to be considered at the conclusion of the war.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd November, 1803.

‘ After I had sent off my dispatch of the 24th of October to your Excellency, I received authentic accounts that the Rajah of Berar had passed through the hills which form the boundary of Candeish, and had moved towards the river Godavery. I therefore ascended the Adjunttee ghaut on the 25th, and continued my march to the southward on the 26th, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th.

‘ The Rajah had advanced gradually to the eastward, and was at Luckagaum, about twenty miles north from Puttun, when I arrived at Aurungabad; and between that night and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which time I was in his neighbourhood, he moved his camp five times.

‘ On the 31st, he detached a body consisting of 5000 horse to endeavor to intercept a convoy consisting of 14,000 bullocks, which was going forward to join the troops on the frontier. This convoy was protected by three companies of the 2nd battalion of 3rd Madras native infantry, with two 3-pounders under Captain Baynes: which detachment, with 400 Mysore horse, has for some time been employed in conveying grain from the districts south of the Godavery to my camp, and by a company from the subsidiary force, and two companies from the corps serving at Hyderabad, under the command of Captain Seton.

‘ They had marched from the Godavery on the morning of the 31st, and reached Umber, where they were attacked: they succeeded in beating off the enemy, and in securing the convoy, which arrived in safety in my camp yesterday, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers by which they were attacked.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of the reports of this action, which I have received from Captain Baynes; upon which I have to observe, that it affords another instance of what can be done, by disciplined infantry, determined to do their duty, against very superior numbers of cavalry.

‘ I beg leave also to take this opportunity to draw your Lord-

ship's notice to the Mysore cavalry under Bisnapah Pundit. This corps, which consists of 2000 men, have performed all the light troop duties of this division of the army, since I was detached from the Toombuddra, in the month of March last. They have performed these duties with the utmost cheerfulness, and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this description. They have frequently been engaged with the enemy's light troops, have conducted themselves well, and have lost many men and horses.

‘ To the credit of the Government of Mysore, I mention that they are paid as regularly as the British troops; and the consequence is, that it is possible to keep them in order and from plundering the country. It is to their example that I attribute the conduct of the Marhatta troops serving with this division of the army, and of which I have no reason to complain.

‘ The Rajah of Berar has moved to the eastward, and I think he is going to his own territories. I have no doubt but that he would have been obliged to do so, even without my presence in these districts, if any one step had been taken by the government for their protection, or, I might add, if there existed any government in the country. It is now obvious that horse alone cannot make any impression on a country; and if there had been only a few peons in the villages, as has been frequently recommended to the government of Hyderabad by the Resident, the Rajah must have lost the whole of his baggage in the confused and precipitate flight which he has made since I have been in this neighbourhood.

‘ The government of Hyderabad appear determined to do nothing in their own defence; and your Excellency will be surprised to learn that even the city of Aurungabad, in which so many of his Highness's relations, and the families of so many of his sirdars reside, is held by 500 men of the old French Infantry, who, I have every reason to believe, are a part of the corps which, under the treaty, ought to be in the field.

‘ This conduct in the government of Hyderabad will, I much fear, put it out of my power to carry the war into Berar as I wish, unless the Rajah should retire towards Nagpoor. I am convinced, however, that, until I am enabled to carry the war into that country, no progress will have been made towards procuring a peace.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah moved to the eastward as soon as I

ascended the Adjunttee ghaut, and he was at Eedlabad on the 29th of October.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Captain Baynes to the Deputy Adjutant General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Umber, 31st October, 1803.

‘ I beg you will report to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, that I was attacked this day about two o’clock, P.M., by about 4000 or 5000 horse. They came on at first as if determined to charge, but receiving a few shot from our guns, they retired; and though they frequently came near us, as if to charge, and some of them within musket shot, they were always driven back.

‘ Our loss is one European wounded, two sepoy wounded, and some Mysoreans killed and wounded, besides a few (perhaps three) horses killed. The loss of the enemy is much greater, particularly in horses. I beg you to say to the General that I shall take post till I shall receive his instructions. I write this by moonlight, which will, I hope, apologise for haste. We were under arms till about sunset, at which time they were out of sight.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ T. BAYNES, Captain,

‘ *Captain Barclay, Dep. Adj. Gen.*’

‘ Commanding a Detachment.

Captain Baynes to the Deputy Adjutant General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Umber, 1st November, 1803.

‘ I last night had the honor to inform you, that I had repulsed a body of Bhoonslah’s horse, and have now, for the information of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to make you more fully informed of the circumstances.

‘ I arrived with my convoy about twelve o’clock, and encamped near the town, with my right flank to it, and my rear protected by a hill. At two o’clock P.M. the attack began, without more than ten minutes’ warning of their approach, by throwing great numbers of rockets and advancing upon our left: this obliged me to change my front by wheeling to the left; at the same time some of them were within musket shot. I then opened my guns, which stopped their approach; they at this time moved round, as if to gain the rear, where the brinjarries were. This movement obliged me to detach a party

to cover them, and having previously posted a company on the hill in my rear, my line became very small; to prevent their knowing my exact strength, I drew up the Mysore horse in one line. They came on repeatedly as if to charge, but were always stopped by our guns. They continued to rocket us till dark, when they retired. I am sorry to add that 100 of the gram bullocks were carried off, and some brinjarry bullocks (perhaps 100) while at grass. I have the honor to enclose a list of killed and wounded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ T. BAYNES, Captain,

‘ *Captain Barclay, Dep. Adj. Gen.*

‘ Commanding a Detachment.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 4th November, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 30th and 31st of October. You will see, in the enclosed letter to Mr. Duncan, an account of what I have been doing since the fall of Asseerghur. The express you sent me was, I know, intercepted; and it is desirable that you should not send expresses. The runners think that they must risk every thing to deliver them; they do not wait their opportunities as the common tappals, and in consequence they are carried off. I have heard, however, of Colonel Harcourt’s success. Tell Malcolm that he may now come on with great safety. Let him bring with him, however, the four hundred infantry of Purneah, which came up to Poonah with his baggage.

‘ I have heard from Webbe of the strange erroneous impressions at Madras respecting Mysore; but no impression made there can at all affect the situation of affairs in that quarter. The Governor General took that country into his own hands shortly after I marched.

‘ Webbe’s going to Mysore will, however, be useful and convenient in more than one respect, and so I have told him.

‘ I think we are shaking a little at Madras: I hear that the arrangement I had made in the bullock department, consequent on the death of poor Mackay, although the only one that could keep it, and consequently the army together, is disapproved of, and it is to be altered after the campaign. All this is very well, but the government, upon the present scale, cannot be carried on, as it has been, if confidence be not placed in the

persons employed, and if they and their acts are liable to misrepresentation in their absence.

‘ I will get from Appah Dessaye the letter you mention and send it to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Secretary of Government,
Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 5th November, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st, relative to the arrangements to be made with the chiefs of the Bheels in the Attavesy and Guzerat.

‘ 2. I had yesterday the honor of addressing you upon the subject of the revenue arrangements made by Colonel Murray, upon which I apprized you that I had addressed the Colonel privately. I have since referred to a copy of my letter to Colonel Murray, in which are the following words: “ In regard to your revenue concerns, I approve of your settling the country as you go on, and I know that this is the only mode of securing a tranquil rear. But the government of Bombay have thrown into Major Walker’s hands the revenue management of all the districts conquered from Scindiah, and it will be necessary that you should make them over to him. This will save you a great deal of detailed trouble; and as Major Walker must have good revenue servants, it may be a beneficial arrangement for your military operations.” This letter was dated the 23rd of October.

‘ 3. I observe that Colonel Murray has made a complete revenue settlement of the districts of Godra for one year; and as it appears that the Honorable the Governor in Council does not conceive that settlement contains anything objectionable, and as to depart from it may occasion difficulties and disturbances in the country, and will certainly create an impression very unfavorable to our good faith, I must anxiously recommend that Major Walker may be directed not only to abide by the general terms of it in favor of the inhabitants, but to keep in employment the person whom it appears Colonel Murray has appointed to be a kind of farmer of the revenue. It may then be hoped that no inconvenience will be felt from the change of authority.

‘ 4. I believe that Godra is the last of Scindiah’s possessions

in Guzerat: if it should not be so, it would be proper that he should send his servants with the troops, with directions in what manner to settle the countries which will be handed over to them by Colonel Murray.

‘5. In respect to the Bheels, I wrote to Colonel Murray as follows, in the same letter of the 23rd of October: “Communicate with Major Walker upon the subject of all your treaties with the Bheel and other Rajahs, in order that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements with them and Rajah Anund Rao respectively.”

‘6. In my letter of the 2nd of August, I stated to the Governor in Council my opinion generally upon this subject. The greater experience I have of this people, the more convinced I am that the course which I then recommended to be adopted respecting them is the best. Colonel Murray with great truth says, “It is not to be expected that the Bheels and Chieftains will remain attached to us without some prospect of advantage:” those which they have had hitherto are trifling, and cannot be supposed to have influenced their conduct; neither are they a description of people to be influenced for any length of time by the mild and civil language of the British agents towards them.

‘7. They feel strongly the oppression of the Marhatta government, and they are willing to close with any offer which holds out a prospect of a change: but when they find that the change which they have made is only of a more powerful, instead of a weak superior, that they are to continue to pay as they have done before, and to pay regularly, which probably they never did, they will become our most irreconcilable, and, from the situation and strength of their country, our worst enemies.

‘8. The question, whether the tribute payable by the Bheels ought to be remitted, may be viewed under two distinct hypotheses: one, if Scindiah’s territory in Guzerat should be restored to him at the peace; the other, if it should remain in the hands of the British Government.

‘9. I am not aware of the amount of the demand upon these Rajahs, but I should suppose it to be small, and not to be an object of consideration to the British Government, for the short period during which, in the first case, the country will be in our hands. At all events, it will not be one when compared

with the advantages of having those people for our friends during the war, and with that of returning them to Scindiah as discontented tributaries, who are close to his capital, and who must always hereafter be ready to join us in any contest in which we may be involved with that Chief.

‘ 10. If the country should remain in the hands of the British Government, the revenue payable by the Bheels becomes an object of greater consequence. But even in this case, the first question that occurs is, whether this war was undertaken to obtain an increase of revenue; and whether it is an object to obtain such military advantage as the possession of the defiles in the countries of the Bheels, and the assistance of these people, even at the expense of the remission of the tribute which they paid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before we obtained possession of the country?

‘ 11. But even if, as is supposed, we continue to enjoy the advantages which we at present possess in the countries of the Bheels, without a remission of the tribute, I doubt the policy of obliging them to continue to pay it: experience teaches us that tribute of this description cannot be collected from the inhabitants of the hilly and jungly tracts of India, without frequent appeals to arms. I have but little doubt the Company would have been richer, and I am convinced that the military reputation of the British nation would have stood higher, and that the power of Government would have been greater, if all tribute payable by hill polygars and rajahs had been originally remitted.

‘ 12. In this part of India, in particular, the policy of government should be cautiously to avoid involving themselves in hostilities such as those above described: their operations are very difficult and uncertain; they require large bodies of the best troops, numbers of men are generally lost, no credit is gained by success, and failure is disgraceful. The Government have no troops to spare in Guzerat to fight the battles which must eventually be the consequence of the demand of the tribute. They have not a sufficient army even to guard their own territory and that of their allies against the inroads of a foreign enemy, without the assistance of these Bheel Rajahs; and it may be depended upon, that a failure in a contest with one of them for tribute, an event which, as it has happened in other parts of India, may also be expected in Guzerat, will occasion

the loss of our reputation, which I believe will be found to be the strongest support of the British power in that quarter of India.

‘13. In respect to Rajah Anund Rao, there may be some objection to giving up his claims upon these Rajahs, on account of the difficulty of reconciling him to the measure; but if this difficulty did not exist, I should think it very desirable that he should give up all claims of this description; and, at all events, the British troops ought to have no part of the trouble of enforcing them on those Rajahs who cover the country from a foreign enemy, and to whom the Company may have remitted the tribute payable to their own government.

‘14. I am also of opinion that endeavors ought to be made to induce the Guickwar government to give up these claims, rather than that they should be encouraged to make them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Govt., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, 6th November, 1803.

‘I now proceed to give your Excellency a detailed account of Colonel Stevenson’s operations against Asseerghur.

‘On the 16th of October he advanced to Asseerghur, and encamped three miles south of the fort. The remains of the enemy’s infantry had fled towards the Nerbudda on the preceding day, in the state in which I reported them to be, in my letter of the 24th of October; and Colonel Stevenson therefore determined to attack Asseerghur.

‘On the 18th, he reconnoitred the fort, attended by a squadron of cavalry, and the picquets of the Native infantry; and having seen a favorable opportunity, attacked the pettah and carried it, and made a lodgment within one hundred and fifty yards of the lower wall of the fort. In the evening he reinforced the troops in the pettah by a battalion.

‘On the 19th all the preparations were made for carrying on the siege; and two batteries were ready to open at two o’clock in the afternoon of the 20th; one to breach the upper wall, and another, of four brass 12 pounders, to destroy the defences of the lower wall.

‘On the 18th Colonel Stevenson had sent a flag of truce to the killadar to summon him to surrender the fort, to which

message he did not receive a decided answer. The communication was continued; but Colonel Stevenson did not relax his operations against the fort, as there was reason to believe that the negotiation was carried on only to give time to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to come to its relief. Before opening his batteries, Colonel Stevenson apprized the killadar of the terms on which he should surrender the fort; which were, that the garrison should march out with their private property, and be allowed to go where they might think proper, and that their arrears should be paid to the amount of twenty thousand rupees.

‘ After the batteries had opened about an hour, a white flag was shown from the walls of the fort, which was the signal which had been agreed upon in case the terms should be accepted; hostages were sent down, and an engagement made that the fort should be delivered up on the following morning. It was accordingly evacuated, the garrison carried off their property in security, and received the sum agreed to be paid to them.

‘ Colonel Stevenson mentions in high terms the conduct of the officers and troops under his command; and I cannot omit to take this opportunity of expressing to your Excellency my sense of the merits of Colonel Stevenson, and of the body of troops under his command. Upon every occasion I have received from the Colonel the most cordial and zealous assistance; and the troops under his command are in the highest state of discipline and order, and fit for any service in which they can be employed.

‘ On the 16th, nine officers, four sergeants, and one matross, formerly in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, delivered themselves up to Colonel Stevenson, under your Excellency’s proclamation of the 29th of August.

‘ I have the honor to inclose a list of their names, and a copy of the order issued by Colonel Stevenson to provide for their subsistence. Lieut. Stuart also delivered himself up at Poonah in the end of the last month. I have called for accounts of the regulated pay and allowances which these persons received in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson, during the operations against Asseerghur. Hereafter I

shall have the honor of transmitting returns of the ordnance, stores, grain, and other property captured in that fort.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Killed 2 Rank and File.

‘ Wounded 5 Rank and File.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 6th November, 1803.

‘ I have nothing particular to tell you from this quarter, excepting that a vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is now on his road to camp; and I expect will be here in a day or two. You may believe that I am anxious to receive from Bengal accounts of the state of your negotiations with the Rajpoots, Jauts, &c., and of your military operations, of which I know nothing since the 18th of September; particularly how matters are getting on in Bundelcund.

‘ The Rajah of Berar is flying to the eastward as fast as he can along the Godavery. I have not heard that he has yet turned to the northward, but I expect he will; as Scindiah marched to the eastward in the valley of the Taptee and Poorna rivers. I know he passed Mulcapoor on the 30th of October, as it is said, on his way to Berar. This movement relieves us from all apprehension of his attacking the territories of the Nizam or the Peshwah, and immediately sets at liberty Colonel Stevenson’s corps, who will follow Scindiah into Berar. I think it very possible that the four armies may be in that country in a few days, which will be delightful to the Rajah of Berar.

‘ You will see in my letter to the Governor General of this day, that I have reported some property captured at Asseerghur. I wish he would make me acquainted with his sentiments upon the subject of these captures. You and I know well that there is nothing respecting which an army is so anxious, as its prize money. Excepting by the Governor General, the army in India have not been well used by government about prize; and they in particular are suspicious and anxious on the subject. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will urge him to give me his sentiments respecting it.

‘ Malcolm left Bombay on the 30th, on his return to the army.

‘ Believe me, &c.

,Major Shawe.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 7th November, 1803.

‘ We are all in confusion on the Kistna and to the southward, in consequence of a report that Succaram Ghautky was coming to attack the post there, which has been circulated in the first instance by an hircarrah of Sir W. Clarke. The consequence is, that the officer in command on the Kistna has taken upon himself to order back Purneah’s battalion that was marching up with Malcolm’s baggage, and has called for a reinforcement from Hullihall, which that fort has sent him, and that post is left almost without a man.

‘ The tappall runs very irregularly from Poonah to the Kistna, although it runs on regularly enough from Poonah to the army. I wish Coleman would send down the detachment, as heretofore ordered, to see how the matter regarding the tappall really stands, and to set all right.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a vakeel from Scindiah, has come into camp this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Chitchooly, 9th November, 1803.

‘ I received yesterday evening your letter of the 5th, and I am much concerned that Malcolm should have been again indisposed. We have now plenty for him to do. Jeswunt Rao Goorparah arrived in camp the day before yesterday, as the vakeel from Scindiah; and as he is a man of high family, being a nephew of Morari Rao, and as he has more the manner and appearance of a gentleman than any Marhatta that I have yet seen, I suspect there is an intention, on Scindiah’s part, to make some concessions for the sake of peace.

‘ Goorparah visited me yesterday, and I propose returning his visit this evening; and after that ceremony is over, I conclude that business will begin.

‘ Our weather here is delightful, only too cold. I am concerned to hear of a deficiency of funds at Bombay. I conclude that the Government of Fort St. George are laying out their money in investments also, by order of the Governor General,

and I dare not alter either that order, or that relative to the loans at Bombay. I have repeatedly written to Bengal upon the subject of supplies of money and grain* for Bombay; but I have not received a line from Calcutta since the 18th of September, and I am entirely in the dark respecting all the transactions in that part of India.

‘As to the operations of the armies, particularly of the detachment in Bundelcund, which to us here is a most interesting point, I know nothing about them. Ragojee has turned to the northward, and is flying towards Nagpoor, which sets all matters right.

‘I have my doubts respecting the capture of Poonadur: I expect Amrut Rao in camp immediately, and I think that I shall be able to get that place from him; and if I should succeed in that object, it may be the means of forcing some concession in his favor from the Peshwah. But if I do not succeed in that object, the attack must be considered as a matter of risk with the force now at Poonah; and, at all events, would involve us in fresh disputes with Amrut Rao.

‘The question is, whether the possession of Poonadur is absolutely necessary to us under present circumstances? If it is, it must be taken at all risks, and whatever may be the consequences: but I do not think it is. We have some little difficulty, it is true, with our tappall; that difficulty is only occasional, and I suspect that it is much exaggerated by the runners, who are Mysore people, and are obliged to stay upon the road. Purneah, who has undertaken to pay them, has not paid them either so regularly, or so much, as when they were paid by the officer in camp.

* ‘By the Madras regulations, in order to insure grain for the sepoys at all times, it is provided that a seer of rice daily shall be issued to each, for which they are to pay whatever may be the bazaar price, but not above the rate of a rupee for twelve seers; thus out of his seven rupees being certain of sufficient food for two and a half. Whether it was ever carried into effect in any former war I know not (*see* p. 40), but from the commencement of this service, General Wellesley has ordered, and that from a conviction that it is cheaper, that each sepoy shall receive daily half a seer gratis from the Company. Thus, though he gives up half the price apparently, he saves half the carriage—a most important difference when grain is thus issued to four or five thousand men. It is given out generally every eighth day in advance. The General has extended this to the Bombay troops at Poonah, and elsewhere under his authority. Half a seer of rice is said, with the usual addition of curry stuff, and meat now and then, to give a sufficient quantity of food for a sepoy.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

‘ The killadar of Poonadur promises fairly (at least as fairly as the Peshwah), and we know that he has never interrupted our supplies, which have been constantly travelling up. I doubt whether we should be so well treated by the Peshwah’s killadar. But, it may be said, it will gratify the Peshwah to put him in possession of this fort. Upon this point I have to observe, that I would not put the public interests to the smallest risk, or incur the inconvenience of a moment’s dispute with Amrut Rao, to gratify the Peshwah.

‘ His Highness may mean well, but it is impossible for a person with the very worst intentions to act in a manner more contrary to the letter and spirit of his treaty with the Company than he has, or to do us more injury by his actions. Therefore, in my opinion, the principle of all our actions towards the Peshwah ought to be our own convenience, and the benefit of the British Government.

‘ While writing upon the subject, I have to mention to you that an officer of the Peshwah, the person who collected the choute at Aurungabad, was discovered to be in a secret correspondence with Ragojee Bhoonslah on the day I arrived there; and I have my doubts whether I should not have surprised that Chief, had it not been for that correspondence. His name is Soormunt, and he is now arrested at Aurungabad.

‘ Another man, in the same office at Burhampoor, has been playing the same tricks, and I have ordered him likewise to be arrested. I have also to mention to you, that the person who, I before apprized you, was going to Poonah as an agent from Scindiah, has arrived there.

‘ The Rajah of Kolapoor’s letters are civil, and I enclose an answer to them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have just received your letter of the 8th. Nothing will give me more pleasure than to hear that Sirjee Rao Ghautky is arrested, and that the Peshwah’s palace is secured by us while that is going on;—only let care be taken that secrecy is observed, and that the blow does not miss: if it does, we shall have the fellow at large in the shape of an enemy, and he will give us much trouble.’

subject I have only to observe, that I might have hoped that a fact which I reported might have been considered as true, without the necessity of referring to Lieut. Colonel Woodington for an opinion regarding its probability.

‘ 8. I have also to acknowledge the receipt from Lieut. Colonel Coleman of a letter from the Government of Bombay on the 29th of August, with various depositions of deserted bullock drivers, against Captain Mackay, taken by the Superintendent of Police at Bombay.

‘ 9. Unfortunately for the service, the gentleman against whom these accusations have been made was killed at the battle of Assye, otherwise I should not now be obliged to write his defence. This officer was notoriously the most humane and gentle towards the natives of any I have yet seen in this army; indeed, this virtue was carried to an excess in his character, that might almost be termed a fault.

‘ 10. At my particular desire, and contrary to his own inclinations, he took charge of that part of the Bombay bullock establishment which was to serve with the troops under my command; and as it was by no means in order, two thousand out of three thousand bullocks being entirely unfit for service, it was necessary to introduce some regulations to provide for the food and care of the cattle. This Captain Mackay certainly did, but neither harshly nor suddenly; and for having done his duty in this instance, those who have deserted this service have been allowed to libel and defame his character, through the medium of the police; and by going through the offices of government, these libels are placed upon record.

‘ 11. As the officer is killed, his character cannot be entirely cleared from the stigma recorded respecting it, on the authority of the lowest and vilest men in society. But I can safely say, that as far as I can answer for another man, these depositions do not contain one word of the truth, excepting that the deponents deserted from the service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Government,
Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ 11th November, 1803.

‘ On the 6th of October, I had the honor to apprise your

Excellency that propositions, tending to negotiations for peace between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had been made to me in various channels, one of which was through the medium of Siddajee Rao Nimbilkar, commonly called Appah Dessaye, who is serving with this division of the army, in the command of a body of the troops belonging to the Peshwah. The result of his communications has been, that a vakeel has been sent here by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to treat for peace.

‘ The name of this person is Jeswunt Rao Goorparah. He is the nephew of the late Morari Rao Goorparah. The usual visits of ceremony have taken place, and I have had one conference with him. In this conference nothing of any consequence passed. He appeared anxious to prove that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been desirous to remain at peace with the British Government, and that if Colonel Collins had not quitted his camp upon receiving the letter addressed to me, which immediately preceded the commencement of hostilities, the war would not have taken place.

‘ His arguments upon this subject were overturned by a narrative of what passed at Ragojee Bhoonslah’s tent immediately previous to the dispatch of the letters in question, as related in Colonel Collins’s dispatch to me of the 30th of July. The principal subject of this conference was occasioned by my calling upon Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to produce his full powers when I showed him in my hand the paper containing those with which your Excellency had intrusted me, of which I explained the nature.

‘ In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that it was not customary to send a letter by a sirdar of high rank, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had particular objections to write a letter to me, because I had omitted to answer that which he had written and transmitted in Colonel Collins’s dispatch of the 6th of August. I explained that I had written an answer to that letter, and a long conversation ensued upon that subject, in which he positively denied that the answer had ever been received.

‘ I then pointed out that it was the common practice throughout the world, and more particularly in the Marhatta empire, that no agent ever was employed in the transaction of the most trifling business, who did not possess some powers

from his employers which he could produce; and I stated the inconvenience which would result in transactions between states, if this practice was departed from. I said that I was convinced that a man of his name and high rank would not attempt to deceive me, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would not venture to deny that he had employed him as a vakeel; but on this ground, and as Appah Dessaye had a letter from Scindiah saying that he was his vakeel, I should suffer him to remain in camp, and should listen to what he had to say. But that I insisted upon his producing full powers to treat for his employer as soon as a messenger could return from Scindiah's camp.

‘ In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah acknowledged the truth and justice of my observations, and said that he should produce the usual powers as required.

‘ I have given your Excellency only an outline of the conversation which passed upon this subject. A memorandum has been taken of this conference, a copy of which shall be transmitted as soon as it can be made.

‘ I cannot account for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah coming unprovided with the usual powers. In proportion, however, as I gain experience of the Marhattas, I have more reason to be astonished at the low and unaccountable tricks which even the highest classes of them practise, with a view, however remote, to forward their own interest.

‘ As Jeswunt Rao Goorparah is a man of high family, and in his manner and appearance rather superior to the Marhatta chiefs whom I have seen in general; and as there is no doubt but that Dowlut Rao Scindiah is reduced to great distress, it is probable that his mission is intended to obtain peace.

‘ It is only lately that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has heard of the brilliant successes of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in the neighbourhood of Delhi, and it is probable that the first accounts he will receive of that of the 10th of October near Agra will be from this camp, when he will of course be more anxious to obtain peace.

‘ I have, therefore, no doubt that the proper powers will be transmitted to his vakeel within the time specified; and if they are not, I shall request Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to withdraw from the camp.

‘ As I apprized your Excellency early in the month of

October, of the probability that I should soon have propositions for peace, and I transmitted the letters I had received from Ballojee Koonger and Mahomed Meer Khan, I think it possible that I may receive your Excellency's instructions applicable to the state of affairs at the period at which you will have received my dispatch of the 6th of October; but lest I should not, I proceed to state to your Excellency the demands which I propose to make to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, according to your Excellency's instructions of the 27th of June.

‘ First, I shall demand from him the cession of all his territories north of those of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

‘ Secondly, The cession of the fort of Baroach, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to ———; and the fort of Ahmednuggur, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to ———.

‘ Thirdly, The cession of all his territories situated southward and eastward of the hills called the Adjunttee Hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, and all districts in which he may have a joint right with the Soubah of the Deccan, and collects the revenues.

‘ Fourthly, A renunciation of all claims of choute, and all other claims, of whatever denomination, upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and all the allies of the British Government.

‘ Fifthly, An acknowledgment of the independence of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

‘ Sixthly, A renunciation of all claims upon the Ranah of Gohud, who is in future to be dependant upon the British Government.

‘ Seventhly, An engagement never to entertain in his service any Europeans belonging to a country which may be at war with Great Britain.

‘ Eighthly, That his Majesty is to be under the protection of the British Government.

‘ Ninthly, That he shall not molest the chiefs who may have assisted the British Government in the war, of whom I shall include the names of as many as I can procure.

‘ I propose, also, to settle some plan for ascertaining what districts in Candeish and Malwa belong to the Peshwah, and what to Scindiah.

‘ According to this plan for a peace, Scindiah will gain his province of Ahmednuggur, excepting the fort; his territory

subject to Baroach; the fort of Powanghur, and all his territory in Guzerat; the fort of Asseerghur, all the city of Burhampoor, with all the territory depending on them in Candeish.

‘ This plan appears to provide for all the material objects of your Excellency’s instructions of the 27th of June, and I shall now state my reasons for not making demands to the full extent of those instructions.

‘ The only objects which I could obtain in addition to those which I propose to demand, are the fort of Asseerghur and the city of Burhampoor, and the territory depending on them in Candeish; the territory depending on Ahmednuggur; that in Guzerat depending upon Baroach; and the fort of Powanghur and its dependency and territory.

‘ The fort of Asseerghur, if ceded by Scindiah, would belong to the Soubah of the Deccan; and from what I have seen and experienced of his Highness’s government, I think there are weighty objections to the increase of his Highness’s territories on his northern frontier.

‘ His Highness depends entirely for their defence upon the exertions of the British Government. The system of operations on this frontier must be fundamentally defensive, from the nature of his Highness’s government, from the deficiency of his means of defending his country, and the probable strength of the corps which the British Government can allot in case of war to give him assistance.

‘ But in proportion as the distance of the frontier is increased, the difficulty of defending it will increase likewise. The fort of Asseerghur will give no strength to it; and as for the city of Burhampoor, it would be an additional weak point on the extreme frontier for the defence of which it would be necessary to provide as for Aurungabad, in the present war, out of the means provided by the treaties with the British Government for carrying on operations in the field.

‘ Another reason for ceding these territories to Scindiah is, that unless they are given to him, he has no motive for making peace. This reason is likewise applicable to the cession of the territories depending upon Ahmednuggur, and those in Guzerat.

‘ I have also to observe, that as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has kept himself hitherto entirely out of the war, and as he will not

be weakened in proportion as Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been by its operations, and as he will be by its result, under the proposed peace, it may be thought necessary by your Excellency to preserve a part of Scindiah's strength to enable him to support himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ On this ground, and as I think it most desirable to detach Scindiah from the confederacy, by which the peace of Mysore, and of the Company's territories on the Toombuddra, will be in a great measure insured, I have it in contemplation to propose to Scindiah to give him a compensation in Berar for the territories which he will cede to the British Government in the north of Hindustan, provided that he will cede to the Company all the territory in Guzerat depending on Baroach, and will join in the war against the Rajah of Berar.

‘ This will make Scindiah more powerful against Holkar and the Rajah of Berar than he was before the war: it will probably induce him to conclude the peace immediately; at the same time that, relatively to the British Government, it will not alter the state of his power.

‘ However, I shall not make this offer, unless I should find great difficulty in obtaining the other objects.

‘ If peace, according to the plan above proposed, should be made, it will remain to be determined in what manner the Soubah of the Deccan is to participate equally with the British Government in the advantages of the war. I believe there is no doubt but that his Highness has not performed all the conditions of the treaty of defensive alliance with the Company; but, upon the whole, your Excellency may think it more consistent with the liberal policy of your government to admit him to a share of the benefits of the peace.

‘ However, before this is done, it is my opinion that advantage ought to be taken of his Highness's breach of his engagements, to improve the treaty of defensive alliance, and to provide some security in future for the due execution of its most material articles. The interests of the parties, it might be supposed, would alone provide a sufficient security for this object; but the Soubah's government are well acquainted with the interest the British Government have in their preservation; they will for ever depend upon that interest, and trust to the known honor of the British Government for their support, and will never make any exertion, the object of which is to

provide for their own security, so long as they have the support of the British power.

‘I would therefore recommend the following amendments to the treaty of defensive alliance, which will ensure the existence of some strength in the government of Hyderabad.

‘First. That the British Resident should have the power of mustering, at certain periods, the troops which his Highness is bound by the treaty to maintain. I believe that his Highness’s government exercise this power in respect to the British troops, and no reasonable objection can be made to the exercise of it by the British Resident in respect to the troops of his Highness the Soubah.

‘Secondly, That for every horseman found absent at muster his Highness should pay fifty rupees per mensem; and for every foot soldier twenty rupees per mensem, till the numbers of each description should be complete.

‘Thirdly, That the British Resident should have the power of sending persons into the forts on his Highness’s frontiers to inspect the state of their magazines, and see that they are filled with grain according to the tenor of his Highness’s engagement with the Company.

‘Under these arrangements, the state of the Soubah of the Deccan will revive, and the government will have some strength to enforce obedience to its orders, and to preserve tranquillity in the country, besides the Company’s troops stationed at Hyderabad.

‘If these arrangements should be consented to, his Highness will have Jalnapoor and all the districts of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah has hitherto collected the revenue jointly with his Highness, situated to the southward and eastward of the Adjunttee Hills. I do not know the value of these districts, but I believe it is above three lacs of rupees per annum.

‘I take the liberty of recommending your Excellency to take into consideration the question regarding the Peshwah’s claim to choute on his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. If the result of the discussions on that subject should be to substantiate the claim of his Highness the Peshwah, the best mode of settling the claims of the Soubah of the Deccan, under the treaty of defensive alliance, would be to take upon the Company the satisfaction of the claims of the Peshwah; and this might be done, either by restoring to his Highness

the territories in the west of India, ceded to the Company by the treaty of Bassein, or by restoring to him a part of Bundelcund, ceded under a late arrangement made at Poonah to amend the treaty of Bassein, to the amount of his claims for choute upon his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘According to this plan, his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan will remain at the end of the war with a larger territory, freed from all the vexatious claims of the Marhattas.

‘If the result of the discussion upon the subject of choute should be, that his Highness the Peshwah has no claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, the share of the latter in the conquests can be given to him in money, or in territory south of the Toombuddra, yielding a revenue equal in amount to that to which he will have a claim.

‘As well as I can recollect the treaty of Bassein, the Peshwah has no claim to participate in conquests; and if he had under the treaty, his breach of all its stipulations would free your Excellency from the necessity of giving him anything. However, your Excellency may deem it proper that he should enjoy some of the advantages resulting from the war, and the cession of his territories in the Surat Attavesy would be full satisfaction for all his claims. But before this territory should be ceded to his Highness the Peshwah, he ought to be required to consent to the improvements of the defensive alliance which I have above recommended should be required from his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘I am of opinion that the fortress of Ahmednuggur ought to be kept in the hands of the British Government until all these arrangements shall have been completed, and your Excellency shall see in what manner the defensive alliances will work.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 12th November, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 9th. Appah Dessaye told me last night that his troops had beat off those which were attacking Manowly, so that the Peshwah’s government have misinformed you upon that point. I suspect also that they have misinformed you regarding the manner in which Appah Dessaye got possession of Manowly.

‘I took the fort in 1800, and gave it to Ball Kischen Bhow. He transferred it to Appah Dessaye; and if he is at Poonah he will inform you by what motive he was urged to do so. I suspect that it was some arrangement made between him and Appah Dessaye, and that the fort, by being transferred to the latter, was saved from the attack of Scindiah’s campoos, which were in the neighbourhood when I quitted the Marhatta territory in November, 1800.

‘I have asked Appah Dessaye for the letter in question; but he tells me that he has got into so many scrapes already by giving me papers which have been afterwards handed up to the durbar, that he is afraid to give this letter. When he sees Sirjee Rao Ghautky arrested, it is probable that he will not have this fear, and that I shall get the letter.

‘I omitted to mention to you that I have had a very pleasant letter from Prittee Niddee, in which he promises to send his quota to Poonah, to serve as the Peshwah may think proper. I have seen Amrut Rao this day*.

‘As for money, I am now in no want, and I expect nine lacs of rupees from Hyderabad.

‘I have desired Stevenson to levy a contribution on Burhampoor, and he expected to get ten lacs there. God knows whether he will get one. However, before the sums I have expended, I trust that the government of Bengal will recollect our possible necessities.

‘I shall send to-morrow to Poonah, if possible, a dispatch I have written to Bengal on the peace. I think that it ought not to be sent to Bombay, at least till I am out of the way, as you will see that the consequence will be that I shall be burnt in effigy.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘We were joined to-day by Amrut Rao, who is the adopted son of the famous Ragoba, in whose favor the Bombay government so long contended with the Peshwah, and whose son is now seated on the Poonah musnud. The adoption of Amrut Rao was prior to the birth of Bajee Rao, and Chimnaje is younger than either. This prince was in close alliance with Holkar, and placed on the musnud by him in 1802. On that Chieftain’s retreat, he accompanied him a part of the way into his own territory, I believe in Baglana, and there he has peaceably awaited the event of our hostilities to choose his side. Until the battle of Assye his views were doubtful; since then his intercourse with us has been friendly, and it is now thought he means to follow our fortunes, or rather promote his by our means. He has three or four thousand troops with him.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 13th November, 1803.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that Amrut Rao joined me yesterday, and that I had a meeting with him in the neighbourhood of this camp. I am to visit him this day.

‘ I have lately received a letter from Pursheram Punt Prittee Niddee, in which that chief informs me that he proposes to send immediately to Poonah his quota of troops which he ought to furnish for the service of the Peshwah.

‘ The Chiefs to the southward are in tranquillity, and have no extraordinary numbers of troops about them. The polygars alone, situated between the rivers Malpoorba and Gutpurba, have been guilty of committing some outrages, encouraged, I believe, by Sirjee Rao Ghautky.

‘ Ragojee Bhoonslah is gone towards the Raim ghaut, on the road to Nagpoor; and Scindiah was, by the last accounts, with a body of cavalry to the east of Mulcapoor, likewise on his road towards the Berar country. Colonel Stevenson has by this time completed his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, from the stores at Asseerghur; and I hope that we shall now be able to carry on that operation, and to make the Berar country the seat of the war in the Deccan.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of the conferences which I have had with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Naroo Punt Nana, and Appah Dessaye, on the subject of peace.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 13th November, 1803.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana arrived in this camp three days ago, as vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah: the former is a nephew of Morari Rao Goorparah, and both in his manner and appearance is superior to the other Marhatta chiefs whom I have seen. Enclosed I send a dispatch for the Governor General, which I request you to for-

ward, in which you will see what has passed in the conference I have had with these persons.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th November, 1803.

‘ I have received all your letters to the 29th of October. I certainly think that you would render a most material service to the general cause, and would give the finishing stroke to the triumph of government over Scindiah, if you could carry your corps upon Ougein. But you will have observed, from my letter to Mr. Duncan of the 2nd of August, that in the arrangement for Guzerat, I did not contemplate offensive operations against the enemy any further than to deprive him of the territories which he held in that quarter. My reasons for giving over all hopes of that desirable event were, that I saw the army in Guzerat in a state of disorganization, from which I could not reasonably hope that it would recover for a length of time; and I knew that there existed a domestic war in that province, which was likely to give employment, throughout the campaign, to any body of troops that I might have hoped to collect and to organize.

‘ After the troops under your command were collected, and organized with a degree of celerity much greater than I could have expected, I began to form hopes that we might be able to do something at Ougein with your corps; but it was first necessary to defeat Canojee. If you had marched out of the province, leaving him in force within it, we should have suffered; very possibly, your communication would have been cut off, and you would have been obliged to return in distress.

‘ In considering a variety of plans proposed by Major Walker for the campaign in Guzerat, I stated my sentiments fully to Mr. Duncan upon this subject, which it appears he has omitted to communicate to you.

‘ In my opinion, your time has been employed more profitably since you have assembled your corps, and more in consistency with the views of the Governor General, than if you had spent it in a fruitless pursuit of Canojee. You have organized the countries belonging to Scindiah; and by the arrangements which you have commenced with the Rajahs bordering on

Guzerat, you have provided some barrier in that province against invasion; at the same time that if circumstances should hereafter permit you to move upon Ougein, everything on the road is in the state to facilitate that operation. Your pursuit and defeat of Canojee is therefore now well timed, and I wish you to do your utmost in that way.

‘ I enclose you an extract of my letter to Mr. Duncan on the subject of the operations in Guzerat, written on the 22nd of August. Since I last wrote to you, Scindiah has returned across the Taptee, and is gone to the eastward, along the valley of the Poorna towards Berar. I have driven the Rajah of Berar from the Godavery, I believe also into Berar; and I think that in a few days I shall make that country the seat of the war in the Deccan.

‘ My letter of the 23rd of October will have explained to you the arrangement made by the Governor of Bombay for the civil government of the countries conquered from Scindiah in Guzerat. In writing to government upon this subject, since I have read your dispatches to General Nicolls on revenue, I have strongly recommended that Major Walker should be directed to conform to all your arrangements; and that he should continue in employment all the people employed by you, and maintain the bargain made by you with the person whom you appear to have employed as a farmer of the revenue. I think, therefore, that no public inconvenience will be felt from the apparent change of authority.

‘ I have lately received a long letter from government on the subject of strengthening Surat. The proposal was to intrench a camp at the distance of eleven miles: I have recommended half that distance, if an equally good position should be found. This proposal comes from the military board, not one of whom, I believe, has ever seen Surat. However, any thing is better than the present state of that place; and Mr. Duncan appears inclined to adopt that plan for its defence, which, at all events, is better than nothing.

‘ I have the honor, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 18th November, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th of October, with the

memorandum and the notes thereon by the Governor General, on the subject of the peace.

‘ Until I received this morning the Governor General’s letter of the 27th, I was afraid that my dispatch of the 11th would have been deemed tame, and that the demands which I proposed to make were below what we were entitled to expect. But I find, by the notes contained in his letter, that there is but little difference between his plan and mine; and, in fact, I intended to amend my plan, before I received your memorandum, according to that contained in the Governor General’s notes.

‘ The principal difference in the plan contained in my dispatch, and that in the memorandum, consists first in the article regarding Europeans. I took the restriction contained in my plan from the treaty of Bassein: but upon reflecting further on the subject, and upon recollecting that the Peshwah would have been restricted from taking into his service any Frenchman, if we had not been at peace with France, I determined to alter the plan so far as to demand that Scindiah should never have any Frenchmen in his service, nor Dutchmen, nor Italians, nor Spaniards; and, in fact, that he should not have in his service the subjects of any European nation, the government of which should be at war with Great Britain.

‘ It appears, however, that the Governor General is desirous that they should not have any Europeans at all. This prohibition will go to their having no infantry or artillery, and this is a point which I think deserves consideration.

‘ Scindiah’s armies had actually been brought to a very favorable state of discipline, and his power had become formidable by the exertions of the European officers in his service; but I think it is much to be doubted, whether his power, or rather that of the Marhatta nation, would not have been more formidable, at least to the British Government, if they had never had an European, as an infantry soldier, in their service; and had carried on their operations, in the manner of the original Marhattas, only by means of cavalry.

‘ I have no doubt whatever but that the military spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establishment of infantry and artillery, possibly, indeed, by other causes; at all events, it is certain that those establishments, however formidable, afford us a good object of attack in a war with the Marhattas, and that the destruction of them contributes to the success of the

contest, and to the re-establishment of peace: because, having made them the principal object of their attention, (which they must do in order to have them at all,) and that part of their strength on which they place most reliance, they become also the principal reliance of the army; and, therefore, when they are lost, the cavalry, as is the case in this war, will not act.

‘ Two questions occur here,—one is, whether the Marhatta cavalry were ever better than they now are: if they were, whether they would regain their spirit, if the infantry establishment were to be destroyed? I believe they were formerly better than they now are. In regard to the second point, I have to observe, that if there were no infantry in a Marhatta army, their cavalry would commence those predatory operations for which they were formerly so famous; and although I am aware of the greater difficulties they would now have to encounter than their ancestors formerly had, from the practice which is universal in the Deccan, and I believe in Hindustan, of fortifying every village, (and I know that these are means of opposing them successfully,) I should still consider these operations to be more formidable to the British Government, than any that they can ever carry on by means of the best body of infantry that they can form.

‘ On this ground, therefore, I think that they should be encouraged to have infantry rather than otherwise. As, however, the Governor General has given a positive opinion upon this subject, I shall make a demand in conformity to his wishes: but this shall be the last of my demands, in hopes that I may hear further from you on the subject, before the peace should be concluded.

‘ In treating with Ragojee Bhoonslah, I shall attend to the 3rd Article of the Memorandum; but I think that it would be desirable that the gentlemen in Cuttack should conquer, if they have the means, the territories which they wish me to demand. Their operations in that quarter would be a diversion in favor of us and the Nizam, and their success would afford a fair ground for claiming the districts in question. I shall write to Colonel Harcourt upon this subject. I am anxious about it, because, in fact, we have as yet done no harm to Ragojee Bhoonslah in this quarter; and if Holkar were to come again into the Deccan, which is not impossible, we should be obliged to defer all our offensive plans in Berar till we should have beaten him.

‘ My plan for a peace includes every thing contained in the 5th Article of the Memorandum, as far as the Nizam is concerned. In respect to the Peshwah, his territories are so intermixed with those of every other power in India, and it is so difficult to ascertain what does and what does not belong to him, that I despair of settling that point, excepting by means of commissioners acting under the arbitration of the British Government. This would be a long business, and can only be settled by the treaty of peace, by stipulating that commissioners shall be appointed for this purpose.

‘ I propose to destroy the upper fort of Powanghur, and then to give back to Scindiah that part of his territories, keeping the territory dependent on Baroach. I think it better to do this than to keep Powanghur, because there are a parcel of Rajahs depending upon that place, with whom I see plainly that the Guickwar government will never come to any arrangements; and if Mr. Duncan’s mooluk-gheerys, on account of that government, are not stopped, of course we shall never be at peace with them; and by our operations against them we shall lose our character in that quarter, as we have already in Malabar, by similar operations. I have recommended that all tribute should be remitted while we have them under us; and I propose to stipulate, in the peace, that they shall receive no injury for having given us assistance. In this manner they will remain perpetual thorns in the side of Scindiah, and we shall avoid all contests with them.

‘ In respect to the 6th Article of the Memorandum, I have written fully, in my dispatch of the 11th, on the subject of increasing the Nizam’s territories to the northward, as well as upon the subject of Ahmednuggur. I see by the Governor General’s notes, that he is not anxious that the Nizam should have the Taptee for his boundary; and by the bye, as Holkar has Chandore and other territories, down to the Godavery, the Nizam would not gain strength by being brought forward to the Taptee.

‘ The Peshwah’s claim of choute upon the Nizam will not be a question at the peace, excepting that the Governor General should act respecting that claim as I have recommended in my dispatch, and then Scindiah will have nothing to do with it.

‘ I shall attend to what is stated in the 8th Article of the Memorandum.

‘ You will see by my dispatch of the 11th that my plan includes all that is contained in the 9th Article of the Memorandum.

‘ The 10th Article of the Memorandum contains matter to be arranged with the Peshwah, which has nothing to do with the peace.

‘ The 11th and 12th the same. All these arrangements must be made with the Peshwah, upon giving him a part of the benefits resulting from the war.

‘ I shall stipulate for the independence of the Seik chiefs, and generally of all persons north of Joudpoor, Jynaghur, and Gohud, according to the 13th and 14th Articles of the Memorandum.

‘ The 15th, 16th, and 17th Articles do not refer to me. I shall attend to the 18th in the treaty with Ragojee Bhoonslah.

‘ The plan in my dispatch of the 11th will provide for the independence of all the persons alluded to in the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd Articles of the Memorandum. But I proposed that the Ranah of Gohud should be dependent upon the Company, according to the letter of instructions of the 27th of June; and I think that the Governor General proposes that he should be in the same state with the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur. I shall stipulate with Scindiah that he shall be independent of them, and that any arrangements made with the Company by the Ranah are to hold good.

‘ In regard to the 22nd Article of the Memorandum, I recommend that the stipulation respecting the independent chiefs, furnishing troops whenever they may be called upon, may be very strictly drawn; and, if possible, that the British Government should have the power of mustering the troops at all times.

‘ The 23rd Article of the Memorandum is provided for in my plan.

‘ The 24th and 25th Articles are not referable to me.

‘ Of course, the treaties of peace shall be separate. I gave the answer to Appah Dessaye in the conference of the 11th, upon the subject of Scindiah’s treating for Ragojee Bhoonslah, to lay the groundwork for giving Scindiah compensation from Berar, if that should be necessary; or rather that there might be no inconsistency in my proposing that measure, which would

northward and eastward, and I was in hopes that by this time he would have passed the ghauts into Berar. As soon as I was joined by Lieut. Hay with the treasure, I marched also towards the Wausim ghaut, with an intention to enter Berar, to cover and support the attack of Gawilghur by Colonel Stevenson's division.

‘ 5. The Rajah, however, has not yet passed the ghauts, and I think that he is going through Mahoor. Colonel Stevenson was on the 15th to the eastward of Mulcapoor, on his road towards Ellichpoor.

‘ 6. No sooner, however, have I begun my march, than the amildars, killadars, &c. &c., in all parts of the country have called out for assistance, not against the common enemy, but against the freebooters who have long been in the frontier, and who have been kept out of the Ahmednuggur districts by the collector's peons, with very little assistance from the battalion in the garrison of Ahmednuggur. The amildar at Bheer, in particular, has desired to have one of the Company's battalions of sepoy's placed in garrison at Bheer, in order to defend that place against this rabble.

‘ 7. It is distressing to witness the state of the Soubah's territories for want of the common means of defence. In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, I observe that you have urged the Soubah's ministers to take measures to drive the enemy's amildars and troops from those districts; the revenues of which have heretofore been collected partly by the Soubah's government, and partly by that of one of the confederates.

‘ 8. Instead of taking any measures to effect this object, which is one of great importance, they have not even taken possession of their districts bordering upon the Godavery, from which we drove the enemy's amildars two months ago, and I cannot prevail upon them to entertain peons to keep possession of the valuable towns and districts of this quarter, from which my detachment daily drive the enemy.

‘ 9. In order, therefore, to secure these places from falling again into the hands of the enemy, by which he could have an opportunity of annoying my communication, I have been obliged to call in the freebooter Ghazy Khan, and to give him possession of the places which I take from the enemy.

‘ 10. I mention this subject to you now, as I suspect that it

will be made a matter of complaint at the durbar, and you will know in what manner to answer these complaints.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I forward this day several letters to the Governor General, which are duplicates of those written to his Excellency since the 12th of September last. I shall be obliged to you, if you will give directions that they may be sent on express from Hyderabad. It is desirable, however, that no expresses should be sent to camp, as the runners are less cautious when they have an express to deliver, and more likely to fall into the hands of an enemy on their road. Indeed, the expresses have generally been taken, when the common dawks, by seizing their opportunities when the road has been clear, have arrived in safety.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 23rd November, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I have this day concluded an agreement with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for a suspension of hostilities between the troops under my command and those belonging to that Chief.

‘ I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting you a copy of this agreement; in the mean time, I have the honor to inform you, that the articles of this agreement referable to the troops in Guzerat, are, that the British troops are not to advance beyond Dohud; and those in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah are not to approach Dohud from the eastward nearer than twenty coss.

‘ If you should have pushed your corps, or a detachment, beyond Dohud, I request you to draw it into that place; if you should have drawn it off from Dohud, you will not advance it farther towards Ougein than the place at which this letter will find you.

‘ This arrangement is liable to be broken off by either of the parties, upon giving notice of such intention.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ This agreement is applicable only to the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.’

ARMISTICE concluded by Major General the Honorable
A. WELLESLEY with DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH.

‘ Camp, 23rd November, 1803.

‘ *Major General Wellesley, on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, on the part of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, having each communicated to the other their full powers, have made the following Agreement:—*

‘ 1. There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the troops commanded by Major General Wellesley, in the Decan and in Guzerat, and those in the service of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ 2. To prevent accidents, and in order to ensure the execution of the 1st article, it is agreed, that there shall be an interval of twenty coss between the different British and allied armies, and that the Maharajah will march with his army, and take up a position twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and he will forage still farther to the eastward.

‘ 3. In case the operations of the British and allied armies against the other enemies of the British Government should draw either of them nearer than twenty coss to the position which the Maharajah will have occupied, according to the 2nd article, previous notice of such operation will be given, in order that the Maharajah may take timely measures always to preserve an interval of twenty coss between his army and the British and allied armies.

‘ 4. In Guzerat the British troops shall not advance beyond Dohud; those of the Maharajah, on the side of Guzerat, shall not approach nearer to Dohud than twenty coss.

‘ 5. Notice must be given, in case either of the parties should be desirous to put an end to this Agreement.

‘ 6. This Agreement is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and his ratification is to be given to Major General Wellesley in the space of ten days from this date.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Rajoora, 23rd November, 1803.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s vakeels have received their powers, but they are not so full as they ought to be. I have had a

conversation with them on the subject of peace, in which I told them that the British Government would not make peace, unless it received compensation for the unjust aggression of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been guilty. I asked them whether they had powers to agree to make compensation and future security to the Company and their allies, the basis of the negotiation for peace? They said they had not: and I referred them to Dowlut Rao Scindiah for further instructions.

‘ They then desired that I should agree to a suspension of hostilities, including the Rajah of Berar. To this proposal I declared that I never would assent.

‘ They then proposed that I should agree to a cessation of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah only; to which I have agreed, upon condition of his going with his army into Berar, twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and of his keeping at all times at that distance from the British troops carrying on their operations against the other enemies of the British Government.

‘ They wished the cessation to extend to Hindustan, to which proposal I would not consent; but I consented to its extending to Guzerat, in which quarter our troops are not to advance beyond Dohud, and theirs are not to approach nearer to Dohud than twenty coss.

‘ I suspect that I shall have some difficulty in convincing the Governor General of the propriety of this arrangement; and as there are many papers to be copied, and, moreover, from the conduct of the Soubah’s amildars, the dawk is not very secure, I shall advert in this letter to the circumstances by which I was urged to adopt this measure.

‘ I have already apprized the Governor General that it was not in my power to do anything more against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Nothing could be done on the side of Guzerat in particular, where we shall remain in possession of the most advanced station we have got, and which we hold only by one battalion; while Colonel Murray, with the remainder of his corps, is obliged to move upon Canojee Rao Guickwar.

‘ Scindiah has with him in the field an army of horse only. It is impossible to expect to make any impression upon this army, unless by following it for a great length of time and distance. To do this would remove our troops still farther than they are already from all the sources of supply, and would

prevent the operations against the Rajah of Berar, from which alone, in my opinion, we are to expect peace.

‘ These facts would possibly be sufficient to prove the propriety of the step which I have taken; but there are others which prove it still more strongly: the fort of Gawilghur, which Colonel Stevenson is equipped to attack, and which I have ordered him to attack forthwith, is one of considerable strength, and is of great importance to Ragojee Bhoonslah. Ragojee’s corps of infantry, and a body of horse under Manoo Bappoo, are assembled near this fort.

‘ They and Scindiah also would probably retire upon Colonel Stevenson’s advance to Gawilghur; but it must be expected that they will endeavor to attack him when he is engaged with the fort; or, supposing Scindiah to be at liberty, that he will make an irruption into the Soubah’s territories, to draw me to a distance; and that Manoo Bappoo will attack Colonel Stevenson. I avoid this by the cessation of arms.

‘ Bappoojee Scindiah has been detached to Hindustan to oppose the troops supposed to be advancing from Guzerat towards Ougein. I have already informed you there is some infantry at Ougein which has not been engaged; and the remains of the defeated campoos are on the Nerbudda.

‘ On his arrival at Ougein, he will find that we cannot invade it, and he would naturally make an irruption into Guzerat. This is avoided by the cessation of hostilities.

‘ The Rajah of Berar’s troops are not included in it, and consequently there becomes a division of interests between these two Chiefs; all confidence in Scindiah, if it ever existed, must be at an end, and the confederacy is, *ipso facto*, dissolved.

‘ I see no inconvenience whatever that can result from the measure: and if the negotiations for peace are delayed in consequence of having concluded the cessation of hostilities, I have it in my power to put an end to that agreement whenever I may think proper.

‘ The rule not to cease from hostilities till peace is concluded is a good one in general: and I have adhered to it, in practice, at the siege of Ahmednuggur; and I have ordered an adherence to it in all instances of that kind. But in this, I think it is a rule, of which the breach is more beneficial than the observance.

‘ I shall send a large packet to the Governor General upon this subject, and the negotiations for peace, as soon as the papers can be copied. Now that these papers become so numerous, as the Governor General has desired to have duplicates of the letters addressed to him, and as I cannot trust them to be copied by any excepting the officers attached to me, two of whom have been laid up ever since the battle of Assye, and all have, besides, their usual duties to perform, I must omit to send copies of them to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and only apprize those governments of the general results.

‘ I have received from Malcolm his memorandum upon my proposed plan for a peace, and for the division of the conquests. You will observe that I have amended my plan in part, as proposed by Malcolm ; and in regard to the division of the spoils, it is a question not referable to me.

‘ I only request that the Governor General, if he should have seen this memorandum, will not make up his mind finally on that subject till I shall have had a conversation with Malcolm.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 24th November, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 18th and 19th.

‘ You have done right in not sending the letter to Mr. Duncan. I have received a memorandum from Malcolm on the subject of my plan for a peace, part of which I approve of, but in the latter part I cannot agree. As is frequently the case, Malcolm has said that other arrangements would be better ; I know that well ; but let him specify those arrangements, let him examine my instructions, and then see whether anything else is practicable.

‘ For instance, he does not approve of giving up the Attavesy, but let him ask the Governor General whether he will give back Bundelcund or the Attavesy to the Peshwah ; he will choose Attavesy. He says the Nizam must be indemnified by the Rajah of Berar : but he forgets that the Governor

General takes to himself all Orissa, and connects the northern Circars with Bundelcund: and the fact is, that it will be as difficult to find compensation for the Nizam, for the British acquisitions, from Ragojee Bhoonslah, as it will for those from Scindiah, consistently with the preservation of the state of Ragojee at all.

‘Then he says, “Keep horse for the Nizam, and increase the subsidiary force rather than muster the troops.” In answer, I say that I do not want to increase the dependence of the Nizam upon the British power: on the contrary, I want to see some power in the country that can go on, in ordinary cases, by itself. There is no such thing now in the country of any sort, and that is the greatest inconvenience I feel. Malcolm’s plan is no remedy for this evil; mine is. But I agree that if mine is not adopted, the subsidiary force ought to be doubled.

‘There is no foundation for any of Sir William Clarke’s reports. The secret history of Colonel ——’s report has reached me. Angria discharged his troops lately; among others, a party of Scindians. A sirdar of these people went to Colonel ——, and told him this story with a view to procure employment for himself, and to have the plundering of his old master. There is no truth whatever in the report.

‘I shall write you further about Amrut Rao, when I receive your dispatch to the Governor General upon that subject. I mentioned to his vakeel my wish, that Amrut Rao should give up all the territory he held from the Peshwah, and no great objection was made to the measure. But Amrut Rao has been a march or two in the rear ever since he joined, for the sake of plundering more conveniently, and I have not yet been made acquainted with his sentiments. I, however, expect the vakeel to-morrow or next day, as I have sent for him.

‘I shall order the guns for the Peshwah from Ahmednuggur, with bullocks, &c., but I have no tumbrils. He shall have bullocks with them, and everything complete.

‘The progress I have made in the negotiation is just this. I have desired that compensation to the Company and their allies should be made the basis of the treaty. The vakeels have no authority to make it so, and I have referred them to Scindiah for further orders.

‘I have agreed to the cessation of hostilities on the ground

of my incapability to do Scindiah further injury, as stated in my dispatch to the Governor General of the 24th October; on that of it being impossible to injure his army of horse; on that of the injury he may do me in the operations against Gawilghur and in Guzerat, to which quarter he has sent Bappojee Scindiah; and on the political ground of dividing his interests from those of the Rajah of Berar, and thereby, in fact, dissolving the confederacy.

‘I was never more convinced of the propriety of any measure, although I am aware it is liable to cavil.

‘I wish you would endeavor to find out what are the Peshwah’s objects, and I will get them for him if I can. I am on the very best terms with the vakeels; and they talk of throwing themselves on the generosity of the British Government, and of placing themselves under its protection.

‘Believe me, &c.,

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘Camp, 24th November, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have written to Colonel Murray, which I request you to forward, and to make known to the Colonel your sentiments regarding the order which I have given him to destroy the upper fort of Powanghur.

‘I must beg leave to delay for a few days to make you acquainted with my reasons for agreeing to this cessation of hostilities, as I am at present much pressed for time.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Governor of Bombay.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 24th November, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a triplicate of a letter which I wrote you on the 22nd, and which I directed to Major Holmes, that he might open it.

‘Notwithstanding this agreement, it is necessary that Major Holmes should be much upon his guard: I should deem it desirable that you also should move towards Dohud with the remainder of your corps, if this movement should be consistent with other objects in Guzerat.

‘ My reason for mentioning this wish is, that I have learnt from Scindiah’s vakeels, that he has detached a body of horse under Bappojee Scindiah to Ougein, to oppose the progress of the British troops in Guzerat towards that place. This cavalry may be joined at Ougein by a body of infantry which has not yet been engaged, and by the defeated infantry which are upon the Nerbudda.

‘ Bappojee Scindiah will soon learn the strength of the British corps at Dohud ; and in case of the renewal of hostilities, he may be induced by its weakness to make an irruption into Guzerat.

‘ I by no means wish that you should draw off the corps from Dohud, or that you should go there yourself, if it should not be consistent with other objects ; I only point out the benefits which will result from this movement in case it should be possible to make it.

‘ I think it would be desirable to destroy the upper fort, or balla killa, of Powanghur ; it never will be of any use to us, as the lower fort is all that we shall ever occupy.

‘ I request you to give directions accordingly, that the work may be done effectually.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp, 24th November, 1803.

‘ Since I transmitted my dispatch of the 11th instant, with an account of the conferences which I had with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, as the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I have received a letter from that Chief dated the 14th, by which it appeared that he intended to appoint Mahomed Meer Khan to be his vakeel in this camp ; and that he in a manner disavowed Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana. This was further confirmed by a letter received at the same time from Mahomed Meer Khan, Ballojee Koonger, and Mirza Wahed Beg, translations of which I enclose

‘ In my letter of the 24th of October, I apprized your Excellency that I had received a variety of propositions, all tending to the commencement of negotiations for peace, but made by unauthorized persons ; and which, being unworthy of your Excellency’s notice, I omitted to transmit. On the 30th

of October, Mirza Wahed Beg arrived in my camp with letters from Mahomed Meer Khan and Ballojee Koonger, addressed to Colonel Stevenson and myself, translations of which are enclosed; in answer to which I wrote a letter to Mahomed Meer Khan, in which I told him, that if Scindiah should depute him to this camp, he should be received with attention and respect. I likewise enclose a translation of this letter, and that of one written at the same time to Ballojee Koonger.

‘ This is the letter which I conceive Scindiah has construed into a request that Meer Khan should be sent here; and I transmit translations of all the papers addressed either to Colonel Stevenson or to me, which have come into my hand, and translations of all that have been written, in order that your Excellency may form a judgment upon the subject.

‘ I should have apprized your Excellency of the receipt of these letters on the 30th of October, only that at the very moment I wrote to Meer Khan, I learnt that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah was on the road, and I sent a passport to enable him to come to my camp. I therefore concluded that this supposed mission of Mahomed Meer Khan was one of those transactions constantly going on in the native durbars, for which it is impossible to account.

‘ As soon as I received the letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 14th of November, I sent for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and his colleague, and had a conference with them, of which your Excellency will find the details in the enclosed paper.*

* The proceedings of the conferences between Major General Wellesley and the vakeels of the confederates from the 10th of November to the 29th of December, are in the Major General's own hand writing, and occupy eighty-six pages. As the substance of these conferences is to be found also in the dispatches, the compiler has not inserted these voluminous, though curious and important documents.

The detail of each conference commences with the date, &c.; for instance, “ Camp, 24th December, 1803. The vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah came to Major General Wellesley's tent, and a conference was held, at which were present, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Naroo Punt Nana, Eitul Punt, and Moon-shee Kavel Nyn,—Major General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Govind Row.” After the last conference, and when the treaty of peace was signed, Rajah Mohiput Ram, the vakeel, or Resident in camp, from the Nizam, Soubah of the Deccan, was anxious to ascertain from Major General Wellesley, what particular countries and districts were likely to fall to the lot of his master, in consequence of the treaty of peace. For various reasons, too long to detail, the Major General declined giving any

‘ I had no doubt whatever of the mission of Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, indeed I had sufficient proofs of it; and it appeared to me to be probable that full powers would be sent to Jeswunt Rao, as soon as Scindiah should receive the accounts of the manner in which he had been received in this camp; and that the mission of Mahomed Meer Khan, in whom it was not probable that Scindiah could have much confidence, was the result of an intrigue in the durbar. I deemed it most prudent therefore to point out to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, and Naroo Punt Nana, the dangers of the situation into which they had been brought, and the great moderation and favor with which they were treated in not being punished, rather than to dismiss them at once with disgrace as impostors.

‘ They accordingly departed from my tent much pleased with the manner in which I behaved to them, and much disgusted with their employer; and in the course of two hours after they had left me, Naroo Punt Nana returned with a letter from Scindiah, conveying powers to these persons, and Appah Dessaye, of which I enclose a translation.

‘ Since I received this last letter, I have received another letter from Mirza Wahed Beg, and Colonel Stevenson has received one from Mahomed Meer Khan, translations of which I enclose. From these letters, it appears clearly that there is a scramble at the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who shall conduct the negotiations for peace. It is probable that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has succeeded, by exaggerated reports of the wishes he found here for peace, and by encouraging hopes that I would send an officer to Scindiah’s camp. But whatever may be the mode in which he has succeeded in retaining his appointment, I think it more probable that he has, than that Mahomed Meer Khan has, Scindiah’s confidence.

‘ At all events, the communications which we have had with him and his colleague already, have had the effect which they

information on the subject, when Mohiput Ram offered the General five lacs of rupees for it; to this the General replied—‘ Can you keep a secret?’ Rajah Mohiput Ram, hoping that he had touched the right chord, eagerly answered ‘ Yes.’—‘ And so can I,’ replied the General. Rajah Mohiput Ram was not, however, it is said, dismayed by this failure, and was supposed in camp to have attained his wishes by a more decided measure; as the tappall, or messenger, who carried the dispatches containing the desired information, was afterwards waylaid and murdered.

have upon all the natives, of convincing them of the justice and propriety of our proceedings; they appear to have confidence in us, they are open and candid in all their proceedings, and have declared more than once, that if Scindiah did not make peace with the Company, his state must be destroyed, and that his only reliance was upon the generosity of the British Government.

‘ On the other hand your Excellency will have observed that Rajah Mohiput Ram was the person who began the communications with Mahomed Meer Khan, a circumstance which has never been accounted for; and that endeavors have been made by the latter, in Scindiah’s durbar, to carry on the negotiations with the former.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter from Colonel Collins, which shows who Mahomed Meer Khan and Mirza Wahed Beg are, and what is the nature of the employment of both at Scindiah’s durbar. From the nature of Mahomed Meer Khan’s employment and his connexions, it is not very probable that he would be desirous to see the King, Delhi, and the Dooab transferred to the Company; and of course Rajah Mohiput Ram and Ballojee Koonger would wish that the compensation for the war should be taken in the Deccan.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the result of this intrigue in Scindiah’s durbar, which shows the great anxiety and desire there is for peace, is fortunate for the British Government.

‘ In the memorandum of the conferences, your Excellency will find a detailed account of what passed at the first meeting between Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and me, upon the subject of peace. I thought it proper in that conference to go no farther than to require that compensation to the British Government and their allies, for the injury they had received by the unjust aggression of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his confederates, should be made the basis of the negotiations for peace; and when I found that the vakeels were not authorized to grant compensation, I referred them to their master for further authority.

‘ They then pressed me to agree to a cessation of hostilities, to which your Excellency will observe that I have agreed; and you will find the terms in the minutes of the conference of the 22nd instant.

‘ My reasons for agreeing to a cessation of hostilities are as follows.

‘ In my letter of the 20th of October, I have shown your Excellency that as I had deprived Dowlut Rao Scindiah of all his territories in the Deccan, and as the corps in Guzerat was not sufficiently strong, and as there existed a domestic war in Guzerat which required all its exertions, and as it was necessary to guard the frontier of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and of his Highness the Peshwah, and to endeavor in the first instance to take Gawilghur, I could not hope to be able to make any further impression on Scindiah at present.

‘ The army he now has with him consists only of horse; and in order to make any impression upon that description of troops, it would be necessary to follow them for a great length of time and of distance, by which means the distance from the sources of our supplies would be increased, which is a subject of very serious consideration, and our operations against the forts in Berar delayed.

‘ On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary to endeavor to strike a blow against the Rajah of Berar which he will feel; and with this view Colonel Stevenson’s corps has been equipped for the siege of Gawilghur.

‘ Ragojee Bhoonslah’s infantry and cavalry under Manoo Bappoo, and Scindiah’s army, are both encamped at present on the road towards Gawilghur, but not joined. It is probable that both will retire, upon Colonel Stevenson’s advance; but it is also probable that they would afterwards endeavor to interrupt the siege, or that Scindiah would, with his cavalry, make an irruption into the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, in hopes to draw me to a distance, and to leave Manoo Bappoo at liberty to interrupt Colonel Stevenson in the siege of Gawilghur. The result of this operation would be fresh loss to, and fresh complaints from, the Soubah of the Deccan, and possibly some of our convoys would be cut off.

‘ Bappojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan, to oppose the troops supposed to be advancing from Guzerat. He will be joined at Ougein by some corps of infantry that have not yet been engaged, and by the defeated infantry which were upon the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find that the troops in Dohud consist only of one battalion;

and that Colonel Murray is necessarily employed with the strength of his corps, in the pursuit of Canojee Rao Guickwar. It is probable that he would then make an irruption into Guzerat.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, upon military principles, the cessation of hostilities with Scindiah was desirable to me; and I had made up my mind to grant it, as soon as I had reason to suspect that it would be asked.

‘ As a political measure, as it does not extend to the Rajah of Berar, and as Scindiah is kept within his territories, it has the effect of separating the interests of those Chiefs entirely. It is impossible that the Rajah of Berar can ever hereafter have any confidence in Scindiah, and it may be considered that the confederacy is dissolved.

‘ If advantage should be taken of the cessation of hostilities to delay the negotiations for peace, your Excellency will observe that I have the power of putting an end to it when I please; and that, supposing I am obliged to put an end to it, on the day after I shall receive its ratification, I shall at least have gained so much time everywhere for my operations, and shall have succeeded in dividing the enemy entirely.

‘ Such an agreement is certainly not usual, and in general impolitic; but the circumstances of this case are also unusual, and upon the whole, I am induced to hope that your Excellency will approve of the measure.

‘ I have great hopes that I shall be able to conclude a peace with Scindiah on favorable terms; and your Excellency will observe, in the conclusion of the conference of the 22nd, a hint thrown out by the vakeels, of an intention to place Scindiah’s government under the protection of the Company, which I think is likely to lead to satisfactory results.

‘ I have the honor to enclose translations of my letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Translation of a Persian letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley. 14th Nov., 1803.

After titles and compliments:

‘ The sincere Mirza Wahed Beg has arrived here, and has explained the whole state of affairs.

‘He has also brought your letter inviting Azim ool Dowlut, the Nabob Mahomed Meer Khan Behauder, Naswunt Jung, who is born of an illustrious race, and sprung from the family of the Prophet. He laid the letter before me, and it has given me much pleasure. I always have approved, and I still approve, the friendship with the Company, which was formerly confirmed by treaties. I see no manner of alteration in it. The Nabob who is named above will soon be sent off, in compliance with your summons. My friend, if in the mean time any other person should hold out that he is negotiating for me, you must by no means believe him, without a writing, signed and sealed by me in the usual manner.

‘What shall I write more?’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘Camp, 22nd November, 1803.

‘I have received your Persian letter of the 14th of November. In answer thereto, I have only to inform you, that I shall receive with respect and attention any person you may send here as your vakeel; and that, of course I shall not negotiate with any person who has not a writing, signed and sealed by you in the usual manner.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘Camp, 22nd November, 1803.

‘I have received your Marhatta letter dated the 17th November, shortly after I had received your Persian letter, in which you informed me that you would send your vakeel, Mahomed Meer Khan. In the mean time, as your vakeels Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana are persons trusted on your part, and you desire that I shall converse with them, and they have communicated to me those orders which they have received from you, I have conversed with them on the subject of peace between the British Government and its allies and you, and they will make you acquainted with the particulars of my conversation. In respect to your wish that I should send an officer to your camp, I have to observe to you, that I can have no objection to that measure, excepting that it is useless. The peace between the British Government and you can be settled only in this camp. But if I should have

anything in particular to communicate, I shall send an officer to represent it.

‘*Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 26th November, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 20th.

‘The present state of the Peshwah’s mind is very satisfactory, and I will give him the guns. I wrote this day to Ahmednuggur, to desire that six guns may be got ready, their carriages to be neatly painted, the bullocks &c., to be well equipped with yokes, and to be sent to you at Poonah. I beg you to present them to the Peshwah; but before you do so, it will be necessary to have some Poonah people as bullock drivers, as my Mysore people will not stay with him; and even if they would, I could not well spare their services from Ahmednuggur, where I have nearly one thousand gun bullocks.

‘Amrut Rao has not yet joined; his vakeel is not yet come in, and, therefore, I was unable to give you an answer upon the subject of your letter to the Governor General. In a few days, however, I hope to be able to write to you fully upon that subject.

‘I have taken the freebooter Ghazy Khan into the Company’s service; and he is to be employed in keeping my rear quiet.

‘I have nothing new to tell you about the negotiation.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp at Akolah, 27th November, 1803.

‘Amrut Rao has come within a short distance from camp, and I have seen and spoken to his vakeel respecting a cordial reconciliation with the Peshwah. I spoke to him particularly respecting the cession of Poonadur; and he said that he was certain that Amrut Rao would have no difficulty in giving up the fort, provided the killadar with his family were taken under the protection of the Company, and carried away to Ahmednuggur; that the arrears of the garrison, amounting to fifty

thousand rupees, were paid, and Amrut Rao allowed to carry away his private property which is now there.

'The vakeel is to come to me again to-morrow upon this and other subjects, and I will not let you know what I shall arrange with him. Amrut Rao's vakeel told me that Baba Phurkia had taken service with the Soubah of the Deccan.

'Believe me, &c.
'Lieut. Colonel Close.' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Parterly, 30th November, 1803.

'I have the honor to inform you that I attacked the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday afternoon, on the plains of Argaum in this neighbourhood, with the divisions of the army under my immediate command, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under Colonel Stevenson, and completely defeated the enemy, having taken from them their cannon, ammunition, &c., and destroyed vast numbers of them.

'I have reason to believe that the loss which I have sustained upon this occasion has not been great. No officer has been killed, and but few wounded. I will forward to your Excellency a detailed account of this action, as well as of the circumstances which led to it, as soon as I shall receive a return of the killed and wounded.

'I have the honor to be, &c.
'The Governor General.' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Parterly, 30th November, 1803.

'Having found that the Rajah of Berar was moving towards his own territories,—that the body of troops he had with him was but small, decreasing in numbers daily, and not likely to do much mischief to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, I descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th, in order to support and cover Colonel Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur in Berar.

'Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of that fort, and had marched to Ballapoor, where he was joined on the 24th by the brinjarries, and other sup-

plies which had been saved from the enemy by Captain Bayne's affair at Umber; and he marched forward on the 26th.

‘Your Excellency has been informed, that on the 23rd I had consented to a suspension of hostilities* with the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in this quarter and Guzerat. The condition on which this agreement depended, viz., “that Scindiah should occupy a position twenty coss to the east of Ellichpoor,” had not been carried into execution; and Scindiah was encamped at Sersooly, about four miles from the camp of Manoo Bappoo, brother to the Rajah of Berar, which was at this place. The army of the former consisted only of cavalry; that of the latter was of cavalry, and a great part, if not the whole, of Ragojee Bhoonslah's regular infantry; and a large proportion of artillery.

‘In the course of the 28th, the vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah urgently pressed me not to attack these troops; but I informed them repeatedly that there was no suspension of arms with Ragojee Bhoonslah; and none with Scindiah, till he should comply with the terms of his agreement; and that I should certainly attack the enemies of the Company wherever I should find them.

‘Colonel Stevenson's division and mine both marched to this place yesterday; the Colonel having with great prudence and propriety halted on the 28th at Huttee Andorah, to enable me to co-operate in the attack of the enemy. We found on our arrival that the armies of both Chiefs had decamped; and from a tower in Parterly, I could perceive, a confused mass, about two miles beyond Sersooly and Scindiah's old camp, which I concluded to be their armies in march.

‘The troops had marched a great distance on a very hot day, and I therefore did not think it proper to pursue them; but shortly after our arrival here, bodies of horse appeared in our front, with which the Mysore cavalry skirmished during a part of the day; and when I went out to push forward the piquets of the infantry to support the Mysore cavalry, and to take up the ground of our encampment, I could perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaum, immediately in front of

* See Agreement, p. 514.

that village, and about six miles from this place, at which I intended to encamp.

‘ Although late in the day, I immediately determined to attack this army. Accordingly, I marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy’s line; covering the rear and left by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry.

‘ The enemy’s infantry and guns were in the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left. Scindiah’s army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, having upon its right a body of pindarries and other light troops. Their line extended above five miles, having in their rear the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argaum; and in their front a plain, which, however, was much cut by water courses, &c.

‘ I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right; and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced in order to press upon the enemy’s left. Some little time elapsed before the lines could be formed, owing to a part of the infantry of my division which led the column having got into some confusion. When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah’s cavalry charged the 1st battalion 6th regiment, which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands thirty eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition.

‘ The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Some of the latter are still following them; and I have sent out this morning all of the Mysore, Mogul, and Marhatta cavalry, in order to secure as many advantages from this victory as can be gained, and complete the enemy’s confusion.

‘ For the reasons stated in the commencement of this letter, the action did not commence till late in the day; and unfortunately sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could

have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night.

‘I have the honor to enclose a return of our loss in this action. The troops conducted themselves with their usual bravery. The 74th and 78th regiments had a particular opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and have deserved and received my thanks. I am also much indebted to Colonel Stevenson, for the advice and assistance I received from him; to the Hon. Lieut. Colonel St. Leger for the manner in which he led on the British cavalry; and to Lieut. Colonels Wallace, Adams (who commanded Lieut. Colonel Harness’s brigade, the latter being absent on account of severe indisposition,) Halyburton, Maclean, Pogson, and Major Huddleston, who commanded brigades of cavalry and infantry; to Major Campbell commanding the 94th regiment; to Capt. Beauman commanding the artillery with the divisions under my immediate command; to Captain Burke commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force; and to the officers of the staff with my division, and belonging to the subsidiary force.

‘I have also to inform your Excellency, that the Mogul cavalry under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore cavalry under Bisnapah Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard from Scindiah’s troops. The Marhatta cavalry were not engaged, as the person who went to them with orders missed his road. Amrut Rao was not in the action, as he had encamped some distance in my rear on the 28th, and he could not march the whole distance to Parterly yesterday morning; but he sent for orders as soon as he heard that I intended to attack the enemy.

‘I propose to march to-morrow towards Gawilghur, and I shall lose no time in attacking that place.

‘I have the honor, &c.
 ‘The Governor General.’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of the Killed and Wounded of the Division of the Army under Major General the Honorable A. Wellesley, and of the Troops composing the Subsidiary Force.

H. M.’s 19th Lt. Dragoons. The Hon. Company’s Artillery. H. M.’s 74th regt. — 78th do. — 94th do.	Europeans.				
		Cpts.	Subs.	Drum.	R. & F.
	Killed	—	—	—	15
	Wounded	3	6	6	145

3rd regt. Native Cavalry.		
4th do.	do.	
5th do.	do.	
6th do.	do.	
7th do.	do.	
1st batt. 2nd regt. Infantry.		<i>Natives.</i>
2nd do.	do.	<i>Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates.</i>
1st do. 3rd	do.	Killed . . . 31
1st do. 4th	do.	Wounded . . . 148
1st do. 6th	do.	Missing . . . 5
2nd do. 7th	do.	
1st do. 8th	do.	
2nd do. 9th	do.	
1st do. 10th	do.	
1st do. 11th	do.	
2nd do. 12th	do.	

N.B. The Officers being British are included under the head of Europeans.

‘ R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 1st Dec. 1803.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 24th ultimo, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has failed to carry into execution the articles of agreement made by his vakeels for suspending hostilities with the troops under my command, and joined himself with an army commanded by Manoo Bappoo, in the service of the Rajah of Berar. Accordingly, I attacked their combined armies on the 29th November, and entirely defeated them, taking from them cannon, ammunition, &c. My loss upon this occasion has not been great. Since this action, Scindiah is gone off to the westward with the remnants of his army, which likewise is directly contrary to the treaty.

‘ By letters received this day from the Government of Bombay, I am happy to observe that you will soon be relieved from the fruitless pursuit of Canojee, and that the Resident at Baroda is exerting himself to bring into the field a respectable body of Marhatta cavalry. Whatever may be the success of those exertions, you will be enabled, by the flight of Canojee, to join Major Holmes at Dohud; and I conclude that you will have commenced your march to that quarter as soon as possible. You will be so kind as to make all your preparations for moving forward upon Ougein from Dohud, when I shall send you orders to do so.

‘ I certainly never should have agreed to the suspension of hostilities in Guzerat, if I had had the smallest hopes that you could have been able to move forward upon Ougein; and

I certainly shall not allow myself to be tricked out of the benefits of it in this quarter, now that I find that the situation of affairs is so much improved in Guzerat, as to render it no longer desirable there.

‘I should not be surprised if Scindiah were himself to go into Hindustan. I know that he has once or twice intended it, as he is now only a vagabond in the Deccan: but I will keep you apprized of events as they occur; and I have only to request that you will be in a state of equipment to move forward at once, when you shall receive orders to do so; and that you will do every thing in your power to obtain information of roads, distance, &c.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec., 1803.

‘I have but little to add to my letter of the 30th to the Governor General respecting the battle of Argaum. The number of the enemy destroyed is very great. Vittell Punt, who commanded the cavalry of the Rajah of Berar, was killed; and Gopal Bhow, who commanded Scindiah’s cavalry that fought, was wounded. If we had had daylight on hour more, not a man would have escaped.

‘We should have had that time, if my native infantry had not been panic struck, and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assye, being broke and running off, when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there, I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for every thing that we should certainly have performed.

‘The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from six in the morning until twelve at night.

‘Nothing could have been more fortunate than my return to the northward. I just arrived in time. Colonel Stevenson was not delayed for me more than one day; and it is a curious

circumstance, that, after having been so long separated, and such a distance between us, we should have joined at a moment so critical.

‘ A vakeel has come in from the Rajah of Berar, but nothing very particular has occurred. I have demanded compensation from the Rajah; and I have desired the vakeel to stay at Ellichpoor until he is authorized to grant it.

‘ The powers to Scindiah’s vakeels were not quite so perfect upon this point as I wished; and they shall go away to-morrow, unless they can produce them in a more perfect form. There is no dealing with these Marhattas, unless they are treated in this manner; and unless a regular document is brought forward upon every point that may occur.

‘ The Rajah is much alarmed about Gawilghur, and I think he is sincere; indeed, I think Scindiah is so likewise. But every Marhatta chief is so haughty, and so prone to delay, that I suspect that both these Chiefs will be ruined, rather than submit to the conditions which I must require from them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Shawe.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec., 1803.

‘ I have received and perused your letter to his Excellency the Governor General, of the 15th November.

‘ I entirely agree in opinion with you respecting the propriety of resuming parts of the great jaghire lands as the best mode of restoring the government of the Soubah of the Decan. But I beg leave to recommend, that the first step taken should be to provide some public force for the service of the Soubah’s government, by the means of which this measure could be carried into execution.

‘ Unless this is done, the execution of the measure will fall upon the British government, whereby a great expense will be incurred; and the unpopularity of the British government, which certainly exists already in a great degree, will be much increased.

‘ This object is certainly not one immediately referable to me; but I think it possible that, at the conclusion of the war,

some means may be devised to place the public force of the Nizam's government upon a better footing; and it is very desirable that you should turn your thoughts to that subject.

' In its present state, it is of no use whatever. The Soubah can do nothing without the assistance of the British government: this inconvenience will increase daily, unless some remedy is applied, and in a greater proportion as the extent of the Soubah's territories may be greater; or the consequence will be, that the British troops must always be in the field; and indeed, if the Soubah's military establishments are not improved, the subsidiary force, as at present, will not be equal to the duties which will be required from it.

' I hope that you will excuse the liberty I have taken in drawing your attention to this subject; but it is one which I consider of great importance, and the evil certainly requires a speedy remedy.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Major Kirkpatrick.*

' *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

' *SIR,*

' *Camp, 2nd Dec., 1803.*

' I received yesterday evening your letters of the 9th and 12th of November, after I had written to you the public letter of yesterday's date, which will reach you through Mr. Duncan.

' I am concerned to observe the state of your Marhatta cavalry, and the trouble they give you by plundering the country: there is no remedy for it, but I positively forbid it.

' I recommend to you to have a conference upon this point with the Chief of the Guickwar troops, to tell him that this practice must be stopped, and that you are determined to punish, with the utmost severity, any that might be guilty of it.

' If my Marhatta allies did not know that I should hang any one that might be found plundering, not only I should have starved long ago, but most probably my own coat would have been taken off my back *.

* ' One of the camp followers was hanged yesterday for stealing a cow from a village, and this evening two villagers were executed in the same manner, for binding a Sepoy, and carrying him off with an intent to rob, if not to murder him. Two officers, who were shooting, discovered the transaction, and pursued the fellows, who ran off, after robbing their prisoner, but were brought in to the number of fourteen, from their village; the other twelve were soundly flogged and dismissed. The proceedings on these occasions are very summary: the fact and person ascertained, punishment follows in a few hours: many affect

‘There is no intention whatever, at least I shall never consent to the measure, to give the countries conquered in Guzerat to the Guickwar government to pay their troops.

‘I have recommended that no tribute should be taken from any of the Bheel Rajahs.

‘In respect to your being under my orders, the best thing you can do is, to correspond officially with me; and to send copies of your letters, or of such parts of them as you may think necessary, to Mr. Duncan. By this mode of transacting business, everything will be much more clear than it is now, and you will be made acquainted with my sentiments on every point in a public form.

‘In respect to your arrangements with the Bheels, they must and shall be confirmed as far as they affect the British Government, provided they are not inconsistent with the other engagements of the government with other powers. The Guickwar government has nothing to do with them. But you must let me have an account of all the arrangements you have made with the Bheels and other Rajahs.

‘The Company never can nor will pay choute, and therefore the arrangements you have made with the Barreah Rajah must be confirmed.

‘I hope to be able to write to you to-morrow, to let you know whether or not you are to advance to Ougein.

‘What troops do you leave at Surat, if you draw away the 75th? That city is very important, and I know that each of the confederates has had an eye upon it; and Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had designed to march there with their cavalry after the battle of Assye.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

to think this a very arbitrary exercise of illegal power, but these are persons who are not daily subject to the deprivations occasioned by camp robbery; yet it cannot be questioned that such a mode of proceeding is in the end the mildest, best adapted to the people of the country and the camp followers, and, as above-mentioned, impartially applied to both. If justice was not effectually administered, between bad servants, the certainty of a ready sale, and great difficulty of detection, with the expertness and number of the country thieves, our property would never be secure, either on a march or at night. For smaller thefts, neglects, and insolence, there is a smaller punishment, that of flogging through the bazaar; the Deputy Adjutant General is in these cases the judge, aided by the cutwal of the bazaar, and the complaints of officers, when well founded, are paid immediate attention to.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*—24th Nov. 1803.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Secretary of Government,
Bombay.*

SIR,

Camp at Ellichpoor, 5th Dec., 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd of November, upon the subject of the conduct of the military at Surat. When the residence of officers who have been accused of improper and riotous behaviour has been described, names have in some instances been stated, and in all a description of their persons, and of their mode of conveyance, has been given, it is scarcely to be credited that the commanding officer had it not in his power to discover those who were accused. At all events, measures might, and ought to have been adopted by the commanding officer to put an end to these disgraceful proceedings, which it appears he entirely neglected.

2. Under these circumstances, I take the liberty of recommending, first, that the commanding officer of Surat may be removed from his situation; and secondly, that orders may be given to the civil magistrate to seize, and send to Bombay for trial in the court of the Recorder, any officer who may hereafter be accused of rioting in the streets or city of Surat. Of course, the civil magistrate must do every thing in his power that the person of the officer of whom complaint may be made may be ascertained, and his name known; and in this respect I have to observe, that the civil magistrate does not appear to me to have done every thing that he could do.

3. I have also received your dispatch of the 23rd of November, relative to Colonel ——. Upon this subject I have to observe, that it would be very agreeable to me if Lieut. Colonel —— were removed to another corps; and this measure would put a stop to all complaints from the Peshwah's amildar at Panwell. I cannot allow Lieut. Colonel —— to join his corps at Poonah, because I do not conceive he is the fittest person to have the command of the troops there; I have therefore ordered that he should remain at Panwell; for it appears that he acknowledges, and is determined to continue the abuses of which the amildar complains.

4. I have likewise the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 24th, regarding Mr. De Souza's complaint against Lieut. Colonel ——. I beg leave to suggest that Mr. De Souza may be desired to prosecute Lieut. Colonel

— in the Recorder's court for his conduct. I beg leave to recommend that Lieut. Colonel — may be dismissed from his command, and Lieut. — from his situation of Fort Adjutant of Baroach; and I am of opinion that it would be very beneficial to the service in this country to send Lieut. Colonel — to join that part of his corps which is in Europe.

‘ 5. I have likewise had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 25th of November. It is impossible but that the Governor must suppose that I should feel the greatest concern in reading Colonel Murray's letter to Major General Nicolls of the 12th of November. It must rest with government to take such measures as may be thought proper to vindicate its own dignity and authority. I cannot presume to suggest anything in such a case; and I have only to add, that I will submit with cheerfulness, and carry into execution, as far as may be in my power, whatever may be ordered upon this unfortunate occurrence.

‘ 6. In respect to the allusions to my opinions on the Governor's remarks upon Colonel Murray's letter, I have to say, that I never had but one opinion upon the subject of the revenue management of the districts conquered from Scindiah in Guzerat; and that was, that it should be in the hands of Major Walker. In my private letter to Colonel Murray the same opinion was given; and a conduct conformable thereto was enjoined. It is perfectly true, that I approved of Colonel Murray's settling the country as he went on; but the reasons for that approbation were, first, that it was absolutely necessary for the subsistence and safety of the troops that the country should be settled; secondly, that Major Walker was not with the army himself, and had no servants with it to take charge and make the settlement of the countries which it should conquer. The approbation contained in my private letter to Colonel Murray went no farther than to his settling as he went on under these circumstances; and it is followed by a particular injunction to do it in communication with Major Walker, to whom I informed him that the revenue management had been given by order from the Bombay government.

‘ 7. In conducting the extensive duties with which I am charged, it has been my constant wish to conform to existing

rules and establishments, and to introduce no innovations; so that at the conclusion of the war, when my duties would cease, every thing might go on in its accustomed channel. For this reason, and for others not necessary at present to discuss, I have sent no orders to Colonel Murray, excepting two orders applicable to the general state of affairs, which have lately gone to him, but which were first submitted to the Governor for his approbation.

‘I do not comprehend, and cannot say that I admire the system according to which the connexion with the Guickwar government is carried on; but this possibly proceeds from ignorance of the subject. At all events, I know that I am not able to suggest or order any measure that could remedy it; and if I were to interfere at all, I might order a measure which would be inconsistent with the existing system. I am therefore very desirous not to be called upon to take a more active part in the internal concerns of Guzerat than I have hitherto; and that matters should be conducted as usual, under the immediate orders of government. Whenever the Honorable the Governor in Council may think proper to call for my opinion upon any subject, I will give it him, to the best of my judgment and abilities; and I shall do so whenever I may think it necessary, in all matters which have a relation to our general situation. But I hope that he will not desire me to enter into the detail of Guzerat affairs, which I cannot be supposed to comprehend, and with which I am convinced it was never intended that I should be charged.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 6th Dec., 1803.

‘I have this instant received a proposal from Baba Phurkia to be allowed to come in upon a cowle. The amount of the proposal is, that I should give an asylum to him and his family, and endeavor to procure a pardon for him from the Peshwah; the meaning of which is, that I should find means of paying four thousand horse, which he says he has with him.

‘Baba Phurkia, in my opinion, stands strictly in the relation of a rebel to the Poonah state; and it is doubtful to me whether it will be proper to have any communication with him

excepting with the Peshwah's consent. At all events, I should not like to commence an arrangement with Baba Phurkia, without first sounding the Peshwah on the subject.

'It is certainly desirable that this, as well as every other great chief of the Marhatta empire, should be conciliated and brought back into the service of the Peshwah. On this ground, I wish you to try whether you could prevail on the Peshwah to pardon Baba Phurkia.

'He promises fairly that he will serve his Highness faithfully, and will never again have any communication with his enemies. If his Highness should consent to pardon Baba Phurkia, I think that I can arrange with him to serve the state for his ancient serinjaumy, which was for seven hundred horse.

'I have informed Baba Phurkia that I know the Peshwah is much incensed against him, and that I fear I shall find it difficult to appease his Highness. In the mean time, I have desired him to remove from the Soubah's territories, in which he now is, to those of the Rajah of Berar, beyond the Wurda, and I have promised to move to his assistance in case the Rajah should attack him.

'Thus I have succeeded in bringing upon that rascal the full measure of God's vengeance; and if I live a month longer, he shall either be at peace with the Company, or I shall be at Nagpoor, with all the armies either with me or about me. We shall take Gawilghur, I hope, with ease. The fort has been firing all day at my parties, which I have pushed to the foot of the hill.

'Our late victory was grand; it has made a great impression throughout the country. Indeed, between the destruction there dealt out, and the consequent desertion of troops, the enemy have but few troops left; and I anxiously hope that they will come within reach to allow me to give them a parting blow with our cavalry only.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

'SIR,

'Camp at Ellichpoor, 6th Dec., 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 15th of November, upon the subject of Bulchund having joined Canojee. That may be the case, and yet Holkar may not have entered the confederacy.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Captain Armstrong,
Military Secretary.*

‘SIR, ‘Camp before Gawilghur, 11th Dec., 1803.

‘I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 14th of November, conveying the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, that I should order one of the European regiments in Guzerat to be sent to Fort William.

‘From the different letters which I have lately addressed to him, his Excellency will have observed that the troops in that part of India are very unhealthy. There are in Guzerat three complete regiments of Europeans, besides detachments, which in numbers of companies ought to amount to a fourth; but Colonel Murray has been obliged to draw from the garrisons, and from Surat, the troops thought necessary and allotted for their defence, in order to reinforce his corps in the field. The 65th regiment, which arrived at Bombay nine hundred strong in May last, has not now one hundred men for duty; and the 75th regiment is nearly in the same state.

‘Under these circumstances, it does not appear to me that it will be practicable to withdraw a regiment of Europeans from Guzerat, without exposing to risk all the British interests in that quarter.

‘The actions in which the troops of this army have been engaged, and the general severity of the service, have weakened the corps to such a degree, that none of them would be a great acquisition to the army under the Commander in Chief, or to the garrison of Fort William, even if it was practicable to detach a regiment through Berar in either direction. But that appears to be impossible, on account of the great distance, the natural difficulties of the country through which the troops would have to pass, and the savage ferocity of the inhabitants.

‘The batteries against this fort will, I hope, open the day after to-morrow.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Captain Armstrong.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Major Shawe.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp before Gawilghur,
12th Dec., 1803.

‘I sincerely congratulate you upon General Lake’s victory at Cassowly*, which I hope will be the last in this war.

* Afterwards called the battle of Laswarree.

‘ I wish it was in my power to reinforce General Lake’s army ; but you will have seen by my letter to Captain Armstrong that it is impossible ; and, indeed, I doubt much, whether the Governor General will wish to weaken Guzerat, when he observes the importance which the enemy attach to the operations of the corps in that country ; and when he contemplates the probability, that if I should make peace with Ragojee Bhoonslah, or should be able to disengage one of the divisions from the operations in his country, I shall carry it immediately into Hindustan, and the corps in Guzerat will come into activity.

‘ I think that I am getting on towards peace. Ragojee’s vakeel does not object to the compensation which I have asked for the Company ; but he does to that required for the Nizam. I have demanded that his boundary should be the Wurda river, from its source in the Gawile hills, to its junction with the Godavery. It would then be advanced as far as it appears to be in Rennell’s map.

‘ I shall find a difficulty in settling with Scindiah, on account of the total want of information respecting the countries, which I have demanded from him. His vakeels declare that he has no countries north of the Rajpoots, of which the Peshwah and Holkar have not each a third ; excepting Perron’s jaghire, which he is willing to make over to the Company.

‘ Therefore, unless we make war upon Holkar, and deprive the Peshwah of his territories, we shall not succeed in driving the Marhattas entirely from these countries, although Scindiah should cede his rights. And I acknowledge that if this is really the state of the case, I should prefer to see Scindiah remain in the partnership, than to introduce the Company.

‘ However, I shall adhere as strictly as I can to the instructions which I have received. But the want of information regarding the proceedings of General Lake, even to the extent to which he has pushed his conquests, and of the country from which he has expelled the Marhattas, and taken possession, is a great bar to the progress of the negotiations.

‘ The battle made by Scindiah’s ministers, this day, was principally to preserve his influence over the King, and his territories about Ahmednuggur ; the last of which, they declared, being the place of his nativity, and the old possession of his ancestors, he never could be brought to consent to give up.

I think it appears from what they said about the King, that the countries in Hindustan were managed in the name of his Majesty, by Scindiah, his vizier.

‘ The vakeels disclosed this day a great apprehension of Holkar’s power; and they almost expressed an expectation that Holkar would attack them, as soon as the peace with the Company should be settled. They said that, in that case, they must depend upon the Company for assistance, in money and troops. When going away, they said they had a proposition to make, to draw closer the connexion between the two governments after the war; to which they hoped we should consent.

‘ In short, every thing appears to go on well, and I think I shall succeed in settling a peace to the satisfaction of the Governor General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Shawe.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I shall open upon this place to-morrow.’

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 12th Dec., 1803.

‘ I have perused your letter to the Governor General, and have received that written to me upon the subject of the Peshwah’s desire to receive Cashee Rao Holkar at Poonah.

‘ You will have observed by my correspondence with the Governor General that I refused to receive Cashee Rao in my camp. The reasons for which I refused it were: first, that he is useless; secondly, the reception of him was likely to create uneasiness in Holkar’s mind, and to increase the number of our enemies.

‘ Both these reasons apply equally to the reception of Cashee Rao by the Peshwah. It is certain that he will be useless, and a burthen to his Highness; but that will not be of much consequence, as his Highness will not do any thing for his relief. It is equally certain, that his residence at Poonah will make Jeswunt Rao uneasy; and it will never be believed that his arrival there has been unknown to, and without the concurrence of the English.

‘ When the war with Scindiah is concluded, of which the prospect becomes better every day, it will be necessary that

some arrangement should be made with Holkar to obtain from him the territories of the Poonah government, provided the Peshwah can make such an exertion as to raise troops to take and keep possession of them. But Holkar may, upon good grounds, refuse to give up the Peshwah's territories, so long as his Highness gives an asylum to one whom he affects to call a rebel and a pretender to the Holkar territories. I most anxiously deprecate fresh cause for war and disturbance, particularly when no end is answered by it; and therefore I am anxious that the Peshwah should be told that he must not receive Cashee Rao Holkar.

'One of two things will be the consequence of his arrival at Poonah. Holkar will refuse to give up the Peshwah's territories, so long as he is there; and we must go to war to force them from him, or we must dismiss Cashee Rao from Poonah on his demand. The first will be inconvenient; the last disgraceful; and it is best to avoid to do that which will probably lead to the necessity of adopting either.

'I have got very far with Scindiah's vakeel. It is strange, that the only demand with which they have positively refused to comply, is one for the Ahmednuggur territory. They consent to give up the fort for the Peshwah. But they say that Jaumgong, Chumargoonda, &c., are the earliest possessions of Scindiah's family, and that he never can give them up. My first project went to his keeping them, but I altered it on Malcolm's suggestion. I wish to know from you, whether these territories are a great object to the Peshwah, and whether they really are the family possessions of Scindiah. I shall storm this fort either to-morrow or next day.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Lieut. Colonel Close,
Resident at Poonah.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec., 1803.

'I take advantage of a few moments' leisure, afforded me by having completed all the arrangements for storming this fort this day, as soon as the breach shall be practicable, to write to you upon the subject of the reconciliation between the Peshwah and Amrut Rao.

'I enclose a long paper which I have received from Amrut

Rao, which contains rather a history of the rascally intrigues of himself and the Peshwah, than an account of the real ground of their dispute. It appears to me to be the desire of Amrut Rao to exercise part of the power of the Poonah government, and the fear and the determination of the Peshwah not to give it to him.

‘ In the prosecution of this dispute, both have been guilty of unjustifiable measures. Amrut Rao joined the Peshwah’s enemies; and I believe there is little doubt that he was concerned in a plot to deprive his Highness of his government, and to substitute his son in his place. The Peshwah, on the other hand, has imprisoned the families, has seized the houses and property, not only of Amrut Rao’s immediate servants and adherents, but he has imprisoned the persons of the old servants of the state; those who formerly carried on its business, and those who alone can again carry it on; under a pretence of their being the adherents of Nana Furnavees, or of Amrut Rao.

‘ In respect to Amrut Rao, he has now placed himself in the hands of the British government; and considering all the circumstances of the moment, it is not very probable that he will again be guilty of the crimes of which the Peshwah has complained with so much reason.

‘ In respect to the Peshwah, I cannot consider his conduct in the light of that of a wise sovereign.

‘ In a case such as Amrut Rao’s, there are two lines of conduct to be pursued. One is to raise a force to attack and subdue the rebel, the other is to pardon him; and if he will not accept the pardon, to endeavor to draw off his adherents by conciliating them; and at all events, by avoiding every act of oppression on their families and servants.

‘ But the principle of the government of Poonah is revenge; and the gratification of that detestable passion, and nothing else, has yet been listened to.

‘ The parties at this moment stand thus in the contest. Amrut Rao has possession of Poonadur and some other forts, and valuable territory belonging to the Peshwah; and the Peshwah has possession of some women, children, and houses at Poonah, belonging to Amrut Rao’s servants and adherents, and has the means of annoying others. I think that Amrut Rao has certainly the best of it.

‘ In order to bring the parties to a decent state of reconcili-

ation and friendship, it will be necessary to save the honor of both parties, and that there should be no formal stipulation.

‘ Amrut Rao is ready to give up Poonadur and all the places belonging to the Peshwah, provided the houses and property are restored, the families released, and no longer oppressed, belonging to the persons whose names are in the enclosed list No. 1; and provided no oppression is practised on those whose names are in the list No. 2; and on the terms which I stated in a former letter for the surrender of Poona-dur particularly.

‘ If the Peshwah should comply with these terms, I will engage for Amrut Rao’s surrender of the forts, &c. But his compliance must be accompanied by a real execution of the measures required from him.

‘ In respect to the persons whose names are mentioned in the paper No. 3, Amrut Rao does not make their release a point on which must depend his reconciliation with the Peshwah; but I consider it to be one of material importance to the welfare, if not to the existence, of the Poonah government.

‘ At present, the Peshwah has not in his service a common carkoon or amildar whom he can trust with the management of a single district. His territories are all either in the hands of his enemies, or without managers on his part; and all those persons belonging to his state who are capable of arranging it, and of rendering its resources available for the service of his government, are either in the service of his enemies, or the greater part of them imprisoned or oppressed by his Highness’s government: this is a most serious consideration.

‘ The day, I hope, is not far distant, when I shall be able to resign my charge in this country, and when the Peshwah will have an opportunity of settling his countries. But how is it to be done? He has not a carkoon or amildar whom he can put in charge of any one district; he has not a sepoy or a peon whom he can place as a guard on any tannah; and not a soul in his government capable of giving a line of information upon any one point, concerning the administration of the extensive territories, the government of which is in his hands.

‘ Not less than fifty times, I have pressed the fellow he has here by way of a vakeel, to urge the government to send into Candeish proper persons to take possession of his Highness’s

rich districts in that province, which the Nizam's officers (whom I desired not to interfere with them) have told me are going to ruin for want of a person to manage them.

‘But nothing is done; because, in fact, all the people who are capable of taking charge are in prison, or oppressed by the Peshwah: I therefore most anxiously recommend it to you to urge the Peshwah to release these people, and to make arrangements for employing them in settling his country and government upon some rational principle. Otherwise, be assured that the Poonah state will never revive.’

‘Another question which occurs upon this point is, what is in future to become of Amrut Rao? I certainly think that the most satisfactory arrangement for him would be to give him a jaghire to the amount of his pension; and for the British government to make good the jaghire to the Peshwah, either by a payment of money, or by a cession in Bundelcund. But this is a question, like many others, which may be deferred till the conclusion of the peace. At all events, I conceive that the British government ought not to give over to the Peshwah any part of the territories which they may intend to cede to him, until he shall have arranged all his matters with Amrut Rao to their satisfaction.’

‘Believe me, &c.’

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Colonel Murray.

‘SIR, ‘Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec., 1803.’

‘I have received your letters of the 17th, 19th, and 23rd November. I have already written to you fully upon the subject of the revenue concerns. All that you have arranged in revenue will be confirmed; but Major Walker has been appointed by government to take charge of the districts conquered from Scindiah, and they must be made over to him.’

‘This arrangement will be convenient, as it will save you much time and trouble: provided there is a perfect understanding between you and Major Walker, and a sincere desire on both sides to carry on the service, and no wish in either to raise his individual personal consequence above that of the other, all will go right; and the natives will not perceive that there is a divided authority.’

‘It might possibly be proper that there should be no such

division of authority; but upon this point I have to observe, that it is impossible, at such a time as this, to alter all the established systems and usages of government without inconvenience, and I certainly cannot attempt such a change. You do not say where Lieut. Carter is, but I have issued an order that he may go to Surat.

‘ In respect to Canojee, I must write you public orders, which I will send to Mr. Duncan. It is a most desirable object to accommodate matters with Canojee; but unluckily, the state of our engagements with the Guickwar government does not allow of our guiding their affairs in relation to foreign states, in which description may be classed such rebels as Canojee. An arrangement between us and Canojee, in which the Guickwar should not be included, would be liable to the inconveniences of its being unattended to by them, and the war would continue between Canojee and Anund Rao. In this state of affairs, we should be obliged to take part with one of the two; and in this manner we should lose all the advantages which we might hope to derive from the arrangement.

‘ I have very little hope, I acknowledge, that the Guickwar government will be brought to consent to such an arrangement with Canojee, as he ought reasonably to be satisfied with; not because it is impossible to prevail upon them to consent to such an arrangement, but because I observe that in all our concerns with that government, instead of endeavoring to check the inveteracy of their prejudices and hatreds, (which are common to all native governments,) and the propensity to making their individual passions the rule of the conduct of the government, those evil dispositions are encouraged; and British assistance is given to carry into execution their dictates. I therefore almost despair of an arrangement with Canojee on any ground; but at all events, supposing him to be inclined to accede to one, it will not answer to make it simply with the British government, without including the Guickwar state.

‘ I had always the idea of the Bheels stated in Colonel Anderson’s letter. The Bheels (properly so called) are the uncivilized race who inhabit the hills, and rob and plunder every body indiscriminately. The Rajahs, in and bordering on the hills, have great influence over these people, and are besides formidable in themselves, on account of the natural strength of their countries, and the numbers of armed men they can bring

into the field for their defence. Both would be our best defence against the attack of a native army; and the adoption of a liberal policy towards them at once will secure them to us for ever.

‘ The way of securing the uncivilized, or thief bheels, would be to conciliate the Rajahs, and then we shall be secure. I recommend that, of all other things, we should avoid any interference in their individual quarrels; or the consequence will be, that we shall be involved in a system of hostilities, more destructive than that which would attend an attempt to subdue them to the British authority. Under existing circumstances, I think that the suspension of hostilities in Guzerat is a great advantage.

‘ I expect to storm this fort to-day. The batteries are open, and the troops are in readiness, waiting till the breach is complete. If I do not storm this day, I shall to-morrow. I have then to take Nernulla, and shall make my arrangements for marching a division upon Ougein by Burhampoor. I think that Nernulla will be given up; but at all events, as soon as I shall get possession of it, I shall break the suspension of hostilities with Scindiah, and shall march a division upon Ougein. You might then come forward also.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Deogaum, 15th Dec., 1803.

‘ After the battle of Argaum, I determined to lose no time in commencing the siege of Gawilghur. I accordingly marched on, and arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th instant, with both divisions, and halted there the 6th, in order to establish an hospital for the wounded in the battle of Argaum.

‘ The fort of Gawilghur is situated in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee. It stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one complete inner fort, which fronts to the south, where the rock is most steep: and an outer fort, which covers the inner to the north-west and north. This outer fort has a third wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers.

‘ The communications with the fort are through three gates ; one to the south with the inner fort ; one to the north-west with the outer fort ; and one to the north with the third wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is practicable only for men ; that to the second is by a road used for the common communications of the garrison with the countries to the southward ; but the road passes round the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance to its fire: it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to approach regularly by it, and the rock is scarped on each side. This road also leads no farther than to the gate. The communication with the northern gate is direct from the village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of the fort ; but the road to Labada leads through the mountains for about thirty miles from Ellichpoor ; and it was obvious that the difficulty and labor of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great.

‘ However, after making inquiry at Ellichpoor, it appeared both to Colonel Stevenson and me, that this point of attack was, upon the whole, the most advantageous, and we accordingly adopted it.

‘ Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of Gawilghur, for which service it had long been destined ; and I therefore determined that he should make the principal attack by Labada, while I should cover his operations with my own division and all the cavalry ; and, if possible, assist them by other attacks to the southward and westward.

‘ On the 6th instant, the 1st batt. 2nd regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, and two companies of the 94th, and the 1st batt. of the 6th under Captain Maitland, were detached ; the former to drive in the enemy from the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort ; and the latter to seize the fortified village of Damergaum, which covers the entrance of the mountains by the road by which Colonel Stevenson was to pass towards Labada, and to protect the parties sent forward to reconnoitre and repair the roads in the mountains. Both these detachments succeeded.

‘ On the 7th, both divisions marched from Ellichpoor: Colonel Stevenson, into the mountains by Damergaum, and my division towards the southern face of the fort of Gawilghur. From that day till the 12th, on which Colonel Stevenson broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division went through a se-

ries of laborious services, such as I never before witnessed, with the utmost cheerfulness and perseverance. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over mountains, and through ravines, for nearly the whole distance, by roads which it had been previously necessary for the troops to make for themselves.

‘ On the 12th at night, Colonel Stevenson erected two batteries in front of the north face of the fort; one consisting of two iron 18 pounders, and three iron 12 pounders, to breach the outer fort and third wall; and one, consisting of two brass 12 pounders and two 5 inch howitzers, to clear and destroy the defences on the point of attack.

‘ On the same night the troops of my division constructed a battery for two iron and two brass 12 pounders on the mountain under the southern gate, with a view, if possible, to breach the wall near that gate; or, at all events, to draw the enemy’s attention to that quarter. Unfortunately the iron guns could not be moved into the battery, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the troops; and the fire of the brass guns produced but little effect.

‘ The fire of all these batteries opened on the 13th, in the morning; and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. All the arrangements were then made for storming on this day. Lieut. Colonel Kenny, of the 11th regiment, commanded the party for the storm, consisting of the flank companies of the 94th regiment, and of the native corps in Colonel Stevenson’s division, supported by the 94th regiment, and Lieut. Colonel Halyburton’s brigade, with Lieut. Colonel Maclean’s brigade in reserve. At the same hour, I made two attacks from the southward to draw the enemy’s attention to that quarter. One, under Lieut. Colonel Wallace, consisting of the 74th regiment, five companies of the 78th and 1st battalion 8th regiment, on the southern gate; and one under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, consisting of five companies of the 78th and the 1st battalion 10th regiment, on the north-west gate. These last attacks could be of no service, except to draw the enemy’s attention from that from the north; unless they should succeed in blowing open the gates; and till they should communicate with detachments from Colonel Stevenson’s corps, as they had no other means of entering the fort. All the troops advanced at about ten in the morning. The detachment under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers arrived at the

north-west gate at the moment when the enemy were endeavoring to escape through it, from the detachment of Colonel Stevenson's corps, which had been sent to communicate with Colonel Chalmers; and he entered without difficulty.

'The wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been made, was then to be carried. After some attempts upon the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, a place was found at which it was possible to escalade the wall. Captain Campbell, with the light infantry of the 94th regiment, fixed the ladders against this place, escaladed the wall, opened the gate for the storming party, and the fort was shortly in our possession.

'The enemy's garrison was numerous. It consisted of Rajpoots, and of a great part of Beny Sing's regular infantry, which had escaped from the battle of Argaum, commanded by Beny Sing himself. They were all well armed with the Company's new muskets and bayonets. Vast numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different gates*.

'This service has been performed, I hope, with small loss on our side. No officer has been killed; and but few wounded, that I have heard of, excepting Lieut. Colonel Kenny of the 11th regiment, and Lieut. Young of the 2nd of the 7th.

'In the performance of this service all the good qualities of

* 'When General Wellesley entered the fort, his first inquiry was for the killadar, and he went immediately to his house: his son, a fine lad of nine or ten years of age, said he did not know where he was; that he had gone out about two hours before, and had not returned. The poor fellow was ignorant of his fate perhaps, but when order was sufficiently restored to admit the inhabitants who survived to venture out, a search was made, and his body, with that of Beny Sing, was found amidst a heap of slain, near the gateway. These two men, of good Rajpoot families, had determined to die in defence of their trust; and, according to the custom of their country, to save their wives and daughters from destruction, by putting them to death, before they went out to meet their own. From some cause unknown to us, this was but imperfectly performed; of twelve or fourteen women, but three, I think, were dead when our men discovered them; and three or four more lay bleeding, having received two or three cuts or stabs with a knife or dagger: probably, these Rajpoots entrusted this shocking duty to hands more humane than their own. General Wellesley visited them, and ordered every respect and care to be shown to them. Beny Sing, and the killadar, however personally brave, do not seem to have been able to frame any regular plan for the defence of the inner wall, or to have infused much of their own spirit into their Sepoys: the former is said to have killed or wounded two or three of our men before he fell.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

British troops have been conspicuous to a degree which I have seldom witnessed. In bringing on their ordnance and stores to the point of attack, the troops of Colonel Stevenson's division performed the most laborious work with a zeal for the service, and patience and perseverance never surpassed; and when opposed to the enemy, their conduct showed the same gallant spirit that has carried the British troops through so many difficulties in the course of this war.

' I am particularly indebted to Colonel Stevenson for the manner in which he conducted the service entrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Ellichpoor to that of the capture of Gawilghur; to Lieut. Colonel Kenny for the manner in which he led on the storming party; to Captain Campbell and the light infantry of the 94th regiment, for the escalade of the inner fort; to Major Campbell and the 94th regiment, and to Lieut. Colonel Halyburton and his brigade, which troops supported the attack.

' Captain Burke, who commanded the artillery with the subsidiary force, Captain Heitland of the pioneers, and Captain Johnson of the Bombay engineers, are also entitled to my acknowledgments. The two latter were sent from my division to assist Colonel Stevenson. Upon the occasion of mentioning the name of Captain Johnson, I cannot omit to inform your Excellency, that throughout this campaign that officer has performed the most important service in the department of the guides entrusted to his charge; and I have no doubt but that his surveys will be a valuable public acquisition.

' Although the most laborious and the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of the troops of my division, I have to apprise your Excellency that they performed the part allotted to them in a manner perfectly satisfactory to me: and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, and Captain Beauman, commanding the artillery, have received my thanks for the manner in which the two former led their divisions to the attack, and the latter exerted himself, to forward the service of his department.

' I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency a list of the killed and wounded, and returns of the ordnance and property captured in the fort.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Treaty of Peace between the Honorable English India Company and their Allies, on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other ; settled by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies, and by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, on the part of Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah ; who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

‘ Deogaum, 17th December, 1803.

‘ Art. 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honorable Company and their Allies on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other.

‘ Art. 2.—Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the province of Cuttack, including the post and district of Balasore.

‘ Art. 3.—He likewise cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all the territories, of which he has collected the revenues, in participation with the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of which he may have possession, which are to the westward of the river Wurda.

‘ Art. 4.—It is agreed that the frontier of Senah Saheb Soubah, towards the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, shall be formed to the west, by the river Wurda, from its issue from the Injardy hills to its junction with the Godavery. The hills on which are the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur are to be in the possession of Senah Saheb Soubah, and every thing south of those hills, and to the west of the river Wurda, is to belong to the British Government and their Allies.

‘ Art. 5.—Districts amounting to four lacs of rupees per annum, contiguous to, and to the south of the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur, are to be given over to Senah Saheb Soubah. Those districts are to be fixed upon by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and delivered over to Senah Saheb Soubah at the same time with the forts.

‘ Art. 6.—Senah Saheb Soubah for himself, his heirs and successors, entirely renounces all claims of every description on the territories of the British Government and their Allies, ceded

by the second, third, and fourth articles, and on all the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ Art. 7.—The Honorable Company engage that they will mediate and arbitrate, according to the principles of justice, any disputes or differences that may now exist, or may hereafter arise, between the Honorable Company’s Allies, Secunder Jah Behauder, his successors, and Rao Pundit Purdhaun, his heirs and successors respectively, and Senah Saheb Soubah.

‘ Art. 8.—Senah Saheb Soubah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British government; or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British government. The Honorable Company engage, on their part, that they will not aid or countenance any discontented relations, Rajahs, Zemindars, or other subjects of Senah Saheb Soubah, who may fly from or rebel against his authority.

‘ Art. 9.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

‘ Art. 10.—Certain treaties have been made by the British government with feudatories of Senah Saheb Soubah. These treaties are to be confirmed. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to Senah Saheb Soubah, when this treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ Art. 11.—Senah Saheb Soubah hereby renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all adherence to the confederacy formed by him and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and other Marhatta Chiefs, to attack the Honorable Company and their Allies. He engages not to assist those Chiefs if the war with them should still continue.

‘ Art. 12.—This treaty of peace is to be ratified by Senah Saheb Soubah within eight days from this time, and the ratification of it is to be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley; at which time the orders for the cession of the ceded territories are to be delivered and the troops are to withdraw. Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley engages that the treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the

Governor General in Council, and that the ratification shall be delivered in two months from this date.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.

*Done in Camp at Deogaum,
this 17th December, 1803,
answering to the 2nd Ram-
zaum, 1213, Fuzale.*

‘JESWUNT RAO RAMCHUNDER,
on the part of

‘SENAH SAHEB SOUBAH.

(A true copy.)

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec., 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the English, Marhatta, and Persian copies of a treaty of peace, which I have this day concluded with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar.

‘I have made the treaty in the name of the British government and its allies generally, and have engaged that it shall be ratified by your Excellency only. The reasons for omitting to name the allies in the treaty, and to engage that they shall ratify it, will become sufficiently obvious, when the character and conduct of the government of these allies are recollected.

‘It will remain with your Excellency to give such orders as you may think proper, to the Residents at the different durbars, to obtain the assent of the allies to this treaty. But I should imagine that the Rajah of Berar will be satisfied with your Excellency’s ratification.

‘The cessions under the treaty are made to the British Government and its Allies; and I have drawn it in this manner in order that your Excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter, in such manner as you may think proper. As soon as the Rajah shall ratify the treaty, I propose to desire the officers of the Soubah of the Deccan to take charge of the countries ceded in this quarter; but I shall request the Resident at Hyderabad to apprise his Highness’s ministers that it must be considered only a temporary arrangement; and that all the acquisitions must be liable to be disposed of hereafter, when peace shall be made with all the powers engaged in the war.

‘I wished to be able to define more accurately the bounds of the cession of the province of Cuttack, but I had no infor-

mation upon the subject. Lieut. Colonel Harcourt stated his opinion, that it would be convenient if the districts of Sohnpore and Boad were ceded besides Cuttack; and Mr. Melville his, that it would be convenient to add to the province of Cuttack countries which would have joined the northern circars with the province of Bundelcund. But upon reference to the map, which is all the information that I could procure, I found that even the first would have increased the extent of the demand, on that side, to such a degree as to make it necessary to give up part of what I demanded on this side; or to risk the conclusion of the treaty altogether.

‘ I learn also, by a late letter from Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, that he has commenced negotiations with the Rajahs of Sohnpore and Boad; and if he should conclude them by treaties, those districts will be added to the Company’s territories under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. If he should not, it is certain that the Company will not have for Cuttack the boundary for which Lieut. Colonel Harcourt wished; but I do not doubt but that that province will have a very good boundary.

‘ By the 3rd article, the Company and their Allies gain, on this side, the whole province of Berar, and the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan will be carried forward to the Wurda river. The countries thus ceded are old possessions of the Soubah of the Deccan, the revenues of which have been collected by them and the Rajah of Berar, in different proportions at different times. When the latter were admitted to a participation of them, they received one fifth, afterwards a fourth, then half, by treaty; and latterly, four fifths by exaction and violence. It appeared to me to be an object of greater importance to get rid of the Rajah of Berar entirely from this fine country, than to secure an additional barrier for Cuttack.

‘ The revenues of Berar, on this side of the Wurda, are computed to amount to about one crore of rupees. The Rajah had appropriated entirely to himself countries, the revenues of which are computed to have been ten lacs of rupees; and the remainder, under different treaties, was to be divided equally between him and the Soubah of the Deccan. However, I have reason to believe, from the conferences during the negotiations, that the Rajah of Berar never received more than thirty lacs, as his share of the countries on this side of the Wurda.

‘ Territory of this value was a great object to gain in this quarter, considering the probable circumstances of the peace with Scindiah ; but whatever may be the real value of the acquisition, a great object is gained by defining the frontier of the Rajah towards the Soubah of the Deccan ; and by his renunciation of all claims, of every description, not only on the countries ceded, but on the other territories of the Soubah.

‘ In the course of the conferences in the negotiation, the minutes of which I shall have the honor of transmitting as soon as they can be copied, the Rajah’s minister declared repeatedly, and I have reason to believe with some truth, that the demands made were of the finest and most valuable parts of his territory.

‘ By the 4th article I have agreed that the Rajah shall have possession of the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur. In fact, these forts are of greater importance to the power which remains in possession of the mountains, than to that which possesses the plains. Without them the Rajah could not have exercised the powers of his government over the Goondwanah Rajahs in those mountains, a race of people who, above all others, require restraint ; and to have given them to the Soubah of the Deccan would have added nothing to his Highness’s power.

‘ I consented to the 5th article, because the districts in the plains immediately under the hills, will always be liable to the depredations of the inhabitants of the hills. The loss to the Soubah’s government will be but trifling, in comparison with that which it would incur if the Rajah were not interested, as he will now be, to restrain the incursions of the hill people into the plains.

‘ The 7th article provides that the Honorable Company are to arbitrate between the Rajah and the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah. The Rajah’s minister was desirous that I should consent to confirm all grants and treaties made heretofore by those powers ; but I refused this, on the ground that I could not consent to anything of which I had no knowledge. I then proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British government and its justice, as the best security the Rajah could have for his claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah ; which proposal was accepted.

‘ The territory which the Rajah wished to secure by this demand was the province of Gurrah Mundela, of which he

ought to collect the revenues in participation with the Peshwah; but I imagine that he has lately seized the whole for his own use.

‘At all events, it appears to me to be an important point gained, and highly honorable to the character of the British government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice, against the demands of its allies. There was no objection on the part of the Rajah’s minister to the 8th or 9th article of the treaty. The last clause was added to the 8th by his desire, after the treaty had been drawn up.

‘The 10th article is one of considerable importance. The Rajah’s minister appeared to feel the full extent of the engagements to which it bound the Rajah, and expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject. He said, that after ceding Berar and Cuttack, the Rajah had no territories excepting what he had conquered from the zemindars, rajahs, &c.; and that by this article he might be bound to give up the whole of his territories. I told him, that whatever might be the consequence, the article was indispensable, and must be agreed to; that peace would not have been agreed to, if the British government had wished for the destruction of the Rajah’s state; and that it certainly was not intended that the article should apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government; and I promised him that the British government would apply it to as few cases as was possible, consistently with an adherence to good faith.

‘The vakeel was satisfied with this assurance, which I requested him to convey to the Rajah; as I think it probable that this article will be that to which his durbar will have the strongest objections.

‘I had demanded an hostage for the performance of the 11th article of the treaty; but upon considering all the circumstances of the case, it appeared to me, that the best security the British government could have, would be its strength and continued success, and I had therefore determined not to persist in that demand. In giving his answer upon it, the vakeel said that the Rajah would send to me whomever I pleased, excepting his brother, his son, or his nephew, who are the only persons whose detention in my camp might possibly be a security against his hostility.

‘ It appeared to me that he would not consent to send either of those persons, and the presence of any other would certainly have been useless. Upon the whole, therefore, I thought it best not to persist in a demand with which he would not comply, and which might have risked the whole treaty.

‘ I hope that your Excellency will approve of, and ratify this treaty. It appears to me to provide for all essential points, at the same time that it leaves the Rajah’s government in existence and strength. I should have demanded a sum of money, but I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar is as poor as the other Marhatta chieftains.

‘ I have written to Mr. Webbe, to inform him that I have signed this treaty; and to request him to prepare to set out for Nagpoor as soon as possible. In the mean time, I propose to send the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone to the Rajah to act as Resident, till the arrival of Mr. Webbe.

‘ In case your Excellency should ratify the treaty, I request that the ratification may be sent to the Resident at Hyderabad, to be forwarded either to Mr. Elphinstone or me, according to circumstances; as I might be at a great distance, and the ratification might not reach the Rajah in the time specified.

‘ Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice to that gentleman to inform your Excellency that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the languages, has experience and a knowledge of the interests of the Marhatta powers, and their relations with each other, and with the British government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at all the sieges; he is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, and with my sentiments upon all subjects. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your Excellency.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Governor General.

MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Ellichpoor, 18th Dec., 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded at the siege, and in the storm of Gawilghur. Lieut. Young died after I addressed your Excellency on the 15th.

‘ I beg you to communicate this circumstance to the government at Hyderabad; but at the same time apprise his Highness the Soubah that this must be considered only as a temporary arrangement, and that all the territories conquered from the enemy, or ceded by treaties of peace, must be deemed liable to be disposed of hereafter when peace shall be made with all the powers at war.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Rajah Mohiput Ram, Vakeel of the Nizam in the British Camp.

‘ 23rd Dec., 1803.

‘ I have to inform you that I have concluded a treaty of peace with the vakeel of Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, which has been ratified by that chief, and the ratifications have been delivered to me this day.

‘ By the 3rd article of that treaty of peace, Senah Saheb Soubah has consented to cede to the British Government and their allies all his rights and interests, and all the territories which he may possess which are to the westward of the river Wurda, and to the southward of the hills on which are situated the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur.

‘ His boundary, therefore, in future, towards the Soubah of the Deccan, will be the Wurda river and the hills above mentioned. I have to request that you will make the following arrangements to take possession of, and settle those countries in the name of the allied governments. You will bear in mind, that, from their situation, it is probable that they will be hereafter the possession of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan solely; but it is impossible to settle that point definitively till peace shall be made with all the powers at war.

‘ First, You will appoint a sirdar to take possession of the countries, in whose ability and integrity you can confide. Let me know the name of the person on whom you shall fix, in order that I may insert it in the proclamation of which No. 1 is a copy.

‘ Secondly, You will place under the command of this sirdar a sufficient body of horse and foot to enable him to perform the service intrusted to him; and to drive out the enemy’s pindarries, who may be expected to remain here for

some time. I will appoint some British troops to remain in the country and assist those of his Highness.

‘Thirdly, You are to give orders to this sirdar to circulate proclamation No. 2, which is enclosed; and he must conduct himself in every respect in the manner pointed out in the proclamation. If I should learn that he has been guilty of any oppression, or that he has persecuted any person because such person has formerly been the subject, or has rendered services to Ragojee Bhoonslah during the war, I will desire you to deprive this sirdar of his office; and will make to the court of Hyderabad a complaint of you and of him; and I shall particularly desire that he may never be employed again.

‘In the arrangements which I have thus requested you to make, you will observe a fresh mark of my confidence in you, and of my desire to act in a manner that will be agreeable to the Soubah of the Deccan; and I hope that, in carrying them into execution, you will take care to act in such a manner as will justify the confidence I place in you, and will be honorable to the British Government and its allies, and particularly to the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘*Rajah Mohiput Ram.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, 23rd Dec., 1803.

‘I have the honor to inform your Excellency, that I this day received the ratification of the Rajah of Berar of the treaty of peace; signed on the 17th instant, by myself on the part of the Honorable Company and their allies, and by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder on the part of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah. I propose hereafter to forward this instrument to your Excellency.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s ministers, Eitul Punt and Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp this afternoon, for the purpose, as they say, of making peace for their master.

‘I yesterday gave notice to Scindiah’s vakeels, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, that I was desirous to put an end to the agreement made on the 23rd of November for suspending hostilities; and that I should consider it as null and void from the 27th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Marquis Wellesley to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR, ‘ Fort William, 23rd Dec., 1803.

‘ I received this morning your dispatch of the 50th November from Paterly, with the account of your signal and most seasonable victory of Argaum. Although I entirely approved your armistice, and thought it a most judicious measure, I confess that I prefer your victory to your armistice; and I think your last battle must have removed every obstacle to peace, and facilitated every accommodation which can tend to enlarge the channels of amicable intercourse.

‘ I have not yet discovered whether the battle was occasioned by a rupture of the truce on the part of Scindiah; or by Scindiah’s refusal to grant to his vakeels the powers which you most properly have required, for the purpose of founding the basis of the negotiation, on the admission of our retention of a part of our conquests; or by Scindiah’s re-disavowal of his avowal of Jeswunt Rao Goorparah; or by an accidental rencontre of the armies before the truce had commenced; or by a treacherous junction between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. But, *quâcunque viâ*, a battle is a profit with the Native powers.

‘ In any truce or treaty you must now require hostages from Scindiah’s or Ragojee’s family, upon Lord Cornwallis’s principle in 1792. If you should happen to take the persons of Scindiah or Ragojee, you will send them with an escort of honor to Fort William, to negotiate peace with me, and to be their own hostages for its due execution.

‘ Ever yours, most affectionately,

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ WELLESLEY.

‘ I do not know why you address your private letters to the private secretary, and not to me; consult, however, your own convenience.’

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp, 30th Dec., 1803.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I have this day concluded, with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and signed, a treaty of peace; copies of which, in the English, Persian, and Marhatta languages, I have the honor to enclose.

‘ This treaty, like that with the Rajah of Berar, is concluded in the name of the British Government and its Allies generally, and the cessions are made to all the allied powers. It will remain with your Excellency to give orders to the Residents at the different durbars, to procure the consent of the Allied Governments to the treaty, and to divide the conquests in such manner as you may think proper.

‘ By this treaty, which I hope your Excellency will ratify, all the important objects detailed in your Excellency’s instructions of the 27th of June are secured, and the ground is laid for a more complete alliance with Scindiah’s government; or supposing that he should omit to take advantage of the terms offered to him, to ally himself more closely with the Company’s government, such an influence will be established in his as will render it very improbable that its means will ever be again directed against that of the Company.

‘ By the 2nd article of the treaty, Scindiah consented to cede to the Honorable Company all his territories north of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud. A schedule is annexed to the treaty, which contains the best account that can be procured of the revenue of those territories.

‘ Besides the territories included in the schedule, there are three pergunnahs also north of the countries of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud, viz., Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which were formerly granted to the family of Scindiah in enaum, which have never been carried into the dufters under the head of lands in Hindustan, and have been considered as the private property of Scindiah’s house. These pergunnahs are to remain in his possession under certain stipulations, which exclude his troops from the line fixed upon by your Excellency.

‘ Besides these pergunnahs, there are others, the jaghire lands of the ladies of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and those of some of the principal sirdars and ministers of Dowlut Rao, also not included in the schedule, which, according to the 7th article, are to remain in the hands of their present possessors, under the protection of the British Government; and the British Government is to give pensions, or jaghires, according to its option, to sirdars to be named by Scindiah, to the amount of seventeen lacs of rupees, including the value of those

jaghires to remain in the hands of their present possessors under the 7th article.

‘ It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in the disturbed state of Scindiah’s government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war ; and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation, in comparison with that of his rival, Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar’s hands, and to add to his armies all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries ; and who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindiah’s service, and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent with your Excellency’s policy ; and it appears that, besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindiah’s durbar which must guide its measures in a great degree, even if Scindiah should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British government in his durbar, if he should agree to the terms of the general defensive alliance.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I hope that your Excellency will approve of this arrangement, the expense of which will amount to about fourteen lacs of rupees annually, to be deducted from the revenues stated in the schedule.

‘ The next point to which I wish to draw your Excellency’s attention, in order to bring under your view at once every thing relating to the cession in Hindustan, is the 15th article of the treaty ; by which it is agreed that Scindiah shall have a subsidiary force, the expense of which shall be paid out of the cessions made by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles of the treaty.

‘ In the course of this war, Scindiah’s power, reputation, and military resources have been greatly diminished ; while his rival, Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family, by his treaty of peace with Scindiah, remains with undiminished power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of Scindiah, his power and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the war ; and I have but little doubt but that the contest between those Chiefs will be revived.

‘ This would be a matter of but little consequence to the British government, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindiah in every point of view; and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be, that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar; or if he should endeavor to avoid the contest, which I do not think probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent upon that of his rival.

‘ Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your Excellency’s determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established, by the exercise of the force of the British government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindiah an option of becoming a party of the general defensive alliance; and as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his revenue.

‘ I was induced to make this last engagement, by the conviction that Scindiah would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he was to be obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive; and that if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is insured so far as it can be by human means.

‘ I have every reason to believe, also, that when Scindiah shall wind up his affairs at the end of this war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue, such as the British government would require to pay the expenses of the force which might be given to him.

‘ Upon this point I have likewise to observe, that supposing Scindiah should agree to the treaty of defensive alliance, the diminution of receipt to the Company will be of eight lacs of rupees annually, if his Highness the Peshwah be admitted to participate equally with the Company and the Nizam, in the benefits of the war; and twelve and a half lacs of rupees if his Highness the Nizam only should be admitted to that participation.

‘ I have sanguine hopes, therefore, that your Excellency will approve of this article of the peace.

‘By the cession of Baroach the Company will gain a clear revenue of ten lacs of rupees annually, and a valuable, territory in a commercial point of view.

‘I ordered that the hill fort of Powanghur might be destroyed, when I determined to return that conquest to Scindiah. My motives for returning the conquests in that part of India, and Asseerghur and Burhampoor in the Deccan, are explained to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 11th of November; and although I intend to endeavour to retain possession of Powanghur and Dohud in the negotiation of the treaty of general defensive alliance, in exchange for land elsewhere, I am still of opinion that, without making some sacrifices, I could not have peace; and these places appeared to me to be of less consequence than any of the other conquests which the British troops had made.

‘The territories restored in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur are the ancient family lands of Scindiah; and your Excellency will perceive, in the minutes of the conferences, which will be sent as soon as they can be copied, the great anxiety to retain their lands. They have been returned, therefore, under a particular stipulation, that no armed men are ever to be kept in them.

‘I did everything in my power to retain the lands of which I took possession upon the capture of Ahmednuggur, as I wished to exclude Scindiah entirely from the Deccan; but as the lands are really his family property, to have kept them would have occasioned a personal inconvenience, which your Excellency would have been desirous to remove; and the restoration of them is accompanied by a stipulation which I hope will prevent the bad consequences attending his having any lands in those countries.

‘There was considerable difficulty, also, in settling the 9th article, respecting the treaties made with the Rajahs. The ministers appeared to be aware of the loss which Scindiah’s government might incur under this article, and they contended strongly against it, till at last I was obliged to tell them that, unless they agreed to it, I could not make peace. The advantage which it appeared to me that your Excellency expected to derive from the independence of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, was, that these chiefs should connect themselves by treaty with the British Govern-

ment. From the different accounts, however, which I have received, I observe that treaties have not been concluded with any of these chiefs, notwithstanding the rapid and astonishing success of his Excellency the Commander in Chief. The consequence of their independence, unless they should have connected themselves with the British Government, would be, that the annual contest which they have had with the Marhattas, for the Peshwah, would cease, and the British Government would derive no additional security.

‘I therefore deemed it best to stipulate generally for the independence of every Rajah with whom a treaty should have been concluded, by which your Excellency’s object is insured in respect to all of this description; and in regard to the others, they are left to their fate.

‘There was not much difficulty in arranging the other articles of the peace. There were some objections to the 12th article, founded upon the necessity of Scindiah’s performing the duties of his office of vakeel ool Mutuluk, which, however, were easily overcome.

‘In negotiating this treaty, I have received the greatest assistance from Mr. Elphinstone, and since he arrived in camp, from Major Malcolm; indeed the acquaintance of the latter with your Excellency’s sentiments upon all political questions, and his own political knowledge and abilities, have enabled me to conclude this difficult treaty in a manner which I hope will be satisfactory to your Excellency.

‘I have requested Major Malcolm to prepare to go to Scindiah’s camp, as soon as I shall have received the ratification of the treaty. By a residence there for some time, he will be enabled to settle with that Chief the treaty of general defensive alliance, if it should be possible to arrange it; or, at all events, to acquire a knowledge of the characters at his durbar, and of the state of his remaining military resources.

‘In case your Excellency should think it proper to ratify this treaty, it will be best to send one copy of the ratification to Major Kirkpatrick, to be forwarded to Major Malcolm; and one to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, to be forwarded through Hindustan; as one of the objects of Major Malcolm’s attention will be to communicate with his Excellency by a dawk.

‘I propose to desire the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan

to take possession of Scindiah's territories, ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of peace. In respect to the other territories, they will remain to be disposed of, according to the orders which I may receive from your Excellency.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Treaty of Peace between the Honorable English India Company and their Allies on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the other; settled by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies, and by Eitul Mahadeo Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah Ameer ool Omrah, and Naroo Hurry, on the part of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

'Surjee Anjengaum, 30th December, 1803.

'Art. 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honorable Company and their Allies, on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the other.

'Art. 2.—The Maharajah cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Dooab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud; of which territories, &c., a detailed list is given in the accompanying schedule. Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharajah, situated between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharajah.

'Art. 3.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon; and the fort of Ahmednuggur and territory depending thereon; excepting those lands which it is agreed by article 8th of this treaty that the Maharajah is to retain.

'Art. 4.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, all the territories which belonged to

him previous to the breaking out of the war, which are situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjuntee hills, including the fort and district of Julnapoor, the town and district of Gundapoor, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery.

‘ Art. 5.—The Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby renounces all the claim to the forts, territories, rights and interests, ceded by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles; and all claims of every description upon the British Government and their Allies, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Peshwah, and Anund Rao Guickwar.

‘ Art. 6.—The fort of Asseerghur, the city of Burhampoor, the forts of Powanghur and Dohud, and the territories in Candesh and Guzerat, depending on these forts, shall be restored to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ Art. 7.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaum, as a gift from the Kings of Hindustan, the districts of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which are situated to the northward of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud; and that lands in Hindustan, ceded by the 2nd article of this treaty to the Honorable Company and their Allies, are held in jaghire by persons of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and others by principal sirdars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those countries: It is agreed, that the Maharajah shall continue to hold, and enjoy in enaum, the lands of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah; and that Bala Baye Saheb, and Munsoor Saheb, Moonsee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, shall continue to hold their lands in jaghire, under the protection of the Honorable Company; and further, in order that no individual may incur loss or suffer distress in consequence of this arrangement, it is agreed that the Honorable Company shall either pay pensions, or grant lands in jaghire, according to the option of the British Government, to certain other sirdars, and others to be named by the Maharajah; provided that the total amount of the sums paid, or jaghires granted or held, does not exceed seventeen lacs of rupees per annum, including the annual value of the lands which it is agreed by this article that Bala Baye Saheb, Munsoor Saheb,

Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, are to continue to hold; and provided that no troops in the service of the Maharajah are to be introduced into Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, or the other lands held in jaghire, under the pretence of collecting the revenue, or any other pretence whatever.

‘ Art. 8.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaum certain lands or villages, &c. [51 *villages, &c. specified*] in the territories of Rao Pundit Purdhaun, which have lately been taken possession of by the British government and their Allies; it is agreed that those lands and villages shall be restored to him; provided that no troops shall ever be introduced into those lands and villages, under pretence of collecting the revenues, or any other pretence whatever.

‘ Art. 9.—Certain treaties have been made by the British government with Rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These treaties are to be confirmed; and the Maharajah hereby renounces all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made; and declares them to be independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud; of which the revenues have been collected by him or his amildars, or have been applicable as surinjaumy to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah when this treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ Art. 10.—No person whatever is to be molested on account of the part which he may have taken in the present war.

‘ Art. 11.—It is agreed that the rights of his Highness the Peshwah to certain lands in Malwa, and elsewhere, shall be established as heretofore; and in case any difference should arise respecting those rights, it is agreed that the Honorable Company shall mediate, arbitrate, and decide, according to the principles of justice, between his Highness and the Maharajah; and whatever may be thus decided shall be agreed to by both parties, and shall be carried into execution.

‘ Art. 12.—The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah hereby

renounces all claims upon his Majesty Shah Alum, and engages on his part to interfere no further in the affairs of his Majesty.

‘ Art. 13.—The Maharajah Ali Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British government; or any British subject, whether European or native of India, without the consent of the British government.

‘ Art. 14.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed, that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

‘ Art. 15.—The Honorable Company being bound by treaties of general defensive alliance with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun, to which the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah is desirous of acceding, he is to be admitted to the benefits thereof; and the Honorable Company, with a view to the future security of the Maharajah’s territories, engage, in the event of his agreeing to the treaty above mentioned, in two months, to furnish him with a force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments of military stores, &c. ; and the expense of this force is to be defrayed out of the lands ceded by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles. But it is agreed, that in case it should suit the interests of the Maharajah’s government to decline to enter into the treaty above mentioned, such refusal shall not affect any of the other stipulations of this treaty of peace; which are in every respect to be binding on the contracting parties, their heirs and successors.

‘ Art. 16.—This treaty is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah in eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley engages that it shall be ratified by his Excellency the most Noble the Governor General in Council, and the ratifications shall be delivered to the Maharajah in three months, or sooner if possible.

‘ The orders for the cession of the territories shall be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley at the same

time with the ratification of the treaty of peace; but the forts of Asseerghur, Powanghur, and Dohud, are not to be delivered up, till accounts shall have been received that the territories ceded have been evacuated by the Maharajah's officers and troops.

Done at Camp at Surjee An-
jengaum, this 30th of De-
cember, 1803, answering to
the 15th Ramzaun, 1213,
Fuzali.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.


EITUL MAHADEO.

KAVEL NYN.

JESWUNT RAO GOORPARAH.

NAROO HURRY.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME




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Wellington, Arthur Wellesley

The dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K. G. during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries and France from 1799 to 1818

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